TransAsia in the water?
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When the right engine went to auto-feather, would there not be pronounced yaw to the right, resulting in left rudder input, and a dead-foot/dead engine clue to guide correct identification and shutdown?
Auto-feather can cause a momentary yaw into the operating engine as the prop goes into coarse pitch. After that transient impulse has passed the rudder input required to maintain longitudinal trim leaves no question as to which engine is still developing power.
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TheInquisitor - I wouldn't be so sure. If you examine the accidents, deaths, incidents per thousand flights you'll find that flying is safer than ever. But this is of little consolation to the relatives and loved ones of those who have died. Now some of this can attributed to aircraft design. For example, the Asiana 777; who could image that there would be so few injuries and fatalities from that crash? I am also sure that cockpit automation is responsible for the current lack of incidents and accidents. Though what we are not doing as an entire industry is adapting our training and procedures to match the aircraft we are now flying. The whiff of old fashioned ex-airforce macho culture from the sixties and seventies can still be smelt within too many training and national oversight authorities. And I'll also agree that we have moved too far way from stick'n'rudder. It's been 20 years since I've tried to pull the wings off an aircraft. I've stalled a biggish jet (Fokker 100) a few times and had a good play about in a Fokker 50 but again, this was years ago.
What we all need is fewer pointless boxes to tick and regular, simple basic training for when horrible things happen.
What we all need is fewer pointless boxes to tick and regular, simple basic training for when horrible things happen.
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caused by 'pilot error' on old-school aircraft with the number caused,or contributed to, by automation may yield interesting (and disturbing) results.
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Comparing the number of accidents & deaths caused by 'pilot error' on old-school aircraft with the number caused,or contributed to, by automation may yield interesting (and disturbing) results.
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Lack of basic flying skills
Unfortunately another accident which seems to indicate that basic flying skills are being steadily eroded by lack of hand flying.
For heavens sake all the PF had to do was to adopt a slightly lower nose attitude, put his big flat foot on the rudder to keep it straight, control IAS with fine attitude adjustments, and then very casually call for any relevant checklist.....slowly deliberately, and with cross reference with the other crew.
What did they collectively do? Rushed into action, shut down the wrong engine, and then ...stall and loss of control.
AF447, crew couldn't gand fly an aircraft in the cruise with nil IAS indications. Result ...stall, and loss of control.
Asiana couldn't do a visual approach with an A/T malfunction, result ....stall and loss of control.
Turkish Airlines at Schipol couldn't handle Rad Alt causing A/T to prematurely close, (A/T malfunction).
Result.....stall, and loss of control.
Lion Air crew couldn't even do a bog standard missed approach when blind Freddy on a galloping horse would have done.
We as an industry desperately need to go back to basics, hand fly aircraft more often, teach crew to think, and not just act.
This crew had "all day" to slowly, deliberately respond to a malfunction. The outcome is tragically linked to a basic lack of flying skills.
The assertion by some on this thread that there is a need to "act quickly" in this situation is quite frankly patently wrong. This aircraft was at or above 1000' when the malfunction occurred. There is NEVER a requirement to rush EFATO procedures, and EFATO is typically practiced as a V1 cut. Thus was no V1 cut. I can see no combination of circumstances, (incorrect wiring, unscheduled Hotel Mode, etc etc), that could have made this tragic accident unavoidable.
One poster mentioned QF A380, and stated that QF didn't have the same time pressure. The QF crew had a non standard series of events that most definately did not fit into any checklist, they had to make things up and improvise, because no known failure ever anticipated what happened to them. Had they lost control of the aircraft it would have been "all over red rover".
My sad conclusion is with this latest accident....lack of basic flying skills. We as an industry need to rectify this, and rectify it RFN.
For heavens sake all the PF had to do was to adopt a slightly lower nose attitude, put his big flat foot on the rudder to keep it straight, control IAS with fine attitude adjustments, and then very casually call for any relevant checklist.....slowly deliberately, and with cross reference with the other crew.
What did they collectively do? Rushed into action, shut down the wrong engine, and then ...stall and loss of control.
AF447, crew couldn't gand fly an aircraft in the cruise with nil IAS indications. Result ...stall, and loss of control.
Asiana couldn't do a visual approach with an A/T malfunction, result ....stall and loss of control.
Turkish Airlines at Schipol couldn't handle Rad Alt causing A/T to prematurely close, (A/T malfunction).
Result.....stall, and loss of control.
Lion Air crew couldn't even do a bog standard missed approach when blind Freddy on a galloping horse would have done.
We as an industry desperately need to go back to basics, hand fly aircraft more often, teach crew to think, and not just act.
This crew had "all day" to slowly, deliberately respond to a malfunction. The outcome is tragically linked to a basic lack of flying skills.
The assertion by some on this thread that there is a need to "act quickly" in this situation is quite frankly patently wrong. This aircraft was at or above 1000' when the malfunction occurred. There is NEVER a requirement to rush EFATO procedures, and EFATO is typically practiced as a V1 cut. Thus was no V1 cut. I can see no combination of circumstances, (incorrect wiring, unscheduled Hotel Mode, etc etc), that could have made this tragic accident unavoidable.
One poster mentioned QF A380, and stated that QF didn't have the same time pressure. The QF crew had a non standard series of events that most definately did not fit into any checklist, they had to make things up and improvise, because no known failure ever anticipated what happened to them. Had they lost control of the aircraft it would have been "all over red rover".
My sad conclusion is with this latest accident....lack of basic flying skills. We as an industry need to rectify this, and rectify it RFN.
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Eventually automation will replace us. We'll still be sitting there "feeding the monkey" but in the end autopilots won't shut down the wrong engine, they will recognise unreliable airspeed and deal with it, they won't be susceptible to CFIT and so on. In the end flying will be safer than it already is. How far into the future? No idea, but it's bound to happen.
I saw the beginning of the process years ago on my 777 conversion with TAC, auto rudder on engine failure. It's not hard to imagine auto everything following eventually.
I saw the beginning of the process years ago on my 777 conversion with TAC, auto rudder on engine failure. It's not hard to imagine auto everything following eventually.
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Lack of basic flying skills
"We as an industry desperately need to go back to basics, hand fly aircraft more often, teach crew to think, and not just act."
I would imagine hand flying tends to use more fuel, and therefore costs more money. I can see why management discourage it. In my experience corporations don't like people to think. They much prefer it when people don't think, but blindly follow SOPs. Thinking people are troublesome, for all kinds of reasons.
"One poster mentioned QF A380, and stated that QF didn't have the same time pressure."
I'm not a pilot, but turboprop pilots here have described graphically the need to act quickly when a windmilling propellor (or engine/prop combination generating negative thrust) is rapidly bringing the aircraft to the edge of controllability.
I can imagine that when one has engine problems at low level over a city, with a training captain breathing down one's neck, one has an incentive to be, or appear to be, decisive. I can also imagine why, for various reasons, pushing the nose downwards to maintain speed might be somewhat unpalatable. One reason which springs to mind would be when a high-rise is filling your windshield.
I'm not particularly surprised at the fumbling under the apparent circumstances. It's human nature. I'm slightly more surprised that the flightpath didn't track the river more closely.
I would imagine hand flying tends to use more fuel, and therefore costs more money. I can see why management discourage it. In my experience corporations don't like people to think. They much prefer it when people don't think, but blindly follow SOPs. Thinking people are troublesome, for all kinds of reasons.
"One poster mentioned QF A380, and stated that QF didn't have the same time pressure."
I'm not a pilot, but turboprop pilots here have described graphically the need to act quickly when a windmilling propellor (or engine/prop combination generating negative thrust) is rapidly bringing the aircraft to the edge of controllability.
I can imagine that when one has engine problems at low level over a city, with a training captain breathing down one's neck, one has an incentive to be, or appear to be, decisive. I can also imagine why, for various reasons, pushing the nose downwards to maintain speed might be somewhat unpalatable. One reason which springs to mind would be when a high-rise is filling your windshield.
I'm not particularly surprised at the fumbling under the apparent circumstances. It's human nature. I'm slightly more surprised that the flightpath didn't track the river more closely.
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There is NEVER a requirement to rush EFATO procedures
Plenty didn't, and stalled and spun and died as a result. Including a guy I knew in a PA38 a few years ago. If he'd got the nose down instead of sending a Mayday he'd almost certainly be with us today.
FLY THE AEROPLANE!
N4790P
It will be interesting to see whether the overall outcomes of these proficiency checks will be published, in the interest of openness & transparency?
No other industry would tolerate this intrusion, nor should ours.
The outcome is for the regulator concerned to determine what remedial action is required.
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Originally Posted by TheInquisitor
Just a theory here, but have another look at the FDR trace, in particular around the time the #1 was slotted.
By pure happenstance, possibly because of where the #1 PL had been retarded to at this time, most of the engine instruments at this time would have been giving very similar readings, comparing left vs right.
Perhaps a contributing factor in misidentification?
By pure happenstance, possibly because of where the #1 PL had been retarded to at this time, most of the engine instruments at this time would have been giving very similar readings, comparing left vs right.
Perhaps a contributing factor in misidentification?
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IronDuck makes some good points. But there is one thing about flying. You have to do things quickly, but even more importantly you have to do things correctly.
The plane could have easily followed the river rather than over fly the densley populated area. On some of the maps of the ground track, I honestly though the plane turned due to not handling the engine out well.
Flying does cost money to do things correctly . And only the lawyers will make out on this flight.
The plane could have easily followed the river rather than over fly the densley populated area. On some of the maps of the ground track, I honestly though the plane turned due to not handling the engine out well.
Flying does cost money to do things correctly . And only the lawyers will make out on this flight.
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"We as an industry desperately need to go back to basics, hand fly aircraft more often, teach crew to think, and not just act."
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Don't rush, if in doubt, DONT RUSH
One more thing worth mentioning, DONT RUSH......EVER!
Fly the A/C, ....ie respond to the event, lower the nose to maintain V2, but time is not critical, you have at least 3 seconds, maybe more. Use rudder to keep the nose straight, follow procedures, at terrain clearance, (typically 400' AGL), commence identification and securing.
This is the typical procedure with a V1 cut, on the runway, prior to rotate, altudude zero, gear down flaps at T/OFF.
These guys had 1000'+, gear up flaps possibly up, and V2+, need to rush nil, zero, non-existent. Am I clear?
Fly the A/C, ....ie respond to the event, lower the nose to maintain V2, but time is not critical, you have at least 3 seconds, maybe more. Use rudder to keep the nose straight, follow procedures, at terrain clearance, (typically 400' AGL), commence identification and securing.
This is the typical procedure with a V1 cut, on the runway, prior to rotate, altudude zero, gear down flaps at T/OFF.
These guys had 1000'+, gear up flaps possibly up, and V2+, need to rush nil, zero, non-existent. Am I clear?
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Used to fly the dash 8 q300. Very similar to the atr on power to weight. When we were given an engine failure at v1 we would state up trim and autofeather and then do nothing until acceleration attitude. In that time you could identify the problem and by the time it came to shutting down an engine you could be confident it was the correct one. There is never a rush to shut down an engine unless it doesn't autofeather.
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@Gazumped
Totally agree with what you said! It's frankly surprised me reading some of these posts talking about reacting "quickly". In my younger days I was a multi-engine flight instructor for 5 years, and nearly every time we went assymetric and the student would panic we would have in correct rudder in-puts, or confirm the wrong engine etc etc. The solution every time, was to slow down, and work through the situation methodically. This priceless lesson still continues to assist me today flying jets.... Whatever happened to "nothing needs to be done in a hurry unless you're on fire"?
Totally agree with what you said! It's frankly surprised me reading some of these posts talking about reacting "quickly". In my younger days I was a multi-engine flight instructor for 5 years, and nearly every time we went assymetric and the student would panic we would have in correct rudder in-puts, or confirm the wrong engine etc etc. The solution every time, was to slow down, and work through the situation methodically. This priceless lesson still continues to assist me today flying jets.... Whatever happened to "nothing needs to be done in a hurry unless you're on fire"?
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The torque fluctuations in the FDR data are interesting.
NH2 looks like it went to roughly 80%, if I'm reading it correctly, which must be well above idle, but possibly low enough to cause the torque to fall below the threshold for the auto-feather. With the engine still running, above idle, the torque would increase as the prop feathered. Would the auto feather cancel if the torque rose above its threshold? If so, the torque would fall again as the prop started to unfeather, and you could end up with an oscillating torque.
The #1 torque fluctuations have got me completely baffled though, as the prop shouldn't be cycling after the #1 condition lever was put to cut-off.
I suspect there is a lot more to this story to come. The indications in the cockpit may not have been as clear as some here seem to assume.
NH2 looks like it went to roughly 80%, if I'm reading it correctly, which must be well above idle, but possibly low enough to cause the torque to fall below the threshold for the auto-feather. With the engine still running, above idle, the torque would increase as the prop feathered. Would the auto feather cancel if the torque rose above its threshold? If so, the torque would fall again as the prop started to unfeather, and you could end up with an oscillating torque.
The #1 torque fluctuations have got me completely baffled though, as the prop shouldn't be cycling after the #1 condition lever was put to cut-off.
I suspect there is a lot more to this story to come. The indications in the cockpit may not have been as clear as some here seem to assume.