Iberia: A-321 210kts at 3.8nms ......
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Purple pitot yes could be inline with IB SOPs, I have no idea. My post above was in response to blind pew's post rather than on the thread as such. Apologies if that was unclear.
Last edited by CaptainProp; 27th Aug 2013 at 20:43.
Another reason to follow SOP's is that it mitigates against pilots with poor decision making skills.
Over half of accidents would not have happened if better decisions had been made. Pilots who lack decision making skills and end up doing things like this
Or
are protected from themselves. So are their passengers because the pilot doesn't get the opportunity to massage their ego at the expense of the daughters, wives, babies etc who have paid to sit behind on the assumption that wise decisions will be made.
When decisions like the above are made there is an assumption that everyone else will do their job correctly,the machinery will behave as advertised, and Mother Nature won't bite. The margins are reduced to the point that a mistake by a controller or another pilot ( as in the IB situation) is all that is required for an accident or incident to occur.
Being a skilful pilot is not all about stick and rudder, a large portion of the skill set is decision making.
Glad you got through Blind Pew.
Over half of accidents would not have happened if better decisions had been made. Pilots who lack decision making skills and end up doing things like this
In my early days I was treated to 365knots down the glide
In my third life we did a 1000ft cloud brake followed by a LEft hand circling approach in severe turbulence...stopwatch abeam threshold followed by gear, 20 secs later rolling in to a constant angle descent, changing config and speed to roll out twix 400 and 500ft with an on limits crosswind...flown from the wrong side.
Sill managed a greaser on a short runway within 3-600m - company limit.
Sill managed a greaser on a short runway within 3-600m - company limit.
When decisions like the above are made there is an assumption that everyone else will do their job correctly,the machinery will behave as advertised, and Mother Nature won't bite. The margins are reduced to the point that a mistake by a controller or another pilot ( as in the IB situation) is all that is required for an accident or incident to occur.
Being a skilful pilot is not all about stick and rudder, a large portion of the skill set is decision making.
Glad you got through Blind Pew.
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321's are energy pigs. Unless the thing was empty AND he had a big headwind I doubt it is possible to slow from 210 to a stabilized approach, flying a 3 deg glideslope. They just don't slow down AND come down that fast.
A light 319, maybe.
A light 319, maybe.
The 1000ft circuit was sop....everything from dc9 through to dc10 and 747...
Company policy at the worst base in Europe.
Lee of the alps in foehn conditions...terrain on all sides...noise restrictions...fog...snow...freezing rain...basically one way in and one way out.
Then we could talk about the round the rock approach in Gib when the spics had a warship and threatened to shoot us down....flying through the rotor with a final turn inside the ship and a line of buoys marking the limit of British waters...From the wrong seat of course...captains only.
And look what happens to the poor guys with a fire who take too long to get on the ground because they can only fly sop....and the poor guy who didn't know where his oxygen bottle was..
Never agreed with the 365 kts but it is what can be done if you are good enough.
As to the hard landing debate if you are not stabilised by 1000ft...rubbish
...unless you can't land heavy metal by eyeball alone....now that would be an interesting survey...
Company policy at the worst base in Europe.
Lee of the alps in foehn conditions...terrain on all sides...noise restrictions...fog...snow...freezing rain...basically one way in and one way out.
Then we could talk about the round the rock approach in Gib when the spics had a warship and threatened to shoot us down....flying through the rotor with a final turn inside the ship and a line of buoys marking the limit of British waters...From the wrong seat of course...captains only.
And look what happens to the poor guys with a fire who take too long to get on the ground because they can only fly sop....and the poor guy who didn't know where his oxygen bottle was..
Never agreed with the 365 kts but it is what can be done if you are good enough.
As to the hard landing debate if you are not stabilised by 1000ft...rubbish
...unless you can't land heavy metal by eyeball alone....now that would be an interesting survey...
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As to the hard landing debate if you are not stabilised by 1000ft...rubbish
Aircraft Energy Management during Approach
Statistical Data
"Approximately 70 % of rushed and unstable approaches involve an incorrect management of the aircraft energy level, resulting in an excess or deficit of energy, as follows:
Being slow and/or low on approach : 40 % of events; Being fast and/or high on approach: 30 % of events."
"The maximum deceleration achievable between the OM (typically 6.0 nm from the runway threshold) and the stabilization point (1000 ft above airfield elevation / 3.0 nm) is:10kt-per-nm x(6.0–3.0)nm=30kt.
In order to be stabilized at 130 kt at 1000 above airfield elevation, the maximum speed that can be accepted and maintained down to the OM is: 130 kt + 30 kt = 160 kt."
"Approximately 70 % of rushed and unstable approaches involve an incorrect management of the aircraft energy level, resulting in an excess or deficit of energy, as follows:
Being slow and/or low on approach : 40 % of events; Being fast and/or high on approach: 30 % of events."
"The maximum deceleration achievable between the OM (typically 6.0 nm from the runway threshold) and the stabilization point (1000 ft above airfield elevation / 3.0 nm) is:10kt-per-nm x(6.0–3.0)nm=30kt.
In order to be stabilized at 130 kt at 1000 above airfield elevation, the maximum speed that can be accepted and maintained down to the OM is: 130 kt + 30 kt = 160 kt."
Safety specialists agree that conducting a stabi- lized approach significantly reduces the risk of a hard landing.
“Hard landings usually result from nonstabilized approaches conducted in difficult situations,” Carbaugh said. “Crews need to know that just prior to touchdown, the go-around option is there for them. If things are not going well, and you’re not stabilized, going around is the right thing to do.”
"Table 2 (page 8) shows elements of a stabilized approach that were recommended by the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) approach-and-landing accident Reduction (alaR) task Force.28 The task force said that the flight crew should conduct a go-around if an approach becomes unstabilized below 1,000 feet above airport elevation in instrument meteorological conditions or below 500 feet above airport elevation in visual meteorological conditions (VMC)."
“Hard landings usually result from nonstabilized approaches conducted in difficult situations,” Carbaugh said. “Crews need to know that just prior to touchdown, the go-around option is there for them. If things are not going well, and you’re not stabilized, going around is the right thing to do.”
"Table 2 (page 8) shows elements of a stabilized approach that were recommended by the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) approach-and-landing accident Reduction (alaR) task Force.28 The task force said that the flight crew should conduct a go-around if an approach becomes unstabilized below 1,000 feet above airport elevation in instrument meteorological conditions or below 500 feet above airport elevation in visual meteorological conditions (VMC)."
Continuing an unstabilized approach is a causal factor in 40 % of all approach-and- landing accidents.
In 75% of the off-runway touchdown, tail strike or runway excursion/overrun accidents, the major cause was an unstable approach.
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It beggars belief in this day and age that this sort of show boating continues, we read all to often about far East airlines over runs and most on here shake our heads and go noo noo couldn't happen in Europe, but 1000'ft IMC & 500'ft SAC are standard for most airline, Sarah, its not about what you can get away with, these are not your toys if you find SAC flying boring hire a light aircraft at the weekend and piss about in that. 1250m is no safety gap, what would have happened if the Jet2 had a major problem beyond V1 and left bits of engine all over the runway, or the IB though better of it and went around, loss of separation for sure.
In my company before every take off and landing we review threats, when in Spain we (including our Spanish pilots) often add Spanish ATC to that list only part in jest !! should we add IB pilots to that list, this like the idiots on bikes that do 90 in a 30 limit, sure they can stop quick and its VMC, the trouble is when i judge if its safe to pull out my thinking is based on 30-50, not 90+
Of course if your flying visual approach's in turbo props with like of Binter turning finals over the threshold on a 3k runway it's both fun and safe, but its not the way to fly an Airbus or Boeing, perhaps Sarah should change jobs, but don't come up my arse at 4nm at more than 160-170 or you'll be going around, i vacate the runway when at a safe speed to do so, expedite the runway means you or the controller have cocked up, your cock-up, you sort it
In my company before every take off and landing we review threats, when in Spain we (including our Spanish pilots) often add Spanish ATC to that list only part in jest !! should we add IB pilots to that list, this like the idiots on bikes that do 90 in a 30 limit, sure they can stop quick and its VMC, the trouble is when i judge if its safe to pull out my thinking is based on 30-50, not 90+
Of course if your flying visual approach's in turbo props with like of Binter turning finals over the threshold on a 3k runway it's both fun and safe, but its not the way to fly an Airbus or Boeing, perhaps Sarah should change jobs, but don't come up my arse at 4nm at more than 160-170 or you'll be going around, i vacate the runway when at a safe speed to do so, expedite the runway means you or the controller have cocked up, your cock-up, you sort it
Death Cruiser Flight Crew
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FOQA to you.
I assume that Iberia have a Flight Operations Quality Assurance programme? What parameters does it have to cause the quick access flight recorder to 'flag up' an exceedance?
Only, when my airline brought it in, I was astonished to see the number of things which were going to cause a printout to land on the fleet manager's desk "De-identified, ladies and gentlemen, just to point up potential non-standard trends." (Hmm, yeah, right.) Within a week, the first whistle blew on an unstabilsed approach, and he knew who the 'culprits' were, oh yes!
Only, when my airline brought it in, I was astonished to see the number of things which were going to cause a printout to land on the fleet manager's desk "De-identified, ladies and gentlemen, just to point up potential non-standard trends." (Hmm, yeah, right.) Within a week, the first whistle blew on an unstabilsed approach, and he knew who the 'culprits' were, oh yes!
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children of the magenta line
There are quite a few ppruners who cut their teeth on older types. Before stabilised approaches and SOPs. I am one, and my first airline type was a DC3, avoiding cumulo granitus in PNG for a couple of years. Not everything could be SOP. Before that, wartime ops with a lot of pressure to perform and not much pressure to comply.
Most COTML will never have the opportunity to fly like that, or gradually discover the limits of an aircraft and their own capabilities. There may be isolated pockets of aviation with those old methods, and sometimes some of those hardy folks will find their way into an airliner. I believe it is important that those alternative origin pilots recognise that most modern pilots have absolutely no chance to discover flying skills in the way they did.
The new age includes clear obligations to comply with regulations and SOPs. Deviations, with just cause, remain pilot prerogative. If an enquiry finds the deviation was not necessary, pilot will wear the consequences. That is how it works now.
Intercepting the GP at 365k, delaying an obvious missed approach or accepting ATC clearance to enter a runway for take-off with another cleared to land, seem to be pushing the limits a touch. For a start, the COTML in the right seat should not have to be put through that pressure, though they should be encouraged to sometimes hand fly without a/t. As the years roll by, even that will be banished to the sim as an abnormal procedure.
Airlines are unlikely to send their cadets to PNG or Africa for a year to toughen them up. So I think we are actually stuck with COTML, regulations and SOP. How we did it in our days may be interesting, but is now mostly irrelevant.
Most COTML will never have the opportunity to fly like that, or gradually discover the limits of an aircraft and their own capabilities. There may be isolated pockets of aviation with those old methods, and sometimes some of those hardy folks will find their way into an airliner. I believe it is important that those alternative origin pilots recognise that most modern pilots have absolutely no chance to discover flying skills in the way they did.
The new age includes clear obligations to comply with regulations and SOPs. Deviations, with just cause, remain pilot prerogative. If an enquiry finds the deviation was not necessary, pilot will wear the consequences. That is how it works now.
Intercepting the GP at 365k, delaying an obvious missed approach or accepting ATC clearance to enter a runway for take-off with another cleared to land, seem to be pushing the limits a touch. For a start, the COTML in the right seat should not have to be put through that pressure, though they should be encouraged to sometimes hand fly without a/t. As the years roll by, even that will be banished to the sim as an abnormal procedure.
Airlines are unlikely to send their cadets to PNG or Africa for a year to toughen them up. So I think we are actually stuck with COTML, regulations and SOP. How we did it in our days may be interesting, but is now mostly irrelevant.
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We also used to lose a lot more aircraft, and PNG and Africa toughen up pilots as a Darwinian process, where the stupid practices are weeded out as idiots remove themselves from the gene pool.
Advocating unstable approaches and reduced margins of safety as the way forward has no place in a modern airline. We do not live in the sixties and stable approaches and SOPs make more sense than the frankly silly advocacy of cowboy operations, just because we can.
Macho ideas and gung-ho attitudes are anachronistic to aviation safety, as someone has already said, if you want to behave like a lunatic, do it on your own dime in an aerobatic aircraft at the weekend, not in the cockpit of an airliner.
Advocating unstable approaches and reduced margins of safety as the way forward has no place in a modern airline. We do not live in the sixties and stable approaches and SOPs make more sense than the frankly silly advocacy of cowboy operations, just because we can.
Macho ideas and gung-ho attitudes are anachronistic to aviation safety, as someone has already said, if you want to behave like a lunatic, do it on your own dime in an aerobatic aircraft at the weekend, not in the cockpit of an airliner.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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A few 'assumptions' in the above posts that need challenging:
- the over-riding impression I get from some posts on here is that this 'approach' is Iberia SOP and this is the way the Vaquero do it, so 'no excedence'.
- can we be sure the 757 was on the same frequency when the 'clearance' was given to the IB and was it in English?
Originally Posted by glhi
to 'flag up' an excedence?
Originally Posted by autoflight
accepting ATC clearance to enter a runway for take-off with another cleared to land, seem to be pushing the limits a touch.
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I think we are mixing up practices from another era and today commercial aviation. From my perspective (ATC) 99.99% of all APP I see are stabilized, and when in 0,01% we have an unstabilized one it results 99.9% of the time in a go around .
When one in a few 100.000 or even a Million occurs, like in this case, a conditional clearance,then a controller pushing with a immediate take off, combined with a fast inbound and a slow moving departure, we get an incident, reported and investigated. So where is the problem ? The system works well I'd say. Even in Spain.
Things have changed a lot in my time. and it is far, far safer today than when I started 40 years ago. Read again Ernst Gann " Fate is the Hunter" you'll see what was possible to do in an airliner in 1940-1950. But do not forget to read also the first opening pages with the 100 names of pilots-friends he lost during that time.
As to going in the week end to practice foolish things on GA aircraft or on UL ,to releive boredom. Forget it. In GA the same energy management rules are applying. Today an airline like Lufhansa has lost quite a few good pilots in aircraft accidents in the last 20 years , all of them in GA/UL accidents .
When one in a few 100.000 or even a Million occurs, like in this case, a conditional clearance,then a controller pushing with a immediate take off, combined with a fast inbound and a slow moving departure, we get an incident, reported and investigated. So where is the problem ? The system works well I'd say. Even in Spain.
Things have changed a lot in my time. and it is far, far safer today than when I started 40 years ago. Read again Ernst Gann " Fate is the Hunter" you'll see what was possible to do in an airliner in 1940-1950. But do not forget to read also the first opening pages with the 100 names of pilots-friends he lost during that time.
As to going in the week end to practice foolish things on GA aircraft or on UL ,to releive boredom. Forget it. In GA the same energy management rules are applying. Today an airline like Lufhansa has lost quite a few good pilots in aircraft accidents in the last 20 years , all of them in GA/UL accidents .
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We also used to lose a lot more aircraft, and PNG and Africa toughen up pilots as a Darwinian process, where the stupid practices are weeded out as idiots remove themselves from the gene pool.
Advocating unstable approaches and reduced margins of safety as the way forward has no place in a modern airline. We do not live in the sixties and stable approaches and SOPs make more sense than the frankly silly advocacy of cowboy operations, just because we can.
Macho ideas and gung-ho attitudes are anachronistic to aviation safety, as someone has already said, if you want to behave like a lunatic, do it on your own dime in an aerobatic aircraft at the weekend, not in the cockpit of an airliner.
Advocating unstable approaches and reduced margins of safety as the way forward has no place in a modern airline. We do not live in the sixties and stable approaches and SOPs make more sense than the frankly silly advocacy of cowboy operations, just because we can.
Macho ideas and gung-ho attitudes are anachronistic to aviation safety, as someone has already said, if you want to behave like a lunatic, do it on your own dime in an aerobatic aircraft at the weekend, not in the cockpit of an airliner.
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Why did I do that?
The old saying that there are no new accidents in aviation, applies equally to incidents.
Physics is physics whether it be iron dial or fly by wire.....you need to manage the energy.
To acknowledge our humanity in this job is paramount because the only way any individual pilot establishes their limits is to go beyond them at some point.
Our hope is that this one breach will suitable chasten the individual, but in the absence of self preservation SOPs serve as a good anchor.
But in our humanity we must also acknowledge in the cold light of day why did this happen in the first place.
On review of any incident the protagonists must ask what was I thinking when;
My speed is high on final approach and there is an aircraft lining up.
I'll issue a line up clearance to an aircraft not yet at the holding point of the runway with an aircraft approaching rapidly.
I'll accept such a line up when I know I'm heavy not yet at the runway and a combination of the TCAS data and visual clues show an aircraft less than 4 miles out.
I become a spectator to the event as my options have run out because for some reason I couldn't say no.
And yes I'm tired I'm human I make mistakes but now I have to write a report detailing why this happened and how I was party to it. This tires me out even more and makes me worry for my job which is fatiguing which if we all think about in this job is the biggest enemy to aviation.
Then armchair experts dissect the report who weren't there.....or would have done it better or different. Because when it happened to them there was no Ops monitoring, Internet, forums looking over their shoulder.
The human experience don't ya love it........
Physics is physics whether it be iron dial or fly by wire.....you need to manage the energy.
To acknowledge our humanity in this job is paramount because the only way any individual pilot establishes their limits is to go beyond them at some point.
Our hope is that this one breach will suitable chasten the individual, but in the absence of self preservation SOPs serve as a good anchor.
But in our humanity we must also acknowledge in the cold light of day why did this happen in the first place.
On review of any incident the protagonists must ask what was I thinking when;
My speed is high on final approach and there is an aircraft lining up.
I'll issue a line up clearance to an aircraft not yet at the holding point of the runway with an aircraft approaching rapidly.
I'll accept such a line up when I know I'm heavy not yet at the runway and a combination of the TCAS data and visual clues show an aircraft less than 4 miles out.
I become a spectator to the event as my options have run out because for some reason I couldn't say no.
And yes I'm tired I'm human I make mistakes but now I have to write a report detailing why this happened and how I was party to it. This tires me out even more and makes me worry for my job which is fatiguing which if we all think about in this job is the biggest enemy to aviation.
Then armchair experts dissect the report who weren't there.....or would have done it better or different. Because when it happened to them there was no Ops monitoring, Internet, forums looking over their shoulder.
The human experience don't ya love it........
Perhaps I need to put my last companies proceedures in perspective...
They were launch customers for most of their aircraft, they had the best maintainace, paid the best salaries and the instructors were all current military pilots....no expense was spared.
Of the 1000 pilots ALL could fly the 1000ft circuit because it is what we were trained to do. We had only one landing incident in my 18years that I can remember and that was a 747 after a long night scraped a pod with a close to limiting xwind...at home base and after a stabilised approach from OM.
The only thing that a few didn't do was to grease it on...what one calls a catch the first wire landing or some call the Boeing handbook landing...they were all military guys or thought smooth landings were for woossies.
Pay gold sovereigns then you don't get monkeys....or something like that.
I only once broke SOP....as a first officer on a polar flight.
Because of an unusual wind pattern we flew way north of the great circle track (shortest distance on the globe for you flat earth geezers) which took us over the pole.
At the time the death ship had the most sophisticated nav system..but as I had never been fortunate enough to do a nav ticket I bought a sextant and a book. (belt braces bit of string).
Our planning was tight, very tight and was Fairbanks with alternate ANC.(com dest).
To save fuel engines turned off most of the bleeds ...which wasn't nice since we had 200 chain smokers from the land of the rising sun.
At the pole the displays switched and gave us two different tracks 30 degrees apart which is when I eventually said horlicks to the book and using the moon and nav read outs intercepted the correct track.
Whilst I was initially castigated I happened upon the fleet chief techy...who hadn't understood the incident and contacted the manufacturer.
A couple of months later he came back with an answer that there had been something wrong with the software which but they didn't know what.
For those of you who don't understand the implications...if we had not followed the correct track we would have run out of fuel.
No superman cape needed as it is what we were all paid for.
I posted a less explicit version on an old farts site which I enjoy most of the time to have a fellow member post a 707 reminiscence on the same route but during day when the Gyro compass went US....the skipper annoyed the CC before they had started lunch service with a request for the cheese platter...and two tooth picks. He cut off two lumps of cheddar, stuck the toothpicks in and positioned them on a clipboard on the coaming which he used as a sun sight.
With some clever mathematics ..the sun moves around the earth at 15 degrees per hour for you flat earth disciples...plus the rate of crossing meridians ....another complication as the spacing changes depending on you latitude ...he managed to maintain a heading within 5 degrees...and the nav did the rest.
I notice that none of you wizz kids have commented on the 747 fuel transfer using jettison pumps (they have stand pipes in the tank) nor the on ground emergency where the fuel tank shut off was left open nor the other little naughties that if the crews were professional they wouldnt have dug themselves into a hole or a watery grave as the case may be.
Thank the lord or Mohamed (as the case may be) that I worked for a proper company and can enjoy the fruits of my labour and a decent pension...pass the chardonnay .....whilst some of you lot are missing the point about being a professional.
And for the bus drivers amongst you...an apt discription for some of you...I met the skipper who had a hydraulic controls warning after take off ...action offload ...followed in quick succession by the other systems...mayday...quick circuit and put it back on terra firma ASAP.... From what has been posted think many of you would have been in the mire....he is 1/2 my age....
They were launch customers for most of their aircraft, they had the best maintainace, paid the best salaries and the instructors were all current military pilots....no expense was spared.
Of the 1000 pilots ALL could fly the 1000ft circuit because it is what we were trained to do. We had only one landing incident in my 18years that I can remember and that was a 747 after a long night scraped a pod with a close to limiting xwind...at home base and after a stabilised approach from OM.
The only thing that a few didn't do was to grease it on...what one calls a catch the first wire landing or some call the Boeing handbook landing...they were all military guys or thought smooth landings were for woossies.
Pay gold sovereigns then you don't get monkeys....or something like that.
I only once broke SOP....as a first officer on a polar flight.
Because of an unusual wind pattern we flew way north of the great circle track (shortest distance on the globe for you flat earth geezers) which took us over the pole.
At the time the death ship had the most sophisticated nav system..but as I had never been fortunate enough to do a nav ticket I bought a sextant and a book. (belt braces bit of string).
Our planning was tight, very tight and was Fairbanks with alternate ANC.(com dest).
To save fuel engines turned off most of the bleeds ...which wasn't nice since we had 200 chain smokers from the land of the rising sun.
At the pole the displays switched and gave us two different tracks 30 degrees apart which is when I eventually said horlicks to the book and using the moon and nav read outs intercepted the correct track.
Whilst I was initially castigated I happened upon the fleet chief techy...who hadn't understood the incident and contacted the manufacturer.
A couple of months later he came back with an answer that there had been something wrong with the software which but they didn't know what.
For those of you who don't understand the implications...if we had not followed the correct track we would have run out of fuel.
No superman cape needed as it is what we were all paid for.
I posted a less explicit version on an old farts site which I enjoy most of the time to have a fellow member post a 707 reminiscence on the same route but during day when the Gyro compass went US....the skipper annoyed the CC before they had started lunch service with a request for the cheese platter...and two tooth picks. He cut off two lumps of cheddar, stuck the toothpicks in and positioned them on a clipboard on the coaming which he used as a sun sight.
With some clever mathematics ..the sun moves around the earth at 15 degrees per hour for you flat earth disciples...plus the rate of crossing meridians ....another complication as the spacing changes depending on you latitude ...he managed to maintain a heading within 5 degrees...and the nav did the rest.
I notice that none of you wizz kids have commented on the 747 fuel transfer using jettison pumps (they have stand pipes in the tank) nor the on ground emergency where the fuel tank shut off was left open nor the other little naughties that if the crews were professional they wouldnt have dug themselves into a hole or a watery grave as the case may be.
Thank the lord or Mohamed (as the case may be) that I worked for a proper company and can enjoy the fruits of my labour and a decent pension...pass the chardonnay .....whilst some of you lot are missing the point about being a professional.
And for the bus drivers amongst you...an apt discription for some of you...I met the skipper who had a hydraulic controls warning after take off ...action offload ...followed in quick succession by the other systems...mayday...quick circuit and put it back on terra firma ASAP.... From what has been posted think many of you would have been in the mire....he is 1/2 my age....