Crash-Cork Airport

[horsebadorties]

Airfrance 7

No, I don't know any more than anyone else on this forum knows about the Cork accident - that is my point.

[calypso]

Will you guys stop telling everyone to wait for the final report, it is getting a bit tedious. This thread is useful for those of us that are interested in the chains of events that lead to an accident and how to avoid them. They DO involve speculation and exploring dead alleyways but are nevertheless informative. Some theories are plain impossible (due to ignorance of the procedures, the technology, the phisycs, etc I concede that) others may not have been the cause of this accident yet they also provide food for thought. We are all capable of sorting through the wheat and the chaff. If someone comes here to dazzle us with their intimate knowledge of ILS systems, Metro liners, prop feathering systems I am the more grateful for it.

YOU know what this threads are like. You have made your point about waiting for the final report. The thread IS going to continue. If it upsets you in any way, just don´t read it. Simples.

Because pilots are goal oriented and "tunnel vision" can become a problem we have the approach ban. You could also argue that it does not matter what the RVR reading is before or after the OM, all that matters is wether you have the required visual reference at decision altitude. Experience has shown that pilots can get fixated with landing and the approach ban was brought in. The max two approaches unless there is a marked improvement is no different. I agree that in a way we do not need more rules but it certainly is good practice to try twice and fly to the alternate. Unless you have very very good reasons not to.

Wether the third approach was a contributing cause for THIS accident or not it certainly has given me food for thought about why we have that rule in my company and how and why I would attempt a third approach.

[O'Neill No6]

Agree with Captplaystation et al

I find this thread very interesting. It brings back many memories of my experiences flying the type of aircraft involved in the Cork accident.

I was once flying single-crew south-bound down the east coast of England, en-route to Southend. Pre-departure forecasts had been perfectly acceptable for the safe completion of the flight. However,I began receiving weather reports for the whole of the south and south-east of England by volmet. All below minima, (600m required for our operation-no flight dir./autopilot btw) everywhere I checked below minima, you name it. I checked Luton (300m reducing), Birmingham (400m reducing). I reasoned that I was fast painting myself into a corner, I may be forced to make an approach below minimums. So I checked Manchester and it was 1200m and expected to remain so. Decision made and I made a landing a short time later in Manchester with a sensible reserve fuel remaining, Liverpool also being above minima should it have been required.

Once on the ground I called the airline. I was told that the Chief Pilot needed to speak to me, "go home by road, you're sacked!" was all he said! So, captplaystation I totally agree, look after your life first, licence second, then you still have both of these available to you to look for your next job.

Following this experience as I progressed in my career I realised that, unpleasant as it was, it was a great early lesson. My priorities were very firmly set on that day.

At this early stage in the investigation I am not suggesting that any of the above was the cause of the Cork accident btw. I have no knowledge of any of those concerned in Cork. Just thought it might be useful for some to realise the pressure of flying in some small airline operations. In particular with this sort of aircraft.

Look after yourselves guys.

O'Neill

[mark25787]

O'Neill No6

Great (but shocking) post, and shows the pressure pilots are under to reach destination.

What some PAX don't understand is that there is only a relatively small area of tarmac that the plane can land on and if for whatever reason that is unavailable, then alternatives have to be looked at for the safety of the plane, passengers and crew. No-one wants a divert but sometimes they are essential, despite the time and cost implications.

[mary meagher]

Preserve (1) Life (2) License (3) Job

Absolutely! Capt. Playstation has set up a Priority List to be engraved on every pilot's brain right beside AVIATE, NAVIGATE, COMMUNICATE.

O'Neill No6 tells the story that drives the point home.

The only time I got in serious trouble in the air, or on the water, was when I pressed on when running out of alternates. I should have turned around and gone back. Lesson learned. Fortunate to still be here and wiser. And so were my passengers.

[Matt101]

Originally Posted by calypso

Will you guys stop telling everyone to wait for the final report, it is getting a bit tedious. This thread is useful for those of us that are interested in the chains of events that lead to an accident and how to avoid them. They DO involve speculation and exploring dead alleyways but are nevertheless informative.

The thing is, when you come on to read this thread you are presented with 25 pages of reading, of which 23 are complete twaddle and so it becomes increasingly tedious trying to sort out the useful, factual information from the less so.

I cannot thank enough those contributors who can tell us about the Metro, the actual observed weather on the day, the state of the aircraft post accident, provide pictures or pass on information and statements from the investigators, they provide more than enough information to continue an interesting debate about the incident, one that doesn't disrespect the lost airmen or the profession.

However when I read the thread at the moment I can reach the bottom of the page having witnessed a debate about the meaning of DA and speculation that DA was busted, or that the aircraft suffered an engine failure (in contradiction to what the investigators have said) or that the aircraft popped out the clouds upside down pointing at the terminal. All entirely confusing information for which we have no evidence and more worryingly information that may be taken at face value by other readers.

All we know really is that the right wing made contact with the runway (according to pax statement), we also know thanks to a metro pilot and a few engineers that the last section of the wing is particularly frangible, we know the aircraft subsequently inverted, continued along the runway for a number of yards before coming to rest off the edge of the runway in boggy ground.

The weather was crappy however we are not yet in possession of RVR's given by ATC at the time of the third approach. So far as the AAIB have said the aircraft was in working order prior to impact.

We might be able to reasonably guess that the cause of the aircraft ending up where it did is due to the wing tip strike (though it's still not a certain), what we shouldn't be speculating is the reason that occurred.

Off hand I could think of at least a dozen reasons, given time and a sharper mind I'm sure we could all think of many more, but this isn't supposed to be treated as a guessing game.

The tendency to fall into talking about minimas, engine out situations, p-factor etc, is fine but I just don't think it should happen on this thread, they're interesting topics but could we not segregate interesting topics which as yet have nothing to do with this accident from the thread so that we can all be spared having to read about it in some crappy report in the Daily Mail where a Journalist has quoted PPRuNe as if it were gospel.

[Scottso]

Human factors??

A couple of passing thoughts. Given that the weather in the Metar was giving broken at 100’ I can not help wondering what the tops were and what the above cloud visual segment was. If the cloud was thin quite possible the reasonably clear sight of the surface was a tempting feature - especially if, from the where captain saw it, the weather appeared to be clearing. A semi visual approach into low cloud/poor vis can be very disturbing.

Secondly, for those who are not in the habit of being in the front seat, it is sometimes not easy to visualise, or realise just how low a 200’ decision height is. It is not much more that the width of the runway which is given as 45 meters. - or less that 4 times the aircraft wingspan.

No criticism of anyone intended, more a look at some of the human factors.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I don't have the information...does anyone know if the runway the landing was attempted on has ALSFII...or what kind of approach lights? sequenced flashers/rabbit?

anyway, in the USA...at DA/DH if you have JUST the sequenced flashers in sight you may descend to TDZE plus 100'...at that time you must have the many items we used to call the runway environment in sight to continue to landing.

Does Ireland have that rule?

[Matt101]

Sevenstrokeroll....

JAR OPS 1.430 (i'm guessing someone can find the equivelent EU-OPS but this came to me first)

(3) Visual Reference. A pilot may not
continue an approach below the Category I
decision height, determined in accordance with
sub-paragraph (c)(2) above, unless at least one of
the following visual references for the intended
runway is distinctly visible and identifiable to the
pilot:
(i) Elements of the approach light
system;
(ii) The threshold;
(iii) The threshold markings;
(iv) The threshold lights;
(v) The threshold identification
lights;
(vi) The visual glide slope
indicator;
(vii) The touchdown zone or
touchdown zone markings;
(viii) The touchdown zone lights; or
(ix) Runway edge lights.

How this is relevant here though I am completely at a loss to see......

[aterpster]

seventrokerroll:

I don't have the information...does anyone know if the runway the landing was attempted on has ALSFII...or what kind of approach lights? sequenced flashers/rabbit?

Check the airport diagram in Post #83.

[BOAC]

I think your link is kaput? I just get 'about:blank'

17 has HIALSII plus TDZ lighting, 35 only HIALS. We do not normally see ALSFII/sequencers in this part of the world.

[Haven't a clue]

There's a media report here:

Black boxes found and investigation into Cork air tragedy starts - Traffic and Transport - iomtoday

Cork Airport has a precision instrument landing system that enables safe landing in reduced visilibility due to fog, rain or snow where the ‘runway visual range’ is not less than 300 metres.

This is a category 2 ILS whereas Ronaldsway has a catagory 1 system that enables safe landing in runway visual range of not less than 550 metres.

In each case, a suitably-equipped aircraft and appropriately qualified crew are required

Which suggests Cat 2 was ok

[parkfell]

Although the ILS may well have been radiating a Category 2 signal, I think the crew were flying a Category 1 approach ?

[aterpster]

[Zeffy]

Which suggests Cat 2 was ok

The airfield capability is only part of the Cat II operation.

The aircraft, operator as well as crew require state authorizations.

[Haven't a clue]

The way I interpreted the quoted article was that the airfield offered Cat 2 and that Noel Hayes, the M2 chairman was suggesting that a CAT 2 approach with 300m RVR was permitted by the a/c operator. But then again this was a media report which may or may not be be accurate.

[LH-OAB]

Ref the post by "Haven't a clue", as far as I know, the Chairman of Manx2 is neither a Pilot nor an expert on the intricacies of ILSs.

A few posters have shown a real insight into the reality of life in small "airlines", most are making assumptions that it's more sophisticated than it is. Suffice to say, it's HIGHLY probable that a Cat I approach was being flown.

[PBL]

Smudger,

I think PJ2 is pointing out that if a thread reader is discerning, relevant information, such as it is, is still here.

Even if he isn't, I am!

Of course, there is no magic formula to turn one into a discerning thread reader. Although I believe there is a relatively simple formula to turn one into a relatively discerning thread contributor: check out all the available information, miss nothing, compare with what you already know, and tell!

[aterpster]

Smudger:

I am a Cat 3b qualified 757 Captain and as such have been disappointed at the level of ignorance and speculation displayed on this thread. Those who aren't aware of lo-vis operations and the technicalities involved are perfectly entitled to ask us professionals about the intricacies of such operations.. but please... don't accuse aircrew of being "cowboys" and such until the facts are known.. rant over

There is not one mindset in the ranks of professional who conduct special-authorization low-visibility approach and landing operations.

I was flying the line when the FAA first came up with the idea of Category II operations. I was also on ALPA's All Weather Flying Committee at the time. Our committee had a whole lot of combined experienced and we all agreed that the early CAT II program was permissive, unsafe, and poorly conceived.

My airline, TWA, became a complete CAT II fleet with the 707 and 727s, with their lousy autopilots and a marginal A/T that worked only on approach. And, the FAA granted an exemption from radar altimeters with an absurd concept of a more carefully calibrated baro altimeter (the so called "yellow dot" altimeter). Eventually, TWA was forced into installing radar altimeters to stay in the program.

Because those autopilots were so bad, the crews were given the option to hand-fly CAT II approaches with A/T and FD. It was not a good program. (American Airlines crashed a 727 at ORD not too many years ago using the same arcane equipment).

Then, came along the L-1011 with its robust fail-active autoland system. Although all that sophistication was intended for CAT III with the Alert Height concept it finally provided a platform that made CAT II safe.

I flew the 727 for much of my career and refused to make any CAT II approach based on my work on the All Weather Flying Committee.

I briefly flew F/O on the L-1011 in 1974, so I learned first hand the difference that fail-active autoland made. I then went back to the 727 as captain for 10 more years, with more disdain for its CAT II system.

In 1984 I progressed to the B767 and found the autoflight to be as good, but not better, than the pioneering L1011. I flew a few actual CAT II approaches in the 767 using autoland and felt good about it. It permitted me to make the legally required visual assessment that was not possible in the 727 (or 707) if, in fact, the weather was RVR 1200.

I concluded my career on the L-1011, where I made several CAT IIIb actual approaches, seeing nothing until the nose began lowering to the runway. I did wonder about the errant fuel truck lost in the fog.

During the 1970s the ALPA All-Weather Committee strongly lobbied the FAA to require HUD for CAT II. We were shown the door. the intervening years have shown the value of HUD as an option to fail-operational autoland to make CAT II safe. In fact, the FAA has long since embraced HUD as a vehicle to safe CAT II operations.

One expert's view.

[corsair]

RTE one o'clock news has just now featured an interview with Mark Dickens from Essex who survived the crash. Pretty much confirms previous witness statements. He said they came out of the fog, saw the runway very low, 'too low in my opinion'. he said. Then the aircraft banked, then wing touched the runway and went they became inverted. He was sitting by the wing. So pretty much saw it all.