Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol
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Reports are coming out now that one of the F/O's was still alive for 40 minutes after the accident but rescue-workers were unable to free him due to... The SECURITY DOOR.
On B737, the window next to the F/O (R2) can be opened from the outside. However, this mechanism is known to malfunction when under severe stress (as certainly happened in this case) and not all emergency teams are aware of the fact.
Erickthepilot, condolences with the loss of your collegues, we are all collegues in the aviation world actually and should act accordingly.
On B737, the window next to the F/O (R2) can be opened from the outside. However, this mechanism is known to malfunction when under severe stress (as certainly happened in this case) and not all emergency teams are aware of the fact.
Erickthepilot, condolences with the loss of your collegues, we are all collegues in the aviation world actually and should act accordingly.
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Don't want to seem boorish, but in the light of Belgique's posts at 699 and 648, I think that we can sensibly cease speculating about the scenario and instead wonder how this type event (below) can happen. i.e. there is an existing and glaring 737 precedent that fits the bill exactly:
.
Thomsonfly unstable Bournemouth approach under investigation
By David Learmount
.
The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch confirms that it is investigating an "unstable approach" by a Boeing*737-300 at Bournemouth International airport in the UK.
Unofficial sources say that incident on 23 September 2007 involved a go-around following an uncommanded power reduction that left the aircraft at stalling speed during the approach.
The crew disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle to recover the aircraft successfully to safe flight, but witnesses report that the nose-up attitude during recovery exceeded 40°*and the airspeed reduced to approximately 90kt (166km/h) at its lowest point. The crew then carried out a safe landing at the airport, the AAIB confirms.
Because the AAIB is still studying the case, which is known to have involved a Thomsonfly 737-300, it will only confirm that the event took place and that it is formally under investigation.
The airline has not responded to requests to comment. Thomsonfly is one of the airlines owned by the international TUI Travel group.
from link
.
Thomsonfly unstable Bournemouth approach under investigation
By David Learmount
.
The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch confirms that it is investigating an "unstable approach" by a Boeing*737-300 at Bournemouth International airport in the UK.
Unofficial sources say that incident on 23 September 2007 involved a go-around following an uncommanded power reduction that left the aircraft at stalling speed during the approach.
The crew disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle to recover the aircraft successfully to safe flight, but witnesses report that the nose-up attitude during recovery exceeded 40°*and the airspeed reduced to approximately 90kt (166km/h) at its lowest point. The crew then carried out a safe landing at the airport, the AAIB confirms.
Because the AAIB is still studying the case, which is known to have involved a Thomsonfly 737-300, it will only confirm that the event took place and that it is formally under investigation.
The airline has not responded to requests to comment. Thomsonfly is one of the airlines owned by the international TUI Travel group.
from link
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See my Post 140 on page 7...
Already 2 days ago I discreetly mentioned this scenario. Personally, I agree with Belgique as this seems at the moment a plausable and realistic scenario.
For those not familiar with the B737:
On a Dual-Autopilot approach, the aircraft back-trims at around 400'. In case of a subsequent manual GA (normally the autopilot handles the GA) for whatever reason, a downward force is needed on the joke to avoid over-rotation...this can surprise sometimes new left-seaters during their sim-training.
Already 2 days ago I discreetly mentioned this scenario. Personally, I agree with Belgique as this seems at the moment a plausable and realistic scenario.
For those not familiar with the B737:
On a Dual-Autopilot approach, the aircraft back-trims at around 400'. In case of a subsequent manual GA (normally the autopilot handles the GA) for whatever reason, a downward force is needed on the joke to avoid over-rotation...this can surprise sometimes new left-seaters during their sim-training.
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Unctuous,
Somebody already did, and somebody else already posted the link here, but it was later removed.
airdisaster.info • View topic - THY Turkish 737-800 crash lands at Amsterdam
The data there only concerns the flight from the FAF to the crash site, not the approach. And keep in mind that localizer intercept happened at about 5 nm out, while the FAF is at 6.2 nm.
Anybody able to integrate that graph (link) from Luckystrike's post
into a timescaled versus height and distance graph (and mount it)?
into a timescaled versus height and distance graph (and mount it)?
airdisaster.info • View topic - THY Turkish 737-800 crash lands at Amsterdam
The data there only concerns the flight from the FAF to the crash site, not the approach. And keep in mind that localizer intercept happened at about 5 nm out, while the FAF is at 6.2 nm.
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Mods please delete if not considered relevant at this stage.
Mr Pieter van Vollenhoven, head of the Dutch Safety Board, has so far thwarted the strident demands of the Dutch Public Prosecutor for access to, and control of the FDR & CVR. Basing his denial on Dutch law which allows such access only in case of terrorism or criminal acts.
The Public Prosecutor has an unpleasant record for this kind of behaviour*, but mr. van Vollenhoven is known for not giving in to the demands of expediency.
A majority in Dutch parliament, demonstrating their ignorance of the blame free reporting system and its benefits, is siding with the Public Prosecutor.
*
November 28, 2004, PH-BTC left the runway at Barcelona. post
The Dutch Public Prosecutor made a great and prolonged effort to prosecute the captain for having accepted an aircraft with a cable system where grease had been applied incorrectly during maintenance. Their efforts lead to nothing, but the attempt and its effects on the flight crew were not well received by the pilot community.
Mr Pieter van Vollenhoven, head of the Dutch Safety Board, has so far thwarted the strident demands of the Dutch Public Prosecutor for access to, and control of the FDR & CVR. Basing his denial on Dutch law which allows such access only in case of terrorism or criminal acts.
The Public Prosecutor has an unpleasant record for this kind of behaviour*, but mr. van Vollenhoven is known for not giving in to the demands of expediency.
A majority in Dutch parliament, demonstrating their ignorance of the blame free reporting system and its benefits, is siding with the Public Prosecutor.
*
November 28, 2004, PH-BTC left the runway at Barcelona. post
It is considered that the accident probably happened because during the takeoff a bird strike broke one of the cables of the nose wheel steering system of the aircraft and jammed the other, which made that the nose wheels were rotated to the left during landing, causing a veering to the left that could not be arrested by full rudder deflection as the aircraft decelerated. The subsequent application of brakes and other actions by the crew could not avoid that the aircraft went outside the runway surface.
The damages to the aircraft were increased by the condition of the runway strip due to the airport construction works.
Contributing to the breaking of the cable was the fact that it was severely worn locally. The wear could be traced back to the incorrect application of grease to the cable system during maintenance. Despite the training and experience of the flight crew, they were unable to quickly recognize the possible cause of the deviation of the aircraft and to keep the aircraft on the runway.
The damages to the aircraft were increased by the condition of the runway strip due to the airport construction works.
Contributing to the breaking of the cable was the fact that it was severely worn locally. The wear could be traced back to the incorrect application of grease to the cable system during maintenance. Despite the training and experience of the flight crew, they were unable to quickly recognize the possible cause of the deviation of the aircraft and to keep the aircraft on the runway.
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Mr Pieter van Vollenhoven, head of the Dutch Safety Board, has so far thwarted the strident demands of the Dutch Public Prosecutor for access to, and control of the FDR & CVR. Basing his denial on Dutch law which allows such access only in case of terrorism or criminal acts.
The Public Prosecutor has an unpleasant record for this kind of behaviour*, but mr. van Vollenhoven is known for not giving in to the demands of expediency.
The Public Prosecutor has an unpleasant record for this kind of behaviour*, but mr. van Vollenhoven is known for not giving in to the demands of expediency.
And for the record, I'm with the Public Attorney as well. I think the "Openbaar Ministerie" has to have access to the data (but maybe not the actual physical CVR and FDR) to determine whether a criminal investigation should be started or not. Giving them access to the data does not automatically make this a criminal case.
But right now it is Mr. van Vollenhovens Onderzoeksraad who is the only one able to make the determination whether this is a criminal case or not. Something that's completely and utterly outside their jurisdiction and expertise.
On the other hand, what's the rush? The Openbaar Ministerie can also sit on their hands for a month, wait for the analysis of the data and then subpoena the data anyway. It's the investigation and the results of the investigation of the OVV that should not be used in criminal cases, but I cannot believe that that would also go for the raw data on which the OVV investigation is based.
That would actually create a nice loophole in general. If I'm involved in an accident which might somehow lead to a criminal investigation, I would ship everything that might even be remotely used as evidence to the OVV, knowing that it's going to be safe from the OM.
Mr. van Vollenhoven is right in the sense that he wants to protect the independence of the OVV, but I think he's wrong in not giving the OM access to the raw data.
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The one about the door remaining locked is surely a red herring; it will unlock when the a/c is (electrically) powered down, as in, when the power is interrupted. Condolences to all concerned, my money is on a psuedo-CFIT, looks like the "FLCH trap" strikes again.
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can you please expand by what you mean by the "FLCH trap"?
Granted I fly the 757 and not the 737 but many of the AFDS modes have similar functionality and i'm not sure I understand what you are alluding to?
Granted I fly the 757 and not the 737 but many of the AFDS modes have similar functionality and i'm not sure I understand what you are alluding to?
Looking at those graphs it looks like the aircraft didn't pick up the glide at the FAF, and the crew had to disconnect and chase it down by hand (no a/t). The high ROD close in is the clue.
Possibly the workload with the config changes may then have lead to not increasing the thrust from idle when needed, especially if an inexperienced pilot is on the controls, who does not interpret the increased back load on the yoke as a speed loss. The rate of speed loss with the flaps at a landing setting and the thrust at idle is of course quite high.
Possibly the workload with the config changes may then have lead to not increasing the thrust from idle when needed, especially if an inexperienced pilot is on the controls, who does not interpret the increased back load on the yoke as a speed loss. The rate of speed loss with the flaps at a landing setting and the thrust at idle is of course quite high.
Political pressure?
Does anyone know why the authorities are holding back the report on the Thomsonfly BOH incident. Bearing in mind the crew were able to be interviewed & the FDR/CVR readily available the report should have been released a long time ago.
The relevance to this thread - part of accident investigation should be the prevention of future accidents. If it is proved that the THY accident was due to similar factors then the authorities have inadvertently helped line up the swiss cheese. Surely more effort should be made to disseminate reports such as the TFly to improve procedures than reporting on catering trucks taking wingtips off aircraft parked on stand.
I know off at least 2 incidents where 737s have been to the stick shaker after crews disconnected a/t when hot & high to prevent spoolup, & then forgotten to increase thrust when regaining profile.
The relevance to this thread - part of accident investigation should be the prevention of future accidents. If it is proved that the THY accident was due to similar factors then the authorities have inadvertently helped line up the swiss cheese. Surely more effort should be made to disseminate reports such as the TFly to improve procedures than reporting on catering trucks taking wingtips off aircraft parked on stand.
I know off at least 2 incidents where 737s have been to the stick shaker after crews disconnected a/t when hot & high to prevent spoolup, & then forgotten to increase thrust when regaining profile.
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@ BackPacker
Mr Van Vollenhoven clearly wants to avoid any premature information leaking to the press.For this very reason, the Dutch Transport Safety Board locks up all information as they are familiar with the indiscretions of the public office, particularly the one at Amsterdam/Haarlem.
In this particular case, it is not said that the public office has anything to say or demand for the moment. Unless there are signs of unusual and/or criminal activity. Which are not.
When such is an established fact, it will be explained for by the evidence that is found. For the time being we are already plastered with erroneous outings of the general press, let alone what will happen if misinterpreted information comes into their hands.
Read de Telegraaf of today and you will know where I point at.
Mr Van Vollenhoven clearly wants to avoid any premature information leaking to the press.For this very reason, the Dutch Transport Safety Board locks up all information as they are familiar with the indiscretions of the public office, particularly the one at Amsterdam/Haarlem.
In this particular case, it is not said that the public office has anything to say or demand for the moment. Unless there are signs of unusual and/or criminal activity. Which are not.
When such is an established fact, it will be explained for by the evidence that is found. For the time being we are already plastered with erroneous outings of the general press, let alone what will happen if misinterpreted information comes into their hands.
Read de Telegraaf of today and you will know where I point at.
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From the OpenATC profiles HERE
Whatever the reason for the bilateral power loss.... I am left with this distinct impression that our man was trying to stretch the glide over the motorway and canal that lie just before the crash position.
...And we all know what happens if you try and stretch a glide.
Whatever the reason for the bilateral power loss.... I am left with this distinct impression that our man was trying to stretch the glide over the motorway and canal that lie just before the crash position.
...And we all know what happens if you try and stretch a glide.
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Sorry if I am being picky and as a non-pilot I don't know how relevant these comments are, but I think that there is a basic error in the altitude/distance graph in the site linked to by BackPacker in post 713. This shows the final point at an altitude of zero and I am assuming that the originator of the graph merely added 200 feet to all the altitudes shown on the data from OpenATC.com.
It was reported early on in this thread that the QNH at the time of the crash was 1027hPa. Since the SBS altitude data is related to standard pressure, it was under-reporting the altitude by 14 times 27feet, i.e. 378 feet. Since the altitude data, anyway, is reported only in multiples of 25 feet, this points the altitude at the final position report as 175 feet +/- 10 feet or so. It is quite likely that the final position reported was not the impact point but just that at which the SBS box stopped receiving updates. This was likely due to the low height. For instance, I cannot follow aircraft all the way down to either 27L or 27R at Heathrow due to the intervening reservoirs (my whereabouts will be obvious from my name).
If we assume that all altitudes in the graph should be shifted up by about 175 feet, and adjust the graph accordingly it shows a somewhat different pattern. The graph shows the aircraft crossing the G/S at about 10 kilometres, staying above it for a time before steadily falling below it. Making the altitude adjustment I mentioned, the pattern shows the aircraft always above the GS but getting steadily closer until reaching it at the penultimate data point (the 75'/250' one). At this point, the sudden increase in the sink rate takes it sharply below the G/S until impact.
As a non-pilot, I am not sure if this is what HundredPercentPlease is discussing in post 720.;
I'm sorry that I can't post a revised graph here (I have to go out). However, if anyone would like a copy of my Excel file, please pm me and I will do so asap. If, as a non-pilot I am talking gibberish then I apologise. The same if this post is irrelevant.
SFS
It was reported early on in this thread that the QNH at the time of the crash was 1027hPa. Since the SBS altitude data is related to standard pressure, it was under-reporting the altitude by 14 times 27feet, i.e. 378 feet. Since the altitude data, anyway, is reported only in multiples of 25 feet, this points the altitude at the final position report as 175 feet +/- 10 feet or so. It is quite likely that the final position reported was not the impact point but just that at which the SBS box stopped receiving updates. This was likely due to the low height. For instance, I cannot follow aircraft all the way down to either 27L or 27R at Heathrow due to the intervening reservoirs (my whereabouts will be obvious from my name).
If we assume that all altitudes in the graph should be shifted up by about 175 feet, and adjust the graph accordingly it shows a somewhat different pattern. The graph shows the aircraft crossing the G/S at about 10 kilometres, staying above it for a time before steadily falling below it. Making the altitude adjustment I mentioned, the pattern shows the aircraft always above the GS but getting steadily closer until reaching it at the penultimate data point (the 75'/250' one). At this point, the sudden increase in the sink rate takes it sharply below the G/S until impact.
As a non-pilot, I am not sure if this is what HundredPercentPlease is discussing in post 720.;
I'm sorry that I can't post a revised graph here (I have to go out). However, if anyone would like a copy of my Excel file, please pm me and I will do so asap. If, as a non-pilot I am talking gibberish then I apologise. The same if this post is irrelevant.
SFS
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LuckyStrike -
Interesting graph. I can easily put together a scenerio/speculation from that based on my full stall incident in a 737-200. WARNING, from here on is SPECULATION. It appears as though when the stall was recognized, full power was applied along with back elevator. then they just sat there not knowing what to do to get out of that "mushy" feeling. From here on: fact. I had to reduce power by nearly 50% to get out of the stall we were in. But.....it took two thousand feet to do it. They obviously did not have that luxury. Our stall was tail ice related and that may or may not have been an issue here.
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Dysag -
I have yet to see it in writing just WHO the third crew member was. Have you?
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funfly -
Depends! Too many variables.
Interesting graph. I can easily put together a scenerio/speculation from that based on my full stall incident in a 737-200. WARNING, from here on is SPECULATION. It appears as though when the stall was recognized, full power was applied along with back elevator. then they just sat there not knowing what to do to get out of that "mushy" feeling. From here on: fact. I had to reduce power by nearly 50% to get out of the stall we were in. But.....it took two thousand feet to do it. They obviously did not have that luxury. Our stall was tail ice related and that may or may not have been an issue here.
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Dysag -
There were three on the flight deck and no-one has yet revealed where the "apprentice" was sitting.
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funfly -
Would 150 kts have been about right for this type of aircraft on final?
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StainesFS
Thanks for your contribution. I think you are right and it corrects the impact point and also this -4096.
I think it makes the picture a lot clearer. But well, I'm not a pilot...
If we assume that all altitudes in the graph should be shifted up by about 175 feet, and adjust the graph accordingly it shows a somewhat different pattern. The graph shows the aircraft crossing the G/S at about 10 kilometres, staying above it for a time before steadily falling below it. Making the altitude adjustment I mentioned, the pattern shows the aircraft always above the GS but getting steadily closer until reaching it at the penultimate data point (the 75'/250' one). At this point, the sudden increase in the sink rate takes it sharply below the G/S until impact.
I think it makes the picture a lot clearer. But well, I'm not a pilot...
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@DC-ATE:
Post #227 by ManaAdaSystem:
I have yet to see it in writing just WHO the third crew member was. Have you?
The pilots
Co-pilot Olgay Oezguer, Pilot Hasan Tahsin Arisan and Co-pilot Murat Sezer.
Co-pilot Olgay Oezguer, Pilot Hasan Tahsin Arisan and Co-pilot Murat Sezer.
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DC-ATE
Re the third crew member Olgay Özgür. I've searched a bit but can find nothing which says where he was sitting or his level of qualification.
In the press he is universally referred to as an "apprentice pilot". Presumably because journos are lazy and just copy/paste from each other. I suppose he could equally have been called a trainee or student pilot.
In the press he is universally referred to as an "apprentice pilot". Presumably because journos are lazy and just copy/paste from each other. I suppose he could equally have been called a trainee or student pilot.
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DC-ATE said "I have yet to see it in writing just WHO the third crew member was. Have you?"
I, and I suppose hundreds of others have.
From Wikipedia:
"
A total of 128 passengers and seven crew members were on board[1] when the flight left Istanbul at 6:22 UTC (7:22 CET) under the command of Captain Hasan Tahsin Arısan, one of the airline's most experienced pilots with more than 15,500 hours of flying experience. He had been working for Turkish Airlines since 1996, and previously flew for the Turkish Air Force.[9] The other crew members were Olgay Özgür (co-pilot), Murat Sezer (pilot), Figen Eren, Perihan Özden, Ulvi Murat Eskin, and Yasemin Vural."
From samanyoluhaber.com:
KOKPİT: Hasan Tahsin Arısan, Olgay Özgür ve Murat Sezer.
From Yahoo News.com:
Turkish Airlines said the dead included pilots Hasan Tahsin Arisan, Olgay Ozgur and Murat Sezer and flight attendant Ulvi Murat Eskin.
I, and I suppose hundreds of others have.
From Wikipedia:
"
A total of 128 passengers and seven crew members were on board[1] when the flight left Istanbul at 6:22 UTC (7:22 CET) under the command of Captain Hasan Tahsin Arısan, one of the airline's most experienced pilots with more than 15,500 hours of flying experience. He had been working for Turkish Airlines since 1996, and previously flew for the Turkish Air Force.[9] The other crew members were Olgay Özgür (co-pilot), Murat Sezer (pilot), Figen Eren, Perihan Özden, Ulvi Murat Eskin, and Yasemin Vural."
From samanyoluhaber.com:
KOKPİT: Hasan Tahsin Arısan, Olgay Özgür ve Murat Sezer.
From Yahoo News.com:
Turkish Airlines said the dead included pilots Hasan Tahsin Arisan, Olgay Ozgur and Murat Sezer and flight attendant Ulvi Murat Eskin.