PIA A320 Crash Karachi
The "false glideslope" theory holds no water.
ATC queried their position and offered alternatives, the crew's reply was indicative that they knew they were high and would press on with the approach.
It was VMC and being "local" pilots they would know that the view out of the window wasn't normal.
Absolutely NOTHING in the speed and height data looks normal.
As a former ATCO, what does bother me is that the TWR controller wasn't keeping a good eye on his piece of real estate and the customer and missed the runway contact.
ATC queried their position and offered alternatives, the crew's reply was indicative that they knew they were high and would press on with the approach.
It was VMC and being "local" pilots they would know that the view out of the window wasn't normal.
Absolutely NOTHING in the speed and height data looks normal.
As a former ATCO, what does bother me is that the TWR controller wasn't keeping a good eye on his piece of real estate and the customer and missed the runway contact.
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Also another video with clearer audio.
He is saying, are you going to try again (carry on), with the Belly Landing procedure, that i have just seen you attempt prior to the Go Around.
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Here's some audio I edited and posted here a few hours after the crash. There is presumably a much better recording available from ATC including the minutes before this clip starts. The earlier LiveATC.net OKPC recording was unusable due to an open squelch on one of the channels scanned.
Last edited by Airbubba; 29th May 2020 at 20:11.
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My red ...
The "false glideslope" theory holds no water. Not a pilot, so I defer to them.
ATC queried their position and offered alternatives, the crew's reply was indicative that they knew they were high and would press on with the approach. Not a pilot, so I defer to them. BUT I see no reference to the pilot(s) saying they knew were high.
It was VMC and being "local" pilots they would know that the view out of the window wasn't normal. Not a pilot, so I defer again.
Absolutely NOTHING in the speed and height data looks normal. Generally agreed here, from TOD.
As a former ATCO, what does bother me is that the TWR controller wasn't keeping a good eye on his piece of real estate and the customer and missed the runway contact. AGREED. Regardless of disparaging remarks up-Thread, TWR should be looking out of the windows at a landing aircraft. Did he have 5-10 other aircraft on frequency that prevented him looking at the PIA on short final? I asked earlier if anyone knew what the traffic density was like ... no response from anyone. But ATC comments usually carry little weight in this environment - Captains rule 😎.
ATC queried their position and offered alternatives, the crew's reply was indicative that they knew they were high and would press on with the approach. Not a pilot, so I defer to them. BUT I see no reference to the pilot(s) saying they knew were high.
It was VMC and being "local" pilots they would know that the view out of the window wasn't normal. Not a pilot, so I defer again.
Absolutely NOTHING in the speed and height data looks normal. Generally agreed here, from TOD.
As a former ATCO, what does bother me is that the TWR controller wasn't keeping a good eye on his piece of real estate and the customer and missed the runway contact. AGREED. Regardless of disparaging remarks up-Thread, TWR should be looking out of the windows at a landing aircraft. Did he have 5-10 other aircraft on frequency that prevented him looking at the PIA on short final? I asked earlier if anyone knew what the traffic density was like ... no response from anyone. But ATC comments usually carry little weight in this environment - Captains rule 😎.
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The approach mode engages automatically, except when it doesn’t. You may have to select it yourself.
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Ian at FlightRadar24 has harvested some indicated airspeed data from the extended Mode-S data fields:
This altitude plot agrees nicely with the ones previously posted in this thread.
https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/p...-near-karachi/
This altitude plot agrees nicely with the ones previously posted in this thread.
https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/p...-near-karachi/
Thanks again Airbubba
took the liberty of highlighting a couple of key areas below, although it's comes as no surprise to most here.
Based on the FR24 CSV data
- (best approximation, due to periodicity and latency of recorded data)
-
took the liberty of highlighting a couple of key areas below, although it's comes as no surprise to most here.
Based on the FR24 CSV data
- (best approximation, due to periodicity and latency of recorded data)
-
- 251 IAS out of FL100
- 240 during descent, give or take
- 236 IAS at 2,000'
- ~215 IAS on tarmac, skipping down to 191 IAS
- recording a minimum of 173 IAS, 200' AGL into the GA
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OK when the weather is bad airport cameras won’t help, but just as police now wear body cameras for after the fact analysis, shouldn’t airports have permanent cameras to film all ground , approach and landing activity to help provide facts. Imagine if we had high quality footage of this event from multiple angles.
No, although the moving TLs are helpful on a Boeing, the single most important indication of what a complex automated aircraft is doing (be it Airbus or Boeing) are the FMAs and having a solid understanding of automation modes. In this case they did not see or understand the FLCH/HOLD trap.
I'm not saying the Boeing moving throttles is inherently better (I think it is but I'm biased
), I'm saying it's different than Airbus so when a pilot is transitioning, they should fully understand the differences and how best to use those differences to their advantage. Same thing with the force feedback through the yoke - it's there on Boeing, so the pilots should be taught what it means - and that if it starts getting excessive it's telling you something is wrong (reportedly the Asiana pilot was having to pull back with ~80 pounds of force before he hit the seawall - anyone experienced with flying Boeing aircraft would know that meant something was seriously wrong - but apparently he hadn't been so taught.In short, the differences training that the Asiana pilot received was inadequate, and that contributed to the accident.
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Guys, I cannot buy the question of fixed throttles (Airbus) or moving ones (Boeing). In my opinion it’s unlikely it has anything to deal with this accident. I guess many of us here started flying on poorly automated aircraft, let alone the Cessnas, Piper, Jodel, Robin, Stampe, Tiger Moth we learnt to fly on (and still fly, in my own case).
What do we do when at the controls of these, and of the Classic 747s, DC8, DC9s, Focker 27s and B727s we used to fly ? We set a preset power value, eg for example 1.15 EPR, 5000 in/lbs torque, 45% N1, or 1750 rpm on a fixed-pitch prop piston aircraft. And we set a pitch attitude, relevant with sequence of flight and airplane weight and configuration.
So while moving throttles, we look at power gauges and visually set proper value. Furthermore, on all aircraft but tail mounted jets, engine sound can be helpul. Then, as a former Boeing airman, I obviously learnt to do the same while feeling the autothrottle moving in my hands. And, then, some years ago I switched to the A330 and its fixed throttles. What am I doing when flying an Autothrust approach ? I’m still monitoring engine power gauges every 5 seconds or so... I cannot imagine any pilot doing otherwise.
So in the case of this terrible accident, I don’t think fixed throttles were an issue. If all what has been said before is true, ie ‘‘supersonic’’ speed, descent path, pitch attitude and vertical speed ŕ-la space shuttle, these unhappy guys were not in condition to fly an aircraft. Poor training ? Poor CRM ? Poor physical condition due to ramadan ? Lack of recent experience ? Hopefully future will say..
What do we do when at the controls of these, and of the Classic 747s, DC8, DC9s, Focker 27s and B727s we used to fly ? We set a preset power value, eg for example 1.15 EPR, 5000 in/lbs torque, 45% N1, or 1750 rpm on a fixed-pitch prop piston aircraft. And we set a pitch attitude, relevant with sequence of flight and airplane weight and configuration.
So while moving throttles, we look at power gauges and visually set proper value. Furthermore, on all aircraft but tail mounted jets, engine sound can be helpul. Then, as a former Boeing airman, I obviously learnt to do the same while feeling the autothrottle moving in my hands. And, then, some years ago I switched to the A330 and its fixed throttles. What am I doing when flying an Autothrust approach ? I’m still monitoring engine power gauges every 5 seconds or so... I cannot imagine any pilot doing otherwise.
So in the case of this terrible accident, I don’t think fixed throttles were an issue. If all what has been said before is true, ie ‘‘supersonic’’ speed, descent path, pitch attitude and vertical speed ŕ-la space shuttle, these unhappy guys were not in condition to fly an aircraft. Poor training ? Poor CRM ? Poor physical condition due to ramadan ? Lack of recent experience ? Hopefully future will say..
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I wonder if they tried to use the emergency cancel button to silence the overspeed alarm (and I'm pretty sure that it can't be cancelled that way) and inadvertently removed the GEAR NOT DOWN warning.
Sorry homebuilt - that was part of a thread drift that started several pages back where this was compared to the Asiana 777 crash at SFO (horribly botched approach under near ideal weather conditions resulting in a crash). No suggestion that it has any relevance to this crash other than the inability to land a perfectly good aircraft in good weather.
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Sorry homebuilt - that was part of a thread drift that started several pages back where this was compared to the Asiana 777 crash at SFO (horribly botched approach under near ideal weather conditions resulting in a crash). No suggestion that it has any relevance to this crash other than the inability to land a perfectly good aircraft in good weather.
Why these observations/comments about "non-moving thrust levers" continue to arise in discussions regarding accidents involving Airbus after thirty years of worldwide A320 flying, is a puzzle. Moving/non-moving is not an issue. I flew Douglas, Boeing NB/WB, Lockheed, Airbus NB/WB, the latter for fifteen years, and the thrust levers and all types were never an issue because one just adjusts to the machine one is currently flying; QED.
And if one didn't like what the airplane, including the Airbus, was doing at any time, one just disconnected everything including thrust levers and flew the airplane just as one would fly a DC9/DC8 or 727 because that's all the A320 is, underneath the C* laws and protections.
On thrust levers/throttles, joysticks or control columns, one can comment on an airplane only if one has been trained on it and has flown it for some bit of time. Otherwise its just opinion and while perhaps interesting to argue, I believe that remaining curious and asking questions rather than pronouncing is still a good way to engage and learn in aviation. This isn't an "invitation" to stay in one's back yard...not at all...this is about acknowledging real expertise while engaging same. And that is still just good manners, isn't it?
PJ2
PJ, did you read my followup post #900 where I pointed out I was referring to the Asiana crash in SFO? Particularly this part?
No suggestion that it has any relevance to this crash other than the inability to land a perfectly good aircraft in good weather.
Precisely.
Why these observations/comments about "non-moving thrust levers" continue to arise in discussions regarding accidents involving Airbus after thirty years of worldwide A320 flying, is a puzzle. Moving/non-moving is not an issue. I flew Douglas, Boeing NB/WB, Lockheed, Airbus NB/WB, the latter for fifteen years, and the thrust levers and all types were never an issue because one just adjusts to the machine one is currently flying; QED.
And if one didn't like what the airplane, including the Airbus, was doing at any time, one just disconnected everything including thrust levers and flew the airplane just as one would fly a DC9/DC8 or 727 because that's all the A320 is, underneath the C* laws and protections.
On thrust levers/throttles, joysticks or control columns, one can comment on an airplane only if one has been trained on it and has flown it for some bit of time. Otherwise its just opinion and while perhaps interesting to argue, I believe that remaining curious and asking questions rather than pronouncing is still a good way to engage and learn in aviation. This isn't an "invitation" to stay in one's back yard...not at all...this is about acknowledging real expertise while engaging same. And that is still just good manners, isn't it?
PJ2
Why these observations/comments about "non-moving thrust levers" continue to arise in discussions regarding accidents involving Airbus after thirty years of worldwide A320 flying, is a puzzle. Moving/non-moving is not an issue. I flew Douglas, Boeing NB/WB, Lockheed, Airbus NB/WB, the latter for fifteen years, and the thrust levers and all types were never an issue because one just adjusts to the machine one is currently flying; QED.
And if one didn't like what the airplane, including the Airbus, was doing at any time, one just disconnected everything including thrust levers and flew the airplane just as one would fly a DC9/DC8 or 727 because that's all the A320 is, underneath the C* laws and protections.
On thrust levers/throttles, joysticks or control columns, one can comment on an airplane only if one has been trained on it and has flown it for some bit of time. Otherwise its just opinion and while perhaps interesting to argue, I believe that remaining curious and asking questions rather than pronouncing is still a good way to engage and learn in aviation. This isn't an "invitation" to stay in one's back yard...not at all...this is about acknowledging real expertise while engaging same. And that is still just good manners, isn't it?
PJ2
Spot on
B727/A300/A310/A320/A340
ATC watching ?
possible, but ...
suggests that they did know, if so why not advise the crew, did they really want their runway damaged ?
Or the phone may have rung just at the wrong time. Who knows?
do we not already have reports from ATC interviews that gear was UP on approach ?
Hi td - yes, I thought what you wrote was spot on because that is precisely what occurred. Perfectly serviceable & nobody home.
Knowing one's airplane including its energy-level & trend, the sounds of the air and the engines, what "low" and "high" look like outside, well enough to only glance inside at the airspeed to put it 350ft over the start of the approach lights. Others have said it here better - I'm just nodding in their direction. Sorry for the drift.
Knowing one's airplane including its energy-level & trend, the sounds of the air and the engines, what "low" and "high" look like outside, well enough to only glance inside at the airspeed to put it 350ft over the start of the approach lights. Others have said it here better - I'm just nodding in their direction. Sorry for the drift.