I have read all the posts in this thread, including the limited factual information so far released by the Dutch Accident Investigation Authority. The main conclusions I draw from the available information are:
1. If the RA1 had functioned normally, the aircraft would probably have landed safely and uneventfully.
2. Notwithsatnding the erroneous hight information supplied by the RA1, if the crew had monitored their airspeed carefully during the final approach, and taken timely corrective action, the aircraft would probably have landed safely and uneventfully.
3. During the approach phase, it is possible for the A/P to apply automatic Up-Trim to an extent which makes successful stall recovery extremely difficult, or impossible.
4. Pressure on aircrews to expedite their approaches at AMS, by the ATC authority, may have increased flight 1951 crew workload and contributed to the crew's failure to notice their aircraft's dangerous reduction in airspeed.
As more information becomes available, no doubt other factors contributing to this accident will come to light. At this stage, I see little point in assigning degrees of relative importance/blame to the items on my list. What I do expect is that all the stakeholders in commercial aviation (aircraft manufacturers, certification authorities, airline operators/maintainers, ATC service providers, aircrew trainers) should, in due course, re-examine their system designs, procedures and training to see if improvements can be made to reduce the chance of a similar accident occurring in future. This re-examination should not be confined simply to Boeing products: all aircraft manufacturers should look again at the way automation is implemented on their aircraft to eliminate potential 'gotchas' and improve the clarity of warnings/info provided to aircrews. This is the least that the travelling public expects from the aviation industry. To simply dismiss this accident as one due solely to pilot error is not acceptable.