Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash
So why would the Alitalia flight NOT be operating within SOPs.
Please don't get me wrong. Had this happened to me during my military days and had there been any sign of aggressive activity from the great unwashed, then I would have gone within two miliseconds.
However, the Alitalia flight was under no such threat.
Please don't get me wrong. Had this happened to me during my military days and had there been any sign of aggressive activity from the great unwashed, then I would have gone within two miliseconds.
However, the Alitalia flight was under no such threat.
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: He pushes TL to TO power, and slips away in the confusion
You are watching too much American movies !
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AIT
AIT released by Airbus. Initial facts based on readouts: no aircraft system malfunctions, no fuel starvation, no sign of fire or explosion.
What an educational thread. Wow, thanks gents. A few comments/points.
C-SAR: thanks for you over and above efforts with the pictures. You took a risk with the Federales being there ...
Highlander: thanks for the first person experience at TIP
There is an ILS, RWY 27.
General question: does anyone do back course localizer approaches anymore, or have they fallen into disuse?
I added that to spool up time in my brain, vis/glare/visual disorientation, and began to see a crew possibly behind an aircraft. Thanks for that trigger.
Command climate, corporate culture ... recall that being discussed in Air India Crash, Mangalore ...
Cultural influences, and corporate cultural influences, are all imbedded in that trifecta you mention. Funny that some people get sensitive about that well demonstrated fact in air operations.
As to the running battle over pilot skills, please consider this, gents.
A bit over a decade ago, had working for me an Instructor from Test Pilot School, Patuxent River, as my director of Flight Operations. (After his Pax River tour).
He had to recommend a wash for two Seahawk pilots who made the cut and got into TPS (damned hard competetitive climate, that) for what he found disturbing: poor (for a test pilot) stick and rudder skills.
Having flown the Seahawk, I was not all that surprised. If you don't make it a point to work on Stick and Rudder skills, you can rack up over a thousand hours in a Seahawk, or could, and get precious little stick and rudder time.
So yes, us old timers are not wrong to raise that point, time and again, about what a pilot is for.
But I am not an airline guy, so take it with a grain of sea salt ...
C-SAR: thanks for you over and above efforts with the pictures. You took a risk with the Federales being there ...
Highlander: thanks for the first person experience at TIP
RadAlt2010: Now wouldnt you agree that an ILS would have prevented all this? I would like to hear your argument
General question: does anyone do back course localizer approaches anymore, or have they fallen into disuse?
JetJock330: Airbus has many ways to skin the cat and sometimes this cat bites back as Tiger if you screw up. This looks like one of those cases where procedures were not followed and systems not understood.
Autopilot will disconnect at MDA minus 50ft, and then Airbus says you're on your own for what ever happens next.
Autopilot will disconnect at MDA minus 50ft, and then Airbus says you're on your own for what ever happens next.
Jet the Pilot: By the way, in Libya, although the authority do not equip airports well at all, they apparently would bring a pilot before a committee if (minima) rules are breached or even if diversion is requested to expalin their decision. Effect on pax connections, fuel cost, etc. will all be discussed by such committee. Sounds familiar, anyone?
TowerDog: Training, attitude and lack of CRM may be instead.
jshg: thanks for post 803, and places A330 can play gotcha on approach.
As to the running battle over pilot skills, please consider this, gents.
A bit over a decade ago, had working for me an Instructor from Test Pilot School, Patuxent River, as my director of Flight Operations. (After his Pax River tour).
He had to recommend a wash for two Seahawk pilots who made the cut and got into TPS (damned hard competetitive climate, that) for what he found disturbing: poor (for a test pilot) stick and rudder skills.
Having flown the Seahawk, I was not all that surprised. If you don't make it a point to work on Stick and Rudder skills, you can rack up over a thousand hours in a Seahawk, or could, and get precious little stick and rudder time.
So yes, us old timers are not wrong to raise that point, time and again, about what a pilot is for.
But I am not an airline guy, so take it with a grain of sea salt ...
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So yes, us old timers are not wrong to raise that point, time and again, about what a pilot is for.
But I am not an airline guy, so take it with a grain of sea salt ...
But I am not an airline guy, so take it with a grain of sea salt ...
simple, no matter for an airline or anything
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Lonewolf_50,
Disambiguation for Olde Worlde oldies:
He had to recommend a wash for two Seahawk pilots
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Just a point her gentlemen. I worked in Libya for a few years offshore, we used to depart from the International Airport flying with a very professional French based Helicopter company.
On all the Dauphin flights from that airport we had no problems other than slight delays due to weather or minor technical problems, which were always repaired prior to the aircraft departing for the field which was about 45 minutes offshore and very close to the Tunisian border.
Over the last fifteen months when I was their this professional company was deemed to be to expensive by the Libyan Government Oil Company operator. They canceled the contract and brought in a Qatar operator (name on request) based helicopter operation who moved their flight operations to Metiga Airport which was the old American base in Tripoli. And was used for VIP flights, it was also used by the President of Libya and his family for their recreational use to fly elsewhere in the world.
The President or his family never used the international airport because of inadequate poor weather facilities when I was their.
I have had more scares taking off and landing from Metiga Airport due to laziness of Libyan ATC here is an example "we were lined up ready to take off.
An IL-76 from the Libyan national airline carrying out freight operations demanded clearance to land immediately.
We were ordered to taxi from the runway to allow him to touchdown. This was done and an argument ensued as to why an Oil Company helicopter was being allowed to use the main runway at Metiga Airport which was designated for Libyan and VIP Flights.
I have also had to face down a TU-134 that has clearance to take off from the opposite end of the runway. The Libyan pilots of the Bell 214 were absolutely aghast. Another mistake that could have had catastrophic consequences.
Life in the Oil and Gas business is not always easy.
On all the Dauphin flights from that airport we had no problems other than slight delays due to weather or minor technical problems, which were always repaired prior to the aircraft departing for the field which was about 45 minutes offshore and very close to the Tunisian border.
Over the last fifteen months when I was their this professional company was deemed to be to expensive by the Libyan Government Oil Company operator. They canceled the contract and brought in a Qatar operator (name on request) based helicopter operation who moved their flight operations to Metiga Airport which was the old American base in Tripoli. And was used for VIP flights, it was also used by the President of Libya and his family for their recreational use to fly elsewhere in the world.
The President or his family never used the international airport because of inadequate poor weather facilities when I was their.
I have had more scares taking off and landing from Metiga Airport due to laziness of Libyan ATC here is an example "we were lined up ready to take off.
An IL-76 from the Libyan national airline carrying out freight operations demanded clearance to land immediately.
We were ordered to taxi from the runway to allow him to touchdown. This was done and an argument ensued as to why an Oil Company helicopter was being allowed to use the main runway at Metiga Airport which was designated for Libyan and VIP Flights.
I have also had to face down a TU-134 that has clearance to take off from the opposite end of the runway. The Libyan pilots of the Bell 214 were absolutely aghast. Another mistake that could have had catastrophic consequences.
Life in the Oil and Gas business is not always easy.
Latest update
Control Issues in Libya Crash
Pilots Were Disoriented; Jet Appeared to Be Working Properly, Officials Say
By ANDY PASZTOR And DANIEL MICHAELS
......................
A spokesman for Airbus, a unit of European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co.,
said the company on Friday sent update notices about the investigation to all operators of A330s, but declined to give details.
A person familiar with the communication said it told airlines that investigators' analysis indicates the crashed plane, which was only nine months old, had no system malfunctions, still had sufficient fuel going to its engines, and didn't suffer a fire before impact.
When the jet was at roughly 1,000 feet in altitude and about a minute from touching down, according to people familiar with the details, the pilots reacted
to some type of ground-proximity warning. The co-pilot, who was flying, increased power quickly and pulled up the nose of the plane, typically the
correct steps to initiate a so-called go-around. But since there weren't many passengers aboard and the jet had relatively little fuel, it accelerated rapidly. The captain, according to people familiar with the sequence of events, may
have been looking at charts or was distracted by something else.
At that point, the co-pilot apparently believed the Airbus A330 was climbing at
a dangerously steep angle and pushed the nose down, quickly losing control of the plane. The captain subsequently tried to yank the nose up again when he heard more collision warnings, but the big plane was too close to the ground
for such maneuvers, these people said. That scenario is consistent with the widely scattered, small pieces of wreckage found at the site.
Pilots Were Disoriented; Jet Appeared to Be Working Properly, Officials Say
By ANDY PASZTOR And DANIEL MICHAELS
......................
A spokesman for Airbus, a unit of European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co.,
said the company on Friday sent update notices about the investigation to all operators of A330s, but declined to give details.
A person familiar with the communication said it told airlines that investigators' analysis indicates the crashed plane, which was only nine months old, had no system malfunctions, still had sufficient fuel going to its engines, and didn't suffer a fire before impact.
When the jet was at roughly 1,000 feet in altitude and about a minute from touching down, according to people familiar with the details, the pilots reacted
to some type of ground-proximity warning. The co-pilot, who was flying, increased power quickly and pulled up the nose of the plane, typically the
correct steps to initiate a so-called go-around. But since there weren't many passengers aboard and the jet had relatively little fuel, it accelerated rapidly. The captain, according to people familiar with the sequence of events, may
have been looking at charts or was distracted by something else.
At that point, the co-pilot apparently believed the Airbus A330 was climbing at
a dangerously steep angle and pushed the nose down, quickly losing control of the plane. The captain subsequently tried to yank the nose up again when he heard more collision warnings, but the big plane was too close to the ground
for such maneuvers, these people said. That scenario is consistent with the widely scattered, small pieces of wreckage found at the site.
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Somatogravic Illussion?
When the jet was at roughly 1,000 feet in altitude and about a minute from touching down, according to people familiar with the details, the pilots reacted to some type of ground-proximity warning. The co-pilot, who was flying, increased power quickly and pulled up the nose of the plane, typically the correct steps to initiate a so-called go-around. But since there weren't many passengers aboard and the jet had relatively little fuel, it accelerated rapidly. The captain, according to people familiar with the sequence of events, may have been looking at charts or was distracted by something else.
At that point, the co-pilot apparently believed the Airbus A330 was climbing at a dangerously steep angle and pushed the nose down, quickly losing control of the plane. The captain subsequently tried to yank the nose up again when he heard more collision warnings, but the big plane was too close to the ground for such maneuvers, these people said. That scenario is consistent with the widely scattered, small pieces of wreckage found at the site.
At that point, the co-pilot apparently believed the Airbus A330 was climbing at a dangerously steep angle and pushed the nose down, quickly losing control of the plane. The captain subsequently tried to yank the nose up again when he heard more collision warnings, but the big plane was too close to the ground for such maneuvers, these people said. That scenario is consistent with the widely scattered, small pieces of wreckage found at the site.
Pilot Control Was Issue in Libya Crash - WSJ.com
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Some more details from the investigation
An article sheds more light on the investigation:
Pilot Control Was Issue in Libya Crash - WSJ.com
In the article disorientaion is mentioned. It may have made the co-pilot believe he was climbing too steep when he was not. Not so sure about the 'good weather' though, because in Tripoli the airfield would have been perfectly visible from several miles away. There are no natural or man made objects to obscure it. It sounded as if the pilot was looking at some charts to locate the strip.
I just wonder if too many chimes and bells in cockpit are unhelpful in stressful situations. Automation is great, but I cannot help thinking that too many loops in the automation systems require leisurely decision making. How about a big switch that disables all automatic control of plane and leaves the pilot to it?
Pilot Control Was Issue in Libya Crash - WSJ.com
In the article disorientaion is mentioned. It may have made the co-pilot believe he was climbing too steep when he was not. Not so sure about the 'good weather' though, because in Tripoli the airfield would have been perfectly visible from several miles away. There are no natural or man made objects to obscure it. It sounded as if the pilot was looking at some charts to locate the strip.
I just wonder if too many chimes and bells in cockpit are unhelpful in stressful situations. Automation is great, but I cannot help thinking that too many loops in the automation systems require leisurely decision making. How about a big switch that disables all automatic control of plane and leaves the pilot to it?
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Hi,
I already read this many time ... the big red push button 
Label:
In case of emergency push here
How about a big switch that disables all automatic control of plane and leaves the pilot to it?
Label:
In case of emergency push here
@76-er Thanks
The WSJ article, which I read in full, scares me. What it implies is that the manufacturer thinks that improving hardware, versus improving training, is the solution to low to the ground/CFIT problems.
Not a Luddite, but quite frankly, that attitude is what leads to what the Flight Safety source in the article referred to as the aircrew getting all caught up in the automated systems.
/rant mode on, fully aware that this board is full of airline professionals
I began a personal boycott of air travel after 9-11, unless I absolutely had to (business, and three family must take trips) due to how the industry (mostly management) and our silly government responded. I've spent more time and money in Texas as a consequence, during my off time, which suits me just fine. The attitude of Airbus, if accurately reflected, confirms my instincts.
If what is attributed to Airbus in that article (which may or may not be so) is in fact where air transport is headed, I shall continue that boycott into the future, with specific inclination to never fly an Airbus product. Ever. It has to do with attitude and operating philosophy.
The problem solution isn't in building a perfect machine, a perfect set of machine level codes, and a perfect rule set so that the robot takes over from the pilot and all perfection results. Reality don't work that way. Murphy rules.
The solution set is in pilot training. What the WSJ article implies is that Airbus doesn't believe that to be true.
/rant mode off
For any of the many airline professionals here who take offense at my boycott (or rather, almost boycott) of your bread and butter, please appreciate that many of my compadres from the service fly big iron for the major airlines, as does a brother in law. That doesn't change my utter disgust at what air travel has become, for me, an unhappy customer.
At the moment I can trust the pilots, if nothing else involving air travel.
If what Airbus is cited as suggesting is the future, that trust is intercepted.
No thanks.
The WSJ article, which I read in full, scares me. What it implies is that the manufacturer thinks that improving hardware, versus improving training, is the solution to low to the ground/CFIT problems.
Not a Luddite, but quite frankly, that attitude is what leads to what the Flight Safety source in the article referred to as the aircrew getting all caught up in the automated systems.
/rant mode on, fully aware that this board is full of airline professionals
I began a personal boycott of air travel after 9-11, unless I absolutely had to (business, and three family must take trips) due to how the industry (mostly management) and our silly government responded. I've spent more time and money in Texas as a consequence, during my off time, which suits me just fine. The attitude of Airbus, if accurately reflected, confirms my instincts.
If what is attributed to Airbus in that article (which may or may not be so) is in fact where air transport is headed, I shall continue that boycott into the future, with specific inclination to never fly an Airbus product. Ever. It has to do with attitude and operating philosophy.
The problem solution isn't in building a perfect machine, a perfect set of machine level codes, and a perfect rule set so that the robot takes over from the pilot and all perfection results. Reality don't work that way. Murphy rules.
The solution set is in pilot training. What the WSJ article implies is that Airbus doesn't believe that to be true.
/rant mode off
For any of the many airline professionals here who take offense at my boycott (or rather, almost boycott) of your bread and butter, please appreciate that many of my compadres from the service fly big iron for the major airlines, as does a brother in law. That doesn't change my utter disgust at what air travel has become, for me, an unhappy customer.
At the moment I can trust the pilots, if nothing else involving air travel.
If what Airbus is cited as suggesting is the future, that trust is intercepted.
No thanks.
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The solution set is in pilot training. What the WSJ article implies is that Airbus doesn't believe that to be true.
That is why they come up with all these creative solutions to destroy the profession, a side effect of which is more smoking holes. So they turn to technology to bail them out, but technology only goes so far.
Trying to fix these problems with technology is the equivalent of memorizing every mathematical calculation in anticipation of solving all math problems. You would be much better prepared to learn and truly understand math and it's equations so you can solve the problems you didn't anticipate.
But like I said, that takes time and money.
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Long, long ago when we were working on the world's first ever automatic landing system, for the De Havilland Trident, some wag drew a cartoon that showed a pilot inside a box with a sign saying 'In emergency break glass'. At the time it was supposed to be a joke. Now I'm not so sure.
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How is it that we are all still preoccupied with automation and all of its perils for modern aviation when it is becoming more and more likely that automation had nothing to do with the accident?
I haven't seen the AIT yet, but if the WSJ's account of it is correct the PF was hand flying either from prior to the G/A or from shortly after initiating it. The critical questions relate to the reasons for his manual input to dramatically reduce pitch attitude and the PF's (Capt. in this case) lack of timely intervention to over-ride the PF's incorrect reactions.
These questions are pretty much independent of the equipment or the automation. The same course of events is possible with a sufficiently high powered aircraft of any era or design.
Automation didn't cause this accident, but it's effective use could likely have prevented it.
ELAC
I haven't seen the AIT yet, but if the WSJ's account of it is correct the PF was hand flying either from prior to the G/A or from shortly after initiating it. The critical questions relate to the reasons for his manual input to dramatically reduce pitch attitude and the PF's (Capt. in this case) lack of timely intervention to over-ride the PF's incorrect reactions.
These questions are pretty much independent of the equipment or the automation. The same course of events is possible with a sufficiently high powered aircraft of any era or design.
Automation didn't cause this accident, but it's effective use could likely have prevented it.
ELAC
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Having read the WSJ article it seems to me Bill Voss is just another talking head. There's no 'automation' in an Airbus that makes responding to a GPWS difficult. If you overspeed the flaps you'll get a warning, just as you will in a Boeing, but the absence of pitch/power couple in the Airbus makes a hard GPWS pull-up a much easier proposition than in a Boeing. This isn't a computer error, this is failing to fly the correct vertical profile then stuffing up the GPWS escape manouvere.
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How about a big switch that disables all automatic control of plane and leaves the pilot to it?
I already read this many time ... the big red push button
Label:
In case of emergency push here
I already read this many time ... the big red push button
Label:
In case of emergency push here
That way the human operator (be it a pilot in an Airbus or Boeing (or Embraer) or a vehicle/ship/hospital/nuclear power station etc) isn't left in the situation where they now have full control of everything but without a clear idea of what state the whole system is in.
IIRC, you can gracefully degrade the automation in an Airbus but selective turning off the compters so that the various protections are selectively disabled and control handed back to the pilot (normal->alternate->direct) in sensible chunks.
In particular we could refer to the US Air Airbus accident where one of the reasons why Sully was so succesful was because he could rely on the automation is assist - by reducing certain aspects of the work-load - in getting the aircraft down. Now if, a big red button" had been present then Sully and crew would have been in the situation where they workload would have suddenly increased damatically as they would have had to manage all the aircraft's systems as well as looking for a place to land. Worse could have been that with the automation completely relinquishing control could have meant that the aircraft would have been in some unknown state (define fail-safe state here!).
To me, this current A330 case is more about piloting rather than any technological issue. If as some of the posters here have stated the FO initiated a go-around and the captain countermanded resulting in the crash is correct then automation or not would have played no part in this at all.
The other incident that comes to mind here regarding automation in the S7 (?) A310 autopilot disengage accident (captain's children in cockpit) where that fact that the pilot took control only exasperated the accident rather than letting the automation in take control - IIRC, the A310 will return to level flight if the pilot releases the yoke.
Anyway, can we get away from all these misconceptions about automation*, be it Airbus, Boeing, Embraer, Tupolev etc etc etc - or is it just becoming a way of protecting our assumed infallibility?
fc101
E145 driver
*ok, I'm naive - given this particular forum
edited: typos