Originally Posted by
zero/zero
No, although the moving TLs are helpful on a Boeing, the single most important indication of what a complex automated aircraft is doing (be it Airbus or Boeing) are the FMAs and having a solid understanding of automation modes. In this case they did not see or understand the FLCH/HOLD trap.
A comprehensive differences training would include a
solid understanding of the automatics (and other systems) and how they should be used, because the Airbus and Boeing automatics are quite different. A good example being the autothrottles - keeping a hand resting lightly on the throttles during final has the useful purpose is indicating what the engines are doing (or at least are being commanded to do) - while on Airbus it won't tell you squat. The SFO Asiana pilot apparently wasn't taught that - or about the infamous FLCH trap.
I'm not saying the Boeing moving throttles is inherently better (I think it is but I'm biased
), I'm saying it's
different than Airbus so when a pilot is transitioning, they should fully understand the differences and how best to use those differences to their advantage. Same thing with the force feedback through the yoke - it's there on Boeing, so the pilots should be taught what it means - and that if it starts getting excessive it's telling you something is
wrong (reportedly the Asiana pilot was having to pull back with ~80 pounds of force before he hit the seawall - anyone experienced with flying Boeing aircraft would know that meant something was seriously wrong - but apparently he hadn't been so taught.
In short, the differences training that the Asiana pilot received was inadequate, and that contributed to the accident.