Clandestino:
Quote:
Originally Posted by DOVES And what about this?:
About what? That someone has not very clear idea about flying in general, 737 flight controls system and Russian grammar so is unable to understand that automatic trim set itself towards nose-down position and did not send the whole aeroplane into dive?
About this!:
…The aircraft began to pitch up under the influence of engine acceleration and flaps retraction reaching 25 degrees nose up, the stabilizer trim system wound - most likely automatically [??? (And we all know that in the B73 the autotrim is only operative with the autopilot engaged)]- wound nose down commanding the aircraft into a dive….
And this!:
http://www.pprune.org/8161310-post107.html
By Sunamer
words of a person participating in the investigation:
...actual GA was initiated at outer marker. They climbed up to 900m and then the airspeed started to decrease. Pitch started to change to negative and they started to fall being at 800m from the threshold of 11 apprx with angle of 75-80 degrees.
And this!:
http://www.pprune.org/8161768-post119.html
By Sunamer
there is an update from MAK
During approach, the crew didn't achieve proper parameters of standard approach that was specified in the documentation. Had assessed AC's position as non-landing in relation to the runway, the crew reported this and initiated GA using TOGA mode. During this phase, one of autopilots that had been used during approach, was disconnected and from this moment piloting was done in manual mode.
(And we all know that in the B73 the autotrim is only operative with the autopilot engaged)
Engines reached thrust mode that was close to TO. The crew changed flaps setting from 30 to 15 degrees. Because of the engine thrust, pitch started to increase and AC started to climb. Pitch angle reached 25 degrees.
IAS started to decrease, then the crew retracted the gear.
From the moment of initiating GA, to this moment the crew had not attempted to actively control the AC with a yoke input.
After IAS decreased from 150 to 125 kt, the crew started to use control column in order to obtain nose down attitude. That led to the arrest of climb, and subsequent descend with increase of IAS. Maximum AoA didn't exceed operational limits.
AC, after reaching alt of 700m, started to descend with negative pitch angle, that reached -75 degrees at the end of the recording. AC came into contact with the ground at high speed (more than 450 kmh ) and with large negative pitch angle.
From the moment of GA to the end of recording 45 sec had passed and the descend took 20 secs.
Engines performed as expected until the moment of impact, and there was no indication of any failures or abnormal operations in any of the AC systems
And this!:
http://www.pprune.org/8178067-post299.html
from avherald:
Information released by Rosaviatsia on Nov 28th 2013 based on preliminary investigation results by MAK states, that the captain of the flight (47, ATPL, 2736 hours total, 2509 hours on type, 528 hours in command) was rated for CAT I ILS approaches only, the first officer (47, no type of pilot rating provided, 2093 hours total, 1943 hours on type) was rated for CAT II ILS approaches. According to preliminary information the crew was significantly (4km) off the approach track prompting ATC to query the crew. Corrections were made, the aircraft remained significantly right of the extended runway centerline however until the crew selected heading 250 into autopilot (heading select mode) and the aircraft intercepted the localizer automatically about 2nm short of the runway threshold at about 1000 feet AGL, the glideslope did not capture due to height however. After passing the missed approach point the crew discussed a go-around and communicated with dispatch, [U]then disengaged both autopilots engaged in the automatic approach and continued manually on flight director. Engines accelerated to 83% N1 (near Go-Around Thrust) and continued at that speed until almost impact. The aircraft began to pitch up under the influence of engine acceleration and flaps retraction reaching 25 degrees nose up,
the stabilizer trim system wound - most likely automatically - nose down commanding the aircraft into a diveIn the meantime the crew retracted the gear, there had been no input on the yoke since deactivation of autopilot until that time, the airspeed had decayed from 150 to 125 KIAS. The crew now applied full forward pressure, the aircraft began to accelerate again after reaching a minimum speed of 117 KIAS at 700 meters/2300 feet above the runway, and began to rapidly descent, EGPWS alerts "SINK RATE" and "PULL UP" sounded, there was no reaction to the extreme nose down attitude however and the vertical acceleration became negative. The aircraft impacted ground at 75 degrees nose down at about 450 kph at coordinates N55.608818 E49.276852, the impact occurred 45 seconds after initiating the go-around and 20 seconds after reaching the maximum height. Initial safety recommendations released are to provide simulator training on balked landings, especially when close to the target altitude for the climb, provide training on recognition of complex spatial disorientation and upset recovery, provide training on operation and characteristics of aircraft systems especially autopilot and flight director during approach and missed approach, study the features of navigation system (FMS), consider revision of air traffic control procedures to provide more assistance to crews with technical failures including providing vectors to guide the aircraft onto the runway and conduct a conference to share technical flight experiences amongst operators.
I know that only you have
[That someone has not] very clear idea about flying in general, 737 flight controls system and Russian grammar so [is] are [un]able to understand that automatic trim set itself (And we all know that in the B73 the autotrim is only operative with the autopilot engaged) towards nose-down position.
Thank you Clandestino for your CRM lesson.