TAM A320 crash at Congonhas, Brazil
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question marciovp
There is something I don't get. Your pilot friend says they simulated a TLA fault and there was no sound or warning?
I have a flight crew operating manual from TAM for A319, 320, 321 that says Thrust Lever Fault or Thrust Level Disagree both lead to a single chime aural warning and a master caution light (these warnings are only inhibited in fase 4 and 5 of flight, before and after take-off). Was this not true in the simulator??
Also, the FDR for TAM 3054 shows TLA fault signal OFF.
second (I think lemurian brought this point and I'm not a pilot and haven't a clue), if the computer orders ToGa, isn't it the right thing to abort landing after all? Because if there is indeed a TLA fault and there will be no reading of at least one thrust lever at idle (where we suppose they may have been for the sake of argument), THEN spoilers will not deploy. If they will not deploy, isn't a go-around a better? Why practice killing the engines? Does that allow for autobreak and spoiler action?
BTW, is this true, what "bombinha" posted -- there is NO manual override for spoilers in the A320?? I have asked if this was an option for the pilots and never got a consistent answer.
sorry for so many questions, few answers.
I have a flight crew operating manual from TAM for A319, 320, 321 that says Thrust Lever Fault or Thrust Level Disagree both lead to a single chime aural warning and a master caution light (these warnings are only inhibited in fase 4 and 5 of flight, before and after take-off). Was this not true in the simulator??
Also, the FDR for TAM 3054 shows TLA fault signal OFF.
second (I think lemurian brought this point and I'm not a pilot and haven't a clue), if the computer orders ToGa, isn't it the right thing to abort landing after all? Because if there is indeed a TLA fault and there will be no reading of at least one thrust lever at idle (where we suppose they may have been for the sake of argument), THEN spoilers will not deploy. If they will not deploy, isn't a go-around a better? Why practice killing the engines? Does that allow for autobreak and spoiler action?
BTW, is this true, what "bombinha" posted -- there is NO manual override for spoilers in the A320?? I have asked if this was an option for the pilots and never got a consistent answer.
sorry for so many questions, few answers.
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I never exchange any correspondence with PPRuNe' poster who is pilot for A320. I do NOT know any A320 pilot who has posted any comment on PPRuNe.
Shall I publish our exchange ?
Yes on the 'net, we can have different names for different forums !
Last edited by Lemurian; 22nd Sep 2007 at 00:45. Reason: non pertinent argument
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SAFO
Safety Alert for Operators
U.S. Department SAFO 07007
of Transportation DATE 9/17/2007
Federal Aviation Flight Standards Service
Administration Washington, DC
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviat...ne_safety/safo
A SAFO contains important safety information and may include recommended action. SAFO content should be
especially valuable to air carriers in meeting their statutory duty to provide service with the highest possible degree
of safety in the public interest. Besides the specific action recommended in a SAFO, an alternative action may be as
effective in addressing the safety issue named in the SAFO.
Subject: Thrust Lever Position during Landing with One Deactivated Thrust Reverser on
Airbus A318, A319, A320, A321 Series Airplanes.
Purpose: This SAFO emphasizes the operational procedure of selecting idle thrust on both
engines during a landing conducted with one deactivated thrust reverser.
Background: At least three accidents/incidents have occurred on A320 aircraft dispatched with one
thrust reverser deactivated (as allowed by the master minimum equipment list (MMEL)) because the
flight crew failed to retard both thrust levers to the IDLE detent for the flare and landing.
The thrust lever corresponding to the engine with the deactivated thrust reverser was left in the CLIMB
detent during the flare and touchdown. MAX REVERSE thrust lever position was selected on the
engine with the operative thrust reverser.
In each instance, the autothrust system remained engaged in the speed mode. This resulted in the thrust
increasing within the range of the CLIMB limit thrust setting in order to maintain the selected speed.
With the selection of reverse thrust on one engine, the autothrust monitoring function detected an
abnormal condition and disconnected the autothrust system. When the autothrust disconnected, the
thrust remained at the last commanded thrust level per the lockout feature, and a “THR LCK” amber
message appeared on the flight mode annunciator (FMA). Ground spoilers did not deploy and
autobrakes, if selected, did not activate. The most recent accident resulted in 199 fatalities.
Discussion: The A320 autothrust system utilizes six detents to establish the maximum full
authority digital engine control (FADEC) computed thrust for the ambient conditions:
• TOGA
• FLEX/MCT
• CLIMB
• IDLE
• REV IDLE
• MAX REVERSE
The thrust levers do not move automatically but are manually placed in one of the detents by the
pilot. The A320 design requires that both thrust levers be retarded to the IDLE detent by the pilot
on landing. This action disconnects the autothrust system, initiates the system logic for the
deployment of ground spoilers and the activation of autobrakes, and avoids an undesired increase
in thrust during the landing roll.
In the case of dispatch with one thrust reverser deactivated, the European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) MMEL and the recent Airbus Accident Information Telex (TAM JJ3054 AIT 4,
August 2, 2007) each call for the pilot to set both thrust levers to IDLE for the flare and to set
both thrust levers to MAX REVERSE at touchdown. The FAA approved MMEL does not
contain procedural guidance regarding the positioning of the thrust levers on landing and during
the rollout. In all cases, the system logic requires that both thrust levers be retarded to the IDLE
detent for flare and landing. Pilots should follow operator specific procedures for the selection of
reverse thrust.
Recommended Action: Directors of safety, directors of operations, chief pilots, check airmen,
pilot instructors, and line pilots of certificate holders operating Airbus A318, A319, A320, and
A321 series airplanes should become familiar with the content of this SAFO. U.S. operators
should implement the following recommended actions:
• Pilots, dispatchers, and maintenance personnel should ensure compliance with the FAA
approved MMEL prior to dispatch.
• Directors of operations should develop operator specific FCOM/POH procedures for landing
with a thrust reverser deactivated that are consistent with Airbus recommended procedures.
• Directors of operations and chief pilots should emphasize to pilots, through an Operational
Bulletin or other written communication means, the necessity to select idle thrust on both
engine thrust levers for the flare and touchdown.
• Dispatchers should insert the following message on the flight crew dispatch release
when the airplane is dispatched with one thrust reverser deactivated:
For a landing conducted with one deactivated thrust reverser, ensure that both
engine thrust levers are retarded to the IDLE detent for the flare and the
touchdown.
• Pilots should select an appropriate autobrake level for landing in accordance with
operator-specific procedures.
• A330 operators should consider the information presented in this SAFO and apply it to
their fleets as applicable.
Questions or comments on this SAFO should be addressed to Pete Neff, SEA-AEG, (425)
917-6628, email: [email protected] or Jim Sheppard, SEA-AEG, (425) 917-6623, email:
[email protected].
Safety Alert for Operators
U.S. Department SAFO 07007
of Transportation DATE 9/17/2007
Federal Aviation Flight Standards Service
Administration Washington, DC
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviat...ne_safety/safo
A SAFO contains important safety information and may include recommended action. SAFO content should be
especially valuable to air carriers in meeting their statutory duty to provide service with the highest possible degree
of safety in the public interest. Besides the specific action recommended in a SAFO, an alternative action may be as
effective in addressing the safety issue named in the SAFO.
Subject: Thrust Lever Position during Landing with One Deactivated Thrust Reverser on
Airbus A318, A319, A320, A321 Series Airplanes.
Purpose: This SAFO emphasizes the operational procedure of selecting idle thrust on both
engines during a landing conducted with one deactivated thrust reverser.
Background: At least three accidents/incidents have occurred on A320 aircraft dispatched with one
thrust reverser deactivated (as allowed by the master minimum equipment list (MMEL)) because the
flight crew failed to retard both thrust levers to the IDLE detent for the flare and landing.
The thrust lever corresponding to the engine with the deactivated thrust reverser was left in the CLIMB
detent during the flare and touchdown. MAX REVERSE thrust lever position was selected on the
engine with the operative thrust reverser.
In each instance, the autothrust system remained engaged in the speed mode. This resulted in the thrust
increasing within the range of the CLIMB limit thrust setting in order to maintain the selected speed.
With the selection of reverse thrust on one engine, the autothrust monitoring function detected an
abnormal condition and disconnected the autothrust system. When the autothrust disconnected, the
thrust remained at the last commanded thrust level per the lockout feature, and a “THR LCK” amber
message appeared on the flight mode annunciator (FMA). Ground spoilers did not deploy and
autobrakes, if selected, did not activate. The most recent accident resulted in 199 fatalities.
Discussion: The A320 autothrust system utilizes six detents to establish the maximum full
authority digital engine control (FADEC) computed thrust for the ambient conditions:
• TOGA
• FLEX/MCT
• CLIMB
• IDLE
• REV IDLE
• MAX REVERSE
The thrust levers do not move automatically but are manually placed in one of the detents by the
pilot. The A320 design requires that both thrust levers be retarded to the IDLE detent by the pilot
on landing. This action disconnects the autothrust system, initiates the system logic for the
deployment of ground spoilers and the activation of autobrakes, and avoids an undesired increase
in thrust during the landing roll.
In the case of dispatch with one thrust reverser deactivated, the European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) MMEL and the recent Airbus Accident Information Telex (TAM JJ3054 AIT 4,
August 2, 2007) each call for the pilot to set both thrust levers to IDLE for the flare and to set
both thrust levers to MAX REVERSE at touchdown. The FAA approved MMEL does not
contain procedural guidance regarding the positioning of the thrust levers on landing and during
the rollout. In all cases, the system logic requires that both thrust levers be retarded to the IDLE
detent for flare and landing. Pilots should follow operator specific procedures for the selection of
reverse thrust.
Recommended Action: Directors of safety, directors of operations, chief pilots, check airmen,
pilot instructors, and line pilots of certificate holders operating Airbus A318, A319, A320, and
A321 series airplanes should become familiar with the content of this SAFO. U.S. operators
should implement the following recommended actions:
• Pilots, dispatchers, and maintenance personnel should ensure compliance with the FAA
approved MMEL prior to dispatch.
• Directors of operations should develop operator specific FCOM/POH procedures for landing
with a thrust reverser deactivated that are consistent with Airbus recommended procedures.
• Directors of operations and chief pilots should emphasize to pilots, through an Operational
Bulletin or other written communication means, the necessity to select idle thrust on both
engine thrust levers for the flare and touchdown.
• Dispatchers should insert the following message on the flight crew dispatch release
when the airplane is dispatched with one thrust reverser deactivated:
For a landing conducted with one deactivated thrust reverser, ensure that both
engine thrust levers are retarded to the IDLE detent for the flare and the
touchdown.
• Pilots should select an appropriate autobrake level for landing in accordance with
operator-specific procedures.
• A330 operators should consider the information presented in this SAFO and apply it to
their fleets as applicable.
Questions or comments on this SAFO should be addressed to Pete Neff, SEA-AEG, (425)
917-6628, email: [email protected] or Jim Sheppard, SEA-AEG, (425) 917-6623, email:
[email protected].
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Posts: n/a
To Lemurian or another his name or nickname
Shall I publish our exchange ?
Yes on the 'net, we can have different names for different forums !
Yes on the 'net, we can have different names for different forums !
Your are a liar. I never sent any message to you.
You must pitch your nose down.
There is a guy here in Brazil called George Alvarega Rocha who stole my e-mail password and he had access to many INTERNET service of mine as if He were me. He had access to my bank account too.
He only presents himself as George Rock ou George Rocha like me.
He had access to many online newspaper Forum and wrote comments as pilot and signed as George Rock.
Some friends of mine advised me about that and asked me whether all written comments had been written by me. This guy made phone calls to televison reporter as if He were me.
So, I am sure I never wrote to you.
I have many friends who are captain for Airbus 320 and we lived together for four years at the same apartment. Both of us pilots. If I had to ask something to an Airbus pilot, I will ask to friends of mine, not to a stupid and arrogant french pilot like you.
I repeat undisturbed, You are a liar.
Sun worshipper
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georgecrock
That person did a lot more than steal your name, then.
He also wrote your articles on your *aviation Troubleshooting* site, including the *correction* you mentioned in your first post, which you made after one e-mail I sent.
And if the technical accuracy of your blog -on tyhe A320 - is representative of your A320 pilots friends, Brazilian aviation is in deep trouble.
Your ire is quite baffling : You have someone using your addresses and I am the liar?
Strange reasoning.Even more so when here I haven't said anything but nice about you.
So far.
Moderators,
As my integrity and honesty are questioned, I'll copy the initial message sent by georgecrock, from the PPrune site.
Please allow it. It will be the last on this forum.
Thanks.
This is it :
"This is a message from georgecrock at PPRuNe Forums ( http://www.pprune.org/forums/index.php ). The PPRuNe Forums owners cannot accept any responsibility for the contents of the email.
To email georgecrock, you can use this online form:
http://www.pprune.org/forums/sendmes...ember&u=159141
OR, by email:
mailto:[email protected]
This is the message:
Dear Lemurian,
I have flown as PIC for many years in Brazil and I already worked for TAM as PIC for Fokker 100 too. I am flying as PIC on Falcon 2000 by now.
I really appreciate to having your comments about the graph for Lateral and Longitudinal INPUTS Sidestick reproduced and amplified at this site address:
Aviation Troubleshooting
http://aviationtroubleshooting.*************/
There is a translation to english written in blue for the
Post Title:
FALHA nos SIDESTICKS - AMBOS controlando - TAM 3054
It is the third POST in the sequence down.
You can answer directly to my e-mail: [email protected]
Thanks a lot.
George Rock
ATP
Flight Instructor (jets)
Rio de Janeiro
Copacabana
Brazil
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orange vous informe que cet e-mail a ete controle par l'anti-virus mail.
Aucun virus connu a ce jour par nos services n'a ete detecte.
"
He also wrote your articles on your *aviation Troubleshooting* site, including the *correction* you mentioned in your first post, which you made after one e-mail I sent.
And if the technical accuracy of your blog -on tyhe A320 - is representative of your A320 pilots friends, Brazilian aviation is in deep trouble.
Your ire is quite baffling : You have someone using your addresses and I am the liar?
Strange reasoning.Even more so when here I haven't said anything but nice about you.
So far.
Moderators,
As my integrity and honesty are questioned, I'll copy the initial message sent by georgecrock, from the PPrune site.
Please allow it. It will be the last on this forum.
Thanks.
This is it :
"This is a message from georgecrock at PPRuNe Forums ( http://www.pprune.org/forums/index.php ). The PPRuNe Forums owners cannot accept any responsibility for the contents of the email.
To email georgecrock, you can use this online form:
http://www.pprune.org/forums/sendmes...ember&u=159141
OR, by email:
mailto:[email protected]
This is the message:
Dear Lemurian,
I have flown as PIC for many years in Brazil and I already worked for TAM as PIC for Fokker 100 too. I am flying as PIC on Falcon 2000 by now.
I really appreciate to having your comments about the graph for Lateral and Longitudinal INPUTS Sidestick reproduced and amplified at this site address:
Aviation Troubleshooting
http://aviationtroubleshooting.*************/
There is a translation to english written in blue for the
Post Title:
FALHA nos SIDESTICKS - AMBOS controlando - TAM 3054
It is the third POST in the sequence down.
You can answer directly to my e-mail: [email protected]
Thanks a lot.
George Rock
ATP
Flight Instructor (jets)
Rio de Janeiro
Copacabana
Brazil
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orange vous informe que cet e-mail a ete controle par l'anti-virus mail.
Aucun virus connu a ce jour par nos services n'a ete detecte.
"
Last edited by Lemurian; 22nd Sep 2007 at 09:16. Reason: Insertion
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Mr. Rock,
please moderate your tone. This is a forum in which we discuss technical and social issues concerning the TAM Congonhas accident.
This is not a place for insults. It is not a debating style that PPRuNe chooses to support, or that many of us wish to read
.
Having said that, I will also say that Lemurian is one of the most insightful, experienced and expert A320-rated people we have, and you will lose any credibility you might wish to develop if you bad-mouth him. I doubt you would wish to lose credibility amongst the group of people who read and write in this forum.
Lemurian,
as far as I am concerned, and I am sure this goes for most readers and posters here, your honesty and integrity have *not* been questioned. You have simply been insulted, and
an insult is not questioning anything.
PBL
please moderate your tone. This is a forum in which we discuss technical and social issues concerning the TAM Congonhas accident.
This is not a place for insults. It is not a debating style that PPRuNe chooses to support, or that many of us wish to read
.
Having said that, I will also say that Lemurian is one of the most insightful, experienced and expert A320-rated people we have, and you will lose any credibility you might wish to develop if you bad-mouth him. I doubt you would wish to lose credibility amongst the group of people who read and write in this forum.
Lemurian,
as far as I am concerned, and I am sure this goes for most readers and posters here, your honesty and integrity have *not* been questioned. You have simply been insulted, and
an insult is not questioning anything.
PBL
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Posts: n/a
To PBL and Lemurian
PBL, you are not professional pilot you are only a Private Pilot. That's all.
You never took off or make a landing of jet plane in you entire life.
Lemurian, you are not pilot, you are only a system engeneer, you never took a plane at your command.
So, both of you ara jokes.
For someone else:
"Crock" for me, stands for 'an earthenware vassel from which we can take fresh water'.
I do not write more for this Forum, in which NOT professional pilot put their comments as if they were expertise to pilot large aircraft.
Lunatics trying to pass to public something they do not have any experience.
Goodbye, Virtual Pilots.
You never took off or make a landing of jet plane in you entire life.
Lemurian, you are not pilot, you are only a system engeneer, you never took a plane at your command.
So, both of you ara jokes.
For someone else:
"Crock" for me, stands for 'an earthenware vassel from which we can take fresh water'.
I do not write more for this Forum, in which NOT professional pilot put their comments as if they were expertise to pilot large aircraft.
Lunatics trying to pass to public something they do not have any experience.
Goodbye, Virtual Pilots.
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SAFO
Thank you Bus Junkie, it is becoming clear that indeed there is a problem in the AB A320 when landing with one reverser locked out. Why I fail to understand because it looks so simple and easy for the two TLs being placed on Idle for the landing...
Why did these pilots made this mistake?...Then my mind goes on...why the A320 is allowed to land with one locked reverser for ten days? I am curious about the ten days. Why not 15 or 30 or 3? And then comes another question: why allow the plane to lad under this circumstances?
Why not send it immediatelly for maintenance?
And finally why only with one reverser locked? Could also be the case to land with the two reversers locket out? Is there a big difference between one reverser locked and the two?...
The CPI (House of Representatives) in Brazil just heard an expert who gave explanations of what he thinks happened. He admitted that there was pilot error but he feels that AB is also responsible for not installing the new warning software in all its planes (well, Lemurian said that this software did not solve the probem...). So the problem is still there with others disasters on the making?
Finally, being repetitious I am sure, it is hard for me to conceive that a plane with a TL on climb detent and the other on reverser with the pilot trying to apply the brakes remains silent, no warning, nothing with this enormous conflict entered in its computers...to the point of crashing...
Do one have to be a genious to figure out that something could and should be done to change this scenario?...Or we just wait for the next?...
Why did these pilots made this mistake?...Then my mind goes on...why the A320 is allowed to land with one locked reverser for ten days? I am curious about the ten days. Why not 15 or 30 or 3? And then comes another question: why allow the plane to lad under this circumstances?
Why not send it immediatelly for maintenance?
And finally why only with one reverser locked? Could also be the case to land with the two reversers locket out? Is there a big difference between one reverser locked and the two?...
The CPI (House of Representatives) in Brazil just heard an expert who gave explanations of what he thinks happened. He admitted that there was pilot error but he feels that AB is also responsible for not installing the new warning software in all its planes (well, Lemurian said that this software did not solve the probem...). So the problem is still there with others disasters on the making?
Finally, being repetitious I am sure, it is hard for me to conceive that a plane with a TL on climb detent and the other on reverser with the pilot trying to apply the brakes remains silent, no warning, nothing with this enormous conflict entered in its computers...to the point of crashing...
Do one have to be a genious to figure out that something could and should be done to change this scenario?...Or we just wait for the next?...
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it is becoming clear that indeed there is a problem in the AB A320 when landing with one reverser locked out. Why I fail to understand because it looks so simple and easy for the two TLs being placed on Idle for the landing...
In response to the first statement: What other jet aircraft do you land with one engine at climb thrust? None. Always at idle. This aircraft has been around for about 20 years. If there have been about 3 of these incident/accidents in that time I can't see it being an aircraft problem as much as being a very serious short circuit between the side stick and the back of the seat.
The first landing you ever did, what were you tought to do with the throttle?
The second statement: Yea no kidding so simple like not flying through thunderstorms. But someone regularly has to reinvent the wheel as square to show round was better in the first place. Remember to KISS when you fly.
In response to the first statement: What other jet aircraft do you land with one engine at climb thrust? None. Always at idle. This aircraft has been around for about 20 years. If there have been about 3 of these incident/accidents in that time I can't see it being an aircraft problem as much as being a very serious short circuit between the side stick and the back of the seat.
The first landing you ever did, what were you tought to do with the throttle?
The second statement: Yea no kidding so simple like not flying through thunderstorms. But someone regularly has to reinvent the wheel as square to show round was better in the first place. Remember to KISS when you fly.
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maintenance
I would really like to "hear" from an A320 mechanic some info on "locking" an engine with reverse inop. What are the procedures in order to keep the a/c flying?
How do you avoid forward thrust when TL goes to idle reverse or full reverse?
Maybe something is inhibited in the TL pedestal? Or software?
Statistics on # of accidents/incidents on a/c with one reverse "locked" is very high, or this is considered "normal"?
IMHO, a loud THROTTLE warning would've helped those TAM pilots. Not the normal "Retard", that the pilots are so used to hear. When "Retard" is part of the routine, chances are that you don't pay much attention to it. Just my opinion.
How do you avoid forward thrust when TL goes to idle reverse or full reverse?
Maybe something is inhibited in the TL pedestal? Or software?
Statistics on # of accidents/incidents on a/c with one reverse "locked" is very high, or this is considered "normal"?
IMHO, a loud THROTTLE warning would've helped those TAM pilots. Not the normal "Retard", that the pilots are so used to hear. When "Retard" is part of the routine, chances are that you don't pay much attention to it. Just my opinion.
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Thanks Bus Junkie
If there have been about 3 of these incident/accidents in that time I can't see it being an aircraft problem
I still believe that it is difficult to conclude that this is only HE and that the AB couldn´t do better... And the question: what can we do to prevent it from happening again?... I am open to suggestions...
Paxing All Over The World
Non-pilot speaking
It would be helpful to get this answer. I asked this question about 500+ posts ago. What are the different ways in which Boeing and Airbus 'lock out' a reverser?
If the locking out is done by a mechanical latch/bolt on the sliding reverser cover AND in software, it would mean that the TLs could be handled in an identical way every time. However, since that sounds too simple, I am sure that it has been thought of and discounted. Perhaps leaving the one TL at Fwd Idl is a left over from the way it was always done.
I realise, of course, the enormous implications of making such a change in system and operational procedure.
Maybe something is inhibited in the TL pedestal? Or software?
If the locking out is done by a mechanical latch/bolt on the sliding reverser cover AND in software, it would mean that the TLs could be handled in an identical way every time. However, since that sounds too simple, I am sure that it has been thought of and discounted. Perhaps leaving the one TL at Fwd Idl is a left over from the way it was always done.
I realise, of course, the enormous implications of making such a change in system and operational procedure.
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Originally Posted by Bus Junkie
In the case of dispatch with one thrust reverser deactivated, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) MMEL and the recent Airbus Accident Information Telex (TAM JJ3054 AIT 4, August 2, 2007) each call for the pilot to set both thrust levers to IDLE for the flare and to set both thrust levers to MAX REVERSE at touchdown. The FAA approved MMEL does not contain procedural guidance regarding the positioning of the thrust levers on landing and during the rollout. In all cases, the system logic requires that both thrust levers be retarded to the IDLE detent for flare and landing. Pilots should follow operator specific procedures for the selection of reverse thrust.
Raises another question, too. WHY did EASA, before the Congonhas crash, mandate 'both throttles to full reverse' at all? Doesn't make sense, really - if one R/T isn't working, surely all you'd need to do is not select it? And why did Airbus emphasise it soon AFTER Congonhas? Do they know something that we (and the FAA, apparently) don't know?
Originally Posted by Rob21
I would really like to "hear" from an A320 mechanic some info on "locking" an engine with reverse inop. What are the procedures in order to keep the a/c flying?
How do you avoid forward thrust when TL goes to idle reverse or full reverse?
How do you avoid forward thrust when TL goes to idle reverse or full reverse?
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Raises another question, too. WHY did EASA, before the Congonhas crash, mandate 'both throttles to full reverse' at all? Doesn't make sense, really - if one R/T isn't working, surely all you'd need to do is not select it?
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Further to that, found the actual quote (from another chat site):
"I haven't touched a V2500 powered A320 in 3 years, the fleet I work on now all have CFM's. The lockout procedure is to deactivate the HCU (hydraulic control valve) of the affected engine and then to secure the sleeves closed mechanically. After this is done you then have to check for specific messages via the CFDS (on board maintenance system) if none of these specific messages are present the aircraft can be dispatched as per the MEL.
"As the HCU is physically deactivated the system can't pressurise. If the circuit can't pressurise then no pressure signal is sent to the EEC (FADEC) and the engine cannot power up to the max reverse setting as all the imputs to complete the system logic are not present."
"I haven't touched a V2500 powered A320 in 3 years, the fleet I work on now all have CFM's. The lockout procedure is to deactivate the HCU (hydraulic control valve) of the affected engine and then to secure the sleeves closed mechanically. After this is done you then have to check for specific messages via the CFDS (on board maintenance system) if none of these specific messages are present the aircraft can be dispatched as per the MEL.
"As the HCU is physically deactivated the system can't pressurise. If the circuit can't pressurise then no pressure signal is sent to the EEC (FADEC) and the engine cannot power up to the max reverse setting as all the imputs to complete the system logic are not present."
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At this time I'm still unsure as to the cause of this crash, be it airplane, training, or simple pilot error.
But there is one thing of which I am absolutely certain in the operation of an Airbus. If the pilot not flying is not now in the habit of confirming that all TLs have been retarded to idle on each and every landing, then I do not want to fly with you.
But there is one thing of which I am absolutely certain in the operation of an Airbus. If the pilot not flying is not now in the habit of confirming that all TLs have been retarded to idle on each and every landing, then I do not want to fly with you.
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Originally Posted by Ghostflyer
You can cut it however you want but it had nothing to do with a dodgy runway, a dodgy reverser, a dodgy airbus or dodgy conditions but a lot to do with our colleagues making an unfortunate mistake.
As far as anyone has been able to calculate from the data, had the runway been 2.4 km long, that airplane would have stopped. (The most optimistic estimate has it stopped in just over 1900 m.)
That means, by the Counterfactual Test, that the length of the runway was a necessary causal factor in the accident.
And that indicates further, as the Brazilian polity has apparently recognised but some of our colleagues on this thread not yet, that dealing with the runway is an important prophylaxis against reoccurrence.
PBL
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RWA,
Thanks!
So there is something done physically to the circuits that "cancel" the signal sent to the FADEC. If you disconnect a signal to the FADEC, this looks like an "induced failure". In order not to ground the a/c, this is a "quick fix". But since nothing is "told" to the computers (via software), this (quick fix) couldn't be grounds for a computer glitch?
Maybe here (computer glitch) is where AI maybe knows something we don't...
Thanks!
So there is something done physically to the circuits that "cancel" the signal sent to the FADEC. If you disconnect a signal to the FADEC, this looks like an "induced failure". In order not to ground the a/c, this is a "quick fix". But since nothing is "told" to the computers (via software), this (quick fix) couldn't be grounds for a computer glitch?
Maybe here (computer glitch) is where AI maybe knows something we don't...
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to PBL
http://www.aircraft-charter-world.co...sia/taiwan.htm (Taipei Sungshan runway length given as 8500 feet)
The Transasia A320 in Taipei went off a 2575 meter long runway but the grass and the ditch finally stopped it with no injuries and the plane went back into service after the necessary repairs.
So I am not certain the TAM flight wouldve stopped on a 2400 meter runway either. But it certainly couldve resulted in a minor overrun per TAipei instead of being the calamity it became. So yes I agree that a 2400 meter runway wouldve certainly helped the situation enormously. However, technically it probably would still have been an overrun.
http://www.aircraft-charter-world.co...sia/taiwan.htm (Taipei Sungshan runway length given as 8500 feet)
The Transasia A320 in Taipei went off a 2575 meter long runway but the grass and the ditch finally stopped it with no injuries and the plane went back into service after the necessary repairs.
So I am not certain the TAM flight wouldve stopped on a 2400 meter runway either. But it certainly couldve resulted in a minor overrun per TAipei instead of being the calamity it became. So yes I agree that a 2400 meter runway wouldve certainly helped the situation enormously. However, technically it probably would still have been an overrun.