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Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol

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Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol

Old 7th Mar 2009, 21:11
  #1781 (permalink)  
 
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Rainboe:
people here think 'the RA is to blame'
More like: many people here think the malfunctioning RA is a significant contributory factor, given its relationship to the A/T. Which it is and undoubtedly will be scored as such by the investigating authority.
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Old 7th Mar 2009, 21:17
  #1782 (permalink)  
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Then that would make Boeing liable? Laurel and Hardy were flying that approach. In an almost perfectly seviceable aeroplane. It will be interesting to see how the blame is apportioned. The lawyers must be salivating already.
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Old 7th Mar 2009, 21:33
  #1783 (permalink)  
 
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Laurel and Hardy were flying that approach.
Nice to see you denigrating the crew Rainboe, and without substantive evidence.
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Old 7th Mar 2009, 21:43
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I Am Just Wondering If The Pilots Are Still Heroes.
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Old 7th Mar 2009, 21:52
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Then Boeing would be to blame?
Through hardware failure or system design?

==============================

The landing configuration stall recovery with approach power is an entirely different beast. There is no discernable buffet and things go real quiet until the very sudden and might I say, startling onset of stick shaker......................... The stick shaker is the life-saver in a landing configuration stall recovery
Then in approcah configuration wouldn't some stick-buffet prior to stick-shake be a good idea... to emulate the clean configuration stall

Subtle but easily noticeable?
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Old 7th Mar 2009, 22:02
  #1786 (permalink)  
 
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Rainboe,

Now you've gone one step too far.
Anyone makes mistakes.
Unfortunately, the Swiss Cheese holes aligned on this flight with the known consequence.
Yes, the crew appeared to have failed in recovering a situation that they partly put themselves in.
yes, the accident shouldn't have happened, tell me one that should have...

Time to reflect on the fact that none of us are perfect, including you.

A professional pilot is a pilot who has the ability to recognize his/hers or someone elses mistakes and corrects it in a timely and appropriate way to ensure the continuous safety of the flight.

In this case however, workload or third factors prevented this recognition for one reason or another.

Let me end with a recapitulation of the DEFiNITION OF SAFETY.:

Safety is the CONDITION of RELATIVE absence of danger
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Old 7th Mar 2009, 22:12
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I thought that was what the stick shaker was for. To warn of an oncoming stall. How many warnings do you need to remind you to fly the airplane properly or you will stall and crash?
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Old 7th Mar 2009, 22:25
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perhaps someone has answered this,but:

IF the pilots weren't watching the airspeed and engine instruments, what were they doing? Paperwork?

You sit in the cockpit, the easiest thing to see is either out the window or the ''gauges''.

When I'm doing an approach, I'm scanning pretty darn fast and I sure include the engine instruments and airspeed.

any ideas?????
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Old 7th Mar 2009, 22:27
  #1789 (permalink)  
 
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Rainboe,
Then that would make Boeing liable? Laurel and Hardy were flying that approach. In an almost perfectly seviceable aeroplane. It will be interesting to see how the blame is apportioned. The lawyers must be salivating already.
Ask any sim instructor how many times he’s seen a crew distracted so that the aircraft’s flight path is not being properly monitored. I think you will find that it happens frequently when workload is high or something out of the ordinary is happening. The only difference with the Turkish flight was that they had one problem too many on that fateful day. There’s a saying in aviation that it’s not the Crocodiles that eat you, it’s the ducks that peck you to death. Terms like “Laurel and Hardy” and “idiots” are grossly unfair and offensive especially as we don’t know the whole story yet. They’re usually used by people who think they’re a bit better than the rest of us. If you had some humility you might realise that an accident like this could happen to any of us.

Last edited by CHfour; 7th Mar 2009 at 22:44.
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Old 7th Mar 2009, 22:40
  #1790 (permalink)  
 
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BOAC Astraeus,
Boeing do not specifically mention it, but it is common practice to disconnect the A/T when performing such a manoeuvre.
Reasonable comment, but given the Recovery Manoever doesn't specifically require it, and in this instance it adversely affected the recovery (because of A/T issue) it leaves a widening gap between training practices, procedures and the (degraded) hardware.
Or does this caveat come in to play....................from QRH
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
While every attempt is made to provide needed non–normal checklists, it is not
possible to develop checklists for all conceivable situations, especially those
involving multiple failures. In some unrelated multiple failure situations, the flight
crew may combine elements of more than one checklist or exercise judgment to
determine the safest course of action. The captain must assess the situation and use
good judgment to determine the safest course of action.
In some cases, the crew may need to move between two checklists

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Laurel and Hardy were flying that approach
You need to retract that one Rainboe, or risk losing a great deal of credibility

Last edited by vino; 7th Mar 2009 at 22:52.
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Old 7th Mar 2009, 23:03
  #1791 (permalink)  
 
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Rainboe:
Then that would make Boeing liable? Laurel and Hardy were flying that approach. In an almost perfectly seviceable aeroplane. It will be interesting to see how the blame is apportioned. The lawyers must be salivating already.
I'm not really interested in assigning blame or in lawyers. Boeing are big boys and they can look after themselves.

I want to understand how this accident happened in order to learn from it and hopefully ensure nothing similar happens to me or those I am responsible for. That will involve a dispassionate consideration of all the factors that contributed in some way to flight 1951 ending up in that plowed field short of the EHAM runway. It certainly would appear from what we know at this stage of the investigation that this accident would not have happened if the crew had been more attentive to their airspeed and power settings. But its equally true to say that the accident probably would not have happened if one piece of non essential equipment (RA#1) hadn't apparently malfunctioned and placed another piece of non essential equipment (A/T) in a mode uncommanded by the crew.

If you don't believe the RA was a contributory factor, then I would like to hear some explanation of your reasoning beyond "it's all the crews fault".

While we're at it, is there a real safety benefit from having A/T on the type of approach flown here? Easier, more convenient perhaps, as long as everything works as advertised. But if we want to avoid complacency and keep pilots in the loop then perhaps they should be required to manage their own power first hand by manipulating the PL's rather than once removed thro the automation. Just a thought.

Last edited by MU3001A; 8th Mar 2009 at 03:38.
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Old 8th Mar 2009, 01:03
  #1792 (permalink)  
 
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Rainboe, your assertion that the 737NG FGS is not ‘new’, because it uses the same components and appears similar to the 747 and 777, is made without substantiation, the presence of which might alleviate fears that the latter aircraft could suffer the same fault as in this accident.
Just because things look the same – enabling a ‘common’ crew interface, doesn’t mean that the ‘system’ (which I referred to) is the same. You probably realise that it is the component interface and operating logic which are the important contributors to the safety of the complete system.

As with human and organisational activities, times of change are opportunities for error; so too are the changes made to established designs.
Too often we make gross assumptions that things are the same, whereas in detail they may not be. How do we view a line training flight – normal or a change involving threats and opportunities for error?

----------------------

The focus on blame in this thread, and occasionally in our industry, contributes little if anything to improving the safety of our operations.
Blame is an emotional reaction, a need to hit-out, do something, to achieve a level of self-satisfaction, or express frustration, perhaps because ‘you’ as an interested individual could not have done anything to prevent the accident.
There is a place for blame (and punishment) in society, but it’s not normally exercised by those at the workface and it has no place in an investigation into the contributory or causal aspects of aircraft accidents.

The industry needs an understanding of what and why events happened in this accident. The contributions could involve technical or human aspects, unsafe acts, latent conditions, threats or errors. By establishing these aspects the industry should have opportunity to change what is currently in place and thus improve safety.
It’s relatively easy to identify technical aspects, although software engineers might offer a different view. Complex, yes, but the underlying theories are well defined.
However, with humans there might be many differing interpretations of the observed behaviour, differing theories of cognition, rational or irrational decisions. We lack the means to have the same understanding of the situation as did the crew; we do not know what knowledge was brought to bear on their thoughts, or biases and beliefs which could have shaped their decisions. These, in most cases can only be opinion, best judged by the more experienced in human interface and operational issues. We at best might speculate.

There is opportunity, indeed a need for individual pilots to consider their opinion of the accident – “could it have happened to me?” Such judgement requires skills of thought, which as in operations should be used to weigh the evidence without jumping to conclusion, to consider other viewpoints, to subdue unwarranted bias, and being prepared to change belief.
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Old 8th Mar 2009, 03:24
  #1793 (permalink)  
 
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The Sp-300 Sperry autopilot has been in use since 1984 in the 737 series aircraft.
Main difference over the years has been the MCP.
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Old 8th Mar 2009, 04:28
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the last few posts will be deleted again in the morning!!!!
Well I suppose some of us here can live in hope. 4 posts in a row doing nothing more than attacking an individual poster - and nothing added to the discussion. Seems that soon the whole page will be devoted to flaming Rainboe - guess the truth must hurt.


To write such hideous things about a dead crew that cannot account for their actions is unforgivable in my book.
well.... if so inclined - maybe rates alongside failing to monitor an auto-coupled approach - not to mention not noticing (apparently) a ninety second decay towards a stall.
Failing to notice an A/T annunciation change from SPD to IDLE,
a R/A of -8 when not planted firmly on terra firma, a ****ing serious decay in airspeed, etc, etc. As stated previously by others, this should NEVER have gotten as far as stick shaker - training flight or not.


IF the pilots weren't watching the airspeed and engine instruments, what were they doing? Paperwork?
AT this point in time - I share your and Rainboe's (apparent) bewilderment.


Rainboe, your assertion that the 737NG FGS is not ‘new’, because it uses the same components and appears similar to the 747 and 777, is made without substantiation, the presence of which might alleviate fears that the latter aircraft could suffer the same fault as in this accident.
If by fault, you mean R/altimeter failure, I'm not sure what fears there are concerning failures of similar type on any aircraft. I think it's a pretty safe assumption to make that it, and other failures, have, do, and will continue to happen on a weekly basis, if not daily, somewhere around the world. The difference being, by mere logical deduction, that other crews exhibit non-exceptional airmanship - and MONITOR their approach.
Why would any professional pilot, or by extension the flying public in their charge, be concened about A/T failure (for whatever reason)? We even have to demonstrate it in the sim below AH on CATIIIc. - But then again - that would be those of us who know what were talking about and actually watch what's happening!!!!!


While we're at it, is there a real safety benefit from having A/T on the type of approach flown here?
Taking all the conditions here into account, weather, and the expectation that this was an autocoupled approach up to becoming vis - then the answer to that question should be blatantly obvious (there being several equally obvious reasons) to anyone claiming to be a qualified (esp. transport jet) jockey! Flying on AP with LOC and G/S and manual throttles (for reasons other than failure) would make for some interesting passenger experiences, esp' given the right weather - but then that was something which Rainboe indirectly mentioned earlier.


However, in this case, rainboe needs to know that we don't all see him as he seems to imagine we do!
Seems the "holier than thou" continue to flame - especially interesting considering the advice to ignore that which obviously triggers a response
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Old 8th Mar 2009, 04:52
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As stated previously by others, this should NEVER have gotten as far as stick shaker - training flight or not.
No, it shouldn't. Neither should the LGW based 757 have found itself on departure with a >25deg PNU and entering a full stall, or the NG which spent >5mins at altitude in and out of stick shaker-etc etc etc-neither were training flights.
But it happened.
And I think the pilots here are trying to work through the info so far to try and discover if there were a series of insidious events which led a relatively experienced crew to a disaster.
That doesn't mean exonerate poor performance, but focusing purely on crew error and tucking it away as 'won't happen to me...' IMHO is not the pathway to improving safety and situational awareness.
But that's just me..........

Last edited by vino; 8th Mar 2009 at 05:03.
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Old 8th Mar 2009, 06:27
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@HarryMann: Blame is not so simple here. There might be more to this then just the faulty RA (I'm convinced).

From lawyers view I'm sure the approach will be to try to prove faulty system design as that would yeald largest monetary return.
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Old 8th Mar 2009, 07:11
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theamrad: "As stated previously by others, this should NEVER have gotten as far as stick shaker - training flight or not."
The scary part is not only about not detecting the premature A/T retard at 1950 feet and not noticing continuous airspeed decay, not monitoring their airspeed, . . . but about improper stall recovery.

The crew had become completely bedazzled by the automatics.
The airplane easily could have been recovered from an approaching stall at 500 feet if only the captain had kept his paw on the thrust levers after shoving them forward. Instead, after applying full thrust, he had taken his paw off the thrust levers and allowed the still engaged Auto Throttle to retard the thrust levers a second time. At this point the do nothing copilot was a flying passenger. This comedy of fatal errors is a symptom of a complete breakdown of cockpit discipline and lack of application of elementary, manual flying skills.
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Old 8th Mar 2009, 07:21
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I would sue the airline

Pilots there made mistake therefore airline is guilty assuming preliminary report is true......
Airspeed ,altitude are not followed according to the CVR there were no reported problems untill 1950 feet and even after captured GS .....

or whole story is different.... again according to preliminary report....

Sami Aker
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Old 8th Mar 2009, 07:26
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With regard to post #1846 above, several people have already made the analogy between the A/T and cruise control on a car. On my car, if I manually override the cruise control (i.e. put my foot on the throttle) the cruise control disengages until I manually reengage it. Are there reasons why such an approach would not be desirable in an aircraft? It seems this would have prevented the scenario described above.

(Yes, obviously, I am not a pilot, but I think the question is marginally more interesting than reading the clash of egos amongst some of the other posters here...)

Last edited by PEHowland; 8th Mar 2009 at 12:19.
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Old 8th Mar 2009, 07:37
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Yes PEHowland that's a good idea. Perhaps Boeing will make a note of it. And also make a note of retracting the [extended] speedbrake handle when throttles are shoved full forward, a la AA B757 CFIT crash at Buga, Colombia in 1996.
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