Boeing 737 Max Recertification Testing - Finally.

[WideScreen]

Originally Posted by MechEngr

The pilots could over-rule MCAS at any time. Press the trim switch on the wheel and MCAS trim command stops. That's clearly seen in the FDR graphs. The pilots retained the ability to set whatever trim status they wanted at any time. The source of the problem is the SMYD with a side of ADIRU - their design to pass on false AoA and a false stall warning is the source of the problem. As I mentioned even the Autopilot was trying to force the nose down when the ET302 crew got it to engage. Forcing the nose down on a stall warning is the action pilots should take (though they should actually set pitch and power appropriate for the weight and altitude.)

They changed the switches because (AFIAK) the NG guidance was that for any trim runaway, both switches are to be used, so operationally it made no difference.

The first Lion Air crew flew just fine with the manual trim wheel. It went so fine, they re-enabled electric trim, MCAS gave another kick, and they turned it back off.

If you are looking for the regulatory smoking gun, that was fired a long time before MAX was a twinkle in anyone's eye when they allowed a false stall warning to be acceptable and did not seek a way to invalidate a failed AoA sensor, perhaps as detected by loss of continuity in the de-ice circuit which occurs when the external vane is stripped from the plane.

Not sure if your writing is to "defend" the Boeing statements that "just switching off the electrical trim" using the trim cut-out switches is suitable to control the aircraft, but just reading your "instructions" makes me wondering, how pilots should be able to find out the need to do so, within seconds the cacophony started and let alone decide which actions to perform.

Not to say, IF the instruction to apply manual trim every 10 seconds, during the remainder of the flight, in case of an AoA sensor failure, to avoid an imminent crash, would have made it to the memorized instruction list, the whole MCAS disaster would have been unfolded before the first 737MAX take-off and MCAS design returned to the drawing board.

[WideScreen]

Originally Posted by Loose rivets

...... if I were acting for Boeing, that would be my prime defence: There are many hundreds of small software processes going on at any one moment. At what level of complexity should Boeing be obliged to tell the customer/trainers just what is being processed?

Yep, leave out all those items that are not relevant and only report the ones that are relevant. MCAS' existence turned out to by highly relevant (and obviously needing redundancy in systems/sensors, blablabla), so should have been reported/documented, but was deliberately avoided in all communication with the FAA (and towards customers, except 1 stray mention of the mnemonic).

[Less Hair]

Didn't they try to avoid requiring sim training for MAX conversion because Southwest would get reimbursed one million per aircraft in case they'd need the sim?

[WideScreen]

Originally Posted by Less Hair

Didn't they try to avoid requiring sim training for MAX conversion because Southwest would get reimbursed one million per aircraft in case they'd need the sim?

Yep, and even an extra warning bulb would turn the MAX conversion into a sim training. With the $1M WN penalty, per airplane ....

[MechEngr]

There's no evidence that it would have made any difference at all. The ET302 crew was too overwhelmed by a stall warning to cut the autothrottle and still worked hard, against the stall warning memory item checklist to enable the autopilot. An extra warning light on the dash when they weren't looking at the instruments to begin with would have been equally easily ignored.

Originally Posted by WideScreen

Not sure if your writing is to "defend" the Boeing statements that "just switching off the electrical trim" using the trim cut-out switches is suitable to control the aircraft, but just reading your "instructions" makes me wondering, how pilots should be able to find out the need to do so, within seconds the cacophony started and let alone decide which actions to perform.

Not to say, IF the instruction to apply manual trim every 10 seconds, during the remainder of the flight, in case of an AoA sensor failure, to avoid an imminent crash, would have made it to the memorized instruction list, the whole MCAS disaster would have been unfolded before the first 737MAX take-off and MCAS design returned to the drawing board.

It was literally what crew #1 and the captain of crew #2 did - applying manual trim when the trim loads became noticeable at a few pounds, prior to any prompting by the documentation that was delivered shortly after the FO of crew #2 didn't. Trim cutout switches have been in place for several decades. Were pilots required to diagnose a wiring fault or an STS software failure prior to using the cutout switches back then?

No one called for any heads to roll until the owner of the plane that crew #3 controlled claimed that crew #3 followed every step exactly as laid out in the emergency AD and demanded that following those instructions was not enough to avoid a crash. That claim turned out to be entirely untrue, but was only revealed a full year later with the preliminary report. It certainly seems to me that everyone operating the 737, and the MAX in particular, accepted the AD as sufficient until then. Was there any testimony to Congress to the contrary?

For decades, pilots weren't all rigorously trained to deal with unwanted trim system actuation, certainly not in conjunction with any other problem. For decades it was OK to issue false stall warnings and stick-shaker activation. MCAS merely exposed that there had been no safety net on those two fronts for a long time.

What I am pointing out is that there are and have been systemic issues that extended far beyond Boeing and that sole focus on Boeing and MCAS is an incomplete lesson to learn.

[Imagegear]

Perhaps like this today:

B737 Max FLE2615 Cancun - Toronto diverting to FLL on descent and approach with a chase plane - FEL2615


Something went pear shaped

IG

[WideScreen]

Originally Posted by MechEngr

There's no evidence that it would have made any difference at all.

That's a sneaky way to reason. Of course, there is no evidence of that. How to accomplish that ?

Originally Posted by MechEngr

The ET302 crew was too overwhelmed by a stall warning to cut the autothrottle and still worked hard, against the stall warning memory item checklist to enable the autopilot. An extra warning light on the dash when they weren't looking at the instruments to begin with would have been equally easily ignored.

Of course, the warning light would be overseen in the cacophony of alarms. The MCAS should simply have been working properly, instead of being a deathtrap. That would have bought the crew time to get their act together, diagnose and resolve without crashing.

Originally Posted by MechEngr

It was literally what crew #1 and the captain of crew #2 did - applying manual trim when the trim loads became noticeable at a few pounds, prior to any prompting by the documentation that was delivered shortly after the FO of crew #2 didn't.

Yes, of course, though the simple fact that the FO of crew #2 didn't apply the <10s repeated trim input, does not imply, it is "normal" to assume, this is a crew failure. Such a repeated manual input, to avoid a catastrophe, is simply not something acceptable in the airline industry.

Originally Posted by MechEngr

Trim cutout switches have been in place for several decades. Were pilots required to diagnose a wiring fault or an STS software failure prior to using the cutout switches back then?

Of course, the cut-out switches are there and were for a long time. Though, IF the failure diagnose does take more than a couple of seconds and the MCAS creates a runaway, the manual trim wheel no longer provides a trim solution and there is no other option, then to turn on the trim cut-out switches again. OF the crew(s) had known, they could only use the cut-out switches, until the aircraft was in trim and then turn-off again and use the manual trim wheel, they would have done, but this info was completely hidden by Boeing.

Originally Posted by MechEngr

No one called for any heads to roll until the owner of the plane that crew #3 controlled claimed that crew #3 followed every step exactly as laid out in the emergency AD and demanded that following those instructions was not enough to avoid a crash. That claim turned out to be entirely untrue, but was only revealed a full year later with the preliminary report. It certainly seems to me that everyone operating the 737, and the MAX in particular, accepted the AD as sufficient until then.

Yeah, that was a wrong statement, though, it does not imply, the MCAS issues should have been acceptable.

Originally Posted by MechEngr

Was there any testimony to Congress to the contrary?

I don't know, though it doesn't matter. The MCAS issues should not have been there to start with.

Originally Posted by MechEngr

For decades, pilots weren't all rigorously trained to deal with unwanted trim system actuation, certainly not in conjunction with any other problem. For decades it was OK to issue false stall warnings and stick-shaker activation. MCAS merely exposed that there had been no safety net on those two fronts for a long time.

Yes, for decades it has been, wrongly, especially in the past 10 years, acceptable, that such a cacophony can raise, that the pilots lose the plot.

There are reasons, the 737MAX (and more or less the 737NG too) is considered a bridge too far, see the opinions on this board and the FAA/Congress attempts to limit the legally allowed, but practically unwanted inheritance of certified old-technology in "new generation" airplanes. That old (GUI) technology, which should have been abandoned long ago in "new" airplanes brought to the market. The result of this is, the deplorable state Boeing ended up in.

And, I wrote earlier about this, when you start/keep feeding/demanding new items to be learned by pilots, you need to accept, that things will be falling off the table, since it is becoming just "too much" to learn all these things (in the time available). Which in turn implies, the pilots need to get more current technology, taking care of more basic items, especially conflicting alarms, freeing up the pilots' brains for more high-level knowledge/capabilities. (Not saying, that basic flying skills should be sacrificed).

There are reasons, pilots try to engage the autopilot, when things go haywire: It relieves them from the low basic tasks to keep a desirable flight path.

Originally Posted by MechEngr

What I am pointing out is that there are and have been systemic issues that extended far beyond Boeing and that sole focus on Boeing and MCAS is an incomplete lesson to learn.

Of course, though it is largely Boeing (and their $ oriented customers), who just ignore the need to move on to better technologies and "invest" in that, by accepting higher prices for the airplanes. And, a practical issue is, that certifying "new technology" is extremely difficult and expensive.

[WideScreen]

Originally Posted by Imagegear

Perhaps like this today:

B737 Max FLE2615 Cancun - Toronto diverting to FLL on descent and approach with a chase plane - FEL2615


Something went pear shaped

IG

Looks like a decompression issue to me.

[MechEngr]

"Yes, of course, though the simple fact that the FO of crew #2 didn't apply the <10s repeated trim input"

He did. He just didn't correct the trim forces he could clearly feel. You need to read the FDR graphs to see what everyone did.

The "cacophony" was from the stall warning. If pilots are blacking out from a stall warning then something is seriously wrong with the training. In this case it was a false alarm. I'm not sure why that is a factor, issuing false alarms, crying wolf, demanding focus on something that isn't a problem, is pushed off as not of primary importance. It's exactly what brought down AF447, another plane that was fully controllable by the crew. As suggested before, there are plenty of ways to detect the AoA system is either incorrect or has failed completely without using best 2 out of 3 (which failed on at least one Airbus, which also shoved the nose down and required power to be pulled from 2 of 3 flight computers). Using that detection to invalidate that side SMYD and ADIRU would have meant that MCAS would not function. Stop the first domino rather than expect the last domino not to get knocked down after, by my count, 4 have already failed.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Meanwhile, in the criminal case against Boeing in federal district court in Texas, the judge has denied the motion by the crash victims' families to modify (or even suspend) the Deferred Prosecution Agreement between Boeing and the Dep't of Justice. Reportedly the basis of the ruling is that the court does not have legal authority, under the CVRA (Crime Victims' Rights Act) or otherwise, to change the DPA. The court did express some frustration about this lack of authority, along with statements indicative of some extent of agreement with the families' factual and legal contentions. An appeal is expected.

[WillowRun 6-3]

The appeal has been filed in the U.S.Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (23-10168).

I'm not going to try summarizing the legal argument or otherwise commenting on the likelihood of various possible outcomes . . . . . . . Not until I've read the brief in support, that is (and maybe not even then). Still, I can say, for anyone not following close enough along in the legal process to date, that the families of the crash victims are seeking reversal on appeal of the ruling by the trial court (Judge Reed O'Connor, U.S.D.C. Northern District of Texas) denying any reopening or other modification of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement. Recall, the District Court ruled that the families are within the scope and definition of "crime victims" for the applicability of the federal Crime Victims' Rights Act, and stated damning things about Boeing's crime - criminality which the company admits in the DPA, of course.

On the related thread that started with a focus on the criminal trial of a Boeing development or test pilot (M. Forkner), discussion has sprung up again about MCAS and the various wrong-doings by Boeing. There are a goodly number of "main points" in the sordid tale - which I'm pointing out because if the Court asked this SLF/attorney what I think it should rule - not a prediction, mind you, just my view- I'd say, "reverse the District Court, remand with instructions to stop-the-clock of the time period set forth in the DPA, and then...... Appoint a Special Master, and convene a big, encompassing, painful inquest into all the things done wrong by the company. Bring in all the reports, from Congress, the Inspector General, the specially-convened panels in the federal interagency, everything. There may no longer be a procedural posture for an actual criminal trial, but do the next best thing." Sure, the Federal Rules might not exactly provide for, might not contemplate, this sort of inquest conducted by a Special Master. But, consider, I think I read about some guy, a former federal bureaucrat I guess, who had a bunch of federal government papers, maybe classified ones included?, stored with his golf gear or something, in Florida I think, and the District Court judge involved there appointed a Special Master. Aren't the CVRA rights of 346 crime victims' families entitled to vindication even if by some creativity with the Federal Rules?

I'll show myself out, but not without hoping that justice, justice will be done.

[MechEngr]

Justice won't be done. Sovereign immunity precludes it. This leaves only one cash-filled pinata, the real reason for the action. Maybe via settlement, maybe shorting the stock.

If a crime was committed then who will go to prison for it?

[WillowRun 6-3]

No, sovereign immunity has nothing to do with the question whether the DPA, entered into by the Justice Department and Boeing, can be re-opened and, if so, whether it should be modified

The corporation admitted criminal responsibility in the DPA, as you (presumably) know. So it is accurate to say that the district court action resulted in, among other things, the determination that a crime was committed. The district court's language on this particular point is quite stark, is it not?

Whether it still is a possibility that anyone formerly or currently employed by the company and/or responsible for the company's acts and omissions leading up to the crashes will be held criminally liable remains to be seen - though my own cynicism is a mere slice of the massive cynicism you seem to hold. But cynic or not, no individual is being adjudicated criminally responsible, in my view, without a very expansive proceeding that would delve into reams upon reams of information about how and why the crashes occurred - including all the dense reams about design, aircraft systems, certification matters, and flight operations. You'll recall the government presented a narrow effort to convict Mr Forkner, who defended under the burden of ill-advised communications that made him look bad, if not "guilty of something." And he was acquitted. Incidentally, MechEngr, you don't hold the view that Forkner should have been found guilty, do you?

[Organfreak]

Obviously I am not the person you are addressing; I am only a well-informed SLF in the peanut gallery who has followed this whole dismal situation closely, and *I*, a jury of one, do not agree that Forkner is not guilty. (I grew up in Seattle and remember the good ole days of Boeing being heroes to us kids.) But it has been clearly shown that lately Boeing has a criminally negligent corporate culture and a way to hold them responsible needs to be conceived and acted-upon. Maybe some ppl feel that they will pay at the cash register.. I dunno if that is enough!

[MechEngr]

So Ethiopia, the owner of the aircraft, the employer of the pilots, the supplier of training to those pilots, the ones responsible for their training, the supplier of their chief pilot, and the ones who sold the tickets, is no longer a sovereign nation?

Every level was provided with ample notice. At every level that notice was ignored and the orders given to proceed.

They failed to follow the memory items for the stall warning - 30+ years in existence. Both pilots failed at that, MCAS not involved at all. Were their trainers investigated about that failure? Will their chief pilot go to prison for not recognizing that inability? MCAS didn't do anything to the throttle, which was the pilot's responsibility, but that unattended throttle left the plane uncontrollable at the end. Perhaps counter with "MCAS", but the emphasized part of stall warning procedure is to never engage the autopilot or autothrottle - set pitch and set power. They re-enabled the trim so they could re-enable the autopilot because the control forces from the over-speed due to the unattended throttle were too high. The emphasized part of the AD and the FCOM was "never re-enable the trim" if it is disabled for any reason.

There will be no justice for ET302.

[WillowRun 6-3]

MechEngr
It's always so tempting, when some specific legal issue is in the public arena, and someone deliberately muddies the discussion, to wish upon that person the best counsel they can find if and when they find themselves in court. But this being a community, instead, I'll say I hope you never even need legal counsel at all.

The subject is the DPA. If there's a problem in the international legal framework which precludes justice - as someone may define it - with respect to the country, Ethiopia, that isn't an argument that will help in the DPA matter. It may arrive as a surprise, but legal counsel representing the families have an obligation to represent them as fully and far as the law allows. What can or cannot be achieved under current law in holding Ethiopia, the country, accountable, just isn't a factor. (If it turns out that the 5th Circuit case, the appeal of the DPA status, does involve the Ethiopian government issue you've asserted, I'll come back here and acknowledge it.)

I won't even guess at how the domestic law of Ethiopia would handle a lawsuit against the government. Maybe that's a subject you're well-versed in - but I'm not and won't guess as to how the U.S. doctrine of sovereign immunity might find a parallel in the other country.

As to the flight operation itself of ET302 - strictly off-limits for this SLF/attorney, so I'll leave it alone, other than to say your comment certainly seems to blame the pilots, though unclear how that blame compares in your view to others at fault... like Boeing. But as a non-aviator, I'm not commenting in substance on all that.

[MechEngr]

Yes, I can see that ignoring the facts regarding the incident are going to be off limits in seeking justice, even though they are core to understanding the main topic, recertification. Ignoring the facts makes sense if you have predetermined a desired outcome.

When you enter a courtroom have you looked at sufficient legal precedents to understand how the case might go or do you just wing it? Would a loss for your client be your fault if you just winged it or would you say that LexisNexis let you down and deserve all the blame? Or would your Bar association that skipped questions of law share some blame? Possibly if your school didn't even cover law before giving you a degree. Surely it's someone else's fault, someone with cash.

However far up the chain responsibility for pilot mismanagement of that flight goes needs to be investigated. But they won't be.

There will be no justice.

[MechEngr]

For further clarity - entering court with a case that is essentially identical to one that had two recent examples where one was won and the other lost, making huge international news, and with a large amount of legal analysis by expert lawyers. As you enter the court your client asks about those cases and you reply, "Not sure what you are talking about" and then you throw a hot coffee at the judge.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Actually, I'm now taking somewhat of a step back here.

The legal system - the processes within the system - in this country do not provide an omnibus (overall) forum for addressing all the issues in a given situation in one setting. I recognize that you're intensely indignant over what you perceive as getting-away-with-murder by the State of Ethiopia, or parts of it. But to the extent that your view is that this specific injustice must be pounded upon endlessly, to the exclusion of achieving some positive results in a given case in which that State is not directly present, I'll just agree to disagree.

I'm not going to engage in any dialogue which involves any attorney, least of all a rhetorical version of myself, engaging in courtroom misconduct. I'm a guest here, you surely realize -- and lawyers in general already have a bad enough name here. No, thank you. But I will say: if the families win before the Fifth Circuit, and the DPA is re-opened, and some further recourse or redress is obtained for the families, I'll view that as a more just outcome, even if other unjust aspects of the unnecessary deaths of 346 people remain unredressed.

[artee]

^^
I've always appreciated your posts. thoughtful, well reasoned, and able to explain legal things in a way that makes it easier for non-legal beagles to understand.
Please keep up the good work.