TransAsia in the water?
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Canada
Posts: 603
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If the story is accurate, it is an amazing route to take.
TransAsia says all its 71 ATR aircraft pilots face skills test following crash
PUBLISHED ON FEB 6, 2015 10:26 PM Dec 6, 2014. Taiwan's TransAsia Airways said Friday all its 71 ATR pilots will have to take a flight skills test following its second deadly accident in seven months. -- PHOTO: EPA
TAIPEI (AFP) - Taiwan's TransAsia Airways said Friday all its 71 ATR pilots will have to take a flight skills test following its second deadly accident in seven months.
In a statement, the airline said "71 pilots on its fleet of 10 ATR planes will be required to do a test by the Civil Aeronautics Administration and a professional unit to make sure they are all qualified on their jobs."
- See more at: TransAsia says all its 71 ATR aircraft pilots face skills test following crash - East Asia News & Top Stories - The Straits Times
TransAsia says all its 71 ATR aircraft pilots face skills test following crash
PUBLISHED ON FEB 6, 2015 10:26 PM Dec 6, 2014. Taiwan's TransAsia Airways said Friday all its 71 ATR pilots will have to take a flight skills test following its second deadly accident in seven months. -- PHOTO: EPA
TAIPEI (AFP) - Taiwan's TransAsia Airways said Friday all its 71 ATR pilots will have to take a flight skills test following its second deadly accident in seven months.
In a statement, the airline said "71 pilots on its fleet of 10 ATR planes will be required to do a test by the Civil Aeronautics Administration and a professional unit to make sure they are all qualified on their jobs."
- See more at: TransAsia says all its 71 ATR aircraft pilots face skills test following crash - East Asia News & Top Stories - The Straits Times
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: On the equator
Posts: 1,291
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Errm, excuse me, but shouldn't that have been done before they were employed by the airline? A bit too late once they're on the line to find later that they're not "qualified on their jobs".
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: On the equator
Posts: 1,291
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It's obvious they mis-identified the failed engine and that there was poor CRM, because before making such actions, the PNF who is performing the actions needs to confirm with the PF that the Power Lever and Condition Lever is that of the affected engine, whilst the PF continues to fly the aircraft.
#327
With PT6 engines, in case of suspected engine problems, both power levers stay or go to TOGA [or appropriate] power.
Why would "one" throttle be retarded in an ATR?
With PT6 engines, in case of suspected engine problems, both power levers stay or go to TOGA [or appropriate] power.
Why would "one" throttle be retarded in an ATR?
. The ATR is a very deifferent beast compared to most TP in its operation.Also be aware it's standard ATR procedure (right or wrong) that PF manipulates the PL during the memo items. From there the PNF takes over and does the CL and Bleed.
Join Date: Dec 2004
Location: In Hyperspace...
Posts: 395
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hello Ka6crpe,
I've based my supposition primarily on the data published from the FDR trace and the FlightRadar24 ADS-B returns, and they seem to roughly correlate. I've only used what I've seen in the videos / stills as secondary data to confirm or discard thoughts based on the other data.
Whilst I've no doubt that the final few seconds involved a deepening stall culminating in wing drop, I don't believe it was flown from TOD in stalled conditions - and I theorised as much yesterday, before the FDR trace was released.
Did you take perspective / parallax aspects into account when you did your visual analysis, and what did you use as your reference point in the vids to derive the angles from? I don't mean to dismiss your thoughts at all - you could easily be right and I wrong, in a paucity of a complete data set.
Happy to discuss...
I've based my supposition primarily on the data published from the FDR trace and the FlightRadar24 ADS-B returns, and they seem to roughly correlate. I've only used what I've seen in the videos / stills as secondary data to confirm or discard thoughts based on the other data.
Whilst I've no doubt that the final few seconds involved a deepening stall culminating in wing drop, I don't believe it was flown from TOD in stalled conditions - and I theorised as much yesterday, before the FDR trace was released.
Did you take perspective / parallax aspects into account when you did your visual analysis, and what did you use as your reference point in the vids to derive the angles from? I don't mean to dismiss your thoughts at all - you could easily be right and I wrong, in a paucity of a complete data set.
Happy to discuss...
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: yankton, sd
Posts: 290
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
boom...how is this engine different? I mean I understand the stages, but in operation, if engine 1 is producing thrust, and engine 2 has something wrong, why touch power lever on 1?
I would protect it from moving. I think most of us would.
Certainly if you were below Vmca, you might retard #1, but unless there was a good reason, why touch it?
I would protect it from moving. I think most of us would.
Certainly if you were below Vmca, you might retard #1, but unless there was a good reason, why touch it?
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: New Zealand
Age: 71
Posts: 76
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TheInquisitor, OK I see where we are differing. I based my fully stalled comment on the video in post 326, which is in the last few seconds of flight from building height and lower, not from TOD. I thought I had made that clear when I referenced "...in that video", but maybe I did leave too much room for interetation.
To get the angle of descent I took the point at which the top of the cockpit crossed the horizon to where it crossed the building imediately in front (at the 26 second mark). It is not quite square on but is certainly less than 30 degrees of parallax, so the error would not be too great. I allowed a full 30 degrees in my estimate, hence the comment that the actual descent may have been at a greater angle than my estimated 14 degrees.
That video from the dash cam in post #8 appears to pick up the aircraft as it passes that same building and is 5 seconds to impact.
To get the angle of descent I took the point at which the top of the cockpit crossed the horizon to where it crossed the building imediately in front (at the 26 second mark). It is not quite square on but is certainly less than 30 degrees of parallax, so the error would not be too great. I allowed a full 30 degrees in my estimate, hence the comment that the actual descent may have been at a greater angle than my estimated 14 degrees.
That video from the dash cam in post #8 appears to pick up the aircraft as it passes that same building and is 5 seconds to impact.
This is looking like second stage power turbine failure to me, it’s easy to miss identify an engine failure in this condition and not something we train for since simulators generally don’t accommodate this condition.
How we monitor the condition of this turbine is when takeoff torque is within 2% of target torque for takeoff check, assuming this was within allowable limits at takeoff then as the second stage turbine degrades the torque will fall away until it drops to the auto feather trigger value, usually around 50%.
This is where the confusion starts, the gas generator is still functioning normally the feathered propeller is still being driven by the seriously degraded engine, you would expect to see a prop rpm in the order of 30 to 40 percent and a torque value quite possibly exceeding 100%, with no engine failure indications apparent, if all your looking at is the torque gauges, left at say around 98% right engine more than that and an airplane performing as it should on one engine, one can begin to see if we are honest how easily it is to misidentify an underperforming engine, particularly if you.ve never seen this condition before.
How we monitor the condition of this turbine is when takeoff torque is within 2% of target torque for takeoff check, assuming this was within allowable limits at takeoff then as the second stage turbine degrades the torque will fall away until it drops to the auto feather trigger value, usually around 50%.
This is where the confusion starts, the gas generator is still functioning normally the feathered propeller is still being driven by the seriously degraded engine, you would expect to see a prop rpm in the order of 30 to 40 percent and a torque value quite possibly exceeding 100%, with no engine failure indications apparent, if all your looking at is the torque gauges, left at say around 98% right engine more than that and an airplane performing as it should on one engine, one can begin to see if we are honest how easily it is to misidentify an underperforming engine, particularly if you.ve never seen this condition before.
N4790P
Quote:
Originally Posted by Longtimer
In a statement, the airline said "71 pilots on its fleet of 10 ATR planes will be required to do a test by the Civil Aeronautics Administration and a professional unit to make sure they are all qualified on their jobs."
Errm, excuse me, but shouldn't that have been done before they were employed by the airline? A bit too late once they're on the line to find later that they're not "qualified on their jobs".
Originally Posted by Longtimer
In a statement, the airline said "71 pilots on its fleet of 10 ATR planes will be required to do a test by the Civil Aeronautics Administration and a professional unit to make sure they are all qualified on their jobs."
Errm, excuse me, but shouldn't that have been done before they were employed by the airline? A bit too late once they're on the line to find later that they're not "qualified on their jobs".
Somehow, I think they may be more to it then this though and they shouldn't be crucified just yet.
(I don't know if the July 2014 accident report has been published yet but both the airline and the Taiwanese regulator will know that it was a totally avoidable accident and that may well have a bearing on the (training and checking) recommendations from this accident too)
Join Date: Dec 2004
Location: In Hyperspace...
Posts: 395
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ka6crpe - Agreed, within those bounds - if one looks again at the 'height' traces both on FDR and FR24, you can see a significant 'dip' towards the end - which may correlate with the portion of the video you analysed?
Useful, I feel, for 'end-game' analysis - but maybe less useful in determining causality?
Perhaps it's an indication of the human tendency to concentrate on the 'spectacular' (which the videos representing a few seconds certainly were!) - as opposed to the relatively dull linear analysis of some 2-3 mins worth of flight...
Whatever the conclusion, I have to say that in 25 years as an aviator, I have never before seen such close-up and detailed video evidence, followed by such a rapid release of FDR data - on top of the relatively new phenomenon of ADS-B derived traces, too...
I'm not sure yet whether it's a good or bad thing that we are somehow able to be sitting here, only 3 days after an accident, doing an 'amateur' (albeit as interested and deeply-connected professionals) analysis of an accident sequence.... to my knowledge, it is unprecedented.
Useful, I feel, for 'end-game' analysis - but maybe less useful in determining causality?
Perhaps it's an indication of the human tendency to concentrate on the 'spectacular' (which the videos representing a few seconds certainly were!) - as opposed to the relatively dull linear analysis of some 2-3 mins worth of flight...
Whatever the conclusion, I have to say that in 25 years as an aviator, I have never before seen such close-up and detailed video evidence, followed by such a rapid release of FDR data - on top of the relatively new phenomenon of ADS-B derived traces, too...
I'm not sure yet whether it's a good or bad thing that we are somehow able to be sitting here, only 3 days after an accident, doing an 'amateur' (albeit as interested and deeply-connected professionals) analysis of an accident sequence.... to my knowledge, it is unprecedented.
Join Date: Dec 2004
Location: In Hyperspace...
Posts: 395
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Xeptu,
Thanks for the in-depth tech info.
Can you see anything from the FDR trace that indicates this as a possibility? From my (admittedly, non-type-expert) analysis, I can see little wrong with either engine prior to the #2 autofeather.
...which leads us back to the first of my '2 mysteries' postulation above... Why did the #2 autofeather, and what triggered the 'flameout' detection when the engine appears not to have flamed out at all?
I would also be very interested to know what type / company SOPs are with regards to a/p engagement - were they likely to be hand-flying, or relying on the automatics?
I ask because from experience, I cannot fathom how a misdiagnosis of which engine has failed can occur in a twin TP that is being hand-flown.
Thanks for the in-depth tech info.
Can you see anything from the FDR trace that indicates this as a possibility? From my (admittedly, non-type-expert) analysis, I can see little wrong with either engine prior to the #2 autofeather.
...which leads us back to the first of my '2 mysteries' postulation above... Why did the #2 autofeather, and what triggered the 'flameout' detection when the engine appears not to have flamed out at all?
I would also be very interested to know what type / company SOPs are with regards to a/p engagement - were they likely to be hand-flying, or relying on the automatics?
I ask because from experience, I cannot fathom how a misdiagnosis of which engine has failed can occur in a twin TP that is being hand-flown.
BO0M,
ATR SOP is for the PM/NFP to action all checklist items, upon confirmation from the PF, whose primary job is aircraft flightpath maintenance i.e. Flying the plane
ATR SOP is for the PM/NFP to action all checklist items, upon confirmation from the PF, whose primary job is aircraft flightpath maintenance i.e. Flying the plane
Upside, count yourself lucky you have good SOPs.
Join Date: Jun 2006
Location: Canada
Posts: 15
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Dead foot/dead engine
Curious. And forgive if this comes across over-simplified (I've never flown a twin bigger than a 402).
When the right engine went to auto-feather, would there not be pronounced yaw to the right, resulting in left rudder input, and a dead-foot/dead engine clue to guide correct identification and shutdown?
Or on the ATR is the yaw not that pronounced?
Many thanks, all.
When the right engine went to auto-feather, would there not be pronounced yaw to the right, resulting in left rudder input, and a dead-foot/dead engine clue to guide correct identification and shutdown?
Or on the ATR is the yaw not that pronounced?
Many thanks, all.
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: bangko
Posts: 20
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Oooops
Its clear they shut down the wrong engine
Its clear they realized this late in the gane and turned the fuel lever on and started engine 1. It did spool up, but too late
Its clear they realized this late in the gane and turned the fuel lever on and started engine 1. It did spool up, but too late
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: Front Left
Posts: 19
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I think its is pretty clear that the crew shut down the wrong engine, #1.
But what happened to ENG #2?
Unless there are some timing issues (Sample rate) on the DFDR traces released it doesn't make any sense.
The triggering condition for ATPCS is one TQ < 18%. But according to the DFDR the engine was already feathered by the time TQ #2 dropped below 18%, that sould rule out an standard ATPCS sequence, unless there are timing issues with DFDR data.
The only uncommanded feathering of a propeller on an ATR I have head about involved the incorrect installation of the prop itself, in which the mechanics omitted installing the stepped pin, which after a few flights resulting in loss of oil pressure to the prop which then by design will feather.
But that would initially lead to a massive over torque on affected engine, and even if the DFDR data does indicate an initial TQ 2 increase, its very hard to tell from the low res scale provided.
But what happened to ENG #2?
Unless there are some timing issues (Sample rate) on the DFDR traces released it doesn't make any sense.
The triggering condition for ATPCS is one TQ < 18%. But according to the DFDR the engine was already feathered by the time TQ #2 dropped below 18%, that sould rule out an standard ATPCS sequence, unless there are timing issues with DFDR data.
The only uncommanded feathering of a propeller on an ATR I have head about involved the incorrect installation of the prop itself, in which the mechanics omitted installing the stepped pin, which after a few flights resulting in loss of oil pressure to the prop which then by design will feather.
But that would initially lead to a massive over torque on affected engine, and even if the DFDR data does indicate an initial TQ 2 increase, its very hard to tell from the low res scale provided.