I hope that readers will not take any of my post amiss as I only seek to assist in clarifying events surrounding the recent IX 812 accident at Mangalore.
My experience to date is nudging on 30K hours of military jet and heavy jet transport time with RAF and major national carriers, world-wide. I’m currently on contract with Air India (AI) as an aircraft Commander. I pass on this experience sketch to establish that I know what I am talking about.
I spoke a couple of days ago with two AI senior management Captains who separately confirmed to me that they had heard the CVR tapes relating to the accident and they independently confirmed that all seemed to be going well on the approach until approx 1500 AGL, with Captain as PF (Pilot Flying) and FO as PM (Pilot Monitoring). Subsequently, the FO was heard five times to exhort the need for a Go Around, with no response heard from the Captain.
For information, the Captain was not “of Serbian origin, travelling on a British Passport” as reported by a “spokesman” in the Indian press. He was a Serbian national with a Serbian Passport and possessing an Indian Employment visa issued by the Indian Embassy in Belgrade (both of which documents I recently saw copies of). He and I knew each other and I can confirm that he was a mature, capable, humorous, sociable and well-respected air transport professional.
I’ve just checked one of my log books and I note that I made a VOR approach to R/W 01 at Porto Santo (Madeira Islands) in 1978. I was PM as FO and the Captain (hugely experienced and very well respected) was PF. Aircraft was a B737-200. Final approach track (from memory) was 10-15 degrees offset from R/W track and just before seeing the R/W we flew through a rain squall at about 1000 AGL, which seemed to unsettle the Captain. From then on I started to realise that he was both disorientated and fixated with getting in and was making no attempt to line up with the R/W but seemed to be heading for open, rocky ground. I mentioned, conversationally at first, that we would have to line up with the R/W or think about Going Around but got no response. After three or four increasingly urgent calls I finally called “Ok xxx we’re Going Around”, put on G/A thrust, selected 15 degrees nose up, G/A flap and raised the gear with positive climb indicated. We then made a safe landing (Captain as PF) on the reciprocal runway. Captain subsequently quietly expressed appreciation of my actions and I said something to the effect that “shucks, ‘twern’t nothing” and he could buy the beers at the next opportunity. That, of course, was in the days prior to DFDRs, CVRs and the requirement to exhaustively report every fart and belch to the relevant authorities (all great safety tools but their absence meant my thoughts and actions were completely free of any consideration of, or worry about, justifying my safety actions at a later date).
Bottom line? Anyone can make errors of judgment or skill at any time but we rely on our PM colleagues to correct them and maybe save the day if necessary – but they can only do this if we operate in a non-punitive and non-negative regulatory regime (ie. no worries about executing vital safety actions). The Indian Regulatory System has an amount of self-examination to go through before it achieves this sunlit elysian state.
On a final note, as I get towards the end of my flying career, I become more and more aware of the daily potential for air transport disaster, of how quickly and easily things can unravel in any aircraft and of the absolute need, as pilots, to stay humble, acutely aware and very well informed in our uniquely unforgiving operating environment.