TAM A320 crash at Congonhas, Brazil
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Interesting answers...
(loud whistle
BOOOOOOOMMMMMMMMMMMMMM !!!!!!!!!! )
Bombed ?
BOOOOOOOMMMMMMMMMMMMMM !!!!!!!!!! )
Bombed ?
besides boowing?...
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SIDSTAR:
I have no doubt in my mind that the 737 is an easier aircraft for pilots to convert to and not just because it doesn't have the advanced design of the 320. It is simply more intuitive and therefore easier.
I have no doubt in my mind that the 737 is an easier aircraft for pilots to convert to and not just because it doesn't have the advanced design of the 320. It is simply more intuitive and therefore easier.
Anyhoo, I'll have a go at these with what I've understood from my participation here:
1. Why would any pilot leave the Thrust lever at CLB
2. Why does the availability of autobrake depend on spoilers
3. Why was this aircraft designed in such a manner that if the automatic deployment of spoilers fails for whatever reason, manual spoiler control is not available to the pilot when he most needs it - on the landing roll in limiting conditions.
I know that there will always be a desire in many pilots to be as directly connected to the metal as possible, and that is what you're talking about in your post, and the Brazilian pilot in China was saying in his. As a programmer I like to occasionally go back to 'hitting the metal' and do some hardcore bit-flipping because it gives a rush that you don't get so much with with modern languages and their in-built safeguards.
But those inbuilt safeguards are there to make us more productive and make the other aspects of our jobs easier, just as the intention was with the A320 cockpit interface. It's hard to say whether pilot consternation at a computer-controlled aircraft was caused by a genuine concern for safety, or a concern that the presence of flight envelope protection might lead to 'de-skilling' of their jobs. In all likelihood it was a combination of the two.
But of the few airline pilots I've met in my time, there are some that find the A320 interface as intuitive as the more classic cockpit design, in some cases even more so. And there are some that feel the same way you do. Either way it's horses for courses and we should try to keep everything as safe as possible - it's always a trade-off really.
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One interesting thing (of many) on the message marciovp posted is the pilot stating that there are so many different softwares installed on the Airbus, so all A320 are different.
I can imagine a fleet of 40 Aibuses A319 through A321, some are 25 years old, each one with it's own "software package" (TAM?) and the pilots figuring out which "package" his plane has for that flight...
Another interesting thing is that is not strange for an Airbus pilot to hear about computer misreading TLA. It is a training issue in the Sim, there is a procedure for TL malfunction. Like the pilot said, "you look at the TL, and it's there, at idle..."
By the way, I don't think flyingnewbie10 "booed" your post. That was the "sound effect" of the impact of your post.
Thanks for your post, marciovp.
I can imagine a fleet of 40 Aibuses A319 through A321, some are 25 years old, each one with it's own "software package" (TAM?) and the pilots figuring out which "package" his plane has for that flight...
Another interesting thing is that is not strange for an Airbus pilot to hear about computer misreading TLA. It is a training issue in the Sim, there is a procedure for TL malfunction. Like the pilot said, "you look at the TL, and it's there, at idle..."
By the way, I don't think flyingnewbie10 "booed" your post. That was the "sound effect" of the impact of your post.
Thanks for your post, marciovp.
Last edited by Rob21; 19th Sep 2007 at 19:55. Reason: typo
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I have deleted several of my posts as they were based on the false assumption that Boeing denied TR if ALL thrust levers were not in IDLE.Big assumption and big error and I offer my apologies to all on this thread.The FCOM information is ambiguous and I rushed to judgement.I disqualify myself from further debate on the matter and humbly bow out with apologies to Airbus Industrie.
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SIDSTAR asks...
"One Engine Inop" type mindset leading to only holding one T/L? I don't subscribe to DozyWannabe's "fundamental misunderstanding of human psychology in the design of the interface" whatever that means - all the a/c I have flown have the same number of thrust levers as engines.
If I may be subtle for a moment .. no pilot would decide to leave one T/L at CLB on a normal landing, but he/she might for some reason as yet unexplained decide to retard only one T/L - perhaps by holding the Reverser Latching Lever in order to make a rapid selection on touchdown?
Not sure this is the correct emphasis - operation of both depends on the conditions for Ground Spoiler extension being satisfied - why have another electronic logic chain for the Autobrake using exactly the same sensors? Using the SEC "Spoilers extension" signal to operate the Autobrake is entirely logical.
Two points.. firstly the automatic deployment did not fail - conditions for deployment were not met.
Secondly because if it ain't safe to deploy them automatically it ain't safe to do it manually - the a/c was assumed to be airborne in CONF FULL.
Cheers, TP
1. Why would any pilot leave the Thrust lever at CLB
If I may be subtle for a moment .. no pilot would decide to leave one T/L at CLB on a normal landing, but he/she might for some reason as yet unexplained decide to retard only one T/L - perhaps by holding the Reverser Latching Lever in order to make a rapid selection on touchdown?
2. Why does the availability of autobrake depend on spoilers
3. Why was this aircraft designed in such a manner that if the automatic deployment of spoilers fails for whatever reason, manual spoiler control is not available to the pilot when he most needs it - on the landing roll in limiting conditions.
Secondly because if it ain't safe to deploy them automatically it ain't safe to do it manually - the a/c was assumed to be airborne in CONF FULL.
Cheers, TP
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I just came out of the simulator and in one of the panes we trained to reduce the TLs to land, but there is a pane in the TLA(1) sensor and the computer believes that the pilot did not reduce the TLs and doesn´t warn you of nothing.
MarcioVP, Rob21,
I will play the devil's advocate here:
Maybe this simulation started to be done after the PR-MBK accident.
I am not sure it isolatedly means that there is a considerable risk of a malfunction in the TLA reading.
And after all: How did you get this, MarcioVP ? Is it a friend of yours ?
P.S.: One should expect heavy artillery after that post.
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marciovp
The post you copied (/) was so outrageous that the only thing I can say is that your friend -who is just going operational after 650 hours- must be dumber than the computer he flies.
In fact, such an a88swipe, considering his prejudice and lack of understanding is a danger to everyone he carries .
The Chinese must be desperate to find only amateurs/mercenaries of his ilk.
Rob21,
I don't know about TAM or marcio's friend's employer but a software change, initiated by AI, finds its application in all the fleet within a period of one month, as each aircraft goes to its A or B checks.We have 150 planes.
As a matter of fact, the only two major changes -or differences - in the fleet are 1/-about the arrival of crystal screens instead of the CRTs and 2/-a modification in the braking system of the 318 which is now being introduced as well to the new entrants in the fleet. Sorry, I forget 3/- the fuel system of the 319LR.
First of all, the first 320 arrived in line operations in 1988, that's just 19 years ago.
Second,upon accepting a given aircraft for dispatch, we don't try and figure out anything : we consult the airplane tech briefing sheet in which all the particulars are described : equipment /MELed items ...etc...
Like sh*t hitting the surface of a Chinese latrine.
Ask marcio's friend a copy of the FCOM on that particular procedure.
Sidstar,
Old (g)oats, isn't it , old friend ? Or old red herrings ?
but I ask you a question ? You refer to the OG plane in HKT. IF (big IF...)it was a microburst that brought that aircraft down, wouldn't they have been happy to have the 320 envelope protection ?
Just a question.
The post you copied (/) was so outrageous that the only thing I can say is that your friend -who is just going operational after 650 hours- must be dumber than the computer he flies.
In fact, such an a88swipe, considering his prejudice and lack of understanding is a danger to everyone he carries .
The Chinese must be desperate to find only amateurs/mercenaries of his ilk.
Rob21,
One interesting thing (of many) on the message marciovp posted is the pilot stating that there are so many different softwares installed on the Airbus, so all A320 are different.
As a matter of fact, the only two major changes -or differences - in the fleet are 1/-about the arrival of crystal screens instead of the CRTs and 2/-a modification in the braking system of the 318 which is now being introduced as well to the new entrants in the fleet. Sorry, I forget 3/- the fuel system of the 319LR.
I can imagine a fleet of 40 Aibuses A319 through A321, some are 25 years old, each one with it's own "software package" (TAM?) and the pilots figuring out which "package" his plane has for that flight...
Second,upon accepting a given aircraft for dispatch, we don't try and figure out anything : we consult the airplane tech briefing sheet in which all the particulars are described : equipment /MELed items ...etc...
"sound effect" of the impact of your post.
that is not strange for an Airbus pilot to hear about computer misreading TLA. It is a training issue in the Sim, there is a procedure for TL malfunction.
Sidstar,
The A320 has all sorts of flight envelope protections that will cut in regardless of pilot inputs, just to give a simple example. It does lots of things by itself - often despite the pilot's efforts.
but I ask you a question ? You refer to the OG plane in HKT. IF (big IF...)it was a microburst that brought that aircraft down, wouldn't they have been happy to have the 320 envelope protection ?
Just a question.
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marciovp
I presume that *pane* means *failure*.
If that is the case, You get a *Retard* warning.
Why, in this condition isn't an aborted landing more appropriate ?
Why ?
Are you sure that there is also an air/grnd issue ?
If the fbw fails, you'll get so many warnings your cockpit should lit like a Xmas tree. Degrading from Normal law to Alternate law, with a further protection at Abnormal Alternate Law, to DirectLaw, and to Manual Back-up, you'd have plenty of annunciations.
Was your friend trying to fly a rickshaw onto which he latched a siedestick?
It's a damn sight better than the one on the 737 / 744...If you program it correctly, that if you're not too lazy to program it correctly.
Oh yes, a bit of dough and I'm ready to swallow anything, even a plane that could make soon a widow of my wife and orphans of my kids...
After 650 hours of training, it's about bloody time. Why not ? Any idiot can fly !
in one of the panes we trained to reduce the TLs to land, but there is a pane in the TLA(1) sensor and the computer believes that the pilot did not reduce the TLs and doesn´t warn you of nothing.
If that is the case, You get a *Retard* warning.
in this situation we have to cut the motor immediatelly, but there is no alarm or proper time to identify and react!!!
And worse yet the computer orders the motor to accelerate for TOGA
Cancel the spoilers and auto-brakes because it believes that the airplane is still flying even though we already landed and are trying to brake the plane. You look at the TL and it is there on Idle.
The whole sh... is that although you have all manual commands, if the so called fly-by-wire is in pane and is not warning you, you are fuc... out.
Was your friend trying to fly a rickshaw onto which he latched a siedestick?
And the VNAV(3) of this plane is the dummiest and retarded thing that I have seen in a plane all my life!!!
But here there is that shut your mouth day (28) when the salary come in straight and fat...
I have 650 hours in the plane and I am feeling an expert in computers, not an aviator
But we will go for full operation...
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TyroPicard:
don't subscribe to DozyWannabe's "fundamental misunderstanding of human psychology in the design of the interface" whatever that means
don't subscribe to DozyWannabe's "fundamental misunderstanding of human psychology in the design of the interface" whatever that means
In plain English, I meant whether the "Reduce both TLs to idle, then pull the TL with good reverser into reverse" was being misinterpreted and reduced to "Pull the TL with good reverser into reverse" by the brain in the stress situation of a difficult landing.
Hope that helps.
Rananim - I salute your candidness.
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Thanks
flyingnewbie10, I understand better where you are coming from now. Rob21, it is nice to have you here. I feel less alone...I corrected some
words in my poster. Yes pane means failure, malfunction. The portuguese
word "pane" has the proper meaning...and better.
I trust what the pilot said from his experiences. Let´s not shot the messenger. Or do you think that all pilots who had the TAM´s problems were also idiots?...
I know, I know... but I am not going to allow these people to blame all the pilots who had these serious problems?
Again shooting the messenger. This was a expontaneos letter from someone who is a pro. Would you say that all pilots who had these problems are dumber that the computers in the A320?
Actually this is what he is saying...that the computers fly the plane, not him... I guess AB believes that pilots are dumber...than their computers.
I have a good friend just retired pro pilot who has flown many, many different planes and many airlines in his pro life. A very serious and competent guy. He corresponds with many colleagues pilots many of them he trained. In this correspondence he received this letter of a friend pilot who is working in China. He is entitled to his opinion and he did not impressed me as being dumb...
words in my poster. Yes pane means failure, malfunction. The portuguese
word "pane" has the proper meaning...and better.
After 650 hours of training, it's about bloody time. Why not ? Any idiot can fly !
As I said... Heavy artillery shells already falling.
You have been warned, MarcioVP.
You have been warned, MarcioVP.
The post you copied (/) was so outrageous that the only thing I can say is that your friend -who is just going operational after 650 hours- must be dumber than the computer he flies.
Actually this is what he is saying...that the computers fly the plane, not him... I guess AB believes that pilots are dumber...than their computers.
And after all: How did you get this, MarcioVP ? Is it a friend of yours ?
I have a good friend just retired pro pilot who has flown many, many different planes and many airlines in his pro life. A very serious and competent guy. He corresponds with many colleagues pilots many of them he trained. In this correspondence he received this letter of a friend pilot who is working in China. He is entitled to his opinion and he did not impressed me as being dumb...
Last edited by marciovp; 20th Sep 2007 at 00:45. Reason: typo
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marciovp, for my part, thanks for posting that material. It clearly represents the firsthand views of two serving pilots, and is therefore as relevant as any other part of the (inevitably somewhat speculative) information that has been posted on this thread. People can accept it or reject the information as they choose; but, as you say, there's no reason to 'shoot the messenger.'
Tend to agree. Ever since the Lauda Air accident (R/T deployed in flight) there have been numerous safeguards on all makes of airliner to prevent the pilots OR the systems carrying out 'after landing' procedures while the aircraft is still in the air; and still leave open the go-around option.
A possible 'hole' in the A320 logic, though, is that because one TL was not retarded (or not recorded as having been retarded) the systems prevented deployment of the ground spoilers and autobrakes but ALLOWED the deployment of reverse thrust. With hindsight, it might be better to organise the systems so that they take R/T deployment as proof of the pilots' intention to land rather than go-around; though I accept that that might make further complications requiring careful adjustment of the logic of other 'interlocking' systems.
I still feel that this accident is 80% certain to be the result of 'pilot error.' But, in addition, that the REASONS for that error must also be identified and rectified. From the CVR/FDR recordings of both Taipei and Congonhas, it is clear that the pilots were utterly confused as to what was CAUSING their problems. The Taipei crew thought that they had a brake malfunction, the Congonhas one that they had a ground spoiler malfunction. In both cases, had they been able immediately to identify the problem - a misplaced or jammed TL - the accidents could have been avoided, or at least very much reduced in terms of severity.
In that connection I keep thinking back to that Taipei report I quoted back in Post 2198:-
"During landing, the FWC has delivered four aural “RETARD” alerts and then after touchdown two seconds it came to stop. But at this moment the thrust control lever no.2 was not pulled back to idle or reverser position yet. In this situation, one of thrust control lever is not in proper position but the aural “RETARD” alert already stopped. The aural “RETARD” alert should continue or there should be other ways to remind the pilots of pulling back thrust control lever to reduce the probability of an accident caused by human error."
Airbus confirmed in their evidence at Taipei that the problem existed, and that retarding even one TL was sufficent to turn off the RETARD' call:-
Q2/ Why does the message "Retard" stop 2 s after the nose gear touched down? Is it as per design?
A. As soon as one TLA is set to REVERSE (whatever the other TLA position), the internal FWC signal "TLA inhibition" becomes true. If "TLA inhibition" is true, RETARD is inhibited.
Airbus also developed a modification to provide a specific warning if one TL was left out of 'Idle' - but neither they nor the regulating authorities chose to make the mod. mandatory.
I for one hope that it is now made both mandatory AND urgent. If it is even possible (leave alone probable, as in this case) that pilots can become utterly confused at such a critical moment, it is not enough just to add a line to the manuals. The design should be modified to ensure that, as far as possible, the same situation cannot occur again.
Originally Posted by Dozywannabe
Quote:
2. Why does the availability of autobrake depend on spoilers
At a guess I'd say this is because without spoilers the aircraft will become considerably harder to stop and the designers considered it better in that situation to promote a go-around and a second attempt to land or a diversion.
2. Why does the availability of autobrake depend on spoilers
At a guess I'd say this is because without spoilers the aircraft will become considerably harder to stop and the designers considered it better in that situation to promote a go-around and a second attempt to land or a diversion.
A possible 'hole' in the A320 logic, though, is that because one TL was not retarded (or not recorded as having been retarded) the systems prevented deployment of the ground spoilers and autobrakes but ALLOWED the deployment of reverse thrust. With hindsight, it might be better to organise the systems so that they take R/T deployment as proof of the pilots' intention to land rather than go-around; though I accept that that might make further complications requiring careful adjustment of the logic of other 'interlocking' systems.
I still feel that this accident is 80% certain to be the result of 'pilot error.' But, in addition, that the REASONS for that error must also be identified and rectified. From the CVR/FDR recordings of both Taipei and Congonhas, it is clear that the pilots were utterly confused as to what was CAUSING their problems. The Taipei crew thought that they had a brake malfunction, the Congonhas one that they had a ground spoiler malfunction. In both cases, had they been able immediately to identify the problem - a misplaced or jammed TL - the accidents could have been avoided, or at least very much reduced in terms of severity.
In that connection I keep thinking back to that Taipei report I quoted back in Post 2198:-
"During landing, the FWC has delivered four aural “RETARD” alerts and then after touchdown two seconds it came to stop. But at this moment the thrust control lever no.2 was not pulled back to idle or reverser position yet. In this situation, one of thrust control lever is not in proper position but the aural “RETARD” alert already stopped. The aural “RETARD” alert should continue or there should be other ways to remind the pilots of pulling back thrust control lever to reduce the probability of an accident caused by human error."
Airbus confirmed in their evidence at Taipei that the problem existed, and that retarding even one TL was sufficent to turn off the RETARD' call:-
Q2/ Why does the message "Retard" stop 2 s after the nose gear touched down? Is it as per design?
A. As soon as one TLA is set to REVERSE (whatever the other TLA position), the internal FWC signal "TLA inhibition" becomes true. If "TLA inhibition" is true, RETARD is inhibited.
Airbus also developed a modification to provide a specific warning if one TL was left out of 'Idle' - but neither they nor the regulating authorities chose to make the mod. mandatory.
I for one hope that it is now made both mandatory AND urgent. If it is even possible (leave alone probable, as in this case) that pilots can become utterly confused at such a critical moment, it is not enough just to add a line to the manuals. The design should be modified to ensure that, as far as possible, the same situation cannot occur again.
Last edited by RWA; 20th Sep 2007 at 11:18.
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A captain from my company was deadheading here in USA in a northwest flight on A320 that had to go around for 3 times according to captain of the flight speach, the computers were not recognizing the airplane was landed so they went go around for several times till the computer finally got straight.
Not flame anything but those guys new the airplane doesn't have a manual override for spoilers so the most logical is going around. Anyone can land w/o reversers they are not even used to caculate landing distance but no spoilers means a very big hit on your landing performance normally if within 3 sec you don't have spoilers deployed you done. So Boeing is far superior on this matter with manual override in case of logical or computers failures.
Sao Paulo has some wierd storms sometimes I myself lost a engine on a F100 during aproach to CGH when we got a lightning strike. The FADEC shut down the engine after the strike burned the oil transmiter and FADEC lost the oil pressure signal. Also inhibited a possible relight do same reason. At the end we had to divert the flight to VCP. But even the F100 has manual override. Actually I got very surprise to hear the airbus is the only ariplane in the whole world that doesn't have this manual overide for spoilers. Very bad.
Just my couple cents
Not flame anything but those guys new the airplane doesn't have a manual override for spoilers so the most logical is going around. Anyone can land w/o reversers they are not even used to caculate landing distance but no spoilers means a very big hit on your landing performance normally if within 3 sec you don't have spoilers deployed you done. So Boeing is far superior on this matter with manual override in case of logical or computers failures.
Sao Paulo has some wierd storms sometimes I myself lost a engine on a F100 during aproach to CGH when we got a lightning strike. The FADEC shut down the engine after the strike burned the oil transmiter and FADEC lost the oil pressure signal. Also inhibited a possible relight do same reason. At the end we had to divert the flight to VCP. But even the F100 has manual override. Actually I got very surprise to hear the airbus is the only ariplane in the whole world that doesn't have this manual overide for spoilers. Very bad.
Just my couple cents
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I have asked the 'seniors' already to split this thread into a 'tech' and pilot thread, but they have decided to leave it as is. I will ask again. I would prefer the tech/computer logic topics to move to the tech forum and to leave 'pilot' input here so we can clarify its direction. I'm afraid that all the talk of sampling rates-logic circuits/gates-programme designed-safety research papers etc, while vitally important, is making this thread very difficult to follow and to pick out the 'news'. If that can be done, then this thread will either remain 'live' or slip gently down the page until we have some investigative news.
Now I would like to pick up on 'marciovp' at post 2255 - my bolding:
I just came out of the simulator and in one of the failures we trained to reduce the TLs to land, but there is a malfuntion in the TLA(1) sensor and the computer believes that the pilot did not reduce the TLs and doesn´t warn you of nothing.
//
We trained this in the simulator and in this situation we have to cut the motor immediatelly, but there is no alarm or proper time to identify and react!!!
//
And worse yet the computer orders the motor to accelerate for TOGA(2). Cancels the spoilers and auto-brakes because it believes that the airplane is still flying even though we already landed and are trying to brake the plane. You look at the TL and it is there on Idle.
If true, this to me represents the most startling information for a long time. If true, it needs immediate investigation with the airline concerned and questions as to why it has not appeared in the safety system - or if it has, why it appears not to have been addressed. If not true then I respectfully suggest the seniors get out the red pen to avoid further distractions.
Anyone else with stories of 'known' similar A320 computer/system faults?
Now I would like to pick up on 'marciovp' at post 2255 - my bolding:
I just came out of the simulator and in one of the failures we trained to reduce the TLs to land, but there is a malfuntion in the TLA(1) sensor and the computer believes that the pilot did not reduce the TLs and doesn´t warn you of nothing.
//
We trained this in the simulator and in this situation we have to cut the motor immediatelly, but there is no alarm or proper time to identify and react!!!
//
And worse yet the computer orders the motor to accelerate for TOGA(2). Cancels the spoilers and auto-brakes because it believes that the airplane is still flying even though we already landed and are trying to brake the plane. You look at the TL and it is there on Idle.
If true, this to me represents the most startling information for a long time. If true, it needs immediate investigation with the airline concerned and questions as to why it has not appeared in the safety system - or if it has, why it appears not to have been addressed. If not true then I respectfully suggest the seniors get out the red pen to avoid further distractions.
Anyone else with stories of 'known' similar A320 computer/system faults?
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BOAC wrote :
Very good point. Airplane /systems-related incidents are spread all over the safety departments of all client airlines -at least - and the measures to implement to improve safety.
Such *information*, which I have never been appraised of could be appertained to what is generally called *malicious intent*.
Having a second reading of the letter, the only explanation that comes to my mind is that someone just imagined the CGH accident with the #2 T/L at idle -meaning an exoneration of any pilot error, but putting the blame on a faulty TLA input to the ATHR system- and then repeating -with glaring errors of interpretation - the rest of the accidents parameters. Any 12-year old with some FlightSim experience can do that.
An Airbus pilot would not make so many errors in their systems' knowledge.
marciovp,
I notice that your subsequent posts haven't answered any of my tech points.
I presume your *talented and experienced friend* is George Rock. See his blog and how he's amended some of his early interpretations of the CGH graphs. At least, he's acknowledged his basic ignorance of the 320 systems, but very honestly changed his arguments after some correspondance with 320 pilots.
I wish I could say the same about your defence of the Brazilian TAM pilots.
If true, this to me represents the most startling information for a long time. If true, it needs immediate investigation with the airline concerned and questions as to why it has not appeared in the safety system - or if it has, why it appears not to have been addressed. If not true then I respectfully suggest the seniors get out the red pen to avoid further distractions.
Such *information*, which I have never been appraised of could be appertained to what is generally called *malicious intent*.
Having a second reading of the letter, the only explanation that comes to my mind is that someone just imagined the CGH accident with the #2 T/L at idle -meaning an exoneration of any pilot error, but putting the blame on a faulty TLA input to the ATHR system- and then repeating -with glaring errors of interpretation - the rest of the accidents parameters. Any 12-year old with some FlightSim experience can do that.
An Airbus pilot would not make so many errors in their systems' knowledge.
marciovp,
I notice that your subsequent posts haven't answered any of my tech points.
I presume your *talented and experienced friend* is George Rock. See his blog and how he's amended some of his early interpretations of the CGH graphs. At least, he's acknowledged his basic ignorance of the 320 systems, but very honestly changed his arguments after some correspondance with 320 pilots.
I wish I could say the same about your defence of the Brazilian TAM pilots.
I just came out of the simulator and in one of the failures we trained to reduce the TLs to land, but there is a malfuntion in the TLA(1) sensor and the computer believes that the pilot did not reduce the TLs and doesn´t warn you of nothing.
//
We trained this in the simulator and in this situation we have to cut the motor immediatelly, but there is no alarm or proper time to identify and react!!!
//
And worse yet the computer orders the motor to accelerate for TOGA(2). Cancels the spoilers and auto-brakes because it believes that the airplane is still flying even though we already landed and are trying to brake the plane. You look at the TL and it is there on Idle.
//
We trained this in the simulator and in this situation we have to cut the motor immediatelly, but there is no alarm or proper time to identify and react!!!
//
And worse yet the computer orders the motor to accelerate for TOGA(2). Cancels the spoilers and auto-brakes because it believes that the airplane is still flying even though we already landed and are trying to brake the plane. You look at the TL and it is there on Idle.
Paxing All Over The World
non-pilot speaking, after discussion with my nephew who is FO on A340.
marciovp
If he says that (allowing for translation) then he is either in the wrong job or has received very bad training in the correct operation of a AI machine.
marciovp
Actually this is what he is saying...that the computers fly the plane, not him..
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This discussion leads to nowhere.
Some believe that the pilots just let the TL there...
Others are not sure about what happened but even so state that the pilots just let the TL there...
We have
1 - The right procedure in the previous landing;
2 - A right TLA FDR reading at 22.5 degrees;
The problem:
CENIPA send what (is believed) to be the (almost entirely melted) TL pedestal to.... AIRBUS !!!
If Airbus safety director, before a parlamentary commission, states that French certification authorities opposed to the mandatory implementation of a warning that could avoid the PR-MBK accident in either case (HF or mechanical/electronical failure) without showing any proof of it, how can you trust these guys ?
Who has enough knowledge to completely overrule the hypothesis of electrocnical, mechanical or arbitration failure that is sparked by only one engine being put in reverse ?
Who can assure that in the other accidents (in Taiwan there is a mechanical sound - but it could be the Tl that was in reverse being put back to idle) there wasn't any pressure from the manufacturer or the airline ? Who talked to the pilots ?
Secretely conducting those investigations is innacceptable.
Some believe that the pilots just let the TL there...
Others are not sure about what happened but even so state that the pilots just let the TL there...
We have
1 - The right procedure in the previous landing;
2 - A right TLA FDR reading at 22.5 degrees;
The problem:
CENIPA send what (is believed) to be the (almost entirely melted) TL pedestal to.... AIRBUS !!!
If Airbus safety director, before a parlamentary commission, states that French certification authorities opposed to the mandatory implementation of a warning that could avoid the PR-MBK accident in either case (HF or mechanical/electronical failure) without showing any proof of it, how can you trust these guys ?
Who has enough knowledge to completely overrule the hypothesis of electrocnical, mechanical or arbitration failure that is sparked by only one engine being put in reverse ?
Who can assure that in the other accidents (in Taiwan there is a mechanical sound - but it could be the Tl that was in reverse being put back to idle) there wasn't any pressure from the manufacturer or the airline ? Who talked to the pilots ?
Secretely conducting those investigations is innacceptable.