Iberia: A-321 210kts at 3.8nms ......
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APPROACH STABILIZATION CRITERIA
The prerequisite for a successful final approach and landing is to stabilize the aircraft on the final approach trajectory in pitch, thrust, airspeed, and bank angle.
This signifies that the:
‐ Aircraft is established on the:
Final approach trajectory, and only minor heading corrections are necessary (except for indirect or curve approaches) to correct the effect of external conditions, acting on the roll axis
Final approach vertical flight path, and only minor pitch corrections are necessary to correct the effect of external conditions;
‐ The target speed is maintained on the desired descent path, with the appropriate thrust (not stabilized at idle).
The prerequisite for a successful final approach and landing is to stabilize the aircraft on the final approach trajectory in pitch, thrust, airspeed, and bank angle.
This signifies that the:
‐ Aircraft is established on the:
Final approach trajectory, and only minor heading corrections are necessary (except for indirect or curve approaches) to correct the effect of external conditions, acting on the roll axis
Final approach vertical flight path, and only minor pitch corrections are necessary to correct the effect of external conditions;
‐ The target speed is maintained on the desired descent path, with the appropriate thrust (not stabilized at idle).
Spooled up or "not stabilized at idle". Wanna split hairs? Go ahead.... My previous two companies and current one requires engines to be "spooled up".
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For all those saying that passing 500' on the approach above target speed, resulting in thrust at idle is perfectly normal/acceptable, my only question is:
Why would you want to do that??? What is the reward (point) for the additional risk? Or do you simply see no risk??
Do you have any personal (informal) limit for engines stabilised?
Do you brief your colleague in the other seat? How does he/she know what the limit is? What if their comfort zone is (understandably) less adventurous than yours?
Same question for those using 500-600' as a target rather than a limit? Why? What's the reward????
Don't you think there's a much less stressful (and potentially safer?) way to manage an approach???
Why would you want to do that??? What is the reward (point) for the additional risk? Or do you simply see no risk??
Do you have any personal (informal) limit for engines stabilised?
Do you brief your colleague in the other seat? How does he/she know what the limit is? What if their comfort zone is (understandably) less adventurous than yours?
Same question for those using 500-600' as a target rather than a limit? Why? What's the reward????
Don't you think there's a much less stressful (and potentially safer?) way to manage an approach???
Last edited by 4468; 26th Aug 2013 at 23:28.
As far as the Iberia was given "Expect late landing cleareance" in proper english by the ATC, was also in good VMC conditions with the TO Rolling traffic, i cant see here anything different from any summer busy mediterranean airport in some periods of the day, just my humble 2 cents
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I don't know the Iberia SOP but most of the companies use to be stable on approach by 1000ft and by 500ft on visual approaches.
According to me, the approach of that Iberia flight doesn't look like to be stable especially if we're talking about the speed related to the APPROACH STABILIZATION CRITERIA, the target speed is part of that (usually +10/-5) but not 210kts or thrust idle!
So it's easy to recognize if you are stable or not...if unstable the only action is go around, that's it.
According to me, the approach of that Iberia flight doesn't look like to be stable especially if we're talking about the speed related to the APPROACH STABILIZATION CRITERIA, the target speed is part of that (usually +10/-5) but not 210kts or thrust idle!
So it's easy to recognize if you are stable or not...if unstable the only action is go around, that's it.
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Sarah737
From 2.4 nm. at 180KTS to the threshold what the SKILLED pilot does is pull off a landing at idle thrust and higher speed. Still it is an uneventfull unstable approach. There are no other tricks. Airbus has published FOBN explaining how fast you can be on approach according to that deceleration on 3 degrees glide path is appx. 10KTS/nm.
From 2.4 nm. at 180KTS to the threshold what the SKILLED pilot does is pull off a landing at idle thrust and higher speed. Still it is an uneventfull unstable approach. There are no other tricks. Airbus has published FOBN explaining how fast you can be on approach according to that deceleration on 3 degrees glide path is appx. 10KTS/nm.
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Taught when I was a young first officer and still true today. "A superior pilot uses his superior judgement to keep out of situations that need his superior skills."
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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There is no way this can be deflected onto the Jet2 crew - it is purely ATC and Iberia that are responsible for this close call. I see no mention of "Expect late landing clearance", and even so, if given, they appear to have landed without it.
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JanetFlight
No, I think it wasnīt a situation like the usual "summer busy mediterranian airport / airspace paranoia". At least the reports says different in itīs key sentence:
The incident was caused by the improper handling of the immediate takeoff clearance by ATC.
I cannot agree more. In ICAO DOC 4444, Ch. 7, Pt. 7.8 it is in general said: an aircraft established on final approach shall have priority to departing traffic.(for precise phrasing plse. see DOC 4444).
To this the controller initially adhered when he issued an unconditioned landing clearance at 6 NM final for the IB flight.
As I see it, with this clearance the "gate" for any departure on the same RWY was closed !!
Obviously at that time he also didnīt see reason to clear the Jet2 flight for an expeditious departure in front of the arriving IB.
He than decided different, based on the assumption the 757 was close to holding position on the TWY( The report mentions he was unsure where excactly the 757 was).
Instead of first verifying position and readiness for an expeditous departure, next cancelling the issued landing clearance and issueing different instructions to the IB flight. Than finally clear that Jet 2 flight for expeditious departure would have been the normal procedure.
However a 6 NM final under normal conditions means a remaining time to touchdown in the region of 2:15 to 2:30 min. The departure had not reached the holding position in fact - the report states - it took them 20 sec. to get there.
My point in this case is: How can a gain of probably 1 or 2 minutes by an earlier departure ever balance the substantial loss of safety of flights and the severe infringement of separation??
The incident was caused by the improper handling of the immediate takeoff clearance by ATC.
I cannot agree more. In ICAO DOC 4444, Ch. 7, Pt. 7.8 it is in general said: an aircraft established on final approach shall have priority to departing traffic.(for precise phrasing plse. see DOC 4444).
To this the controller initially adhered when he issued an unconditioned landing clearance at 6 NM final for the IB flight.
As I see it, with this clearance the "gate" for any departure on the same RWY was closed !!
Obviously at that time he also didnīt see reason to clear the Jet2 flight for an expeditious departure in front of the arriving IB.
He than decided different, based on the assumption the 757 was close to holding position on the TWY( The report mentions he was unsure where excactly the 757 was).
Instead of first verifying position and readiness for an expeditous departure, next cancelling the issued landing clearance and issueing different instructions to the IB flight. Than finally clear that Jet 2 flight for expeditious departure would have been the normal procedure.
However a 6 NM final under normal conditions means a remaining time to touchdown in the region of 2:15 to 2:30 min. The departure had not reached the holding position in fact - the report states - it took them 20 sec. to get there.
My point in this case is: How can a gain of probably 1 or 2 minutes by an earlier departure ever balance the substantial loss of safety of flights and the severe infringement of separation??
The story of Madrid controllers lining up Iberia in front of foreign operators goes back 40 years when a Trident 3 on two engines was forced into a low go around and nearly perished...
Have executed late go arounds or landed when an Iberia aircraft was rotating myself...
All part and parcel of the job.
Have executed late go arounds or landed when an Iberia aircraft was rotating myself...
All part and parcel of the job.
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Annex 14 - agreed, but nonetheless Iberia still need to rethink their policy;
Considering the above - and the speeds stated in the incident report - the possibility for ATC to have averted this b@lls-up by assigning a speed limit to the approaching bus would have been well-and-truly nullified. The Iberia crew appear to have painted themselves into a corner and (unless the speed limit was assigned whilst they were still 20nm out) they would not have been able to wash-off the excess energy even if they wanted to (and I suspect they were already trying!).
Hot and slick approaches might appear to be the mark of an "ace" crew (and no one can deny they can save time and fuel....), but they reduce the tolerable margins for error in the operating crew, ATC, and other users of the airspace, to unacceptable levels.
IMHO to avoid these incidents we need to ALL be doing the same thing (no - not "hot" approaches) so operational expectations are consistent across all airlines and ATC.
Remember that there will always be new and old experience levels in the industry on both sides of the flight deck AND radio - we need to play it safe for it to be safe.
Specifically, airlines typically resort to the so-called decelerated approaches as part of their fuel savings policies. Such approaches translate into shorter times to the threshold as compared to conventional approaches. This is the case with Iberia, which not only considers them in its Operations Manual, but recommends their use whenever possible
Hot and slick approaches might appear to be the mark of an "ace" crew (and no one can deny they can save time and fuel....), but they reduce the tolerable margins for error in the operating crew, ATC, and other users of the airspace, to unacceptable levels.
IMHO to avoid these incidents we need to ALL be doing the same thing (no - not "hot" approaches) so operational expectations are consistent across all airlines and ATC.
Remember that there will always be new and old experience levels in the industry on both sides of the flight deck AND radio - we need to play it safe for it to be safe.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Leaving aside the 'legality' of the Iberia 'tapering' approach, it surely would be no surprise to the controller at TFS who must see the odd Iberia barrelling in in a day?
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IB part in the case
Because I havnīt mentioned the part of IB played in this incident, no one should think that I havnīt seen the short comings of their performance.
Itīs only that my background on the aviators side of this is much too limited and there are quite a lot of posts that point hit.
However, what I think I can say to the airborne part, while SOP for pilots is to be ahead of their airplane this IB crew apparently was miles behind !!
As a controller, if such a mix up has happened the only safe chance to clear the sh.... , is to cancel t/o clearance for that Jet2 flight and sent the IB into a go around
Also as was mentioned already, what earlier chance would the controller have at hand to speed down the A 320 ?? If at all he really recognized the high speed. I donīt know what kind of equipment is installed at TFS TWR.
Therefore, correcting actions appear necessary not only on ATCO side but also on IB
Itīs only that my background on the aviators side of this is much too limited and there are quite a lot of posts that point hit.
However, what I think I can say to the airborne part, while SOP for pilots is to be ahead of their airplane this IB crew apparently was miles behind !!
As a controller, if such a mix up has happened the only safe chance to clear the sh.... , is to cancel t/o clearance for that Jet2 flight and sent the IB into a go around
Also as was mentioned already, what earlier chance would the controller have at hand to speed down the A 320 ?? If at all he really recognized the high speed. I donīt know what kind of equipment is installed at TFS TWR.
Therefore, correcting actions appear necessary not only on ATCO side but also on IB
Sounds like the safety culture at IB is driven by accountants not pilots.
It's not that hard to do high speed 'decelerating approaches' if you get a chance to practice a few. Thing is, what pilot who wants to keep flying for 30 years likes to reduce his/her safety margins to keep the accountants happy? Not me that's for sure.
It's not that hard to do high speed 'decelerating approaches' if you get a chance to practice a few. Thing is, what pilot who wants to keep flying for 30 years likes to reduce his/her safety margins to keep the accountants happy? Not me that's for sure.
According to the report the IB had been given a clearance to land at 8 miles. It doesn't mention it being conditional. On that basis; how can the tower controller then clear somebody else to use the same runway ?
I assume the first conversation having taken place in Spanish was the reason the J2 did not immediately query his clearance.
For those of you that ply your trade around the Med, how much of what is spoken in native languages do you understand ? would you have picked up that the IB had been cleared to land in Spanish ?
I assume the first conversation having taken place in Spanish was the reason the J2 did not immediately query his clearance.
For those of you that ply your trade around the Med, how much of what is spoken in native languages do you understand ? would you have picked up that the IB had been cleared to land in Spanish ?
Dave Gittins, from the final report:
Addenda Bulletin 3/2013 150
The crew of aircraft EXS518 stated that they were aware that there was an aircraft on short final, since they were notified of this by ATC and had visual contact with it. They saw the landing lights of the approaching aircraft but did not think it was particularly close to the landing. They added that once cleared for takeoff, they did not stop the
aircraft at any point and that the taxi and takeoff maneuvers proceeded normally. They did not notice any anomalies in the instructions given to either aircraft by the controller, which they described as efficient from the point of view of maximizing the airports capacity
The crew of aircraft EXS518 stated that they were aware that there was an aircraft on short final, since they were notified of this by ATC and had visual contact with it. They saw the landing lights of the approaching aircraft but did not think it was particularly close to the landing. They added that once cleared for takeoff, they did not stop the
aircraft at any point and that the taxi and takeoff maneuvers proceeded normally. They did not notice any anomalies in the instructions given to either aircraft by the controller, which they described as efficient from the point of view of maximizing the airports capacity
They saw the landing lights of the approaching aircraft but did not think it was particularly close to the landing.
Sarah 737
This is called the Professional Pilots Forum, I don't think you are either one of those. And if you are talking about the slow airline (the one who makes 380Million Profit) then I'm proud to be part of 250Kts at 30 miles 220KTS to 15 miles and then all the way back to 160 kts. Even Ryanir are now flying 245 kts in the descent. There is little skill in being just stable at 500-600 feet.
This is called the Professional Pilots Forum, I don't think you are either one of those. And if you are talking about the slow airline (the one who makes 380Million Profit) then I'm proud to be part of 250Kts at 30 miles 220KTS to 15 miles and then all the way back to 160 kts. Even Ryanir are now flying 245 kts in the descent. There is little skill in being just stable at 500-600 feet.
It amazes me what sort of professional pilots are out there.
The point of being to be able to get everything sorted by 500ft or later is knowing your aircraft, building confidence and ability.
It is the same as knowing the systems and the checklists and not revising for a sim check as one flag carrier chappie posted last month.
To be blunt..what sort of pilot doesn't understand his fuel system, nor the law, nor the concept of minimum drag when the engines don't burn as they should, followed By the importance of the sequence of the on ground emergency.
Then we can ask why you would change the configuration when the airframe has been damaged...or talk about the lack of fire detection and protection without cowls.
But this isn't just with one carrier...pilots who do not understand the ITCZ and weather radar, the control laws, auto trim.
In my early days I was treated to 365knots down the glide from Margate by a jock within a few years of his retirement.
In my third life we did a 1000ft cloud brake followed by a LEft hand circling approach in severe turbulence...stopwatch abeam threshold followed by gear, 20 secs later rolling in to a constant angle descent, changing config and speed to roll out twix 400 and 500ft with an on limits crosswind...flown from the wrong side.
Sill managed a greaser on a short runway within 3-600m - company limit.
A couple of years ago I watched from 1A an approach onto the closed runway at MRS...crew realised and did a go around from around 600 ft...couldn't or wouldn't fly a swing over.
Needless to say they thumped it on.
Had a mate with a fire in the overhead emergency bus bar selector...did a 180 and landed downwind on standby instruments which he could only read cause his copilot kept whiping the glass....third degree burns of his right hand.
Needless to say both of them knew the checklist philosophies as well as the systems...helped especially with smoke masks, very limited viz and coms
I know who I would rather be sitting behind when the
hits the fan in the middle of the night when the 100 year storm hits yet again and it certainly isn't behind a bloke who can only pass a sim check if he revises and thinks that a professional approach can only be carried out when stabilised from 1000ft.
Not forgetting believing that thumping it in is good for the airframe and pax as well as uses less runway.
It's no wonder terms and conditions are going down the plug hole.
Back to the Chardonnay
The point of being to be able to get everything sorted by 500ft or later is knowing your aircraft, building confidence and ability.
It is the same as knowing the systems and the checklists and not revising for a sim check as one flag carrier chappie posted last month.
To be blunt..what sort of pilot doesn't understand his fuel system, nor the law, nor the concept of minimum drag when the engines don't burn as they should, followed By the importance of the sequence of the on ground emergency.
Then we can ask why you would change the configuration when the airframe has been damaged...or talk about the lack of fire detection and protection without cowls.
But this isn't just with one carrier...pilots who do not understand the ITCZ and weather radar, the control laws, auto trim.
In my early days I was treated to 365knots down the glide from Margate by a jock within a few years of his retirement.
In my third life we did a 1000ft cloud brake followed by a LEft hand circling approach in severe turbulence...stopwatch abeam threshold followed by gear, 20 secs later rolling in to a constant angle descent, changing config and speed to roll out twix 400 and 500ft with an on limits crosswind...flown from the wrong side.
Sill managed a greaser on a short runway within 3-600m - company limit.
A couple of years ago I watched from 1A an approach onto the closed runway at MRS...crew realised and did a go around from around 600 ft...couldn't or wouldn't fly a swing over.
Needless to say they thumped it on.
Had a mate with a fire in the overhead emergency bus bar selector...did a 180 and landed downwind on standby instruments which he could only read cause his copilot kept whiping the glass....third degree burns of his right hand.
Needless to say both of them knew the checklist philosophies as well as the systems...helped especially with smoke masks, very limited viz and coms
I know who I would rather be sitting behind when the
hits the fan in the middle of the night when the 100 year storm hits yet again and it certainly isn't behind a bloke who can only pass a sim check if he revises and thinks that a professional approach can only be carried out when stabilised from 1000ft.Not forgetting believing that thumping it in is good for the airframe and pax as well as uses less runway.
It's no wonder terms and conditions are going down the plug hole.
Back to the Chardonnay
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Blind pew - Ever heard of SOPs? This is not about ability to land after a high speed approach, or making a 180 and land after a fire, or knowing "checklist philosophies as well as systems"(?!).
This is about SOPs. SOPs that we, most of us anyway, are paid to follow. Some SOPs might seem daft, unecessary or overprotective. Never the less, we are paid to follow them. If you don't like them, send in suggestions to your fleet management on how to change them in to better procedures.
Also, following SOPs does not produce pilots that "only pass a sim check if he revises and thinks that a professional approach can only be carried out when stabilised from 1000ft". Are there pilots out there that should have never gotten in to a cockpit in the first place? Absolutely, but that has always been the case. Nothing new there.
Wonder why we fly stabilised approaches?
Because its in our SOPs.
Because it reduces deep landings that result in expensive overruns.
Because it reduces hard, expensive, landings.
Because insurance companies are keeping an eye on nr 2 and 3 above.
Because it reduces costly non weather related go-arounds.
Etc etc etc.....
This is about SOPs. SOPs that we, most of us anyway, are paid to follow. Some SOPs might seem daft, unecessary or overprotective. Never the less, we are paid to follow them. If you don't like them, send in suggestions to your fleet management on how to change them in to better procedures.
Also, following SOPs does not produce pilots that "only pass a sim check if he revises and thinks that a professional approach can only be carried out when stabilised from 1000ft". Are there pilots out there that should have never gotten in to a cockpit in the first place? Absolutely, but that has always been the case. Nothing new there.
Wonder why we fly stabilised approaches?
Because its in our SOPs.
Because it reduces deep landings that result in expensive overruns.
Because it reduces hard, expensive, landings.
Because insurance companies are keeping an eye on nr 2 and 3 above.
Because it reduces costly non weather related go-arounds.
Etc etc etc.....