TransAsia in the water?
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I wonder if it could be a case that prior to takeoff, concern was heavily focused on the left engine. When something went wrong on the other side, as a group, the crew's collective focus joined the dots by assumption (and under significant stress) that the problem was on the left when it wasn't. They may have been solving the problem they thought was there, rather than the actual problem.
As well as obviously being an extremely tragic incident, that would also be an interesting scenario to unpick.
As well as obviously being an extremely tragic incident, that would also be an interesting scenario to unpick.
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Are the 600's fuel booster pumps still switched on manually WITH NO WARNING IN T/O CONFIG?
They are not covered by Takeoff Config Warning, why should they be?
Leaving them OFF with an engine running will give you an FUEL FEED LO PRESS caution right away.
There in an post engine start FWS recall, that will reveal the omission, as well as a pre-take off flight deck visual scan, that is good airmanship.
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Absolutely, flying a turbo prop is just as difficult as a jet, when it all starts to go wrong.
Apologies if this has been discussed, but what is this auto rudder system on the ATR?
Dead leg = Dead engine,
...is a very useful way of identifying a failed engine in a multi engined aircraft. If all the rudder is being put in for you, you will not have this confirmation?
Apologies if this has been discussed, but what is this auto rudder system on the ATR?
Dead leg = Dead engine,
...is a very useful way of identifying a failed engine in a multi engined aircraft. If all the rudder is being put in for you, you will not have this confirmation?
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I'm trying to understand how/why the warning of #2 Engine Flame out was triggered, looking at the FDR plot the warning was @ 02:52:39 yet the drop in #2 ITT, FF & TQ didn't occur until 02:52:40, 1 sec later.
I assume the Flame out warning comes from the FADEC, but how would the FADEC detect this? could it have been a false warning, considering ITT & TQ were still normal?
I'm also assuming that the FADEC reduces Fuel Flow to idle and tries to relight the engine, and that the PLA needs to be returned back to idle and increased in order to command the engine to increase power after this condition.
I don't believe it is a refresh rate issue as you can instantly see #1 Engine produce more power at 02:52:39.
I assume the Flame out warning comes from the FADEC, but how would the FADEC detect this? could it have been a false warning, considering ITT & TQ were still normal?
I'm also assuming that the FADEC reduces Fuel Flow to idle and tries to relight the engine, and that the PLA needs to be returned back to idle and increased in order to command the engine to increase power after this condition.
I don't believe it is a refresh rate issue as you can instantly see #1 Engine produce more power at 02:52:39.
Maybe this information has slipped past me in this thread, but with all this discussion about the crew being focussed on the left hand engine, I ask myself - why should that be?
Apart from #1 engine being critical due to the propellers direction of rotation, is there any technical peculiarity to the ATR that makes the failure of #1 particularly undesirable? Possibly even to a point where actions in that case will be expressively briefed during the departure/emergency briefing?
Apart from #1 engine being critical due to the propellers direction of rotation, is there any technical peculiarity to the ATR that makes the failure of #1 particularly undesirable? Possibly even to a point where actions in that case will be expressively briefed during the departure/emergency briefing?
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This morning's New Zealand Herald says the co-pilot was a New Zealand citizen who learned to fly in Auckland. Also says he was a captain.
Hero pilot killed in Taiwan tragedy was Kiwi citizen - National - NZ Herald News
Mr So said Mr Lau was a flight captain and was on leave when he got called in to take the co-pilot shift of the TransAsia flight to Kinmen Island.
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I don't believe it is a refresh rate issue as you can instantly see #1 Engine produce more power at 02:52:39.
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Well, the #1 engine has had a recent flame-out after which is was serviced. Big chance they briefed beforehand that they had to keep an eye out.
Also, the progessive retarding of the left power lever (PLA1) is a typical procedure when you have a surging or stalling engine. Is there any way there could have been a surging feel to the plane from the right engine?
Also, the progessive retarding of the left power lever (PLA1) is a typical procedure when you have a surging or stalling engine. Is there any way there could have been a surging feel to the plane from the right engine?
Is it just me or is there a rising trend of air accidents happening when there are more then 2 crew members in the flight deck?
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I misstated that the ATPCS will delay around 2 seconds before feather. I think that is true only on the ground. In the air it should occur right away. Anyone care to correct me further?
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Pilot error and engine failure on TransAsia 235 ? Jan's Aviation
The black boxes from TransAsia Airways flight 235 have been recovered and analyzed, and the Aviation Safety Council is releasing some new information.
Just over half a minute into the flight, one of the engines began to idle. Just as it reached 1,200 feet, the right engine went out.
However, the pilots shut down the left engine, instead of the right. They later tried to restart both engines, but the plane crashed.
There were five stall warnings before the ATR-72 landed in the Keelung River.
Thomas Wang, the Executive Director of the Aviation Safety Council in Taiwan, said that this information comes from the flight data recorder. The cockpit voice recorder is still being analyzed. A transcript will be released once that is complete.
The black boxes from TransAsia Airways flight 235 have been recovered and analyzed, and the Aviation Safety Council is releasing some new information.
Just over half a minute into the flight, one of the engines began to idle. Just as it reached 1,200 feet, the right engine went out.
However, the pilots shut down the left engine, instead of the right. They later tried to restart both engines, but the plane crashed.
There were five stall warnings before the ATR-72 landed in the Keelung River.
Thomas Wang, the Executive Director of the Aviation Safety Council in Taiwan, said that this information comes from the flight data recorder. The cockpit voice recorder is still being analyzed. A transcript will be released once that is complete.
I've heard several CVRs with extras in the cockpit. Some increased the load on the pilot with utterances while some seemed to have no affect.
my view is that when in a life and potential imminent death situations in seconds, extra words beyond commands don't help
my view is that when in a life and potential imminent death situations in seconds, extra words beyond commands don't help
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I agree with Sop Monkey. 2 captains on the flight deck = not good in an emergency (non-standard CRM, non-standard relationship between LH and RH seats).
2 captains and a check pilot = potentially disastrous if something goes wrong. All of the above plus "that check guy is watching what we do" and the check guy thinking "I don't want to die; do I trust these two or should I jump in and save it?".
Regarding the Australian A380 was that a well-handled incident? The aeroplane had structural damage, but the the crew spent ages paging through screenfulls of computer fault reports rather than getting on the ground ASAP.
2 captains and a check pilot = potentially disastrous if something goes wrong. All of the above plus "that check guy is watching what we do" and the check guy thinking "I don't want to die; do I trust these two or should I jump in and save it?".
Regarding the Australian A380 was that a well-handled incident? The aeroplane had structural damage, but the the crew spent ages paging through screenfulls of computer fault reports rather than getting on the ground ASAP.
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AVHearld CVR info
Crash: Transasia AT72 at Taipei on Feb 4th 2015, right engine failed, left engine shut down, aircraft rolled sharply and lost height shortly after takeoff
On Feb 6th 2015 Taiwan's ASC reported that the investigation so far determined from flight data and cockpit voice recorders: the aircraft received takeoff clearance at 10:51L, in the initial climb the aircraft was handed off to departure at 10:52:33L. At 10:52:38L at about 1200 feet MSL, 37 seconds after becoming airborne, a master warning activated related to the failure of the right hand engine, at 10:52:43L the left hand engine was throttled back and at 10:53:00L the crew began to discuss engine #1 had stalled. At 10:53:06L the right hand engine (engine #2) auto-feathered. At 10:53:12L a first stall warning occured and ceased at 10:53:18L. At 10:53:19L the crew discussed that engine #1 had already feathered, the fuel supply had already been cut to the engine and decided to attempt a restart of engine #1. Two seconds later another stall warning activated. At 10:53:34L the crew radioed "Mayday! Mayday! Engine flame out!", multiple attempts to restart the engines followed to no avail. At 10:54:34L a second master warning activated, 0.4 seconds later both recorders stopped recording.
On Feb 6th 2015 Taiwan's ASC reported that the investigation so far determined from flight data and cockpit voice recorders: the aircraft received takeoff clearance at 10:51L, in the initial climb the aircraft was handed off to departure at 10:52:33L. At 10:52:38L at about 1200 feet MSL, 37 seconds after becoming airborne, a master warning activated related to the failure of the right hand engine, at 10:52:43L the left hand engine was throttled back and at 10:53:00L the crew began to discuss engine #1 had stalled. At 10:53:06L the right hand engine (engine #2) auto-feathered. At 10:53:12L a first stall warning occured and ceased at 10:53:18L. At 10:53:19L the crew discussed that engine #1 had already feathered, the fuel supply had already been cut to the engine and decided to attempt a restart of engine #1. Two seconds later another stall warning activated. At 10:53:34L the crew radioed "Mayday! Mayday! Engine flame out!", multiple attempts to restart the engines followed to no avail. At 10:54:34L a second master warning activated, 0.4 seconds later both recorders stopped recording.
The procedure I was taught for an engine failiure after take off with a Handling Pilot and a Non-handling pilot.
NHP "Engine failure No1/2.
HP Confirms engine failiure No 1/2
HP "Retard No 1/2
NHP places his hand on the appropiate throttle. "No 1/2."
HP confirms that it is the correct throttle and the throttle is retarded.
This would take a lot longer than the five seconds shown on the FDA of this aircraft. That five seconds suggests that the NHP acted independently.
The sounds of silence at multi engine training schools where the wrong feathering button has been pressed are legend.
As a previous poster has mentioned it is easy to rush an incident into an emergency.
NHP "Engine failure No1/2.
HP Confirms engine failiure No 1/2
HP "Retard No 1/2
NHP places his hand on the appropiate throttle. "No 1/2."
HP confirms that it is the correct throttle and the throttle is retarded.
This would take a lot longer than the five seconds shown on the FDA of this aircraft. That five seconds suggests that the NHP acted independently.
The sounds of silence at multi engine training schools where the wrong feathering button has been pressed are legend.
As a previous poster has mentioned it is easy to rush an incident into an emergency.
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Agree with Sop Monkey
So true: "2 captains and a check pilot = potentially disastrous if something goes wrong"
We are all human beings: to operate efficiently our brain needs no distractions, if we know we are under scrutiny and detailed observation, the pressure and anxiety can interfere with our brain functions to the point that we can make silly basic mistakes which would have not been done if we were not under observational pressure.
Examples: some people do all wrong if they know they are being observed from behind whilst they work on a computer, some people end up doing all wrong if their phone call is being monitored and they know about this, and so on. Many real life examples (driving exams, etc).
We are all human beings. Full concentration is achieved when there is minimal external interference.
During a real emergency it would be better not to be under observation or examination. Anxiety status would certainly not help to get out alive.
We are all human beings: to operate efficiently our brain needs no distractions, if we know we are under scrutiny and detailed observation, the pressure and anxiety can interfere with our brain functions to the point that we can make silly basic mistakes which would have not been done if we were not under observational pressure.
Examples: some people do all wrong if they know they are being observed from behind whilst they work on a computer, some people end up doing all wrong if their phone call is being monitored and they know about this, and so on. Many real life examples (driving exams, etc).
We are all human beings. Full concentration is achieved when there is minimal external interference.
During a real emergency it would be better not to be under observation or examination. Anxiety status would certainly not help to get out alive.
Tu.114--- Maybe this information has slipped past me in this thread, but with all this discussion about the crew being focussed on the left hand engine, I ask myself - why should that be?
Apart from #1 engine being critical due to the propellers direction of rotation, is there any technical peculiarity to the ATR that makes the failure of #1 particularly undesirable? Possibly even to a point where actions in that case will be expressively briefed during the departure/emergency briefing?
Apart from #1 engine being critical due to the propellers direction of rotation, is there any technical peculiarity to the ATR that makes the failure of #1 particularly undesirable? Possibly even to a point where actions in that case will be expressively briefed during the departure/emergency briefing?
Subconscious pre-dispostion to assume your warning/issue is with a known problem. If you had a known issue with your water pump in your car, like it was leaking or making strange noises, and your engine suddenly dies as you are driving down the road, you may jump to the conclusion that your water pump just failed, as you were "worried" about it.
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Glasgow, Scotland
Wrong engine shut off before fatal air crash
12:01AM BST 31 Jul 2001
MISLEADING instrument readings may have led an experienced captain to take action against an engine working normally moments before an eight-death air crash, an accident report said today.
Capt John Easson, 49, seemed to have reacted initially to a perceived loss of power from the right-hand engine in the Cessna 404 Titan crash in which five stewardesses from the airline Airtours were killed.
But it was the left engine that had suffered a catastrophic failure in the accident near Glasgow airport, from where the aircraft had just taken off on Sept 2, 1999.
When Capt Easson, of Bryde, Isle of Man, who was taking the Airtours crew to Aberdeen, feathered the right-hand engine there was a total loss of thrust, said the report from the Air Accidents Investigation Branch.
He tried to return to Glasgow, but the plane went down in a field, bursting into flames. A post-accident inspection "did not reveal any mechanical evidence of a problem with the right engine".
Related Articles
An Airtours captain and two Airtours stewards were injured but got clear of the plane and survived. But Capt Easson, his co-pilot, five stewardesses and another Airtours captain all died.
The five stewardesses who died, who all lived in Strathclyde, were Pauline MacIver, 31, from Stevenston; mother-of-three Pauline Moyes, 38, from Ranton; newly-wed Linda Taylor, 29, from Troon; Helen Steven, 28, of Helensburgh; and Lynn McCulloch, 23, of Kirkintilloch.
Also killed was Colin Finnie, an Airtours pilot and father of three from Irvine, Strathclyde. The co-pilot, who also died, was Bill Henderson, 54, a father of four, of Lower Largo, Fife. The AAIB also said that all the passenger seats had come loose from the floor of the aircraft.
The aircraft was operated by the Edinburgh Air Charter company and was taking the Airtours staff to Aberdeen to connect with a holiday flight to Majorca.
Today's report praised a farm worker who helped rescue survivors before being beaten back by flames. The AAIB said the plane did not have, nor was required to have, flight recorders.
The board recommended that such aircraft should at least have a cockpit voice recorder and that the Civil Aviation Authority should look at the whole question of safer seats.
Wrong engine shut off before fatal air crash - Telegraph
12:01AM BST 31 Jul 2001
MISLEADING instrument readings may have led an experienced captain to take action against an engine working normally moments before an eight-death air crash, an accident report said today.
Capt John Easson, 49, seemed to have reacted initially to a perceived loss of power from the right-hand engine in the Cessna 404 Titan crash in which five stewardesses from the airline Airtours were killed.
But it was the left engine that had suffered a catastrophic failure in the accident near Glasgow airport, from where the aircraft had just taken off on Sept 2, 1999.
When Capt Easson, of Bryde, Isle of Man, who was taking the Airtours crew to Aberdeen, feathered the right-hand engine there was a total loss of thrust, said the report from the Air Accidents Investigation Branch.
He tried to return to Glasgow, but the plane went down in a field, bursting into flames. A post-accident inspection "did not reveal any mechanical evidence of a problem with the right engine".
Related Articles
An Airtours captain and two Airtours stewards were injured but got clear of the plane and survived. But Capt Easson, his co-pilot, five stewardesses and another Airtours captain all died.
The five stewardesses who died, who all lived in Strathclyde, were Pauline MacIver, 31, from Stevenston; mother-of-three Pauline Moyes, 38, from Ranton; newly-wed Linda Taylor, 29, from Troon; Helen Steven, 28, of Helensburgh; and Lynn McCulloch, 23, of Kirkintilloch.
Also killed was Colin Finnie, an Airtours pilot and father of three from Irvine, Strathclyde. The co-pilot, who also died, was Bill Henderson, 54, a father of four, of Lower Largo, Fife. The AAIB also said that all the passenger seats had come loose from the floor of the aircraft.
The aircraft was operated by the Edinburgh Air Charter company and was taking the Airtours staff to Aberdeen to connect with a holiday flight to Majorca.
Today's report praised a farm worker who helped rescue survivors before being beaten back by flames. The AAIB said the plane did not have, nor was required to have, flight recorders.
The board recommended that such aircraft should at least have a cockpit voice recorder and that the Civil Aviation Authority should look at the whole question of safer seats.
Wrong engine shut off before fatal air crash - Telegraph