Air India Express B738 crash
PT6A
Interesting - but what really matters is the attitude of Operations Management to actual G/As. Do they query the crew in an inquisitional manner (and demand reports of every G/A) or do they try to find out why it happened in a positive way in order to understand if there's a systemic problem with either the airline SOPs, the training, the airport, ATC or whatever.
I've flown for quite a few operators in my time and I've yet to see an Ops Manual that genuinely tells the crew to G/A if they're unhappy with the approach, safe in the knowledge that there will be NO COMEBACK to them.
Well, one can dream...perhaps we'll see it one day ............???
Interesting - but what really matters is the attitude of Operations Management to actual G/As. Do they query the crew in an inquisitional manner (and demand reports of every G/A) or do they try to find out why it happened in a positive way in order to understand if there's a systemic problem with either the airline SOPs, the training, the airport, ATC or whatever.
I've flown for quite a few operators in my time and I've yet to see an Ops Manual that genuinely tells the crew to G/A if they're unhappy with the approach, safe in the knowledge that there will be NO COMEBACK to them.
Well, one can dream...perhaps we'll see it one day ............???
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: Thailand
Posts: 942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
johannschmith says;
"I've flown for quite a few operators in my time and I've yet to see an Ops Manual that genuinely tells the crew to G/A if they're unhappy with the approach, safe in the knowledge that there will be NO COMEBACK to them."
You could always join the UK's favourite airline which is the butt of constant crticism in every aspect of their operations by all the enlightened souls who contribute to these forums (or is it fora?), open their Ops manual and find that indeed, if you are unhappy with the approach then you MUST Go-around. Nowhere does it say that you will be subseqently questioned as to why you did so.
So, yes, there are airlines who adopt such an enlightened policy, you just need to be fortunate enough to actually work for one of them.
"I've flown for quite a few operators in my time and I've yet to see an Ops Manual that genuinely tells the crew to G/A if they're unhappy with the approach, safe in the knowledge that there will be NO COMEBACK to them."
You could always join the UK's favourite airline which is the butt of constant crticism in every aspect of their operations by all the enlightened souls who contribute to these forums (or is it fora?), open their Ops manual and find that indeed, if you are unhappy with the approach then you MUST Go-around. Nowhere does it say that you will be subseqently questioned as to why you did so.
So, yes, there are airlines who adopt such an enlightened policy, you just need to be fortunate enough to actually work for one of them.
Join Date: Sep 1999
Posts: 541
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Bloody sight safer than going off the far end of the runway and killing people.
FO can command a GA and this should be done by calling "GA" and advancing TL's.If the Captain resists and the FO is 100% sure that to continue the approach and landing will result in mortal danger,then yes okay he/she can do whatever is necessary,including raising the gear(200' at latest).But this is extreme action designed only to prevent a disaster.Its not to be taken because of SOP infringement alone.The Captain is PIC,not the FO.
I agree its a fine line and a tough call for the FO but taking control from the PIC is only to be done when a clear and present danger is self-evident and the PIC refuses to heed any warnings.
We already have an indication in India that ATC are now taking it upon themselves to command a GA for reasons that are clearly beyond their jurisdiction(Indigo).We dont want FO's taking control or putting the gear up because the plane's a bit high or a bit long .The remedy must fit the problem.An Asian airline once banned all FO landings because of one overrun in wet weather.Disproportionate and counter-productive response.Lets not see the same mistake made here.
Join Date: Jan 2002
Location: Melbourne
Posts: 102
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
approach and landing accident reduction
I continue to be amazed at the number of approach and landing accidents that have occurred over the past few years.
Six years ago I was involved in the Flight Safety Foundations roll out of their approach and landing accident reduction program (ALARP) in Australia. At the time ALA accidents made up almost 60% of all accidents. I hazard a guess it is even higher at the moment. According to the FSF at the time implementation of the program amongst South American airlines had been the main reason accident rates in that region had substantially decreased. The culture of the airlines involved had been turned around with simulator training emphasising that G/As were fully supported if a stabilised approach had not been achieved at a certain point of the approach. This training was fully supported by the airlines management.
Most code sharing airlines are now subject to the IATA IOSA audit program. Perhaps the ALARP program should be included in an airlines operational audit program as part of the cultural assessment of the airlines management.
Six years ago I was involved in the Flight Safety Foundations roll out of their approach and landing accident reduction program (ALARP) in Australia. At the time ALA accidents made up almost 60% of all accidents. I hazard a guess it is even higher at the moment. According to the FSF at the time implementation of the program amongst South American airlines had been the main reason accident rates in that region had substantially decreased. The culture of the airlines involved had been turned around with simulator training emphasising that G/As were fully supported if a stabilised approach had not been achieved at a certain point of the approach. This training was fully supported by the airlines management.
Most code sharing airlines are now subject to the IATA IOSA audit program. Perhaps the ALARP program should be included in an airlines operational audit program as part of the cultural assessment of the airlines management.
Join Date: Feb 2010
Location: a shack on a hill
Posts: 128
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
(...) and the FO is 100% sure that to continue the approach and landing will result in mortal danger,then yes okay he/she can do whatever is necessary,including raising the gear(200' at latest).
How stupid is this? You only raise the undercarriage if you have a positive rate of climb, be it either T/O or G/A, but certainly not to force the PF into a G/A from an approach...
Join Date: Sep 1999
Posts: 541
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
How stupid is this? You only raise the undercarriage if you have a positive rate of climb, be it either T/O or G/A, but certainly not to force the PF into a G/A from an approach
This idea of raising the gear to force a GA was put forward as a last ditch option for the FO if the Captain refuses to abort a landing.I dont like it anymore than you do.However,perhaps it is sometimes called for if the Captain seems intent on killing everyone.The B737 Indonesian crash is a case in point.
Read the entire thread and dont ever wave your finger at me again.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If this suggestion (raising gear) is coming from professional pilots I am worried.
If the situation is so desperate (3 calls and all that) that drastic action is needed, a firm push forward on the T/Ls will stop the a/c landing and force a g/a. Raising the gear when the other pilot is so obviously 'out of it' and fixated could well result in a wheels up landing. A quick punch in the jaw works too. I once had to 'karate chop' a student in RAF days who had landed with the footbrakes on - that worked too
.
Better to be arguing with the chief pilot about why you did it than being dead.
If the situation is so desperate (3 calls and all that) that drastic action is needed, a firm push forward on the T/Ls will stop the a/c landing and force a g/a. Raising the gear when the other pilot is so obviously 'out of it' and fixated could well result in a wheels up landing. A quick punch in the jaw works too. I once had to 'karate chop' a student in RAF days who had landed with the footbrakes on - that worked too
.Better to be arguing with the chief pilot about why you did it than being dead.
Join Date: Sep 2004
Location: Germany
Posts: 63
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Folks, first to outline before questions:
I am not a pilot but I work in the Safety-Department of a european airline.
Those of you who assume that the PNF might have initiated a GA may have a look at this
ASN Aircraft accident Airbus A300-622R B-1814 Taipei-Chiang Kai Shek International Airport (TPE)
This is how a flight ends if the PNF interupts (or better counteracts) the PF's actions shortly before landing!
I hope we do NOT have a similar case here!
My firm does not work together with HRM-Agencies so may I ask those of you who work (or have worked) for such suppliers how training is performed before you join an operator?
Any SIM-Rides, Trips with a TRI or anything before you start your temporary life at an airline?
I am not a pilot but I work in the Safety-Department of a european airline.
Those of you who assume that the PNF might have initiated a GA may have a look at this
ASN Aircraft accident Airbus A300-622R B-1814 Taipei-Chiang Kai Shek International Airport (TPE)
This is how a flight ends if the PNF interupts (or better counteracts) the PF's actions shortly before landing!
I hope we do NOT have a similar case here!
My firm does not work together with HRM-Agencies so may I ask those of you who work (or have worked) for such suppliers how training is performed before you join an operator?
Any SIM-Rides, Trips with a TRI or anything before you start your temporary life at an airline?
If this suggestion (raising gear) is coming from professional pilots I am worried.
Have witnessed this many times during simulator training of certain countries. F/O has already been alarmed enough to call for a GA or at the least has indicated he is most unhappy at the prospects of an over-run after a non-stable approach well below the mandatory go around of 500 ft VMC or 1000 ft IMC.
Some captains - again depending on their character type - will strongly resent "advice" from the subordinate and be determined to force the landing all the while risking a long float. In most cases where culture dominates the flight deck the F/O will sit glumly watching as events unfold while making weak attempts at dissuading the captain from pressing on regardless of the potential consequences. And to be blunt, that could mean if the aircraft goes off the end at high speed, it is probable (judging by recent gruesome pictures on Pprune) that people will die a horrible death in their seats -all because the captain stuffed up badly and the F/O should have taken drastic action to stop him.
How does the F/O fix the problem, exactly? his support calls went unheeded. It is usually obvious by 200 ft agl that the aircraft is going to finish in the over-run if high and fast on a short wet runway - or in the under-run if undershooting. So what happens if the F/O says calmly "Captain - I have control and we are going around Sir".
Is the captain then expected to happily say "Handing over, First officer" and himself becomes the subordinate until the F/O hands over control back to the captain with an apologetic and sickly smile knowing he will soon be out of a job. Well it ain't going to happen that way - ever.
The captain would likely shout at the F/O to get his dirty mitts of the controls and continue to press on regardless. In other words there is a chance of blows on the flight deck.
What else is left to the hapless F/O under these circumstances? Pprune readers have come up with several choices -each to his own. Shoving the throttles forward on the captain will catch the captain by surprise and he better be real quick to stop the nose from pitching up fast under the influence of full power and full flap. He may even fail to react quickly enough to prevent the nose pitching up and there is a great risk of a high power high nose attitude stall and fall-off. If the captain is that incompetent as to press on regardless on short final despite several warnings from the F/O, the chances are he will also be incompetent to handle an unexpected power increase and subsequent rapid pitch up not of his own making. That then is the great risk of the F/O shoving open the thrust levers against the stops and hoping his captain can recover from the shock of his subordinate having the hide to question his actions.
On the other hand, the captain will have probably completed numerous normal go arounds from an ILS DA on instruments - both in the real aircraft and certainly in the simulator. Presumably he has been certified competent at that manoeuvre.
If, as a last resort, the F/O elects to call "Go Around" and then pulls up the landing gear lever while leaving the captain to conduct the go-around, then I believe it may be the safest(?) method of forcing a recalcitrant captain to abandon the approach. It would be highly unlikely the captain would then deliberately press on and land gear up. If however, he does press on after the landing gear has been selected up, then the F/O is justified in taking his last chance card and start fighting the captain for control of the aircraft.
It is wrong to ignore the realities that fatal over-runs have occured and no doubt will continue in the future. It is also head in the sand and unfair to the first officer, who is given precious little written guidance in company FCOM on how convince the captain that his approach is basically dangerous. Fighting for control when near the ground is a recipe for disaster and that is the reason why the F/O should select gear up to force a go-around rather than risk a loss of control. It then becomes a matter of personal opinion between pilots which of the two choices is the lesser evil.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
You can argue 'what ifs' all day - and I did not suggest firewalling the throttles, by-the-way - so 'what if' the gear going up at 200' ALSO catches the Captain 'by surprise' and he firmly shoves it down again? Which is the safer option? Which, in the RHS would you prefer? At least one pilot would be ready for the pitch up!
FlyingPhil - I can see no suggestion in your report of ANY interference by another crew member - I would suggest PF managed to stuff it up all by him/herself, and in fact the LACK of 'interference' is probably what caused the accident?
FlyingPhil - I can see no suggestion in your report of ANY interference by another crew member - I would suggest PF managed to stuff it up all by him/herself, and in fact the LACK of 'interference' is probably what caused the accident?
Join Date: May 2001
Posts: 395
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I hope that readers will not take any of my post amiss as I only seek to assist in clarifying events surrounding the recent IX 812 accident at Mangalore.
My experience to date is nudging on 30K hours of military jet and heavy jet transport time with RAF and major national carriers, world-wide. I’m currently on contract with Air India (AI) as an aircraft Commander. I pass on this experience sketch to establish that I know what I am talking about.
I spoke a couple of days ago with two AI senior management Captains who separately confirmed to me that they had heard the CVR tapes relating to the accident and they independently confirmed that all seemed to be going well on the approach until approx 1500 AGL, with Captain as PF (Pilot Flying) and FO as PM (Pilot Monitoring). Subsequently, the FO was heard five times to exhort the need for a Go Around, with no response heard from the Captain.
For information, the Captain was not “of Serbian origin, travelling on a British Passport” as reported by a “spokesman” in the Indian press. He was a Serbian national with a Serbian Passport and possessing an Indian Employment visa issued by the Indian Embassy in Belgrade (both of which documents I recently saw copies of). He and I knew each other and I can confirm that he was a mature, capable, humorous, sociable and well-respected air transport professional.
I’ve just checked one of my log books and I note that I made a VOR approach to R/W 01 at Porto Santo (Madeira Islands) in 1978. I was PM as FO and the Captain (hugely experienced and very well respected) was PF. Aircraft was a B737-200. Final approach track (from memory) was 10-15 degrees offset from R/W track and just before seeing the R/W we flew through a rain squall at about 1000 AGL, which seemed to unsettle the Captain. From then on I started to realise that he was both disorientated and fixated with getting in and was making no attempt to line up with the R/W but seemed to be heading for open, rocky ground. I mentioned, conversationally at first, that we would have to line up with the R/W or think about Going Around but got no response. After three or four increasingly urgent calls I finally called “Ok xxx we’re Going Around”, put on G/A thrust, selected 15 degrees nose up, G/A flap and raised the gear with positive climb indicated. We then made a safe landing (Captain as PF) on the reciprocal runway. Captain subsequently quietly expressed appreciation of my actions and I said something to the effect that “shucks, ‘twern’t nothing” and he could buy the beers at the next opportunity. That, of course, was in the days prior to DFDRs, CVRs and the requirement to exhaustively report every fart and belch to the relevant authorities (all great safety tools but their absence meant my thoughts and actions were completely free of any consideration of, or worry about, justifying my safety actions at a later date).
Bottom line? Anyone can make errors of judgment or skill at any time but we rely on our PM colleagues to correct them and maybe save the day if necessary – but they can only do this if we operate in a non-punitive and non-negative regulatory regime (ie. no worries about executing vital safety actions). The Indian Regulatory System has an amount of self-examination to go through before it achieves this sunlit elysian state.
On a final note, as I get towards the end of my flying career, I become more and more aware of the daily potential for air transport disaster, of how quickly and easily things can unravel in any aircraft and of the absolute need, as pilots, to stay humble, acutely aware and very well informed in our uniquely unforgiving operating environment.
My experience to date is nudging on 30K hours of military jet and heavy jet transport time with RAF and major national carriers, world-wide. I’m currently on contract with Air India (AI) as an aircraft Commander. I pass on this experience sketch to establish that I know what I am talking about.
I spoke a couple of days ago with two AI senior management Captains who separately confirmed to me that they had heard the CVR tapes relating to the accident and they independently confirmed that all seemed to be going well on the approach until approx 1500 AGL, with Captain as PF (Pilot Flying) and FO as PM (Pilot Monitoring). Subsequently, the FO was heard five times to exhort the need for a Go Around, with no response heard from the Captain.
For information, the Captain was not “of Serbian origin, travelling on a British Passport” as reported by a “spokesman” in the Indian press. He was a Serbian national with a Serbian Passport and possessing an Indian Employment visa issued by the Indian Embassy in Belgrade (both of which documents I recently saw copies of). He and I knew each other and I can confirm that he was a mature, capable, humorous, sociable and well-respected air transport professional.
I’ve just checked one of my log books and I note that I made a VOR approach to R/W 01 at Porto Santo (Madeira Islands) in 1978. I was PM as FO and the Captain (hugely experienced and very well respected) was PF. Aircraft was a B737-200. Final approach track (from memory) was 10-15 degrees offset from R/W track and just before seeing the R/W we flew through a rain squall at about 1000 AGL, which seemed to unsettle the Captain. From then on I started to realise that he was both disorientated and fixated with getting in and was making no attempt to line up with the R/W but seemed to be heading for open, rocky ground. I mentioned, conversationally at first, that we would have to line up with the R/W or think about Going Around but got no response. After three or four increasingly urgent calls I finally called “Ok xxx we’re Going Around”, put on G/A thrust, selected 15 degrees nose up, G/A flap and raised the gear with positive climb indicated. We then made a safe landing (Captain as PF) on the reciprocal runway. Captain subsequently quietly expressed appreciation of my actions and I said something to the effect that “shucks, ‘twern’t nothing” and he could buy the beers at the next opportunity. That, of course, was in the days prior to DFDRs, CVRs and the requirement to exhaustively report every fart and belch to the relevant authorities (all great safety tools but their absence meant my thoughts and actions were completely free of any consideration of, or worry about, justifying my safety actions at a later date).
Bottom line? Anyone can make errors of judgment or skill at any time but we rely on our PM colleagues to correct them and maybe save the day if necessary – but they can only do this if we operate in a non-punitive and non-negative regulatory regime (ie. no worries about executing vital safety actions). The Indian Regulatory System has an amount of self-examination to go through before it achieves this sunlit elysian state.
On a final note, as I get towards the end of my flying career, I become more and more aware of the daily potential for air transport disaster, of how quickly and easily things can unravel in any aircraft and of the absolute need, as pilots, to stay humble, acutely aware and very well informed in our uniquely unforgiving operating environment.
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: 45 yards from a tropical beach
Posts: 1,103
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
High Cirrus
A great post, and who can argue with your logic and experience?
You demonstrated great airmanship, survival instinct, flying ability and cojones in what you accomplished.
However, what chance for the passengers in a similar situation sitting aft of the 250 or even 1,000 hour wonders that now undermine our profession?
Nobody I care for will ever fly with a LoCo.
A great post, and who can argue with your logic and experience?
You demonstrated great airmanship, survival instinct, flying ability and cojones in what you accomplished.
However, what chance for the passengers in a similar situation sitting aft of the 250 or even 1,000 hour wonders that now undermine our profession?
Nobody I care for will ever fly with a LoCo.
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Philippines
Posts: 29
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Who had control?
"Fighting for control when near the ground is a recipe for disaster and that is the reason why the F/O should select gear up to force a go-around rather than risk a loss of control. It then becomes a matter of personal opinion between pilots which of the two choices is the lesser evil."
Maybe the fight for control was not near the ground, but ON the ground (during those 12 or so terrifying seconds)
For example, IF it was a long ****ty landing, and reversers selected..(standard procedure) SB up and slowing ..last 1000 feet in sight..and...even if possible overun.. bad situation.
If reverse was (even partially) deployed, and just ONE of the cockpit crew-members decided at that point that it was time for a go around with Flaps40......well say no more.... (as is very clearly written in the manufacturers manuals, that for a variety of reasons, this is absolute folly)...very bad situation.
What the hell do I know...just speculation...so far...like almost all the previous posts on this terrible tragedy.
All over the world, thousands of times, day in, day out (even last stormy night), we mix the ingredients, and mostly the recipe turns out alright.
NB
Maybe the fight for control was not near the ground, but ON the ground (during those 12 or so terrifying seconds)
For example, IF it was a long ****ty landing, and reversers selected..(standard procedure) SB up and slowing ..last 1000 feet in sight..and...even if possible overun.. bad situation.
If reverse was (even partially) deployed, and just ONE of the cockpit crew-members decided at that point that it was time for a go around with Flaps40......well say no more.... (as is very clearly written in the manufacturers manuals, that for a variety of reasons, this is absolute folly)...very bad situation.
What the hell do I know...just speculation...so far...like almost all the previous posts on this terrible tragedy.
All over the world, thousands of times, day in, day out (even last stormy night), we mix the ingredients, and mostly the recipe turns out alright.
NB
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: Nanaimo
Age: 75
Posts: 34
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A humble story of a go around
While searching through previous threads on near disasters and go arounds I came across this gem by a certain true gentleman :
What a fine captain to share his humble experience and what a fine first officer he had!
4th March 2008, 21:36 #252 (permalink) OKhalsa
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: Asia
Age: 59
Posts: 10
Captain's landing in marginal weather? Well, my present and past airlines practise that. However, there were cases where the humble eff oh did a better job.
Years ago in another life flying the old A300 B4 into old Kai Tak at the onset of a typhoon. X-Winds were within limits but very gusty. After the checker board, we were turning beautifully for a textbook gusty X-W landing when a mighty gust turned everything pear shaped! The wings went wiggy waggy, the concentration and focus throughout the whole IGS 13 approach was so intense that the skipper ended up with tunnel vision and keep struggling to salvage the landing. The F/E was pretty quiet; the young F/O just grunted " GO A... " and pressed the Go levers! In a daze the skipper and F/O struggled together for a split second before, unbelievably, the skipper shouted " you have control " and the young f/o took it around. The skipper , ashen faced, with shaking knees and squeaky voiced asked the f/o to fly to TPE. Since we had plenty of fuel ( no problem with 8 extra tons ), the young f/o proposed another try. Skipper agreed with f/o flying..well f/o brought it down beautifully on the IGS to an equally beautiful landing. Later we celebrated at the bicycle bar!
The skipper was : YOURS truly. The F/O... well he has moved on to become a great skipper. The F/E; he probably learnt a lot that day and too took up flying as f/o and is now a junior skipper!
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: Asia
Age: 59
Posts: 10
Captain's landing in marginal weather? Well, my present and past airlines practise that. However, there were cases where the humble eff oh did a better job.
Years ago in another life flying the old A300 B4 into old Kai Tak at the onset of a typhoon. X-Winds were within limits but very gusty. After the checker board, we were turning beautifully for a textbook gusty X-W landing when a mighty gust turned everything pear shaped! The wings went wiggy waggy, the concentration and focus throughout the whole IGS 13 approach was so intense that the skipper ended up with tunnel vision and keep struggling to salvage the landing. The F/E was pretty quiet; the young F/O just grunted " GO A... " and pressed the Go levers! In a daze the skipper and F/O struggled together for a split second before, unbelievably, the skipper shouted " you have control " and the young f/o took it around. The skipper , ashen faced, with shaking knees and squeaky voiced asked the f/o to fly to TPE. Since we had plenty of fuel ( no problem with 8 extra tons ), the young f/o proposed another try. Skipper agreed with f/o flying..well f/o brought it down beautifully on the IGS to an equally beautiful landing. Later we celebrated at the bicycle bar!
The skipper was : YOURS truly. The F/O... well he has moved on to become a great skipper. The F/E; he probably learnt a lot that day and too took up flying as f/o and is now a junior skipper!
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Rockytop, Tennessee, USA
Posts: 5,898
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
Those of you who assume that the PNF might have initiated a GA may have a look at this
ASN Aircraft accident Airbus A300-622R B-1814 Taipei-Chiang Kai Shek International Airport (TPE)
ASN Aircraft accident Airbus A300-622R B-1814 Taipei-Chiang Kai Shek International Airport (TPE)
ASN Aircraft accident Airbus A300B4-622R B-1816 Nagoya-Komaki (NGO)
The copilot was over the alcohol limit for many countries (although alcohol has never been blamed for a crash according to some here):
China Air co-pilot over limit for DWI 05/06/1994 | Archives | Chron.com - Houston Chronicle
After the 1998 TPE crash and customary resignations, China Air management decreed that the A300 autoflight system was incompatible with local training culture and the A300 became an almost totally expat fleet for its last few years.
Join Date: May 2009
Location: Birthplace of Aviation
Posts: 462
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Probe into Mangalore crash begins - Mangalore - City - The Times of India
I hope this assuages fears about partiality of investigation to some extent.
I hope this assuages fears about partiality of investigation to some extent.
Gokhale said the court of inquiry would also set up a website where the progress of the inquiry would be posted for people to follow. "We are here to perform a thorough and serious job," he said, adding that it would also get in touch with other officials who have already gone through various evidence. The court of inquiry would be headquartered in New Delhi, as per an official notification.
Join Date: Oct 2009
Location: Isle of Wight
Age: 54
Posts: 18
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks totem and Okhalsa, what a delightful thing to share! My guess is that with the nature of the Kai Tak IGS RW 13 approach with the right turn after the checker board, your F/O was able to judge the crosswind and gusts better the second time around. This is not to detract from the great job he did.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
What is the point of posts #394 and #401 (Flyingphil and Airbubba)? They have nothing to do with this thread!.
a) The a/c quoted did not touch down
b) Approaches were flown by F/O
c) A300
d) Incorrect g/a procedure
e) Not Mangalore
f) No (public) suggestion that the AIX co-pilot was over any alcohol limit
The only common factor appears to be poor command by the Captains concerned.
a) The a/c quoted did not touch down
b) Approaches were flown by F/O
c) A300
d) Incorrect g/a procedure
e) Not Mangalore
f) No (public) suggestion that the AIX co-pilot was over any alcohol limit
The only common factor appears to be poor command by the Captains concerned.