Crash-Cork Airport
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barbiesboyfriend's views echo my own.
wake turbulence is very unlikely here, but I had to ask. (although departing aircraft might have stirred up the fog a bit to get to minimums).
wake turbulence is produced when lift is produced...and as the metroliner made approaches to both sides of the same runway, departure traffic may have had an affect...BUT AGAIN, I DOUBT IT. JOURNOs could help only by asking ATC about other arrivals...and departures.
I do ask another question...one I have posed before:
In what position was the horizontal stabilizer trim selector switch found?
copilot or pilot?
wake turbulence is very unlikely here, but I had to ask. (although departing aircraft might have stirred up the fog a bit to get to minimums).
wake turbulence is produced when lift is produced...and as the metroliner made approaches to both sides of the same runway, departure traffic may have had an affect...BUT AGAIN, I DOUBT IT. JOURNOs could help only by asking ATC about other arrivals...and departures.
I do ask another question...one I have posed before:
In what position was the horizontal stabilizer trim selector switch found?
copilot or pilot?
Psychophysiological entity
So the reason that this particular aircraft did NOT land on the first or second attempt presumably also had no causal connection with the ultimate crash?
So much is being said about possibilities, and not too much about facts, but the thread has considerable value, because any brain-storming over a serious issue like this can lead to more general awareness.
The quote is about a vital issue, and one that I've posted on before. If the information above is correct, statistics show a grave increase in taking a third shot, but I'm still very uneasy about making this 'quasi-rule' another burden on the shoulders of a stressed pilot in these circumstances.
There can only be one person making that executive decision at that time.
If the guy has been given his command, then there can't be a dozen other people at both ends of his flight all inputting into his decisions.
Like tossing a penny, the odds are not affected by what went before. Pure logic will say the current set of conditions are the only ones valid.
Clearly this has to take into account all the obvious factors like fuel, but the stress factor on a young pilot can be horrendous. Indeed, given the BOAC link above, probably on a much wider age group.
That decision has to rest with the man of the moment, and there has to be silence from the hoards as he tries to cope with the inevitable testing moments.
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sevenstrokeroll:
Both sides, as in the left or right side, or as to both ends of the runway?
and as the metroliner made approaches to both sides of the same runway
I think the dangers of multiple approaches are worth talking about, and things that clearly add to the risk are
- very low but variable visibility = the temptation for "just one more go and I can get in"
- crew inexperience = poorer risk assessment
- minimally equipped older technology commuter airliners = This sector of the industry won't invest in technology upgrades which make approaches safer and easier.
Whether or not the multiple approaches affected the outcome (I believe it was a casual factor, but that is pure speculation on my part) I firmly believe all pilots, and particularly the ones operating at the lower tiers of commercial operations, should think long and hard about a third attempt.
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just FYI
this plane doesn't have a flight director. It does have an HSI. Unless someone actually invested in some real upgrades...its a tough ILS...nothing easy about it.
this plane doesn't have a flight director. It does have an HSI. Unless someone actually invested in some real upgrades...its a tough ILS...nothing easy about it.
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The reality of life in small, struggling companies can be pretty grim.
My first airline (not so very long ago) was an operator of similar sized and utterly shagged out aircraft few if any of which were fit to fly for a variety of reasons. Maintenance was almost non existent and company culture had it that no-one diverted without management "permission" , recorded a defect or objected to an overload for fear of dismissal. It was normal to bust minima, indeed the Chief Pilot led from the front on that score. Autopilots? Ha! De-icing u/s on most of the fleet, radar u/s on all iirc, engines that wouldn't give full power, AIs so knackered that they moved in 2-3 degree jerks, RMI intermittently showing fly left when it meant fly right, and doing same on LOC as well (the corrective maneuvres below DH to get onto the runway could be pretty radical) - but no defects at all in the tech log! And all this given to the youngest and/or least experienced pilots in the country, Capts and FOs. The concept of putting "experienced" - that's a relative term - FOs with new Capts was mentioned occasionally but was difficult to achieve in so small a company. Anyway, it often wasn't convenient. A bit like minima. Or maintenance. Or honest loadsheets.
It was by far the most hazardous flying I've ever done.
Does any of this sound familiar?
My first airline (not so very long ago) was an operator of similar sized and utterly shagged out aircraft few if any of which were fit to fly for a variety of reasons. Maintenance was almost non existent and company culture had it that no-one diverted without management "permission" , recorded a defect or objected to an overload for fear of dismissal. It was normal to bust minima, indeed the Chief Pilot led from the front on that score. Autopilots? Ha! De-icing u/s on most of the fleet, radar u/s on all iirc, engines that wouldn't give full power, AIs so knackered that they moved in 2-3 degree jerks, RMI intermittently showing fly left when it meant fly right, and doing same on LOC as well (the corrective maneuvres below DH to get onto the runway could be pretty radical) - but no defects at all in the tech log! And all this given to the youngest and/or least experienced pilots in the country, Capts and FOs. The concept of putting "experienced" - that's a relative term - FOs with new Capts was mentioned occasionally but was difficult to achieve in so small a company. Anyway, it often wasn't convenient. A bit like minima. Or maintenance. Or honest loadsheets.
It was by far the most hazardous flying I've ever done.
Does any of this sound familiar?
Last edited by Agaricus bisporus; 15th Feb 2011 at 03:00.
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I agree with agaricous b:
folks...if you are a flight sim/computer geek...that's great and fun...and I can't do it.
if you lucked out and didn't have to pay your dues and went into a PRIMO, great airline as a cadet, or the nephew of the boss...you haven't been there.
but you have to be singularly determined and clever to make your way in a commuter/regional airline flying a piece of shirt. and throw in a bit of luck too...the only thing worse is flying bank checks and I've done that too.
folks...if you are a flight sim/computer geek...that's great and fun...and I can't do it.
if you lucked out and didn't have to pay your dues and went into a PRIMO, great airline as a cadet, or the nephew of the boss...you haven't been there.
but you have to be singularly determined and clever to make your way in a commuter/regional airline flying a piece of shirt. and throw in a bit of luck too...the only thing worse is flying bank checks and I've done that too.
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Flying a twin Beech, D18, to the desert flying freight with a mode 64 transponder and two sets of coms that worked intermitently doing ILS's into SNA with a broken airplane wing that had fallen off the attitude indicator and was stuck on the bottom so you had to fly with a bar with glue on it to keep the wings level was a lot of fun, but we were young then. It was great to get an airline job where almost everything worked, wasn't it?
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From a Metro III article:
With the trim motor running frequently as our speed came back, the final approach was accompanied by the familiar chirp of the 'in motion' warning sound. However, maintaining a constant trim input makes the approach appear both stable and comfortable, although there seemed little pitch 'feel'. This is an aeroplane best handled by rigid adherence to the numbers and attitude guided by the SAS indicator. With the speed bleeding off carrying some power into the flare, there's little rearwards input of the controls - although any small change of direction, drift and pitch requires a heavyish control input.
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Loose Rivets
I agree, while there has been a lot of noise in this thread and the usual complaints about flight simmers etc. I believe it has been useful, at least to me. For those who believe it's disrespectful, they're missing the point. Pilots read accident reports and reports of accidents avidly, for good reason, because one day they might well face the same scenario. In fact they probably will. I have found myself there with a bunch of trusting faces down the back not realising that things have got very interesting up front. Most never realise how interesting it became unless they see my shaking hands afterwards.
Thanks to the input of several pilots who've flown similar aircraft in similar situations and the known facts rather than speculation. I do believe that a plausible scenario for this accident could be constructed from this thread which will probably be close to the final accident report.
That's useful whatever way you look at it.
So much is being said about possibilities, and not too much about facts, but the thread has considerable value, because any brain-storming over a serious issue like this can lead to more general awareness.
Thanks to the input of several pilots who've flown similar aircraft in similar situations and the known facts rather than speculation. I do believe that a plausible scenario for this accident could be constructed from this thread which will probably be close to the final accident report.
That's useful whatever way you look at it.
Like tossing a penny, the odds are not affected by what went before. Pure logic will say the current set of conditions are the only ones valid.
The penny does not change from toss to toss. It's mass/CofG/mental state do not change. It is inanimate.
However not quite true for an aircraft is it? Or indeed the crew? Recent history has everything to do with what will or might happen next. Fuel state/trim/stress-levels all are affected exactly by what has already happened. It is the combined sequence of events that led to the result, not the instantaneous conditions of the moment.
That is exactly why it is worth discussing the unfortunate outcome, since that may lead someone else to make a different decision faced with a similar set of circumstances and event chain.
- GY
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Corsair, you make an excellent appraisal of this thread so far. The info from those who know the Metro has been very useful in attempting to understand what may have occurred, together with the many other relevant discussions. Thank you sevenstrokeroll, Big Engines et al for your valuable input
l am speculating along similar lines to BarbiesBoyfriend in post 453, but we will have to wait until the Prelimary Report at least to find out
l am speculating along similar lines to BarbiesBoyfriend in post 453, but we will have to wait until the Prelimary Report at least to find out
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I totally agree with garage years.
it is nothing like a chance toss of a coin.
So much speculation it's true, but the wish to be succesful and the commercial need to do so will have increased with each approach.
Possibly encouraged by an earlier late sighting of lights and what I would imagine to have been an improvement in RVR which encouraged the captain to make the decision to leave the hold.
The decision at DH should in an ideal world be totally dependent on the conditions at the time but how many of you commercial PNF's will have said "decide" to have the response dealyed a millisecond to the point when the lights flash into view?
I do have personal experience of this operator attempting to make an approach in UK airspace when the pilot had been warned of the Absolute Minima and having acknowledged the fact. A second clear and unambiguous repetition with emphasis on the phrase:
"if you continue the approach and descend below 1000 ft above aerodrome level it is believed that you will be contravening UK legislation and I shall be required to report the facts, acknowledge” was required for the pilot to understand the potential problem.
Pure speculation of course but I fear the scenario painted by Barbies BF at 453 may prove to be very close to the truth.
it is nothing like a chance toss of a coin.
So much speculation it's true, but the wish to be succesful and the commercial need to do so will have increased with each approach.
Possibly encouraged by an earlier late sighting of lights and what I would imagine to have been an improvement in RVR which encouraged the captain to make the decision to leave the hold.
The decision at DH should in an ideal world be totally dependent on the conditions at the time but how many of you commercial PNF's will have said "decide" to have the response dealyed a millisecond to the point when the lights flash into view?
I do have personal experience of this operator attempting to make an approach in UK airspace when the pilot had been warned of the Absolute Minima and having acknowledged the fact. A second clear and unambiguous repetition with emphasis on the phrase:
"if you continue the approach and descend below 1000 ft above aerodrome level it is believed that you will be contravening UK legislation and I shall be required to report the facts, acknowledge” was required for the pilot to understand the potential problem.
Pure speculation of course but I fear the scenario painted by Barbies BF at 453 may prove to be very close to the truth.
Psychophysiological entity
I concede the above points on stress completely. Indeed, this is part of the post:
Well, I do say Pure logic: This removes all other parameters, and should just leave the pilot with a decision based on that moment in time. Of course, if human nature interferes with that decision, it's back to the drawing board.
a grave increase (Big Piston's quoted statistical danger) in taking a third shot, but I'm still very uneasy about making this 'quasi-rule' - another burden on the shoulders of a stressed pilot in these circumstances.
Like tossing a penny, the odds are not affected by what went before. Pure logic will say the current set of conditions are the only ones valid.
Clearly this has to take into account all the obvious factors like fuel, but the stress factor on a young pilot can be horrendous.
Clearly this has to take into account all the obvious factors like fuel, but the stress factor on a young pilot can be horrendous.
Well, I do say Pure logic: This removes all other parameters, and should just leave the pilot with a decision based on that moment in time. Of course, if human nature interferes with that decision, it's back to the drawing board.
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atprider
When, where and what was the outcome of your 'personal experience of this operator'?
Not getting at you personally but this accident has shown up the worst aspects of PPRuNe, with idle speculation and a desire to get into the most esoteric aspects of the aircraft and its systems to show off personal knowledge.
Much is made of the media picking up and using comments from here out of context. So consider that a company might be condemned because of wrong information here - doesn't do much for fellow pilots who are still working there, does it? If it isn't real, don't post. If it is real, back it up with detail. You can't have it both ways.
Has anyone ever come on hear after the final report on a fatal accident and said "I told you so"? I doubt it.
Has anyone ever come on here after the final report on a fatal accident and said "I got it completely wrong"? I doubt it.
The contrast between this thread and the AF447 search says it all for me.
Not getting at you personally but this accident has shown up the worst aspects of PPRuNe, with idle speculation and a desire to get into the most esoteric aspects of the aircraft and its systems to show off personal knowledge.
Much is made of the media picking up and using comments from here out of context. So consider that a company might be condemned because of wrong information here - doesn't do much for fellow pilots who are still working there, does it? If it isn't real, don't post. If it is real, back it up with detail. You can't have it both ways.
Has anyone ever come on hear after the final report on a fatal accident and said "I told you so"? I doubt it.
Has anyone ever come on here after the final report on a fatal accident and said "I got it completely wrong"? I doubt it.
The contrast between this thread and the AF447 search says it all for me.
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To answer horse,
At an airfield in the London FIR, as an ATCO, and as I said aafter a second clear reminder of the action which would follow, thankfully a reversal of the initial decision to press on and make an approach.
I admint to knowing very little about the aircraft systems , actual compositin of crew or EXACT circumstances.
Only the risks I am aware of and the experience of how I have witnessed the companies operations.
Possibly best that I make no further comment and let the investigators do their job...
At an airfield in the London FIR, as an ATCO, and as I said aafter a second clear reminder of the action which would follow, thankfully a reversal of the initial decision to press on and make an approach.
I admint to knowing very little about the aircraft systems , actual compositin of crew or EXACT circumstances.
Only the risks I am aware of and the experience of how I have witnessed the companies operations.
Possibly best that I make no further comment and let the investigators do their job...
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Having watched this thread from afar, with, it has to be said, a fair old idea of what is the REAL story here, I am heartened to dip back in and find some contributions from individuals who are understanding the REAL issues here, and empathising with those who were doing their best to do their job, whilst staying in a job.
My sympathies to the Crew, and to anyone now in a similar position.
Easy for me to say I know, but I have always said, no matter what, really no matter WHAT, your priorities must AWAYS be, 1 Protect your life, 2 Protect your licence 3 Protect your job.
Respect that and you will live to fight another day, whilst retaining a licence to present, when inevitably you will be forced to seek another job.
That is the harsh reality of aviation at this rarified
level.
My sympathies to the Crew, and to anyone now in a similar position.
Easy for me to say I know, but I have always said, no matter what, really no matter WHAT, your priorities must AWAYS be, 1 Protect your life, 2 Protect your licence 3 Protect your job.
Respect that and you will live to fight another day, whilst retaining a licence to present, when inevitably you will be forced to seek another job.
That is the harsh reality of aviation at this rarified
level.
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Total speculation on my part.
No unusual flight characteristics to report after roughly 6K hours operating these in some of the foggiest places on the planet. Company SOP for approaches near minima was a Captain-monitored approach flown by the FO with control transferred in the event of a landing. Not really much different than a coupled approach IMO.