Crash-Cork Airport
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Touched a nerve.
At almost next to no experience, I ended up doing a better job of flying the aircraft in real IMC than the Instrument rated instructor sitting next to me. As a direct result of several "incidents" on that trip, a few months later he was "invited to find employment outside of the aviation industry"
I mentioned the first time I ever took my children up. They loved it. I was ****less for most of the flight despite it being CAVOK perfect weather.
Several years later, an instructor I'd been flying with a few days earlier on a check ride was killed along with his student when a low approach to the ground (simulated engine failure) went wrong on the go around (from about 10 feet) and they ended up in the middle of a tree,
The gentleman who was the CEO of an organisation I was working for who was looking to get an AOC to operate a number of ATR42's was killed a couple of years ago after an engine failure in a Mooney he was flying. The AAIB reported that the aircraft was out of check and out of inspection at the time of the accident. I also had learnt that he had been somewhat cavalier in his operation of a light twin when doing some of the route proving for the AOC application a few years earlier.
A Harvard that I did aerobatics in at Kissimmee crashed a few months later after the spar let go in flight.
A friend of mine is a ground instructor on 747's. During a visit to a GA sim at Simuflite in Dallas, we were introduced to the 10,000 Ft exercise. The object is ( at the time we were using Kai Tak) take off, CAVOK, no wind, have to go above 10,000 Ft, put it back on the ground full stop, shortest time wins.
It was an interesting exercise in the exec jet that we did it in. We tried the same thing in the 747 sim a while later, with interesting results, we discovered that with some non standard handling, but without breaking the sim, it can be done in 6 mins 25. So what, you may ask. A while later, the same exercise was given to 3 type rated First officers at the end of a sim session. 2 of the 3 broke the aircraft in the air as they were not able to handle it on raw data. As regular SLF on that type at the time, it got my attention, though there was nothing I could do about it.
As part of the in depth research for an A320 simulator, we spent a long session in a level D sim doing manual reversion investigation, with a senior instructor from the operator with us. One of the specific tasks was to do an approach to landing in manual reversion, in CAVOK and good weather, as a concession to the fact that neither of us were type rated. All that works in that scenario is rudder, pitch trim and power. Due to the nature of the other failures we'd simulated, we had very little in the way of instruments.
At 200 Ft, we were not happy, so we did a missed approach, a circuit followed by another attempt, which was successful. At the end of the session, the instructor commented, "I will be talking to my colleagues about that session, we'd been told it wasn't possible to do a missed approach in manual reversion, you just did one".
I did my CPL as a self improver, but didn't go instructing, I was lucky that the work I was doing meant a lot of international travelling, back in the days when Club Class was expensive, so I ended up with my own light twin (PA39) that was extensively used single crewed IFR on international trips with the bills paid by the company travel allowance. I got that aircraft with less than 100 Hrs in the log book, and I would be the first to admit that I was very lucky to get one of the best instructors I could have to get me up to speed. We didn't do it in the theoretical hours, but by the time he signed me off, I was safe to fly the aircraft to IFR standards at night, he wasn't going to let me go solo without doing that, and I was happy with that, it meant I was a lot safer than I might have been.
All of this taught me a lot about flying, and about all the rest of the aspects of aviation, as did many hundreds of hours on commercial jump seats, in approved simulators of all types, as well as many hundreds of unlogged hours testing and refining (at that time unapproved) simulators that were being built for specific tasks and clients.
I ended up with a Frozen ATPL at just the wrong time, as I got it, somewhat older than most people, Saddam started the Gulf War, which killed the jobs that were out there at the time. By the time things recovered, I knew I'd missed my window, so did other things instead.
I'm still involved with many and various aspects of aviation, and intend to keep it that way, but if I am brutal, I am more than sick of the pretentious elitism that comes across from some of the professionals in certain parts of the industry. I have met and worked with many Atpl holders who are not like that, and they have been absolute gentlemen, and we have worked together very successfully on many projects.
So yes, a very tender nerve, because I know just how much money, time and work was involved to get that Frozen ATPL, and how many people put a lot of time and effort into making sure that I did get it (back in the days before multiple choice exams too). The fact that I've not ended up in the cockpit of a large commercial jet is unfortunate, but in many respects, the very unusual route I ended up taking as a result has possibly been more rewarding, in that I got to meet a lot of people closely involved in aviation, and I know that some of the work I've been involved with has been directly responsible for improving the research and development that has gone into the next generation of EFIS cockpits that are now emerging.
Ok, a lot of this is totally off topic to the Cork crash, for which I apologise.
What I will not apologise for is my determination to make sure that the underlying factors that caused the Cork crash are fully revealed, and if necessary changed by the regulators, in order to make sure that small aircraft are safe to travel in, as there are quite a few used in this part of the world, and small should not mean less safe. I also want to make sure that people coming up through "the system" are aware of the things that can go wrong, but preferrably without damaging themselves or an aircraft.
Too many people I've met have been killed by "accidents" in aircraft. Most of those "accidents" were not really accidents, they were events that happened because the rules and limits had been ignored, or were not known in the first place.
The other thing I have a real bee in my butt about is the way that training is going in terms of not giving pilots the full information about exactly how the aircraft is really operating, and what is dependent on other systems, as it's in times of real crisis, like the AF 330 last year, when things go really bad really suddenly that the guys at the sharp end need to know a hell of a lot about how the thing is really working, and what they can or cannot do that will affect their situation.
The gimli glider only got down in one piece because the captain had gliding experience.
The DC10 at Sioux City only got as far as it did because the captain had done some "experimenting" in the simulator a while previously, which meant he had some ideas about what the aircraft would do, which was the difference between survival and not surviving.
The problem now is that in some cases, if a pilot shows interest in developing extra skills or knowledge, it's frowned on by the beancounters as being an expense they don't need, and in some cases, the fleet captain or chief pilot may also see the interest as either the individual trying to hide a handling problem, or as being a danger to "valid" CRM, as it's outside of their "standard operating procedure".
One of the best ways to raise awareness is to make sure that incidents and crashes like Cork are discussed in depth in places where all levels of people involved in aviation can see them, and Pprune is meant to be one of the most widely read fora. If that means a low time PPL sees this thread, and in 5 years time as a low time First officer on a small turboprop type remembers something he read in this thread, then it's served it's purpose,
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wanting to know the underlying factors behind the cork crash is worthwhile.
but I am 99 percent sure that what happened has happened before and will happen again.
Did I read correctly that one instructor you flew with took a plane to 10 feet on a simulated engine failure and then had problems in the go around? I was an instructor, CFIIMEI, and I wouldn't do that on anything but a runway...not just an open field.
but I am 99 percent sure that what happened has happened before and will happen again.
Did I read correctly that one instructor you flew with took a plane to 10 feet on a simulated engine failure and then had problems in the go around? I was an instructor, CFIIMEI, and I wouldn't do that on anything but a runway...not just an open field.
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Over 550 comments in this thread and it has descended into the usual nonsense with little or no relevance to what actually happened.
If the facts as reported in Flight International are correct, and I tend to believe them, the RVR was below CAT1 minimums.
To a retired Twotter driver this smells like an obvious case of getthereitis but we need to understand WHY the crew made 2 failed approaches in conditions which were clearly unsuitable then stooged around wasting fuel which could have taken them to a safe alternative and then made a third attempt in weather which was still below minimums.
What information were they getting from the ground and could this have misled them ?. What pressures were they under, especially from a company culture ?.
There is no excuse for busted minimums, any professional pilot knows that the correct action is to divert before matters get worse. Yet these same tragic events results continue to occur with alarming regularity.
Something is clearly wrong, this is not a one-off event. Why do apparently good professional crews continue to make the same mistake year after year after year with the same tragic result. Training ? Pressure ? Cultural issues ?.
Maybe we need some new clever black box which would automagically detect and report such exceedancies to the CAA. Such a box is most probably totally impractical to design, but if it were possible it could put both pilots and operators in fear of their licences and save lives.
If the facts as reported in Flight International are correct, and I tend to believe them, the RVR was below CAT1 minimums.
To a retired Twotter driver this smells like an obvious case of getthereitis but we need to understand WHY the crew made 2 failed approaches in conditions which were clearly unsuitable then stooged around wasting fuel which could have taken them to a safe alternative and then made a third attempt in weather which was still below minimums.
What information were they getting from the ground and could this have misled them ?. What pressures were they under, especially from a company culture ?.
There is no excuse for busted minimums, any professional pilot knows that the correct action is to divert before matters get worse. Yet these same tragic events results continue to occur with alarming regularity.
Something is clearly wrong, this is not a one-off event. Why do apparently good professional crews continue to make the same mistake year after year after year with the same tragic result. Training ? Pressure ? Cultural issues ?.
Maybe we need some new clever black box which would automagically detect and report such exceedancies to the CAA. Such a box is most probably totally impractical to design, but if it were possible it could put both pilots and operators in fear of their licences and save lives.
Irish steve
great last post.
having flown for three flag carriers I have seen lots of s**t that hasn't happened.
I was abused when I posted a fact that one of my last companies on board security shot two of our passengers.
I was similarly lambasted on another post.
Unfortunately our industry has many dual standards which also exist within the organisations that police it.
I think the best example is how a major carrier had a very expensive and fast aircraft land on fumes - the first officers in that company threatened management and the gentleman involved resigned. The aviation authority involved told me it didn't happen but another department sent me proof that they know about it.
keep up the posts
great last post.
having flown for three flag carriers I have seen lots of s**t that hasn't happened.
I was abused when I posted a fact that one of my last companies on board security shot two of our passengers.
I was similarly lambasted on another post.
Unfortunately our industry has many dual standards which also exist within the organisations that police it.
I think the best example is how a major carrier had a very expensive and fast aircraft land on fumes - the first officers in that company threatened management and the gentleman involved resigned. The aviation authority involved told me it didn't happen but another department sent me proof that they know about it.
keep up the posts
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Does anybody here know if the Irish CAA have an Absolute Minima Procedure for ATC, similar to the UK CAA?* (MATS pt1 maybe?)
I sincerely doubt the crew made an approach below minima and I would be willing to bet that the tower passed them actual RVR via RT which was acceptable to the crew to make the approach. I would also be willing to bet that the aircraft had enough fuel onboard to divert to alternate when it impacted the ground.
*Anybody meaning those qualified to answer not Walter Mitty's, Sim Enthusiasts or anybody else not involved with professional/commercial aviation!
I sincerely doubt the crew made an approach below minima and I would be willing to bet that the tower passed them actual RVR via RT which was acceptable to the crew to make the approach. I would also be willing to bet that the aircraft had enough fuel onboard to divert to alternate when it impacted the ground.
*Anybody meaning those qualified to answer not Walter Mitty's, Sim Enthusiasts or anybody else not involved with professional/commercial aviation!
Last edited by Mercenary Pilot; 21st Feb 2011 at 08:57.
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Irish Steve
You still don't understand. You flew an aircraft in an environment where you had the luxury of going with full tanks. In the cruel world of Turboprop regional ops as explained very well by Madjock earlier on these type of pilots do not.
Please, stop waffling on with your non relevant stories. No one here cares, no one here respects them.
I arrived at my FINAL destination with 2 Hrs fuel, (the alternate then was just under 1 Hr away) and the divert decision was taken less than 1 Hour into what was originally a planned 3 Hour sector that was rapidly becoming a 4 hour flight due to unforecast 50 Kt Headwinds.
Please, stop waffling on with your non relevant stories. No one here cares, no one here respects them.
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Well when its been outside limits when I have been there they have done the UK "whats your intentions" so I presume they do.
Generally I always found ATC in Cork very professional with the odd Irishism thrown in when it wasn't inapproprate, which some may frown at but led to a friendly good working relastionship between ATC and crew.
I operated in there twice a week off and on for a year.
To the mods the tide question is quiet approprate for a regional pilot who knows his coastal airports.
Persoanally with low viz issues at coastal airfields I always check the tides especially this time of year.
The water is at its coldest proberly about 4deg C. If it is coming in especially on a spring there will be a local cycle established with onshore winds bring saturated very cold air onshore. You can spot it with the wind direction at the airfield. Until the tide had turned and the wind shifted and dragged the fog back offshore the RVR will never improve. And any other airfield along the same coast can't be trusted. If the number of times ABZ goes out unforcast with Haar this tide effect is not included in the MET office model.
I know its not taught its purely an experence thing which to be honest I wasn't taught by another pilot. It was a experenced tower controller bitching that the MET office wouldn't do anything when he could see Haar sitting offshore and he knew the it would sweep in when the tide changed. The Haar wasn't forcast and an hour later Aberdeen and Inverness were dealing with multiple Mayday's with Helibuses on fumes looking for somewhere to roost.
To be honest the quality of the TAF's over the last 10 years has gone down hill.
Generally I always found ATC in Cork very professional with the odd Irishism thrown in when it wasn't inapproprate, which some may frown at but led to a friendly good working relastionship between ATC and crew.
I operated in there twice a week off and on for a year.
To the mods the tide question is quiet approprate for a regional pilot who knows his coastal airports.
Persoanally with low viz issues at coastal airfields I always check the tides especially this time of year.
The water is at its coldest proberly about 4deg C. If it is coming in especially on a spring there will be a local cycle established with onshore winds bring saturated very cold air onshore. You can spot it with the wind direction at the airfield. Until the tide had turned and the wind shifted and dragged the fog back offshore the RVR will never improve. And any other airfield along the same coast can't be trusted. If the number of times ABZ goes out unforcast with Haar this tide effect is not included in the MET office model.
I know its not taught its purely an experence thing which to be honest I wasn't taught by another pilot. It was a experenced tower controller bitching that the MET office wouldn't do anything when he could see Haar sitting offshore and he knew the it would sweep in when the tide changed. The Haar wasn't forcast and an hour later Aberdeen and Inverness were dealing with multiple Mayday's with Helibuses on fumes looking for somewhere to roost.
To be honest the quality of the TAF's over the last 10 years has gone down hill.
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And the subject of going fat with fuel.
Yes you do it but never to that extent. Personally I would have gone fat with enough to get to NQY if I had the excess traffic load to do it. But no way would I have had hours of it onboard. If you do that OPS will tell you to sit in the hold until you have to divert. So you end up with over flowing toilets if you have them fitted and a very happy FO with hours in his log book and an extremely sore backside going round in circles.
Personally I would have done one approach to show willing then disappeared off to preferably somewhere in Eire but if none of them look do able off to NQY. And just except I was going to get sworn at on the telephone, it wouldn't be the first time or last.
Yes you do it but never to that extent. Personally I would have gone fat with enough to get to NQY if I had the excess traffic load to do it. But no way would I have had hours of it onboard. If you do that OPS will tell you to sit in the hold until you have to divert. So you end up with over flowing toilets if you have them fitted and a very happy FO with hours in his log book and an extremely sore backside going round in circles.
Personally I would have done one approach to show willing then disappeared off to preferably somewhere in Eire but if none of them look do able off to NQY. And just except I was going to get sworn at on the telephone, it wouldn't be the first time or last.
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mad jock, very good point about coastal fog behavior, coming in with the tide and covering seaside airports, when the TAF's can be unhelpful.
I would hope that the experience of Cork's ATC on this question was a part of the AAIB investigation and recommendations.
Some of you Large Airline Pilots who question the background of certain contributors might want to apologise to Irish Steve. Even if he goes on a bit, and may stray from the topic, he does have experience to share. Or would you require all contributors to be under a certain age?
I would hope that the experience of Cork's ATC on this question was a part of the AAIB investigation and recommendations.
Some of you Large Airline Pilots who question the background of certain contributors might want to apologise to Irish Steve. Even if he goes on a bit, and may stray from the topic, he does have experience to share. Or would you require all contributors to be under a certain age?
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Indeed, with respect to your experience Irish Steve it's is clear that you are out of touch with the current scene. In fact your defence highlights this. This is very evident in your posts. Worse in justifying your position with non relevant stories you have dragged this thread off course again.
I'm not attacking you merely pointing out your mistake.
On the point of mistakes and to drag this thread further away from the topic, the collision with the tree didn't kill both on board. The student survived. The Instructor died. I knew them both, the student was a former boss of mine and the Instructor a friend. When I visited his grave recently. I called him all sorts of names for his stupidity, friend or not. But it's important to remember that, unbelieveably, this practice was SOP at the flying school concerned. I was horrified as a student when it was done with me. A salutory lesson about busting minimums of any sort.
I'm not attacking you merely pointing out your mistake.
On the point of mistakes and to drag this thread further away from the topic, the collision with the tree didn't kill both on board. The student survived. The Instructor died. I knew them both, the student was a former boss of mine and the Instructor a friend. When I visited his grave recently. I called him all sorts of names for his stupidity, friend or not. But it's important to remember that, unbelieveably, this practice was SOP at the flying school concerned. I was horrified as a student when it was done with me. A salutory lesson about busting minimums of any sort.
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Not sure if posted already but article in Flight today stating Manx2 were declining insurance claims saying that Flightline BCN were responsible, this despite Manx 2 web site saying they were liable.. Not good PR if so 
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Irish Steve,
Having so far survived 17000hr in the air, 13000 spent on 737-s, I am happy to report that I have not become elitist enough to have failed to share the heartfelt sentiments you expressed in post 555 and 557. . . . well done
Having so far survived 17000hr in the air, 13000 spent on 737-s, I am happy to report that I have not become elitist enough to have failed to share the heartfelt sentiments you expressed in post 555 and 557. . . . well done
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Pax experience
Just had a chat with my next door neighbour who has recently visited his close friend, Lawrence Wilson.
His recollection is that a wingtip hit the ground and the aircraft flipped and landed inverted on the soft ground at the side of the runway.
The frightening part is that his major fear was of drowning as he had a massive accumulation of mud on his face which he fought (successfully) to remove.
One wonders whether, if the attempt to turn on to the runway centreline had been more successful, there would have been any survivors. i.e. if the impact had been on tarmac.
(I am assuming the wingtip impact was the result of an attempt to regain the centreline).
His recollection is that a wingtip hit the ground and the aircraft flipped and landed inverted on the soft ground at the side of the runway.
The frightening part is that his major fear was of drowning as he had a massive accumulation of mud on his face which he fought (successfully) to remove.
One wonders whether, if the attempt to turn on to the runway centreline had been more successful, there would have been any survivors. i.e. if the impact had been on tarmac.
(I am assuming the wingtip impact was the result of an attempt to regain the centreline).
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Regardless, this is scarcely relevant.
I think what is most important for the AAIU to ascertain is the rationale behind the third approach attempt.
Fuel state on departure from BHD and Company Policy would seem to be the areas where questions should be asked.
I think what is most important for the AAIU to ascertain is the rationale behind the third approach attempt.
Fuel state on departure from BHD and Company Policy would seem to be the areas where questions should be asked.