Russian B737 Crash at Kazan.
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It is clear they screwed up the approach and go-around.
Just WHY pitch angle they got about 75 deg nose down?
Stab/stab trim/elevator failure???
PFD/ADI failure?
Pilot incapacitation?
Just WHY pitch angle they got about 75 deg nose down?
Stab/stab trim/elevator failure???
PFD/ADI failure?
Pilot incapacitation?
Originally Posted by Aluminium shuffler
It could have captured a false glide slope or suffered some sort of disturbance to the glide.
Originally Posted by 5 APUs captain
Just WHY pitch angle they got about 75 deg nose down?
Stab/stab trim/elevator failure???
DOVE
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Clandestino:
Quote:
Originally Posted by DOVES And what about this?:
About what? That someone has not very clear idea about flying in general, 737 flight controls system and Russian grammar so is unable to understand that automatic trim set itself towards nose-down position and did not send the whole aeroplane into dive?
About this!:
…The aircraft began to pitch up under the influence of engine acceleration and flaps retraction reaching 25 degrees nose up, the stabilizer trim system wound - most likely automatically [??? (And we all know that in the B73 the autotrim is only operative with the autopilot engaged)]- wound nose down commanding the aircraft into a dive….
And this!:
http://www.pprune.org/8161310-post107.html
By Sunamer
words of a person participating in the investigation:
...actual GA was initiated at outer marker. They climbed up to 900m and then the airspeed started to decrease. Pitch started to change to negative and they started to fall being at 800m from the threshold of 11 apprx with angle of 75-80 degrees.
And this!:
http://www.pprune.org/8161768-post119.html
By Sunamer
there is an update from MAK
During approach, the crew didn't achieve proper parameters of standard approach that was specified in the documentation. Had assessed AC's position as non-landing in relation to the runway, the crew reported this and initiated GA using TOGA mode. During this phase, one of autopilots that had been used during approach, was disconnected and from this moment piloting was done in manual mode.
(And we all know that in the B73 the autotrim is only operative with the autopilot engaged)
Engines reached thrust mode that was close to TO. The crew changed flaps setting from 30 to 15 degrees. Because of the engine thrust, pitch started to increase and AC started to climb. Pitch angle reached 25 degrees.
IAS started to decrease, then the crew retracted the gear.
From the moment of initiating GA, to this moment the crew had not attempted to actively control the AC with a yoke input.
After IAS decreased from 150 to 125 kt, the crew started to use control column in order to obtain nose down attitude. That led to the arrest of climb, and subsequent descend with increase of IAS. Maximum AoA didn't exceed operational limits.
AC, after reaching alt of 700m, started to descend with negative pitch angle, that reached -75 degrees at the end of the recording. AC came into contact with the ground at high speed (more than 450 kmh ) and with large negative pitch angle.
From the moment of GA to the end of recording 45 sec had passed and the descend took 20 secs.
Engines performed as expected until the moment of impact, and there was no indication of any failures or abnormal operations in any of the AC systems
And this!:
http://www.pprune.org/8178067-post299.html
from avherald:
Information released by Rosaviatsia on Nov 28th 2013 based on preliminary investigation results by MAK states, that the captain of the flight (47, ATPL, 2736 hours total, 2509 hours on type, 528 hours in command) was rated for CAT I ILS approaches only, the first officer (47, no type of pilot rating provided, 2093 hours total, 1943 hours on type) was rated for CAT II ILS approaches. According to preliminary information the crew was significantly (4km) off the approach track prompting ATC to query the crew. Corrections were made, the aircraft remained significantly right of the extended runway centerline however until the crew selected heading 250 into autopilot (heading select mode) and the aircraft intercepted the localizer automatically about 2nm short of the runway threshold at about 1000 feet AGL, the glideslope did not capture due to height however. After passing the missed approach point the crew discussed a go-around and communicated with dispatch, [U]then disengaged both autopilots engaged in the automatic approach and continued manually on flight director. Engines accelerated to 83% N1 (near Go-Around Thrust) and continued at that speed until almost impact. The aircraft began to pitch up under the influence of engine acceleration and flaps retraction reaching 25 degrees nose up, the stabilizer trim system wound - most likely automatically - nose down commanding the aircraft into a diveIn the meantime the crew retracted the gear, there had been no input on the yoke since deactivation of autopilot until that time, the airspeed had decayed from 150 to 125 KIAS. The crew now applied full forward pressure, the aircraft began to accelerate again after reaching a minimum speed of 117 KIAS at 700 meters/2300 feet above the runway, and began to rapidly descent, EGPWS alerts "SINK RATE" and "PULL UP" sounded, there was no reaction to the extreme nose down attitude however and the vertical acceleration became negative. The aircraft impacted ground at 75 degrees nose down at about 450 kph at coordinates N55.608818 E49.276852, the impact occurred 45 seconds after initiating the go-around and 20 seconds after reaching the maximum height. Initial safety recommendations released are to provide simulator training on balked landings, especially when close to the target altitude for the climb, provide training on recognition of complex spatial disorientation and upset recovery, provide training on operation and characteristics of aircraft systems especially autopilot and flight director during approach and missed approach, study the features of navigation system (FMS), consider revision of air traffic control procedures to provide more assistance to crews with technical failures including providing vectors to guide the aircraft onto the runway and conduct a conference to share technical flight experiences amongst operators.
I know that only you have
[That someone has not] very clear idea about flying in general, 737 flight controls system and Russian grammar so [is] are [un]able to understand that automatic trim set itself (And we all know that in the B73 the autotrim is only operative with the autopilot engaged) towards nose-down position.
Thank you Clandestino for your CRM lesson.
Quote:
Originally Posted by DOVES And what about this?:
About what? That someone has not very clear idea about flying in general, 737 flight controls system and Russian grammar so is unable to understand that automatic trim set itself towards nose-down position and did not send the whole aeroplane into dive?
About this!:
…The aircraft began to pitch up under the influence of engine acceleration and flaps retraction reaching 25 degrees nose up, the stabilizer trim system wound - most likely automatically [??? (And we all know that in the B73 the autotrim is only operative with the autopilot engaged)]- wound nose down commanding the aircraft into a dive….
And this!:
http://www.pprune.org/8161310-post107.html
By Sunamer
words of a person participating in the investigation:
...actual GA was initiated at outer marker. They climbed up to 900m and then the airspeed started to decrease. Pitch started to change to negative and they started to fall being at 800m from the threshold of 11 apprx with angle of 75-80 degrees.
And this!:
http://www.pprune.org/8161768-post119.html
By Sunamer
there is an update from MAK
During approach, the crew didn't achieve proper parameters of standard approach that was specified in the documentation. Had assessed AC's position as non-landing in relation to the runway, the crew reported this and initiated GA using TOGA mode. During this phase, one of autopilots that had been used during approach, was disconnected and from this moment piloting was done in manual mode.
(And we all know that in the B73 the autotrim is only operative with the autopilot engaged)
Engines reached thrust mode that was close to TO. The crew changed flaps setting from 30 to 15 degrees. Because of the engine thrust, pitch started to increase and AC started to climb. Pitch angle reached 25 degrees.
IAS started to decrease, then the crew retracted the gear.
From the moment of initiating GA, to this moment the crew had not attempted to actively control the AC with a yoke input.
After IAS decreased from 150 to 125 kt, the crew started to use control column in order to obtain nose down attitude. That led to the arrest of climb, and subsequent descend with increase of IAS. Maximum AoA didn't exceed operational limits.
AC, after reaching alt of 700m, started to descend with negative pitch angle, that reached -75 degrees at the end of the recording. AC came into contact with the ground at high speed (more than 450 kmh ) and with large negative pitch angle.
From the moment of GA to the end of recording 45 sec had passed and the descend took 20 secs.
Engines performed as expected until the moment of impact, and there was no indication of any failures or abnormal operations in any of the AC systems
And this!:
http://www.pprune.org/8178067-post299.html
from avherald:
Information released by Rosaviatsia on Nov 28th 2013 based on preliminary investigation results by MAK states, that the captain of the flight (47, ATPL, 2736 hours total, 2509 hours on type, 528 hours in command) was rated for CAT I ILS approaches only, the first officer (47, no type of pilot rating provided, 2093 hours total, 1943 hours on type) was rated for CAT II ILS approaches. According to preliminary information the crew was significantly (4km) off the approach track prompting ATC to query the crew. Corrections were made, the aircraft remained significantly right of the extended runway centerline however until the crew selected heading 250 into autopilot (heading select mode) and the aircraft intercepted the localizer automatically about 2nm short of the runway threshold at about 1000 feet AGL, the glideslope did not capture due to height however. After passing the missed approach point the crew discussed a go-around and communicated with dispatch, [U]then disengaged both autopilots engaged in the automatic approach and continued manually on flight director. Engines accelerated to 83% N1 (near Go-Around Thrust) and continued at that speed until almost impact. The aircraft began to pitch up under the influence of engine acceleration and flaps retraction reaching 25 degrees nose up, the stabilizer trim system wound - most likely automatically - nose down commanding the aircraft into a diveIn the meantime the crew retracted the gear, there had been no input on the yoke since deactivation of autopilot until that time, the airspeed had decayed from 150 to 125 KIAS. The crew now applied full forward pressure, the aircraft began to accelerate again after reaching a minimum speed of 117 KIAS at 700 meters/2300 feet above the runway, and began to rapidly descent, EGPWS alerts "SINK RATE" and "PULL UP" sounded, there was no reaction to the extreme nose down attitude however and the vertical acceleration became negative. The aircraft impacted ground at 75 degrees nose down at about 450 kph at coordinates N55.608818 E49.276852, the impact occurred 45 seconds after initiating the go-around and 20 seconds after reaching the maximum height. Initial safety recommendations released are to provide simulator training on balked landings, especially when close to the target altitude for the climb, provide training on recognition of complex spatial disorientation and upset recovery, provide training on operation and characteristics of aircraft systems especially autopilot and flight director during approach and missed approach, study the features of navigation system (FMS), consider revision of air traffic control procedures to provide more assistance to crews with technical failures including providing vectors to guide the aircraft onto the runway and conduct a conference to share technical flight experiences amongst operators.
I know that only you have
[That someone has not] very clear idea about flying in general, 737 flight controls system and Russian grammar so [is] are [un]able to understand that automatic trim set itself (And we all know that in the B73 the autotrim is only operative with the autopilot engaged) towards nose-down position.
Thank you Clandestino for your CRM lesson.
Last edited by DOVES; 1st Dec 2013 at 15:14.
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(And we all know that in the B73 the autotrim is only operative with the autopilot engaged)
Last edited by Sunamer; 2nd Dec 2013 at 00:06.
DOVES, what you piled up here is just heap of mistranslations and misunderstandings of official releases. BTW, 737 has automatic pitch trim (STS), acting as stability augmentation system when AP is off. Those who know she doesn't, know Jack Schidt.
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Hi,
STS
The system automatically controls the trimming trim in manual flight, without autopilot is STS = speed trim system.
It is active 10 seconds after takeoff, between 100 kts and Mach 0.60 (then 0 and 0.68 M) when the autopilot is not engaged and is made for light offs, rear centering and high engine thrust.
Its purpose is to trim the aircraft with the stabilizer when the aircraft speed varies to return the aircraft to its original speed and flight toiled.
Example, if the speed decreases, the stabilizer trim moves to sting to force the plane to recover the speed at which it was slaved correctly
So .. I dunno if the STS played a role in this crash
STS
The system automatically controls the trimming trim in manual flight, without autopilot is STS = speed trim system.
It is active 10 seconds after takeoff, between 100 kts and Mach 0.60 (then 0 and 0.68 M) when the autopilot is not engaged and is made for light offs, rear centering and high engine thrust.
Its purpose is to trim the aircraft with the stabilizer when the aircraft speed varies to return the aircraft to its original speed and flight toiled.
Example, if the speed decreases, the stabilizer trim moves to sting to force the plane to recover the speed at which it was slaved correctly
So .. I dunno if the STS played a role in this crash
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How about:
-2 middle aged flight engineers/system operators given a very basic/minimum hours pilot course.
-Type rating 737, and the next two, three years flying autopilot.
-One upgrades to captain after minimum hours.
-A 737 prone to map shifts.
-Poor ATC.
-Limited situational awareness.
-Limited manual flying skills.
-Poor systems knowledge.
-Unable to handle a surprise go around
-Not able to prioritize:
Aviate, navigate, communicate switched to communicate, communicate, communicate. As systems operators they would have all the time in the world to do that. Not as pilots.
Thousands of FE hours does not make you into a pilot. Gulf Air lost an Airbus when a FE turned pilot flew the aircraft into the sea.
STS works AFTER TAKE OFF.
Disclaimer: I'm not an aircraft accident investigator, and the views above are my personal speculations regarding this accident.
-2 middle aged flight engineers/system operators given a very basic/minimum hours pilot course.
-Type rating 737, and the next two, three years flying autopilot.
-One upgrades to captain after minimum hours.
-A 737 prone to map shifts.
-Poor ATC.
-Limited situational awareness.
-Limited manual flying skills.
-Poor systems knowledge.
-Unable to handle a surprise go around
-Not able to prioritize:
Aviate, navigate, communicate switched to communicate, communicate, communicate. As systems operators they would have all the time in the world to do that. Not as pilots.
Thousands of FE hours does not make you into a pilot. Gulf Air lost an Airbus when a FE turned pilot flew the aircraft into the sea.
STS works AFTER TAKE OFF.
Disclaimer: I'm not an aircraft accident investigator, and the views above are my personal speculations regarding this accident.
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Quoting accident report of UTAir ATR in Tyumen ; published few weeks ago
CPT :
total fh : 2602
ATR fh : 2522
initial training 80 h : 48 h on Yak 18 + 32 h on Antonov 26 , then ATR type rating.
FO :
total fh : 1825
ATR fh : 1765
initial training :60 h on Antonov 26, then ATR type rating.
CPT :
total fh : 2602
ATR fh : 2522
initial training 80 h : 48 h on Yak 18 + 32 h on Antonov 26 , then ATR type rating.
FO :
total fh : 1825
ATR fh : 1765
initial training :60 h on Antonov 26, then ATR type rating.
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If I understand these experience numbers correctly it suggest both pilots were released on type with only 150-ish total, i.e. cadets, and that the captain was a DEC as a cadet. Can this really be true, and if so, is extraordinary and questions of the airline and local XAA need asking. Perhaps I'm wrong in my perception.
DOVE
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Sunamer Clandestino jcjeant
Thank you all .
Now I am forced to pull out of dust my FOM and check .
What makes me shiver is the movie of the last seconds the ill-fated flight.
In basic piloting courses it is taught to exit a stall without increasing power.
Initially, it is sufficient the load factor reduction caused by the pressure on the control wheel to get out, then, after a short descent, the higher the speed , the wings regain lift , the effectiveness of the elevator increases, and the aircraft begins to climb initiating a phugoid around the trim speed.
So I do not think that only the pressure on the control wheel, however strong and continuous, may have put the plane in so extreme an unusual attitude.
As soon as the plane had gained speed, he should return to go up, and / or: to force her to go down would have required a growing force that sooner or later would become insufficient even with the wheel all the way down
Unless:the vertical component of lift have been reduced for some other reason.
For instance: Excessive bank
In this regard:
Is there anyone who knows how to assess the direction to which the camera, which frames the plane swooping to the ground almost vertically, is oriented?
Supposing that the camera is located in the main apron, I guess that's oriented toward: 150°-200°
By which I think it could be inferred with good approximation the orientation of the top of the plane: c.ca 240°-290°.
-Wing over?...
-Excessive bank?...
Thank you all .
Now I am forced to pull out of dust my FOM and check .
What makes me shiver is the movie of the last seconds the ill-fated flight.
In basic piloting courses it is taught to exit a stall without increasing power.
Initially, it is sufficient the load factor reduction caused by the pressure on the control wheel to get out, then, after a short descent, the higher the speed , the wings regain lift , the effectiveness of the elevator increases, and the aircraft begins to climb initiating a phugoid around the trim speed.
So I do not think that only the pressure on the control wheel, however strong and continuous, may have put the plane in so extreme an unusual attitude.
As soon as the plane had gained speed, he should return to go up, and / or: to force her to go down would have required a growing force that sooner or later would become insufficient even with the wheel all the way down
Unless:the vertical component of lift have been reduced for some other reason.
For instance: Excessive bank
In this regard:
Is there anyone who knows how to assess the direction to which the camera, which frames the plane swooping to the ground almost vertically, is oriented?
Supposing that the camera is located in the main apron, I guess that's oriented toward: 150°-200°
By which I think it could be inferred with good approximation the orientation of the top of the plane: c.ca 240°-290°.
-Wing over?...
-Excessive bank?...
Last edited by DOVES; 2nd Dec 2013 at 19:16.
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STS is, like mentioned, active only briefly after TO - it is not active at any other stage other than if the SMYD detects an approach to the stall, in which case the STS trims nose down at the same time as the Elevator Feel Shift Module adds pressure to increase control column loading, in combination behaving like an old fashioned stick pusher to make the effort on the column to pull the ac into a stall at least twice what is needed without the systems fighting the pilot (at least, that what the NG does, and I think the Classic was similar, though it has been a decade since I last flew one). So, a malfunction in that system could have been an issue, but the FDR reportedly suggests no malfunction.
Equally, a runaway stabiliser would cause a big pitch moment if not responded to in time, but wouldn't cause a full deflection column input.
I had misunderstood the information regarding the incorrect positioning of the AC - I had thought it was vertical profile and hadn't realised they were so far out laterally too. Quite astonishing that anyone would try to intercept an ILS in IMC at 1000" and so close in. Have they never heard of MORA/MSA?
Equally, a runaway stabiliser would cause a big pitch moment if not responded to in time, but wouldn't cause a full deflection column input.
I had misunderstood the information regarding the incorrect positioning of the AC - I had thought it was vertical profile and hadn't realised they were so far out laterally too. Quite astonishing that anyone would try to intercept an ILS in IMC at 1000" and so close in. Have they never heard of MORA/MSA?
Originally Posted by jcjeant
I dunno if the STS played a role in this crash
Originally Posted by ManAdaSystem
STS works AFTER TAKE OFF.
Originally Posted by Aluminium Shuffler
STS is, like mentioned, active only briefly after TO - it is not active at any other stage other than if the SMYD detects an approach to the stall, in which case the STS trims nose down at the same time as the Elevator Feel Shift Module adds pressure to increase control column loading, in combination behaving like an old fashioned stick pusher to make the effort on the column to pull the ac into a stall at least twice what is needed without the systems fighting the pilot
Originally Posted by Boeing
The speed trim system (STS) designed to improve flight characteristics during operations with a low gross weight, aft center of gravity and high thrust. It monitors inputs of stabilizer position, thrust lever position, airspeed and vertical speed and then trims the stabilizer using the autopilot stabilizer trim. It operates most frequently during takeoffs, climb and go-arounds. Conditions for speed trim operation are listed below:
• Flaps up or down (737-400/500)
• Airspeed 100-300 KIAS
• 10 seconds after takeoff
• 5 seconds following release of trim switches
• N1 above 60%
• Autopilot not engaged
• Sensing of trim requirement
• Flaps up or down (737-400/500)
• Airspeed 100-300 KIAS
• 10 seconds after takeoff
• 5 seconds following release of trim switches
• N1 above 60%
• Autopilot not engaged
• Sensing of trim requirement
Vertically they vere flying in alt hold at 1000 ft QFE, which makes it about 1400 QNH. While it was below 2800 ft MSA, highest obstacle around localizer is a bit shy of 700 QNH so they had a good chance of missing everything despite descending without being established on final. Whether they were aware of legal requirements, proper flying and navigation techniques, illusions in flight etc. boils down to pilot selection and training in Tatarstan. First info does indicate these were severely lacking in quality.
Originally Posted by Aluminium Shuffler
FDR reportedly suggests no malfunction.
DOVE
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Dear Aluminium shuffler
Thank you to.
I agree with what ManAdaSystem wrote in the post 341,
Add to this:
shortly thereafter:
Stick Shaker activation and "STALL - STALL - STALL - ...
And after a while
"SINK RATE" "PULL UP" - "PULL UP" - "PULL UP"
It seems an unbearable workload even for a fully trained, skillfull and expert crew.
Thank you to.
Quite astonishing that anyone would try to intercept an ILS in IMC at 1000" and so close in. Have they never heard of MORA/MSA?
...communicate switched to communicate, communicate, communicate.
...After passing the missed approach point the crew discussed a go-around and communicated with dispatch (TWR),..
shortly thereafter:
Stick Shaker activation and "STALL - STALL - STALL - ...
And after a while
"SINK RATE" "PULL UP" - "PULL UP" - "PULL UP"
It seems an unbearable workload even for a fully trained, skillfull and expert crew.
Well, I did quote the "classic" manual, which I suspect might be relevant since the crashed bird was -500, but I can do it for NG too:
Anyway, while individual aircraft equipment might differ, MAK was pretty explicit that the STS did activate during go-around.
Edit:
What occurrence are you referring to?
Originally Posted by Boeing
The speed trim system (STS) is a speed stability augmentation system designed to
improve flight characteristics during operations with a low gross weight, aft center
of gravity and high thrust when the autopilot is not engaged. The purpose of the
STS is to return the airplane to a trimmed speed by commanding the stabilizer in
a direction opposite the speed change. The STS monitors inputs of stabilizer
position, thrust lever position, airspeed and vertical speed and then trims the
stabilizer using the autopilot stabilizer trim. As the airplane speed increases or
decreases from the trimmed speed, the stabilizer is commanded in the direction to
return the airplane to the trimmed speed. This increases control column forces to
force the airplane to return to the trimmed speed. As the airplane returns to the
trimmed speed, the STS commanded stabilizer movement is removed.
STS operates most frequently during takeoffs, climb and go-arounds. Conditions
for speed trim operation are listed below:
• STS Mach gain is fully enabled
between 100 KIAS and Mach
0.60 with a fadeout to zero by
Mach 0.68
• 10 seconds after takeoff
• 5 seconds following release of
trim switches
• Autopilot not engaged
• Sensing of trim requirement
improve flight characteristics during operations with a low gross weight, aft center
of gravity and high thrust when the autopilot is not engaged. The purpose of the
STS is to return the airplane to a trimmed speed by commanding the stabilizer in
a direction opposite the speed change. The STS monitors inputs of stabilizer
position, thrust lever position, airspeed and vertical speed and then trims the
stabilizer using the autopilot stabilizer trim. As the airplane speed increases or
decreases from the trimmed speed, the stabilizer is commanded in the direction to
return the airplane to the trimmed speed. This increases control column forces to
force the airplane to return to the trimmed speed. As the airplane returns to the
trimmed speed, the STS commanded stabilizer movement is removed.
STS operates most frequently during takeoffs, climb and go-arounds. Conditions
for speed trim operation are listed below:
• STS Mach gain is fully enabled
between 100 KIAS and Mach
0.60 with a fadeout to zero by
Mach 0.68
• 10 seconds after takeoff
• 5 seconds following release of
trim switches
• Autopilot not engaged
• Sensing of trim requirement
Edit:
Originally Posted by DOVES
Add to this:
shortly thereafter:
Stick Shaker activation and "STALL - STALL - STALL - ...
shortly thereafter:
Stick Shaker activation and "STALL - STALL - STALL - ...
DOVE
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Clandestino
If something has not been lost or changed in translation.
I don’t think that 117 KIAS is bigger than stick shaker speed, even with 25°(?) flaps. Do you?
If something has not been lost or changed in translation.
…In the meantime the crew retracted the gear, there had been no input on the yoke since deactivation of autopilot until that time, the airspeed had decayed from 150 to 125 KIAS. The crew now applied full forward pressure, the aircraft began to accelerate again after reaching a minimum speed of 117 KIAS…
I just might as there is no such thing as shaker speed in itself, only shaker alpha. There are shaker speeds for weight, configuration and normal acceleration. Shaker activation is not just unconfirmed but for the time being not mentioned at all and as NGs have no other alerting systems apart from shaker I suspect that such might be the case on -500 so "Stall stall stall" belongs among speculation. Anyway:
Originally Posted by MAK
Максимальные углы атаки в процессе полёта не превышали эксплуатационных ограничений.
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Avherald report that they were on their third approach - having already gone around twice.
If this is correct you'd not imagine they'd be caught out by the g/a, nor would you imagine they'd so completely cock up their intercept of the LOC. An even marginally capable crew should be applying lessons learned and getting it right, not getting worse!
If things had been going wrong for the previous two approaches such inexperienced pilot could well have been in a state of near panic by the third. I daresay the CVR will reveal a great deal.
If this is correct you'd not imagine they'd be caught out by the g/a, nor would you imagine they'd so completely cock up their intercept of the LOC. An even marginally capable crew should be applying lessons learned and getting it right, not getting worse!
If things had been going wrong for the previous two approaches such inexperienced pilot could well have been in a state of near panic by the third. I daresay the CVR will reveal a great deal.