Ueberlingen collision Trial started
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21:35:19, Crew report TCAS descent to ACC Zurich
when it was already too late. They were suppose to announce it right after they 've commenced descend. but - anyhow...too many things went wrong that night...
there is always a mean to do it
when it was already too late. They were suppose to announce it right after they 've commenced descend. but - anyhow...too many things went wrong that night...
Chances are they had no say in the matter !!
Again, kontroler, you are wrong. Have you read the full accident report? If so, you will see that the crew made their call as soon as practicable, due to the level of RT traffic on the frequency in use.
The 757 crew reacted correctly, the Tu-154M crew did not.
The 757 crew reacted correctly, the Tu-154M crew did not.
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I checked again, you are right. they called in time. but this doesn't resolve the basic problem (the most obvious) - P. cleared both on same level and then didn't observe what was going on. Clearing DHL to fl340 would be the easiest solution. but we can debate about the reasons why P. didin't do this, the fact is that passengers are dead and so is he. Don't get me wrong - I'm not blaming P. for being the the only responsible for the crash, but it is not fair from ATC community (to which I belong) to point to all other factors except this.
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Nogbad
Isuspect you are right to suggest that this was presented as a fait accompli.
Of course, this is really what unions are for; not just to negotiate good Ts & Cs but also to ensure management don't expose individuals by operating the system without necessary safeguards. Mr Neilsen didn't make the decision to do that but I do believe he should have refused to accept it.
Hypothetical scenario:
ATCO comes on duty, deselects the phones, switches of the STCA and then tells another sector 20 yards away that he will do his sector at the same time. A mid-air collision results. The ATCO's defence? He hasn't any. The responsibility lies with those who take the decisions to operate the system wthout appropriate safeguards. In this case it was not Mr Neilsen.
Kontrolor
My understanding is there was 7 minutes betwen the estimates of these two aircraft? If that is correct then accepting them at the same level is not unreasonable in a radar environment. Having said that, human beings will make mistakes and this is precisely why systems must never be run without reasonable slack and leeway.
I'd love to see the safety case that covered the circumstances that existed.
I have no vendetta but I am anxious to ensure that neither myself or my colleagues end up in jail because of irresponsible management decisions. They must be seen to carry the responsibility for this or a dangerous precedent is set.
.4
Isuspect you are right to suggest that this was presented as a fait accompli.
Of course, this is really what unions are for; not just to negotiate good Ts & Cs but also to ensure management don't expose individuals by operating the system without necessary safeguards. Mr Neilsen didn't make the decision to do that but I do believe he should have refused to accept it.
Hypothetical scenario:
ATCO comes on duty, deselects the phones, switches of the STCA and then tells another sector 20 yards away that he will do his sector at the same time. A mid-air collision results. The ATCO's defence? He hasn't any. The responsibility lies with those who take the decisions to operate the system wthout appropriate safeguards. In this case it was not Mr Neilsen.
Kontrolor
My understanding is there was 7 minutes betwen the estimates of these two aircraft? If that is correct then accepting them at the same level is not unreasonable in a radar environment. Having said that, human beings will make mistakes and this is precisely why systems must never be run without reasonable slack and leeway.
I'd love to see the safety case that covered the circumstances that existed.
I have no vendetta but I am anxious to ensure that neither myself or my colleagues end up in jail because of irresponsible management decisions. They must be seen to carry the responsibility for this or a dangerous precedent is set.
.4
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7 minutes is (by my standard) not enough to be easily taken into the state of such relaxation, to physicaly move to another console and do completely different kind of controlling. I don't leave my console even on night shifts when there is no traffic in more than 20 minutes.
READ UP or SHUT UP
Kontrolor, it is obvious that you are making statements without being fully aware of what happened that night. Before making any more irritatingly silly comments why don't you try and acquaint yourself with ALL the FACTS that led to this terrible tragedy!
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The management of Skyguide , in my opinion are guity of negligence plain and simple. If they want to pass the blame on to the deceased controller , it speaks volumes regarding a lack of professionalism and accountability in the MANAGEMENT of the hardware , liveware and software at their facility - no wonder this accident happened with a corporate attitude such as this...
Still with this accident , it suprises me that the issue of the logo lights on the 757 as being MEL`d wasn`t mentioned. As you can see from the report , the 154 basically took the ( dark ) tail off the 757 , which when recreated for television , erroneously showed a brightly lit tail. Perhaps a brightly lit tail at night might be a good idea , in the meantime contrary to my company sop`s , I keep my logo lights on above FL 100 , see and bee seen as a last resort ??
I hope nobody goes to jail , these`s been enough pain and suffering already , an acknowledgement of guilt and accountability would suffice for me , and a big financial settlement for all the families of the deceased would be just.
Still with this accident , it suprises me that the issue of the logo lights on the 757 as being MEL`d wasn`t mentioned. As you can see from the report , the 154 basically took the ( dark ) tail off the 757 , which when recreated for television , erroneously showed a brightly lit tail. Perhaps a brightly lit tail at night might be a good idea , in the meantime contrary to my company sop`s , I keep my logo lights on above FL 100 , see and bee seen as a last resort ??
I hope nobody goes to jail , these`s been enough pain and suffering already , an acknowledgement of guilt and accountability would suffice for me , and a big financial settlement for all the families of the deceased would be just.
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Although it's unfortunate that ICAO hadn't taken more of a leadership role in TCAS operation, history has now provided ample proof that all pilots need to be on the same page for TCAS to be an effective tool. I feel Mr. Nielson was also a victim in this terrible tragedy, any ACC facility that allows a controller to man two positions as outlined should be held responsible.
If they didn't have the money to properly staff the facility, I hope that the judge sends them a strong message as to how much it costs to improperly staff the facility.
If they didn't have the money to properly staff the facility, I hope that the judge sends them a strong message as to how much it costs to improperly staff the facility.
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Kontrolor, it is obvious that you are making statements without being fully aware of what happened that night. Before making any more irritatingly silly comments why don't you try and acquaint yourself with ALL the FACTS that led to this terrible tragedy!
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cleared both planes to FL360 on crossing tracks and then left the sector
I'm fully aware of ALL the events that night, even those which were not publicized.
We wouldn't have accepted such arrangements as Skyguide has imposed upon his workers.
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To ensure we are all well informed, may I suggest the following link as good reading for all interested, especailly if you currently hold the view that Mr Neilsen was to blame for this accident. It is a review of the BFU report, carried out by Professor Chris Johnson.
http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/Eu...nal_Report.PDF
3 quotes:
"The accident was caused by a combination of the under-manning and a failure to recognise the risks associated with the profound system changes and lack of normal system support as a consequence of the SYCO flight plan processing system upgrade."
"The conditions that make this event more likely include the fact that the paper control strips for the B757 and TU154M do not show any apparent conflict."
"We concur with the BFU that the Swiss authorities had well-documented procedures and principles that would encourage the development of a sound Safety Management System. These principles were in accordance with ICAO and EUROCONTROL guidelines. However, the Swiss ATM organisations lacked the experience and the personnel to implement those procedures. Partly as a result of this opportunities were missed to learn from two AIRPROX incidents that had similarities to the events before the Überlingen accident.
6000PIC - I'm with you; I hope nobody goes to jail. What I believe is essential is that the truth is known and responsibility acknowledged.
.4
http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/Eu...nal_Report.PDF
3 quotes:
"The accident was caused by a combination of the under-manning and a failure to recognise the risks associated with the profound system changes and lack of normal system support as a consequence of the SYCO flight plan processing system upgrade."
"The conditions that make this event more likely include the fact that the paper control strips for the B757 and TU154M do not show any apparent conflict."
"We concur with the BFU that the Swiss authorities had well-documented procedures and principles that would encourage the development of a sound Safety Management System. These principles were in accordance with ICAO and EUROCONTROL guidelines. However, the Swiss ATM organisations lacked the experience and the personnel to implement those procedures. Partly as a result of this opportunities were missed to learn from two AIRPROX incidents that had similarities to the events before the Überlingen accident.
6000PIC - I'm with you; I hope nobody goes to jail. What I believe is essential is that the truth is known and responsibility acknowledged.
.4
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This thread is about the trial, it was not meant to re-open the investigation using rumours and self invented rules.
There is very little unknown , very little questions remaining unanswered in that accident , and the investigation team did quite a good job. Zurich ACC learned their lessons, and we all know the shortcomings .
No need to do everything again .
Kontrolor, :
If you are not happy with 7 minutes in Liubjana ,fine, in other Centres some are happy whith 5 min. You do the nightshift with 4 per sector (
) and can refuse easily management pressure. Bravo. But please do not judge others whithout knowing their working enviroment. And I can assure you that on the morning of the 2nd July 2002, there were many , many ATC centres in Europe , including large ones, which said " This could have exactly happened to us ". I am glad to learn this was not the case in Liubjana.
BEagle :
I see what you are trying to say but unfortunately this is not that simple.
The 757 crew was not completely white and the Tu154 not completely black .
It is not that clearly said in the report, but this was the subject of a special briefing afterwards leading to the subsequent changes in ACAS training guidelines.
As I said earlier, everybody did mistakes that night. Some small, some big, but no-one was really totally immune. The early days of blaming the Tu154 crew for everything proved to be not that evident . One has to see this in the context of the ACAS training guidelines in foce then , not the ones we have today ,and largely modified as a result of this accident.
Now back to the subject :
Today Wenesday 30 was the last day of the public hearings in Buelach. The lawyers of the last 2 accused repeated the same story : the controller on duty is the " only one responsible for the collision , therefore my clients should not even be here "
The only interesting comment : Zurich management had argued that they did not warned specifically the 2 controllers on duty that night of the work planned,and its consequences, but that they had to look at a publication board where it was explained . The controllers apparently failed to look at the board. Well, it turned out that it would have made no difference , as the notice did not say when the work would take place and which systems will be affected.
Another Zurich management poor show.
This is the end of the public days.
The judges did not say when to expect the verdict.
There is very little unknown , very little questions remaining unanswered in that accident , and the investigation team did quite a good job. Zurich ACC learned their lessons, and we all know the shortcomings .
No need to do everything again .
Kontrolor, :
If you are not happy with 7 minutes in Liubjana ,fine, in other Centres some are happy whith 5 min. You do the nightshift with 4 per sector (
) and can refuse easily management pressure. Bravo. But please do not judge others whithout knowing their working enviroment. And I can assure you that on the morning of the 2nd July 2002, there were many , many ATC centres in Europe , including large ones, which said " This could have exactly happened to us ". I am glad to learn this was not the case in Liubjana.BEagle :
The 757 crew reacted correctly, the Tu-154M crew did not.
The 757 crew was not completely white and the Tu154 not completely black .
It is not that clearly said in the report, but this was the subject of a special briefing afterwards leading to the subsequent changes in ACAS training guidelines.
As I said earlier, everybody did mistakes that night. Some small, some big, but no-one was really totally immune. The early days of blaming the Tu154 crew for everything proved to be not that evident . One has to see this in the context of the ACAS training guidelines in foce then , not the ones we have today ,and largely modified as a result of this accident.
Now back to the subject :
Today Wenesday 30 was the last day of the public hearings in Buelach. The lawyers of the last 2 accused repeated the same story : the controller on duty is the " only one responsible for the collision , therefore my clients should not even be here "
The only interesting comment : Zurich management had argued that they did not warned specifically the 2 controllers on duty that night of the work planned,and its consequences, but that they had to look at a publication board where it was explained . The controllers apparently failed to look at the board. Well, it turned out that it would have made no difference , as the notice did not say when the work would take place and which systems will be affected.
Another Zurich management poor show.
This is the end of the public days.
The judges did not say when to expect the verdict.
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6000PIC - I'm with you; I hope nobody goes to jail. What I believe is essential is that the truth is known and responsibility acknowledged.
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Quote from the Brazil mid air collision: by Defense Attorney,
He added: "The fact is that air traffic control placed and approved these two aircraft on a collision course, on the same airway, and altitude traveling toward each other. That is the overwhelming, obvious root cause of this accident."
Last edited by Dream Land; 2nd Jun 2007 at 17:44.
Quote from the Brazil mid air collision: by Fedral Judge, Murilo Mendes
Quote:
He added: "The fact is that air traffic control placed and approved these two aircraft on a collision course, on the same airway, and altitude traveling toward each other. That is the overwhelming, obvious root cause of this accident."
Quote:
He added: "The fact is that air traffic control placed and approved these two aircraft on a collision course, on the same airway, and altitude traveling toward each other. That is the overwhelming, obvious root cause of this accident."
those comments are attributed to the defense lawyer.
(Although I certainly hope the judge is inclined to agree!)
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Been there, seen it,done it and luckily in my case, survived!
It caused me to open a thread back then "RA,to follow or not to follow"
In my case was a B767 operated under Italian FTL's therefore you can assume i was very tired!
SantaMaria cleared a Spanish A340 to climb into conflict from 1000 ft below, on converging course. I was awoken from my short power nap by my F/O who decided to include me in the scenario as other aircraft was 500 ft below and climbing. Resulting RA put me in a descent followed by the same action from the A340 as he realised the mistake and also descended, probably just as he got the climb command! I suspect that his action was also driven by his knowledge that he was about to infringe my airspace!
The resulting aerobatics will remain with me for life but, in this case we all survived!
It caused me to open a thread back then "RA,to follow or not to follow"
In my case was a B767 operated under Italian FTL's therefore you can assume i was very tired!
SantaMaria cleared a Spanish A340 to climb into conflict from 1000 ft below, on converging course. I was awoken from my short power nap by my F/O who decided to include me in the scenario as other aircraft was 500 ft below and climbing. Resulting RA put me in a descent followed by the same action from the A340 as he realised the mistake and also descended, probably just as he got the climb command! I suspect that his action was also driven by his knowledge that he was about to infringe my airspace!
The resulting aerobatics will remain with me for life but, in this case we all survived!
