Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol
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Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Jofm5 - to correct a common misunderstanding, there is no such thing as 'alpha floor' on the 737. It is 'min speed reversion' - covered elsewhere here and is significantly different in action. According to my info from Boeing, while MSR is available at most times, it is NOT available on an autopilot flown ILS so would not have worked at AMS.
- wot! No-one fly with you......
I was alone at the controls of a VC10 at 21
- wot! No-one fly with you......
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Would a doctor be expected to be ready for a consultant's position before he was allowed to go near a patient?
Not a logical example. The average doctor completes seven years of training before taking on a patient solo. Pilots can have only 18 months or less experience before being second in command of a passenger airliner. There is no comparison.
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During flight testing, stall in landing config is demonstrated at a steady 1kt/sec deceleration and recovery is made at either stick-shaker,scheduled stick-shaker speed minus 5 kt,or buffet,whichever comes first.Its not decelerated at idle thrust to the full stall.Nor is any airframe icing permitted.
At 110,000 lbs,stick shaker speed is within the 105-110 knots range.Vref is about 129 kts.SMYD #1 will add a TAI additive to shaker speed if WAI has been on more than 5 seconds during flight.
At 110,000 lbs,stick shaker speed is within the 105-110 knots range.Vref is about 129 kts.SMYD #1 will add a TAI additive to shaker speed if WAI has been on more than 5 seconds during flight.
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BOAC: we definitively have different books. I'll send you a picture of mine where it says "alpha floor": Autothrottle Sysstem/Autothrottle Engangement very last line "aplpha floor automatically engages the A/T when armed.
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Some First Officers are paying the airlines for their line training they don't get a salary. They don't even work for the airline they are flying with. Not a good deal for the public and only a matter of time before this can of worms is smashed all over the media.
It is wrong plain wrong to let pilots pay to fly the fare paying public.
It is wrong plain wrong to let pilots pay to fly the fare paying public.
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I have read all the posts in this thread, including the limited factual information so far released by the Dutch Accident Investigation Authority. The main conclusions I draw from the available information are:
1. If the RA1 had functioned normally, the aircraft would probably have landed safely and uneventfully.
2. Notwithsatnding the erroneous hight information supplied by the RA1, if the crew had monitored their airspeed carefully during the final approach, and taken timely corrective action, the aircraft would probably have landed safely and uneventfully.
3. During the approach phase, it is possible for the A/P to apply automatic Up-Trim to an extent which makes successful stall recovery extremely difficult, or impossible.
4. Pressure on aircrews to expedite their approaches at AMS, by the ATC authority, may have increased flight 1951 crew workload and contributed to the crew's failure to notice their aircraft's dangerous reduction in airspeed.
As more information becomes available, no doubt other factors contributing to this accident will come to light. At this stage, I see little point in assigning degrees of relative importance/blame to the items on my list. What I do expect is that all the stakeholders in commercial aviation (aircraft manufacturers, certification authorities, airline operators/maintainers, ATC service providers, aircrew trainers) should, in due course, re-examine their system designs, procedures and training to see if improvements can be made to reduce the chance of a similar accident occurring in future. This re-examination should not be confined simply to Boeing products: all aircraft manufacturers should look again at the way automation is implemented on their aircraft to eliminate potential 'gotchas' and improve the clarity of warnings/info provided to aircrews. This is the least that the travelling public expects from the aviation industry. To simply dismiss this accident as one due solely to pilot error is not acceptable.
1. If the RA1 had functioned normally, the aircraft would probably have landed safely and uneventfully.
2. Notwithsatnding the erroneous hight information supplied by the RA1, if the crew had monitored their airspeed carefully during the final approach, and taken timely corrective action, the aircraft would probably have landed safely and uneventfully.
3. During the approach phase, it is possible for the A/P to apply automatic Up-Trim to an extent which makes successful stall recovery extremely difficult, or impossible.
4. Pressure on aircrews to expedite their approaches at AMS, by the ATC authority, may have increased flight 1951 crew workload and contributed to the crew's failure to notice their aircraft's dangerous reduction in airspeed.
As more information becomes available, no doubt other factors contributing to this accident will come to light. At this stage, I see little point in assigning degrees of relative importance/blame to the items on my list. What I do expect is that all the stakeholders in commercial aviation (aircraft manufacturers, certification authorities, airline operators/maintainers, ATC service providers, aircrew trainers) should, in due course, re-examine their system designs, procedures and training to see if improvements can be made to reduce the chance of a similar accident occurring in future. This re-examination should not be confined simply to Boeing products: all aircraft manufacturers should look again at the way automation is implemented on their aircraft to eliminate potential 'gotchas' and improve the clarity of warnings/info provided to aircrews. This is the least that the travelling public expects from the aviation industry. To simply dismiss this accident as one due solely to pilot error is not acceptable.
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ant1
Agree re. no RETARD in such circumstances.
What I meant in my post, but didn't perhaps express clearly enough through trying to be too precisely nuanced, was that 'RadAlt Mismatch' should annunciate instead of RETARD implementation.
If 'Gear' is annunciated at all in these circumstances it should be after 'RadAlt Mismatch' - that way cognitive misdirection is far less likely.
Perhaps 'RadAlt Mismatch' is too abstract - maybe Boeing should think outside the usual conventions and program the annunciation 'Hey, I'm confused about our altitude, will you take over full manual please?'
What I meant in my post, but didn't perhaps express clearly enough through trying to be too precisely nuanced, was that 'RadAlt Mismatch' should annunciate instead of RETARD implementation.
If 'Gear' is annunciated at all in these circumstances it should be after 'RadAlt Mismatch' - that way cognitive misdirection is far less likely.
Perhaps 'RadAlt Mismatch' is too abstract - maybe Boeing should think outside the usual conventions and program the annunciation 'Hey, I'm confused about our altitude, will you take over full manual please?'
Come on Tee Emm either you do not really know what goes on in medicine or you are being disingenuous. Everyone knows first year junior doctors are faced all the time with situations that they have never seen and often alone in the middle of the night when the consultant is in bed. Lets get back on subject.
These pilots all had thousands of hours according to earlier posts. Everyone has to convert to a new type at some time. The worrying thing is that things were allowed to deteriorate so far.
I can remember a situation some time ago when I was an FO. I was acting as safety pilot. The trainee who was converting from the 727 with thousands of hours and a view to upgrading did exactly what this guy appears to have done. He got hot and high and made a mess of recovering, although never getting low on speed. The training captain took control, end of problem and there was an intense debrief afterwards. Allowing trainees to get high and learn to recover is part of standard training. But at some point you have to takeover.
I accept that it will be somewhile before we know all the facts. But I think it is not too early to draw some preliminary conclusions.
These pilots all had thousands of hours according to earlier posts. Everyone has to convert to a new type at some time. The worrying thing is that things were allowed to deteriorate so far.
I can remember a situation some time ago when I was an FO. I was acting as safety pilot. The trainee who was converting from the 727 with thousands of hours and a view to upgrading did exactly what this guy appears to have done. He got hot and high and made a mess of recovering, although never getting low on speed. The training captain took control, end of problem and there was an intense debrief afterwards. Allowing trainees to get high and learn to recover is part of standard training. But at some point you have to takeover.
I accept that it will be somewhile before we know all the facts. But I think it is not too early to draw some preliminary conclusions.
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@rananim: Interesting point.
Seems Boeing is aware of the potential situation this can cause. Can you elaborate if this was:
1. Mandatory safety update (so, not done (yet) on the Turkish?)
2. Software update fitted by default to later built aircraft (if so, why were older NG not updated?)
3. Optional fit when ordering (if so, why is this not default on all NG?)
AT computer is fed by RA#1 or both RA#1 and RA#2 depending on software update.There are diagrams in the AMM showing this.
1. Mandatory safety update (so, not done (yet) on the Turkish?)
2. Software update fitted by default to later built aircraft (if so, why were older NG not updated?)
3. Optional fit when ordering (if so, why is this not default on all NG?)
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Why does a pilot need to be reminded about 'AIRSPEED", "TERRAIN", 'RETARD", and all the other myriad aural and visual reminders that a modern aircraft flight deck provides?
If, at any stage of the flight, a mechanical/electo system has to remind you of something your basic flying skills should have been flashing through the back of your mind then there is something very, very wrong with your abilities as a pilot.
This aircraft hit the ground nose high with very little forward speed. It was in a very deep stall. Where was the basic airmanship the Pilot Flying should have been relying on with his interpretation of what the basic 'T' instruments were telling him?
This is a dreadful indictment of the skills that airlines are prepared to accept in order to keep the cost of Flight Crews to a minimum.
Bean counters - be very, very ashamed.
If, at any stage of the flight, a mechanical/electo system has to remind you of something your basic flying skills should have been flashing through the back of your mind then there is something very, very wrong with your abilities as a pilot.
This aircraft hit the ground nose high with very little forward speed. It was in a very deep stall. Where was the basic airmanship the Pilot Flying should have been relying on with his interpretation of what the basic 'T' instruments were telling him?
This is a dreadful indictment of the skills that airlines are prepared to accept in order to keep the cost of Flight Crews to a minimum.
Bean counters - be very, very ashamed.
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bobcat4 ". . . Will we ever see (or have we seen) an accident where the pilots forgot to throttle down to idle after touchdown? Seems weird to me. . ."
" . . . Being too lazy to pull the levers to idle is not an argument (IMHO). . ."
" . . . Being too lazy to pull the levers to idle is not an argument (IMHO). . ."
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ant1:
Forgot to retard manually? Hmm... Is that really possible? Ok, I guess it is. Forgetting gear down is also possible. Anyway, it should not be a big deal. Forgetting to retard manually would initiate a touch-and-go, wouldn't it? Not anything we are used to see with a cabin full of pax, but it does not necessarily leads to disaster.
In real life, is it considered good practise to land without having to remeber to retard? The planes I fly does not have anything like AT or AP so it's paramount to rember to power ide during the flare.
I'm still amazed at the fact that such basic things could be forgotten. What else could be forgotten? Like looking at the airspeed indicator for a minute or two?
Bob.
I already gave you a reason on #1690: If you want alpha floor protection during a "speed deselect" single channel approach then it is wise that those throttles retard during the flare in case you forgot to retard manually as not retarding also has its consequences.
In real life, is it considered good practise to land without having to remeber to retard? The planes I fly does not have anything like AT or AP so it's paramount to rember to power ide during the flare.
I'm still amazed at the fact that such basic things could be forgotten. What else could be forgotten? Like looking at the airspeed indicator for a minute or two?
Bob.
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Xeque:
Maybe because of this ?
bobacat4
Could end up in a runway overrun, for instance. Find it strange ? You wouldn't probably have thought of the presently discussed one outcome in a million years just like me.
Why does a pilot need to be reminded about 'AIRSPEED", "TERRAIN", 'RETARD", and all the other myriad aural and visual reminders that a modern aircraft flight deck provides?
bobacat4
Forgetting to retard manually would initiate a touch-and-go
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SR71 - "If the logic had traded the GS profile for speed, the hole in the ground would presumably have been that much further from the threshold."
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L/D speed is closer to Vref than it is to stall speed. Giving up on the GS to maintain speed increases your gliding distance.
Staying on GS appears to be better, until you run out of airspeed and the plane's glide ratio can approach zero. That's when the guy that stayed closer to L/D flies farther.
The pushover to maintain Vref is a lot more uncomfortable than the choice to slow while staying on the GS. That is, until the sink rate starts. At that point it will be apparent that the guy maintaining Vref is still in control, while the guy that sacrificed airspeed to maintain GS is just along for the ride.
Try both scenarios in a sim. Don't give yourself enough energy to make the runway. Figure out which one scares you more(both gave you a full shot of adrenaline). Whichever scares you more is the one to avoid. It will be obvious.
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L/D speed is closer to Vref than it is to stall speed. Giving up on the GS to maintain speed increases your gliding distance.
Staying on GS appears to be better, until you run out of airspeed and the plane's glide ratio can approach zero. That's when the guy that stayed closer to L/D flies farther.
The pushover to maintain Vref is a lot more uncomfortable than the choice to slow while staying on the GS. That is, until the sink rate starts. At that point it will be apparent that the guy maintaining Vref is still in control, while the guy that sacrificed airspeed to maintain GS is just along for the ride.
Try both scenarios in a sim. Don't give yourself enough energy to make the runway. Figure out which one scares you more(both gave you a full shot of adrenaline). Whichever scares you more is the one to avoid. It will be obvious.
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Ant1
Not quite sure where you are coming from and (I confess) I couldn't read the fax copy you provided.
Are you saying that, because I can (aged 66) multi-task the mental calculations required to maintain airspeed, attitude, altitude and direction in order to arrive without embarrassment at my intended destination that I am some sort of super-hero?
I assure you I'm not. I'm just a normal guy capable of logical thought and forward thinking.
My question is this - 'are the people currently getting jobs as drivers for the worlds airlines able to demonstrate the same flying skills that I can?
Are you saying that, because I can (aged 66) multi-task the mental calculations required to maintain airspeed, attitude, altitude and direction in order to arrive without embarrassment at my intended destination that I am some sort of super-hero?
I assure you I'm not. I'm just a normal guy capable of logical thought and forward thinking.
My question is this - 'are the people currently getting jobs as drivers for the worlds airlines able to demonstrate the same flying skills that I can?
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GlueBall:
Ok, I see... You're referring to TAM Airlines Flight 3054 (PR-MBK) landing at Congonhas I guess. A strange accident. They did close throttle on one engine, but the other one was left with pretty high power setting. Also a very short runway, too short for a B738 according to Wikipedia.
How much automation should be built into an aircraft in order to cope with piltots forgetting how to fly? But if forgetting to retard is forgivable I apologize for suggesting a removal of auto-retard in single channel approach. Pilots obviously need it...
Edit: Or what if notorious forgetful pilots just use Cat III autoland whenever possible. That is, if they don't forget how to configure it...
Curiously, Captain Bobcat, this actually happened rather recently aboard an A320 at CGH where everyone had received fatal injuries.
How much automation should be built into an aircraft in order to cope with piltots forgetting how to fly? But if forgetting to retard is forgivable I apologize for suggesting a removal of auto-retard in single channel approach. Pilots obviously need it...
Edit: Or what if notorious forgetful pilots just use Cat III autoland whenever possible. That is, if they don't forget how to configure it...
Last edited by bobcat4; 7th Mar 2009 at 17:39.