BA288 Emergency at Phoenix
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Thank You Williamd
thanks for taking the time and effort to find this site and post a detailed first hand account that does indeed answer many questions about this event. (ie PA or no PA etc).
while i agree 100% about the handcarry on evac i think it is a bit petty going after this new contributor for that one issue after his input!
(not aimed at you GB)
while i agree 100% about the handcarry on evac i think it is a bit petty going after this new contributor for that one issue after his input!
(not aimed at you GB)
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How close is safe?
Both accounts agree that passengers were left standing within 100 yards of a 747 loaded with fuel for 20 minutes, but none of the responses from the flying pros have addressed this issue. So here is a straight question to all the in-the-know flying personnel: what is the safe distance at which you would stand to watch a potentially burning, fueled-up 747?
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Both accounts agree that passengers were left standing within 100 yards of a 747 loaded with fuel for 20 minutes, but none of the responses from the flying pros have addressed this issue.
Given how close to the terminal it was, I suspect a serious fire would have had much wider consequences anyway.
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I have tried to provide a detailed version of what transpired, as best as I can recall, with some input from my wife, from my position in the rear cabin.
I have read twice now, apparently from different sources, that some people got off the plane without hearing the emergency evacuation command. This leads me to believe that a cabin crew member, on seeing smoke presumably, did indeed open the door before the evac order was given from the cockpit. This may in fact have been what led to the evac being called.
I would be very interested in hearing professional opinions on this incident, especially in relation to the procedures that should have been followed in comparison to the way it played out. Also if anyone else was on the plane it would be very interesting to hear their comments/version.
Please leave aside comments on hand baggage. Fortunately taking hand baggage off the plane did not cause any major issues in this instance. I fully appreciate it could have, but I believe I have explained clearly why some people had their bags with them.
I have read twice now, apparently from different sources, that some people got off the plane without hearing the emergency evacuation command. This leads me to believe that a cabin crew member, on seeing smoke presumably, did indeed open the door before the evac order was given from the cockpit. This may in fact have been what led to the evac being called.
I would be very interested in hearing professional opinions on this incident, especially in relation to the procedures that should have been followed in comparison to the way it played out. Also if anyone else was on the plane it would be very interesting to hear their comments/version.
Please leave aside comments on hand baggage. Fortunately taking hand baggage off the plane did not cause any major issues in this instance. I fully appreciate it could have, but I believe I have explained clearly why some people had their bags with them.
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Having been through a high speed rejected take off and subsequent emergency exit down the slides from a DC10, I can sympathise greatly with the people contributing here who were on the a/c or whose family were onboard.
It is one thing to have SOP's for such situations, it is another to deal with the practicalities and numerous varied circumstances inter-twining with individual crew and passenger reaction.
This sounds a very unpleasent incident to have gone through for both crew and passengers alike which was accentuated by the uncertainty of what was happening, i.e. why was there the smell/smoke and therefore how to deal with it. Hopefully lessons will be learned but I suspect that no training manual will ever be able to deal with all possible scenarios and therefore common sense will often be a major attribute.
Finally I would add my concerns regarding being so close to the aircraft once evacuated. In my own incident we were all left standing near the aircraft at the end of the runway with no-one telling us what to do or where to go. This is perhaps something the airfield operator should be responsible for as they are in the best position to control all movements around the affected area?
It is one thing to have SOP's for such situations, it is another to deal with the practicalities and numerous varied circumstances inter-twining with individual crew and passenger reaction.
This sounds a very unpleasent incident to have gone through for both crew and passengers alike which was accentuated by the uncertainty of what was happening, i.e. why was there the smell/smoke and therefore how to deal with it. Hopefully lessons will be learned but I suspect that no training manual will ever be able to deal with all possible scenarios and therefore common sense will often be a major attribute.
Finally I would add my concerns regarding being so close to the aircraft once evacuated. In my own incident we were all left standing near the aircraft at the end of the runway with no-one telling us what to do or where to go. This is perhaps something the airfield operator should be responsible for as they are in the best position to control all movements around the affected area?
BryceM,
Well, how else are the airport fire services going to know about your problem? If you hadn't yet made the decision to evacuate, a quick PAN call to ATC might save lives if you did catch on fire later on. If you were evacuating, a 5-sec MAYDAY would be useful, too.
Going by the above personal account, it appears that there was plenty of communication going on, including a PA by the Captain. During the return to stand, information was received that led to an evacuation command.
If there *had* been a fire in the cabin, I'm sure an evacuation would have been initiated very quickly indeed, possibly independently by the cabin crew. I don't think their desire to remain on board a burning aircraft is any greater than that of the passengers? As (by all indications) there wasn't, there was some thinking time available.
Whenever an evacuation is commanded, you know there is a high risk of serious injuries, even deaths occurring. This has to be balanced against against your perception of how bad the situation might become on board. For smoke/fumes that appears to be coming from the AC, switching off packs/bleeds/engines/apu might be all you need to do to stabilise the situation. If it doesn't work you can boot everyone off but always in the back of your mind are the non-reversible and potentially injurous qualities of evacuation procedures. Believe me, if we jumped out of aircraft every time someone smelt something funny, we'd never get airborne.
Come on. First priority is to get passengers and crew to safety. 'Notify ATC'? give me a break.
This incident seems to me to be in the grand tradition of failed communication between the cabin and the flight deck, with the result that the pilots were unaware of the seriousness of the situation (ie that the fumes were serious enough to warrant an evacuation, rather than return to stand).
The point of this sort of incident is not that it ended reasonably well, but that the same actions would have had a very poor outcome if there had been fire as well as fumes. Several minutes of delay, poor communications and indecision could have resulted in a body count.
Whenever an evacuation is commanded, you know there is a high risk of serious injuries, even deaths occurring. This has to be balanced against against your perception of how bad the situation might become on board. For smoke/fumes that appears to be coming from the AC, switching off packs/bleeds/engines/apu might be all you need to do to stabilise the situation. If it doesn't work you can boot everyone off but always in the back of your mind are the non-reversible and potentially injurous qualities of evacuation procedures. Believe me, if we jumped out of aircraft every time someone smelt something funny, we'd never get airborne.
Warning Toxic!
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Right, an evacuation would NOT take place without the alarm going off. A procedure is to evacuate using public address followed by activation of the alarm. The alarm horn is cancelled by the crew to prevent panic and so shouted commands can be heard. The 747 cabin is large. The crew are by the doors. It is not inconceivable most people simply couldn´t hear it.
Once outside, what was the danger? It appears the problem was caused by acrid smoke, probably within the aircon system. I have had such an incident myself, which was kept low grade, evac by the door and up the jetty. The situation was being monitored internally and externally. There was less risk keeping people nearby than getting them spread out over all the apron and lost. Unless visible signs of fire are present, there is no risk. Had any flames appeared, people would have moved away. It was contained. It seems to me, the situation was extremely well handled. You do not initiate a full evacuation lightly- it must be carefully controlled from the flight deck relying on all sources of information, internal and external.
Once again , we have a well handled situation being sniped at by instant self appointed 'experts' here. Right now a very comprehensive review is being undertaken by BA management who are experts in this sort of event. They will cover all aspects. By all means ask, but don´t come out with self dreamt up theories and criticisms on why things happened as they did. I have been through all this training which was executed here. They did what they did well.
Once outside, what was the danger? It appears the problem was caused by acrid smoke, probably within the aircon system. I have had such an incident myself, which was kept low grade, evac by the door and up the jetty. The situation was being monitored internally and externally. There was less risk keeping people nearby than getting them spread out over all the apron and lost. Unless visible signs of fire are present, there is no risk. Had any flames appeared, people would have moved away. It was contained. It seems to me, the situation was extremely well handled. You do not initiate a full evacuation lightly- it must be carefully controlled from the flight deck relying on all sources of information, internal and external.
Once again , we have a well handled situation being sniped at by instant self appointed 'experts' here. Right now a very comprehensive review is being undertaken by BA management who are experts in this sort of event. They will cover all aspects. By all means ask, but don´t come out with self dreamt up theories and criticisms on why things happened as they did. I have been through all this training which was executed here. They did what they did well.
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With all due respect to the poster above, there is no point in comparing the incident you were involved with and this incident. I was there and can say that even though I never saw smoke the impression was something was burning. The smell got considerably worse over a 10 min period before it was decided to return to the stand. During this time passengers were increasingly finding it difficult to breathe.
If the plane had reached the jetway and the front door was opened can you imagine the carnage if people had then spotted smoke! No point in announcing over the PA "don't worry chaps, it's just an AC problem and there is nothing to be concerned about". That may be the SOP but in a real life crisis people's survival instincts kick in. Far better to get people off in the chutes than attempt to put 300 panicking passengers through 1 door at the front.
If the plane had reached the jetway and the front door was opened can you imagine the carnage if people had then spotted smoke! No point in announcing over the PA "don't worry chaps, it's just an AC problem and there is nothing to be concerned about". That may be the SOP but in a real life crisis people's survival instincts kick in. Far better to get people off in the chutes than attempt to put 300 panicking passengers through 1 door at the front.
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I was on BA288 on the night of the evacuation so I can clear up some of the uncertainties and expand on what P&H and WD have said. I have a CPL, I’m about to start my IR and I’ve previously worked as cabin crew so I’m in quite a good position to comment on the incident.
I'd agree with this. By the time we evacuated the smell had got pretty bad and it was very irritating to the throat, nose and eyes. Many people including myself had started to cough and choke and understandably people with young children were getting very concerned.
Most of this is correct. I had noticed the odd smell before we pushed back, but it got increasingly worse after push back. A few mins into the taxi one of the flight crew came onto the PA and said that they were heading back to the terminal because they were getting a bad smell. I was a bit surprised by this comment as it implied that they were unaware that the whole aircraft was equally affected by the smell. I was part of a large group that was spread all over the aircraft in every class so I can confirm this. Since everyone was getting the smell, I assume that the gas was circulating through the air conditioning system. As we taxied back one of the crew suggested over the PA that we use the headrest covers to cover our mouth.
The smell got increasingly worse and there was some blue flashing, which I initially I thought was a camera flash, but one of my colleagues later confirmed that it was sparks. Immediately after the sparking, smoke started to rise up from around 34ABC, just to my left and one row behind. I later spoke to a couple who were supposed to sit on these seats and they told me that they were moved because the IFEs were inop so this may be a significant factor.
This is incorrect. All of the photos and videos show the right hand side of the aircraft, where it is true that all the slides deployed correctly. However none of the slides on the left were successfully deployed.
When the smoke started, I immediately made my way to the left overwing exit. When I reached it, the door was opened, but there was no crew in sight and the slide was not deployed, so it is possible that it had been opened by another pax and was not set to automatic. I looked around for the manual inflation, but I couldn’t find it. Eventually a crewmember appeared, but she also couldn’t get the slide inflated. In the end I exited out of the right overwing. There was a man with an artificial leg using this exit who was having some difficulty so I spent over a minute standing on the walkway above the wing and I was one of the last pax to get off the plane.
Later when we walked into the terminal, I noticed that on the left hand side, only one slide had deployed (possibly L1), but it was not inflated. There was some ground equipment and the air bridge to the left, but I don’t think they were that close that they would have impeded the use of the left slides.
We had taxied out and back to the stand, but the bridge was not in place. I think the situation was serious enough to warrant a quicker evacuation than would have been possible by reconnecting the air bridge. There may have been more panic if the only way out was through one door and everyone was pushing forward to get out the same way.
1) Initially there was just the acrid smell, which was very uncomfortable and made breathing difficult. It was sore on the throat, nose and eyes and caused coughing and choking. Visibility was only slightly impaired by the smoke, as we evacuated soon after the smoke began appearing and it was not that thick. I’m told by one of my colleagues that while I was trying to inflate the left overwing slide, one of the cabin crew deployed a BCF in the area where the smoke was coming from, which reduced the amount of smoke that was being produced.
2) I would have liked to see us getting out quicker. I don’t think it was necessary for us to wait until we got back to the terminal before we evacuated. The situation was serious enough to warrant an evacuation earlier. Furthermore there was never an actual evacuation command given by the crew, as I was moving towards the exit to try to inflate the slide, many people were still sitting in their seats with their seatbelts on.
They got there eventually, but they were understaffed and it was a very slow process. My group of nearly 20 were initially told that we couldn’t all get a room. It was a case of computer says no, but when we persuaded them to try again, computer finally said yes. The evacuation was just before 8pm local time and it was 2am by the time we reached the hotel.
I missed a connection from Heathrow and in the morning when I turned up for attempt two at getting to the UK, the staff at Phoenix refused to try rebooking me on another BA flight beyond Heathrow. Luckily we travelled through Denver on the way to Heathrow and a very lovely woman there was more helpful. She got me on standby for the first flight to my destination with a confirmed seat on the next, as well as a very generous amount of food/drink vouchers for use at Denver Airport and I was also upgraded for the Trans-Atlantic flight.
Though I didn’t personally see anybody go down the slides with bags, it was evident from the amount of luggage out on the apron that many had taken their bags. Some of the cabin crew could have been a bit more vocal with their commands. The crewmember at the door I eventually used was not saying a word. In another part of the cabin some of my colleagues, who are also former cabin crew, were directing pax during the evacuation and they stopped a number of people from taking their bags.
This did concern me, more so how close we were rather than how long we waited though.
This was not audible in the part of the cabin where I was and of all the others in my group that I've asked, none of them heard this either.
It seemed a little while before the decision was taken to deploy the slides
I'd agree with this. By the time we evacuated the smell had got pretty bad and it was very irritating to the throat, nose and eyes. Many people including myself had started to cough and choke and understandably people with young children were getting very concerned.
It had left the gate but had not reached the holding point (and it's a very short taxi). Very acrid smoke was coming from the rear of the passenger cabin (galley, maybe??) and some young children were carried forward because of this smoke. I understand the smoke had something of a peroxide-type smell.
Most of this is correct. I had noticed the odd smell before we pushed back, but it got increasingly worse after push back. A few mins into the taxi one of the flight crew came onto the PA and said that they were heading back to the terminal because they were getting a bad smell. I was a bit surprised by this comment as it implied that they were unaware that the whole aircraft was equally affected by the smell. I was part of a large group that was spread all over the aircraft in every class so I can confirm this. Since everyone was getting the smell, I assume that the gas was circulating through the air conditioning system. As we taxied back one of the crew suggested over the PA that we use the headrest covers to cover our mouth.
The smell got increasingly worse and there was some blue flashing, which I initially I thought was a camera flash, but one of my colleagues later confirmed that it was sparks. Immediately after the sparking, smoke started to rise up from around 34ABC, just to my left and one row behind. I later spoke to a couple who were supposed to sit on these seats and they told me that they were moved because the IFEs were inop so this may be a significant factor.
all the door slides were deployed, it appeared.
This is incorrect. All of the photos and videos show the right hand side of the aircraft, where it is true that all the slides deployed correctly. However none of the slides on the left were successfully deployed.
When the smoke started, I immediately made my way to the left overwing exit. When I reached it, the door was opened, but there was no crew in sight and the slide was not deployed, so it is possible that it had been opened by another pax and was not set to automatic. I looked around for the manual inflation, but I couldn’t find it. Eventually a crewmember appeared, but she also couldn’t get the slide inflated. In the end I exited out of the right overwing. There was a man with an artificial leg using this exit who was having some difficulty so I spent over a minute standing on the walkway above the wing and I was one of the last pax to get off the plane.
Later when we walked into the terminal, I noticed that on the left hand side, only one slide had deployed (possibly L1), but it was not inflated. There was some ground equipment and the air bridge to the left, but I don’t think they were that close that they would have impeded the use of the left slides.
i understand that a fire on a fully fueled aircraft is a very scary thing but was it really necessary given the jetbridge was still in place?
We had taxied out and back to the stand, but the bridge was not in place. I think the situation was serious enough to warrant a quicker evacuation than would have been possible by reconnecting the air bridge. There may have been more panic if the only way out was through one door and everyone was pushing forward to get out the same way.
1. What was the "smoke state" in the cabin?
- was visibility impaired: 5m / 1m?
- where did it get to in terms of breathe-ability: choking?
2. Do you ( &/ your wife) think the correct decision was taken this time?
- and was this done too late / too soon?
- where did it get to in terms of breathe-ability: choking?
2. Do you ( &/ your wife) think the correct decision was taken this time?
- and was this done too late / too soon?
1) Initially there was just the acrid smell, which was very uncomfortable and made breathing difficult. It was sore on the throat, nose and eyes and caused coughing and choking. Visibility was only slightly impaired by the smoke, as we evacuated soon after the smoke began appearing and it was not that thick. I’m told by one of my colleagues that while I was trying to inflate the left overwing slide, one of the cabin crew deployed a BCF in the area where the smoke was coming from, which reduced the amount of smoke that was being produced.
2) I would have liked to see us getting out quicker. I don’t think it was necessary for us to wait until we got back to the terminal before we evacuated. The situation was serious enough to warrant an evacuation earlier. Furthermore there was never an actual evacuation command given by the crew, as I was moving towards the exit to try to inflate the slide, many people were still sitting in their seats with their seatbelts on.
How did the ground staff handle the accomadation problem?
They got there eventually, but they were understaffed and it was a very slow process. My group of nearly 20 were initially told that we couldn’t all get a room. It was a case of computer says no, but when we persuaded them to try again, computer finally said yes. The evacuation was just before 8pm local time and it was 2am by the time we reached the hotel.
I missed a connection from Heathrow and in the morning when I turned up for attempt two at getting to the UK, the staff at Phoenix refused to try rebooking me on another BA flight beyond Heathrow. Luckily we travelled through Denver on the way to Heathrow and a very lovely woman there was more helpful. She got me on standby for the first flight to my destination with a confirmed seat on the next, as well as a very generous amount of food/drink vouchers for use at Denver Airport and I was also upgraded for the Trans-Atlantic flight.
My concern would be the report that folks were taking their bags down the slides.
I'm quite surprised nobody has picked up on the fifteen or twenty minutes all the passengers spent standing around out on the ramp comparatively close to the aircraft, watching the fire crews arrive and investigate??
"emergency evacuation, emergency evacuation, right hand side of the aircraft only"
Last edited by Potential; 14th Jul 2009 at 16:17.
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Potential
Many thanks for your post - informative, factual and written from a professional perspective, one of the best on this site for sure.
So having read your post it leaves me with the one key question:
Which door was opened first and by whom? And was this the trigger for all the events that followed?
Many thanks for your post - informative, factual and written from a professional perspective, one of the best on this site for sure.
So having read your post it leaves me with the one key question:
Furthermore there was never an actual evacuation command given by the crew, as I was moving towards the exit to try to inflate the slide, many people were still sitting in their seats with their seatbelts on.
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To "Potential" above.
There was a group of about 12 or so guys and 2/3 girls who I saw at Phoenix before boarding, all with flight cases. I guessed they were trainee pilots.
I was in the rear cabin, seated at 45E, and there was deifnitely an evacuation ordered and it sounded to me to be the captain although it could have been another member of the crew. There was an alarm, a "nnnnnn-nnnnnnn-nnnnnnnn" sound.
There was a group of about 12 or so guys and 2/3 girls who I saw at Phoenix before boarding, all with flight cases. I guessed they were trainee pilots.
I was in the rear cabin, seated at 45E, and there was deifnitely an evacuation ordered and it sounded to me to be the captain although it could have been another member of the crew. There was an alarm, a "nnnnnn-nnnnnnn-nnnnnnnn" sound.
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This reminds me of the Air Canada DC-9 about 30 years ago. A fire started in the aft lav, and in the 20 or so minutes it took to get on the ground and evacuated, 22 people were dead. From the burning interior materials, all had fatal levels of cyanide in their blood.
Blood tests of those on the flight would be worthwhile.
If the IFE, In Fright Entertainment, box under 34ABC were shorted and cooking, it's possible that killed the PA to several sections of the cabin. IFE is an afterthought in airliner design, and is often retrofitted with the latest and greatest to match the competition. Since it is classed as nonessential equipment, it doesn't get the same level of safety analysis as the avionics downstairs and in the cockpit. Not to mention SR111.
The PA is at least at the safety level of Essential. It's even live when the plane is down to running on batteries. It's possible in this case there wasn't enough isolation between the PA and the IFE.
When I first got peripherally involved with IFE a dozen years ago, I was shocked to learn they pipe 115vac to every seat group, and those seat boxes get very hot. It never should have taken that level of waste heat to deliver 100 milliwatts of audio to 3 seats. The stuff on BA should be more efficient than that, but apparently not.
GB
Blood tests of those on the flight would be worthwhile.
If the IFE, In Fright Entertainment, box under 34ABC were shorted and cooking, it's possible that killed the PA to several sections of the cabin. IFE is an afterthought in airliner design, and is often retrofitted with the latest and greatest to match the competition. Since it is classed as nonessential equipment, it doesn't get the same level of safety analysis as the avionics downstairs and in the cockpit. Not to mention SR111.
The PA is at least at the safety level of Essential. It's even live when the plane is down to running on batteries. It's possible in this case there wasn't enough isolation between the PA and the IFE.
When I first got peripherally involved with IFE a dozen years ago, I was shocked to learn they pipe 115vac to every seat group, and those seat boxes get very hot. It never should have taken that level of waste heat to deliver 100 milliwatts of audio to 3 seats. The stuff on BA should be more efficient than that, but apparently not.
GB
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No problem, done. Sorry for any inconvenience.
I got the right guy then.
Interesting to hear your story, luckily we never saw any sparks or smoke, if we had my wife would have totally freaked. I did see one of your colleagues come into the rear cabin and shout "don't come in here there is a fire" (or words to that effect).
As a trained professional what was your mind state at the point of seeing smoke?
My brother is a captain with Airtours/My Travel (Now TC) and he told me he once had sparks in the cockpit and had to put goggles on and call a mayday. Said it was very terrifying despite all the training/sims. I haven't had a chance to speak to him since I got back but I will discuss it with him asap.
I got the right guy then.
Interesting to hear your story, luckily we never saw any sparks or smoke, if we had my wife would have totally freaked. I did see one of your colleagues come into the rear cabin and shout "don't come in here there is a fire" (or words to that effect).
As a trained professional what was your mind state at the point of seeing smoke?
My brother is a captain with Airtours/My Travel (Now TC) and he told me he once had sparks in the cockpit and had to put goggles on and call a mayday. Said it was very terrifying despite all the training/sims. I haven't had a chance to speak to him since I got back but I will discuss it with him asap.
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You probably want to change the above to refer to only one SSSSSSSS person and only one whose name starts with ZZZZZZZ in your class. Sheesh. What is the device that wasn't working, emitted blue sparks, and had caused people to be moved from their seats earlier? You used a three letter acronym above
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Which door was opened first and by whom? And was this the trigger for all the events that followed?
I was in the rear cabin, seated at 45E, and there was deifnitely an evacuation ordered and it sounded to me to be the captain although it could have been another member of the crew. There was an alarm, a "nnnnnn-nnnnnnn-nnnnnnnn" sound.
As a trained professional what was your mind state at the point of seeing smoke?
I think that overall it was a good experience to be involved in a successful evacuation with only minor injuries. Later on at the hotel, I spoke to the only passenger who was hospitalised and he was going to be fine.
What is the device that wasn't working, emitted blue sparks, and had caused people to be moved from their seats earlier?
Last edited by Potential; 14th Jul 2009 at 14:18.
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Potential -
I have read another person's report who stated that the door on the left was opened by a passenger and that the door on the right over the wing was the first to be opened. Some people appear to have got out before the evac announcement and the alarm went off, it appears for maybe up to 1 min before the other chutes were deployed. Do you think that happened?
I have read another person's report who stated that the door on the left was opened by a passenger and that the door on the right over the wing was the first to be opened. Some people appear to have got out before the evac announcement and the alarm went off, it appears for maybe up to 1 min before the other chutes were deployed. Do you think that happened?
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That seems like a plausible explanation William. That would explain why the left door was opened with no slide when I reached it. If it had been opened by a pax then they would not have known to check if the slide was set to automatic. If the pilots had deemed that the ground equipment on the left was too close, it may have been possible for them to disable the manual inflation too, but I'm not sure about this. This would explain why the ccm that came to the door could also not get the slide inflated. However, it seems that, like me, she was unaware that the pilots had said the evacuation was only to be on the right side and it doesn't explain why there wasn't already a crewmember at the door. By the time she arrived, I think the right overwing was already opened.
Last edited by Potential; 14th Jul 2009 at 15:15.