Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol
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Xeque #1809
Maybe not.
Automation is the nth crewmember. My point is that if there's a weakness in the system it will only take time for an accident to find its way through the holes. Humans are by definition fallible and as we have seen here, hardware is also, probably because it's designed by humans.
Xeque #1812
Regarding T&C's, possibly rightly so
Maybe not.
Automation is the nth crewmember. My point is that if there's a weakness in the system it will only take time for an accident to find its way through the holes. Humans are by definition fallible and as we have seen here, hardware is also, probably because it's designed by humans.
Xeque #1812
Regarding T&C's, possibly rightly so
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THY
Make that Turk Hava Yollari
The Turkish version is still half Arabic but all due credit to Ataturk for giving it a go so we don't have to learn shorthand ;-)
Cheers
Airnuts
The Turkish version is still half Arabic but all due credit to Ataturk for giving it a go so we don't have to learn shorthand ;-)
Cheers
Airnuts
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BOAC: I apologise for the misuse of terminology - corrected previous post.
Lederhosen: you say "Allowing trainees to get high and learn to recover is part of standard training." That fills me with confidence. Do you think a revenue flight is some kind of training exercise to test the F/O? What was the consequence of "allowing" this to happen here, may I ask?
Rainboe: I am most definitely not saying training should not happen. Of course not. But you only have to read the earlier posts to see that this may be a factor.
Lederhosen: you say "Allowing trainees to get high and learn to recover is part of standard training." That fills me with confidence. Do you think a revenue flight is some kind of training exercise to test the F/O? What was the consequence of "allowing" this to happen here, may I ask?
Rainboe: I am most definitely not saying training should not happen. Of course not. But you only have to read the earlier posts to see that this may be a factor.
John R,
Am afraid that is the reality these days. And yes I'm sure that Mr Boeing or Mr Airbus did not expect their Airliners to be used to teach low time pilots how to land, on revenue sectors. Again that is the reality.
I don't like it either but what can I say, we all know that the bean counters are in charge and S*d flight safety.
Am afraid that is the reality these days. And yes I'm sure that Mr Boeing or Mr Airbus did not expect their Airliners to be used to teach low time pilots how to land, on revenue sectors. Again that is the reality.
I don't like it either but what can I say, we all know that the bean counters are in charge and S*d flight safety.
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Human Ingenuity
We can speculate until the cows come home about what happened but - and pls excuse me for stating the obvious - the essential tennents of SAFE flying are :
(a) always (even in a LOE flight) have someone minding the shop > fly the aeroplane and/or stay in the loop when on auto > emphasize during the pre flight briefing that this is THE DEFAULT requirement overriding all others and especially a training agenda
(b) if the aeroplane is doing something (in AUTO) which one operating crew member does not understand or views as a hazard (less likely if you are following (a)) call out the problem and take manual control (disconnecting the AUTO function(s) as necessary to achieve control) and fly the machine into a stable condition (which usually means a GA when the a/c has passed the FAF). Don't be afraid of a GA even if your ego or the Co Regs for such an action weigh heavily on your psyche - the passengers and your loved ones will have reason to thank you for it
(c) we learn from our experiences. Whilst not disagreeing with those who advocate the development of "fool-proof" automation, no amount of fuzzy logic and clever software will eliminate or second guess the ability of human ingenuity to find a path through the Swiss cheese. So keep to SOPs (yes, including scanning the PFD FMAs) but maintain a healthy dose of scepticism and above all situational awarenes
(d) it does have help to have a bit of passion for this profession. When it becomes (or never was anything but) another job and your attention tends to drift whilst in the office (particulary below 10K) then it is time to shape up or maybe to look for a much more forgiving environment in which to earn your crust
(a) always (even in a LOE flight) have someone minding the shop > fly the aeroplane and/or stay in the loop when on auto > emphasize during the pre flight briefing that this is THE DEFAULT requirement overriding all others and especially a training agenda
(b) if the aeroplane is doing something (in AUTO) which one operating crew member does not understand or views as a hazard (less likely if you are following (a)) call out the problem and take manual control (disconnecting the AUTO function(s) as necessary to achieve control) and fly the machine into a stable condition (which usually means a GA when the a/c has passed the FAF). Don't be afraid of a GA even if your ego or the Co Regs for such an action weigh heavily on your psyche - the passengers and your loved ones will have reason to thank you for it
(c) we learn from our experiences. Whilst not disagreeing with those who advocate the development of "fool-proof" automation, no amount of fuzzy logic and clever software will eliminate or second guess the ability of human ingenuity to find a path through the Swiss cheese. So keep to SOPs (yes, including scanning the PFD FMAs) but maintain a healthy dose of scepticism and above all situational awarenes
(d) it does have help to have a bit of passion for this profession. When it becomes (or never was anything but) another job and your attention tends to drift whilst in the office (particulary below 10K) then it is time to shape up or maybe to look for a much more forgiving environment in which to earn your crust
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I just wished superman was around, he'd definitely would have saved the day...
For all the people who are kind of shocked that final part of training takes place doing the real thing with paying passengers onboard, when would you consider someone experienced?
Experience is not the sollution for preventing accidents, after all, we're all human, and unfortunatly human tend to make mistakes from time to time, that and it's consequenses are part of the deal we have in our little anvironment called society.
For all the people who are kind of shocked that final part of training takes place doing the real thing with paying passengers onboard, when would you consider someone experienced?
Experience is not the sollution for preventing accidents, after all, we're all human, and unfortunatly human tend to make mistakes from time to time, that and it's consequenses are part of the deal we have in our little anvironment called society.
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looking back
Just reread the first 15 or so pages here....given what is known now....to pickup on some of the witness accounts both onboard and on the ground. One Dutch radio station interviewed a supposed pax who said they had turbulence as they were turning and then descending. Most of the rest of the onboard accounts were of turbulence right at the end...or as some put it..the aircraft just dropped...some said up and down and up and down. Folks on the ground stated seeing the aircraft nose higher and higher then fall off and then nose down...again consistent with the simulator run results.
Another set of remarks early in the thread concerned ATC and their penchant for cutting the corners on approaches and running it 'tight'. Can those who have gone into AMS since then advise whether it seems to be the same now or is there a perception that it has changed?
Another set of remarks early in the thread concerned ATC and their penchant for cutting the corners on approaches and running it 'tight'. Can those who have gone into AMS since then advise whether it seems to be the same now or is there a perception that it has changed?
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AFIT
just like a CFIT controlled flight into terrain maybe we should come up new term AFIT automated flight into terrain because of so many accident happens with new generation airplanes.
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To all the passengers who do not like the idea of training being done on an aircraft in which they are flying.. This has been done since time immemorial. Any pilot transitioning onto a new aircraft type will by definition be inexperienced on type. The first A380 passenger flights will inevitably have had pilots with very limited combined experience on type. Any airline with an expanding fleet will usually have pilots under training. The training Captain will normally be an experienced pilot. Sometimes, but not always, he will be experienced on type. Alternatively you may have flown on a flight where the Captain was on his first ever flight as Captain without supervision. He may have had a copilot who had only 3 months experience in the airline.
With zero flight time simulators once a pilot has passed the simulator course he is deemed to be safe in the real aircraft carrying passengers under the jurisdiction of a training captain. If passengers don't like the idea of that they should stop reading this forum, stop making comments on this forum and leave it to the professionals who know what is safe and what is not safe. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. What is not dangerous, if done properly, is giving pilots line training on passenger carrying aircraft.
With zero flight time simulators once a pilot has passed the simulator course he is deemed to be safe in the real aircraft carrying passengers under the jurisdiction of a training captain. If passengers don't like the idea of that they should stop reading this forum, stop making comments on this forum and leave it to the professionals who know what is safe and what is not safe. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. What is not dangerous, if done properly, is giving pilots line training on passenger carrying aircraft.
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Hiflyer, why would you think something would change?
The best part of the day AMS deals with 1 plane/minute landing. If you look at the landing queue on a clear evening you see the lights of 5 planes queued up typically. Unless there is a gap to switch heavy/light. Traffic is dense, it needs tight control and AMS ATC are capable to handle it.
The best part of the day AMS deals with 1 plane/minute landing. If you look at the landing queue on a clear evening you see the lights of 5 planes queued up typically. Unless there is a gap to switch heavy/light. Traffic is dense, it needs tight control and AMS ATC are capable to handle it.
Mach 3
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misd-agin,
I'm just a regular line pilot who visits the sim every 6 months...
My suggestion of the two options wasn't based on a strict analysis of the aerodynamics of both options.
I presume your sim experiment was in the landing configuration? Curiously, what is L/D speed (green dot?) fully configured (F30/F40) for landing at, say, 50T?
I hear what you're saying but one doesn't get any points for CFIT either...
I'm just a regular line pilot who visits the sim every 6 months...
My suggestion of the two options wasn't based on a strict analysis of the aerodynamics of both options.
I presume your sim experiment was in the landing configuration? Curiously, what is L/D speed (green dot?) fully configured (F30/F40) for landing at, say, 50T?
I hear what you're saying but one doesn't get any points for CFIT either...
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SP
I am asking if there is a perception that it has changed... As there has been numerous posts here and in other forums on AMS running it "tight" it would not be that surprising if ATC went "by the book" during the investigation.
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Re: # 1785 “Why it wasn’t recovered earlier (when it was a recoverable situation) is what we're discussing...your guess is as good as mine”.
Using the scenario and analysis at (#1735), the first indication that the crew’s perception was incorrect might have been approaching Vapp (Vref+5?). The expectation would be for the AT to pick up and maintain the selected speed, possibly allowing a small under-swing to see if the AT would respond … (Vref? 1.3vs). In the accident scenario, the next indication would be stick shake (1.1vs), a further speed reduction of ~20kts, which at 2-3kts/sec (mid - end of the speed trend scale) is 7-10sec later.
Human reaction time is often assumed to be in the 2-4 sec range. In this instance it might be nearer 4sec for the Capt (PNF) to recognise the situation and get in the control loop. It would not be a smooth transition from observing speed decay and waiting for stick shake as in training, it was a sudden onset of a totally unexpected and very attention getting warning. The Capt probably announcing I have control, disconnecting the AP, and applying thrust (but omitting to disengage the AT). The control forces are unexpected due to the mis trim condition (confusion), and the supposed need for two hands push force enables the AT to retard thrust again. In the time taken to read the above the aircraft has stalled and at low altitude could not be recovered.
A dominant issue is that at a critical stage of flight the crew were distracted; either by the surprising / unexpected gear warning; “we don’t get these and if we do they occur at 500ft” … thinks “what’s wrong, we are not at 500 ft” etc, etc.
There could be further distraction from late checklist use / training task which masked the first opportunity to detect the speed error at Vapp.
Logically, if the checklist / training task were the primary distractions you would not need an inaccurate RA to cause this or a similar accident. Solutions involve reducing workload, avoiding distraction, and ‘making time’ by advancing procedures to an earlier, timely point in the operation – slowing the pace of operation.
---------------------------
For the would-be designers, I suggest that you review the guidance material in CS 25 Large Transport Aircraft particularly 25.1309 (p125) and the AMC (p520) on design, analysis and concepts of risk, safety, etc.
Also, see the more recent AMC 25.1302 (Page 485) on human interface, crew error, etc (good reading for HF training and CRM).
The requirement for a Rad Alt comes from CS AWO – All Weather Operations, but with a developing industry the RA is now used in many systems and thus CS 25 1309 etc would apply. Interestingly you only require one RA (two displays) for Cat2/3, but there could be exceptions in order to meet reliability/integrity targets.
I suspect that the 737NG did not have to comply with the new CS 25 AMC 1302 (due to grandfather rights), but many of the HF objectives would have been considered as most manufacturers have been working in this area for many years. Thus the NG is not actually ‘new’; however, IIRC most of the flight guidance system (AP, AT, RA) is new and might not be able to claim extensive proving from previous series of aircraft – instead of Grandfather rights it’s more like Grandfather’s Axe!
Note AMC 25 1302, para 3, ”… the applicant(manufacturer) may assume a qualified flight crew trained in the use of the installed equipment”; this appears to be at odds with operational requirements which enable line training – another mismatch between aircraft certification and operational certification.
CS–AWO 268 (for Cat 2/3 ops) requires “that the probability of the provision of false height information leading to a hazardous situation is Extremely Remote”.
I wonder how this might be interpreted in the context of this accident.
Perhaps this is the basis of the ‘cryptic’ comment in the Boeing communication suggesting that the RA fault (indication) should not have occurred.
Using the scenario and analysis at (#1735), the first indication that the crew’s perception was incorrect might have been approaching Vapp (Vref+5?). The expectation would be for the AT to pick up and maintain the selected speed, possibly allowing a small under-swing to see if the AT would respond … (Vref? 1.3vs). In the accident scenario, the next indication would be stick shake (1.1vs), a further speed reduction of ~20kts, which at 2-3kts/sec (mid - end of the speed trend scale) is 7-10sec later.
Human reaction time is often assumed to be in the 2-4 sec range. In this instance it might be nearer 4sec for the Capt (PNF) to recognise the situation and get in the control loop. It would not be a smooth transition from observing speed decay and waiting for stick shake as in training, it was a sudden onset of a totally unexpected and very attention getting warning. The Capt probably announcing I have control, disconnecting the AP, and applying thrust (but omitting to disengage the AT). The control forces are unexpected due to the mis trim condition (confusion), and the supposed need for two hands push force enables the AT to retard thrust again. In the time taken to read the above the aircraft has stalled and at low altitude could not be recovered.
A dominant issue is that at a critical stage of flight the crew were distracted; either by the surprising / unexpected gear warning; “we don’t get these and if we do they occur at 500ft” … thinks “what’s wrong, we are not at 500 ft” etc, etc.
There could be further distraction from late checklist use / training task which masked the first opportunity to detect the speed error at Vapp.
Logically, if the checklist / training task were the primary distractions you would not need an inaccurate RA to cause this or a similar accident. Solutions involve reducing workload, avoiding distraction, and ‘making time’ by advancing procedures to an earlier, timely point in the operation – slowing the pace of operation.
---------------------------
For the would-be designers, I suggest that you review the guidance material in CS 25 Large Transport Aircraft particularly 25.1309 (p125) and the AMC (p520) on design, analysis and concepts of risk, safety, etc.
Also, see the more recent AMC 25.1302 (Page 485) on human interface, crew error, etc (good reading for HF training and CRM).
The requirement for a Rad Alt comes from CS AWO – All Weather Operations, but with a developing industry the RA is now used in many systems and thus CS 25 1309 etc would apply. Interestingly you only require one RA (two displays) for Cat2/3, but there could be exceptions in order to meet reliability/integrity targets.
I suspect that the 737NG did not have to comply with the new CS 25 AMC 1302 (due to grandfather rights), but many of the HF objectives would have been considered as most manufacturers have been working in this area for many years. Thus the NG is not actually ‘new’; however, IIRC most of the flight guidance system (AP, AT, RA) is new and might not be able to claim extensive proving from previous series of aircraft – instead of Grandfather rights it’s more like Grandfather’s Axe!
Note AMC 25 1302, para 3, ”… the applicant(manufacturer) may assume a qualified flight crew trained in the use of the installed equipment”; this appears to be at odds with operational requirements which enable line training – another mismatch between aircraft certification and operational certification.
CS–AWO 268 (for Cat 2/3 ops) requires “that the probability of the provision of false height information leading to a hazardous situation is Extremely Remote”.
I wonder how this might be interpreted in the context of this accident.
Perhaps this is the basis of the ‘cryptic’ comment in the Boeing communication suggesting that the RA fault (indication) should not have occurred.
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I have a quick question - I'm not too afraid of Rainboe (unlike another poster) but I just hope he doesn't get too stressed
I read with interest Safta's sim report and then a subsequent post showing the stall recovery procedure from Boeing (around page 84 of this thread). The procedure didn't say anything about hitting the TO/GA switch and Safta didn't say if AT was controlling the thrust.
I guess my real question is if recovering from a stall, using the procedure set out by Boeing, if the AT is in control of the thrust - and there is a low altitude reading coming from the appropriate radalt, would the AT not reduce the thrust DURING the stall recovery procedure? I understand that pressing TOGA will disconnect AT....
Sorry for disturbing again...
I read with interest Safta's sim report and then a subsequent post showing the stall recovery procedure from Boeing (around page 84 of this thread). The procedure didn't say anything about hitting the TO/GA switch and Safta didn't say if AT was controlling the thrust.
I guess my real question is if recovering from a stall, using the procedure set out by Boeing, if the AT is in control of the thrust - and there is a low altitude reading coming from the appropriate radalt, would the AT not reduce the thrust DURING the stall recovery procedure? I understand that pressing TOGA will disconnect AT....
Sorry for disturbing again...