Excel B767 and bmibaby B737 collision at Manchester
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You know, people like you can learn from the French. At CDG, they recognised the inadequacies in their system, and put in a second tower and a second layer of ground controllers. They are also very good at making sure you are aware of other aircraft, and making sure they don't clear you past a point that they know is clear (well, most of the time, anyway).
I know it doesn't work like that at MAN, but it should. The lessons of the past tell us that stuff like SMR saves lives and metal. We MAY not have positive control on the ground (depending on how you interpret the CAP), but we should.
I know it doesn't work like that at MAN, but it should. The lessons of the past tell us that stuff like SMR saves lives and metal. We MAY not have positive control on the ground (depending on how you interpret the CAP), but we should.
Just a numbered other
MOR
Now I know you are just trying to wind us up.
Speaking in French keeps us all aware, does it? Tell that to my friend John Andrew's family
At CDG, they recognised the inadequacies in their system, and put in a second tower and a second layer of ground controllers. They are also very good at making sure you are aware of other aircraft, and making sure they don't clear you past a point that they know is clear (well, most of the time, anyway). (sic)
Speaking in French keeps us all aware, does it? Tell that to my friend John Andrew's family
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Some of us are lucky enough to operate into a wide variety of airfields around the world. At many, including a large selection of regular European destinations it is common to be instucted to taxi past a/c at runway holding points. PMI 24R, ALC 28, IBZ 24, TFS,08 to give a few examples. Having been instructed to pass it is the crew's responsibility to decide if it is safe to do so or not. The idea that a ground or tower controller is responsible for preventing you from driving the expensive bit of metal into something solid at any time is just laughable.
You are right MOR the airfield design at MAN is not good which is even more reason for crews to exersise their responsibilty and be extra vigilant whilst taxing.In saying that I am not trying to apportion blame in this accident. As you will see from my earlier post I believe there would have been a whole host of mitigating factors.
Your attempts to persuade us that following a controllers instructions regardless of the consequences because you think they have the responsibility just beggars belief.
You are right MOR the airfield design at MAN is not good which is even more reason for crews to exersise their responsibilty and be extra vigilant whilst taxing.In saying that I am not trying to apportion blame in this accident. As you will see from my earlier post I believe there would have been a whole host of mitigating factors.
Your attempts to persuade us that following a controllers instructions regardless of the consequences because you think they have the responsibility just beggars belief.
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Arkroyal
I completely agree with you what more can ATC do.
MOR If you are flying an ILS and a C172 hits you again ATC cannot physically fly the plane. They can give traffic information even avoiding action, if it is noticed, but we usually have more than one plane to watch at a time. Any ATCO if they spotted a possible nasty would of course yell, but SMRs are not great at spotting how tight a gap is. Get real...
I completely agree with you what more can ATC do.
MOR If you are flying an ILS and a C172 hits you again ATC cannot physically fly the plane. They can give traffic information even avoiding action, if it is noticed, but we usually have more than one plane to watch at a time. Any ATCO if they spotted a possible nasty would of course yell, but SMRs are not great at spotting how tight a gap is. Get real...
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OK well getting bored with this now, so a quick response and then I'll shut up.
Arkroyal
Apart from the fact that the language spoken is outside the control of ATC, they still do a better job of managing ground traffic there because they have, as a result of such accidents, sorted themselves out. More than can be said for some UK airports.
It occurs to me that taxiing into the path of an aircraft on the takeoff roll is even more of an own-goal than hitting a stationary aircraft. If a captain is responsible for not hitting another aircraft on the ground whilst taxiing, he is sure as hell responsible for making sure the runway is clear before leaving the holding point. Or is that somehow different?
tightcircuit
If you bothered to read the thread, you would see that I never said any such thing, in fact I said the reverse.
terrain safe
Really? Then answer me this. Is an aircraft in the final stages of an ILS approach under a positive control service? Is a 172 in the ATZ under a positive control service? If they both are, who is responsible for separation? Particularly when the aircraft on the ILS may be IMC?
Of course they aren't. I am not suggesting for a minute that SMR can discriminate that effectively. However, seeing a possible conflict allows the controller to issue a conditional clearance ("subject the 737 at xx, cleared to continue to xxx"), or, better yet, "Hold position until the 737 has moved up to the holding point".
If the pilot of a 767 can't see his wingtip, he can never be completely assured regarding separation, can he? Now, what is ATC for? To keep aircraft from bumping into each other, from memory.
I can't quite understand why so many people, who have spent their careers being separated by ATC in the air, have such a problem with being separated by ATC on the ground.
I also find it noteworthy that nobody has seen fit to answer the questions I have posed. Too difficult, I suppose, given the assumptions many of you seem to make. Just in case anyone has the intellect to answer, I'll ask them again:
If an aircraft, the pilots of which cannot see the wingtips, taxys into a vehicle which neither pilot could see (as it was next to the wingtip), who is to blame, and why?
What is the point in a system of taxiways that are defined in accordance with a set of specifications that establish lateral clearances, if the pilot cannot assume that those clearances will protect him? In fact, what is the point in having clearances at all?
Why, when a controller issues a taxi clearance, is that clearance somehow not really a clearance, but rather a bit of advice? Given that a clearance implies that it can be safely carried out.
Why is separation on the ground assured under LVP's, but not under any other condition?
If anyone can answer those four simple questions intelligently, I'll be most impressed. "Get real" doesn't count.
I repeat, this incident is about more than just one pilot. Try thinking outside the square a bit.
Arkroyal
Speaking in French keeps us all aware, does it? Tell that to my friend John Andrew's family
It occurs to me that taxiing into the path of an aircraft on the takeoff roll is even more of an own-goal than hitting a stationary aircraft. If a captain is responsible for not hitting another aircraft on the ground whilst taxiing, he is sure as hell responsible for making sure the runway is clear before leaving the holding point. Or is that somehow different?
tightcircuit
Your attempts to persuade us that following a controllers instructions regardless of the consequences because you think they have the responsibility just beggars belief.
terrain safe
MOR If you are flying an ILS and a C172 hits you again ATC cannot physically fly the plane. They can give traffic information even avoiding action
SMRs are not great at spotting how tight a gap is. Get real...
If the pilot of a 767 can't see his wingtip, he can never be completely assured regarding separation, can he? Now, what is ATC for? To keep aircraft from bumping into each other, from memory.
I can't quite understand why so many people, who have spent their careers being separated by ATC in the air, have such a problem with being separated by ATC on the ground.
I also find it noteworthy that nobody has seen fit to answer the questions I have posed. Too difficult, I suppose, given the assumptions many of you seem to make. Just in case anyone has the intellect to answer, I'll ask them again:
If an aircraft, the pilots of which cannot see the wingtips, taxys into a vehicle which neither pilot could see (as it was next to the wingtip), who is to blame, and why?
What is the point in a system of taxiways that are defined in accordance with a set of specifications that establish lateral clearances, if the pilot cannot assume that those clearances will protect him? In fact, what is the point in having clearances at all?
Why, when a controller issues a taxi clearance, is that clearance somehow not really a clearance, but rather a bit of advice? Given that a clearance implies that it can be safely carried out.
Why is separation on the ground assured under LVP's, but not under any other condition?
If anyone can answer those four simple questions intelligently, I'll be most impressed. "Get real" doesn't count.
I repeat, this incident is about more than just one pilot. Try thinking outside the square a bit.
I've only made a few posts so I don't feel the need to order a Personal Title and help support PPRuNe
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Won't answer all the points being made by MOR but in an attempt to get him to give the majority of us a break from his insistence that an unconditional ATC taxi clearance is in some way responsible for the B767 not having enough room to pass behind the B737. I'll just say that whilst the pilot may not be able to see the wingtips of the B767 they certainly would have seen the B737 holding at S1 before they started their right turn onto V. Even after starting the turn onto V the Captain would have been able to see the B737, or at least the front half of it.
I am not apportioning any blame here because we don't know all the facts about what was going on on the flight deck at the time but what is possible is that it is totally wrong to assume, as MOR has done, that just because you are cleared to a particular holding point doesn't mean that you are able to reach that holding point unhindered. Even a runway crossing clearance doesn't absolve the crew from double checking that the approach is clear.
The constant argument put forward that if you don't see a vehicle that is about to hit your wing you are somehow absolved of responsibility just doesn't wash. When you taxi onto stand you should still be looking and checking that what may be in your field of view doesn't appear to be infringing on the path that your wingtips are going to take. If there is any doubt you should stop and ask for whatever assistance is available, whether from ATC, other a/c or ground personnel. There are cues on the B767 and no doubt all other a/c that give you an idea where your wingtips are going to pass over. I remember that on the B767 it was about halfway up the DV window frame. You used that as a reference and if you were unsure the old adage that discretion was a better part than valour in such circumstances.
Manchester has SMR and having seen it in action it is good but it isn't a tool that is used by the GMC unless LVP's are in force. As for positive ground control, get real. Even with positive air control, responsibility is not removed totally from the pilots. As in the Asiana B747 and the Southwest B737 incident on another thread on here, the Asiana pilot made the decisionto go around even though he was cleared to land. You never, ever, assume that the clearance you have been given by a controller is sacrosanct. Human error is always a possibility and because of that the flight crew have to be extra vigilant, especially if they can see an obstruction before they start their turn. The AAIB will eventually produce a report with detailed descriptions of each slice of swiss cheese and then the PPRune vultures will be free to descend on the carcass and rip it to shreds with their sanctimonious offerings of hindsight.
The rest of us will try and learn from it.
I am not apportioning any blame here because we don't know all the facts about what was going on on the flight deck at the time but what is possible is that it is totally wrong to assume, as MOR has done, that just because you are cleared to a particular holding point doesn't mean that you are able to reach that holding point unhindered. Even a runway crossing clearance doesn't absolve the crew from double checking that the approach is clear.
The constant argument put forward that if you don't see a vehicle that is about to hit your wing you are somehow absolved of responsibility just doesn't wash. When you taxi onto stand you should still be looking and checking that what may be in your field of view doesn't appear to be infringing on the path that your wingtips are going to take. If there is any doubt you should stop and ask for whatever assistance is available, whether from ATC, other a/c or ground personnel. There are cues on the B767 and no doubt all other a/c that give you an idea where your wingtips are going to pass over. I remember that on the B767 it was about halfway up the DV window frame. You used that as a reference and if you were unsure the old adage that discretion was a better part than valour in such circumstances.
Manchester has SMR and having seen it in action it is good but it isn't a tool that is used by the GMC unless LVP's are in force. As for positive ground control, get real. Even with positive air control, responsibility is not removed totally from the pilots. As in the Asiana B747 and the Southwest B737 incident on another thread on here, the Asiana pilot made the decisionto go around even though he was cleared to land. You never, ever, assume that the clearance you have been given by a controller is sacrosanct. Human error is always a possibility and because of that the flight crew have to be extra vigilant, especially if they can see an obstruction before they start their turn. The AAIB will eventually produce a report with detailed descriptions of each slice of swiss cheese and then the PPRune vultures will be free to descend on the carcass and rip it to shreds with their sanctimonious offerings of hindsight.
The rest of us will try and learn from it.
Just a numbered other
MOR
Since you claim to know CDG so well, tell me how the captain was supposed to see what was behind him, and being cleared, in french, to begin its take off roll, whilst the same controller had cleared, in english, the shed to line up. Controller cock up, plain and simple, cretin
It occurs to me that taxiing into the path of an aircraft on the takeoff roll is even more of an own-goal than hitting a stationary aircraft. If a captain is responsible for not hitting another aircraft on the ground whilst taxiing, he is sure as hell responsible for making sure the runway is clear before leaving the holding point. Or is that somehow different?
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cargo boy
I'm not saying it DOES, I'm saying it SHOULD.
By the way, the real reason you don't want to answer the four questions, is that you don't have the answers.
Arkroyal
And you call yourself a professional? So, according to you, our 767 captain is at fault because he didn't ensure that he could pass the 737, but your mate, who made no effort to check that the active runway was clear, is not?
The facts are that it is easy, in a shed, to turn enough to check the runway is clear whilst staying within the bounds of the taxiway. In an aircraft that size, you can easily park yourself at the hold at an angle to ensure that you can see. I used to do that in a 146 for gods sake. Knowing that the runway is clear is one of the most basic pieces of airmanship there is, especially when joining the runway at an intermediate hold.
Language was an issue, but the real issue was not looking - plain and simple.
Since we now apparently qualify the causes of accidents according to who you know and who you don't, I will - in some disgust - leave you to it.
it is totally wrong to assume, as MOR has done, that just because you are cleared to a particular holding point doesn't mean that you are able to reach that holding point unhindered.
By the way, the real reason you don't want to answer the four questions, is that you don't have the answers.
Arkroyal
tell me how the captain was supposed to see what was behind him, and being cleared, in french, to begin its take off roll, whilst the same controller had cleared, in english, the shed to line up.
The facts are that it is easy, in a shed, to turn enough to check the runway is clear whilst staying within the bounds of the taxiway. In an aircraft that size, you can easily park yourself at the hold at an angle to ensure that you can see. I used to do that in a 146 for gods sake. Knowing that the runway is clear is one of the most basic pieces of airmanship there is, especially when joining the runway at an intermediate hold.
Language was an issue, but the real issue was not looking - plain and simple.
Since we now apparently qualify the causes of accidents according to who you know and who you don't, I will - in some disgust - leave you to it.
Entering active runway
Looking at the diagram supplied by Danny raises the question of just how do you check for approaching landing traffic when entering from a holding point which has that traffic 135 degrees behind your heading.
If there's not enough room to turn the a/c to look over the approach path, do you open the cockpit window, stick your head out and have a look behind -- or do you entrust the lives of you and your passengers to ATC?
In case of collision with landing traffic when entering the active from a blind holding point in accordance with an ATC instruction, who is responsible? -- bearing in mind that determination of legal responsibility where there's loss of life is a bit of a hollow exercise
If there's not enough room to turn the a/c to look over the approach path, do you open the cockpit window, stick your head out and have a look behind -- or do you entrust the lives of you and your passengers to ATC?
In case of collision with landing traffic when entering the active from a blind holding point in accordance with an ATC instruction, who is responsible? -- bearing in mind that determination of legal responsibility where there's loss of life is a bit of a hollow exercise
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mocoman
If you re-read the BBC article, you'll find it refers to an incident earlier in the year involving an MYT A321 and a Ryanair 737 (Not Aer Lingus as stated!) and is not releated to the XLA/WW collision.
Regards,
If you re-read the BBC article, you'll find it refers to an incident earlier in the year involving an MYT A321 and a Ryanair 737 (Not Aer Lingus as stated!) and is not releated to the XLA/WW collision.
Regards,
Last edited by Stand 22; 11th Nov 2004 at 07:18.
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I`m not aircrew but it`s like driving a car
you never trust anyone or anything else, always check for your self then you only have yourself to blame if it goes wrong ie traffic lights maybe on red but who is going to stop someone jumping them?
Golf India Bravo
you never trust anyone or anything else, always check for your self then you only have yourself to blame if it goes wrong ie traffic lights maybe on red but who is going to stop someone jumping them?
Golf India Bravo
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Grey Area
I am not qualified offer an opinion on this, but it has a parallel with Area Control.
You are cruising at FL370 and I clear you to FL270...sometimes I may say "descend" FL270.....a common response to the latter is "now or at pilot's discretion?"
In earlier years there was a difference but this has been eroded by time. Now I have to add a qualifier, such as "descend now" or "cleared when ready".
One is an executive instruction, one is a clearance [permission].
So when you are issued with a ground movement clearance do you pilots believe that you have been given a clearance to do something i.e. at your discretion/when ready ..or do you believe that you have been given a mandatory instruction i.e. compulsory.
The meaning of ATC words should not go through a transformation depending on whether you are in the air or on the ground.
If a pilot is "cleared" to a certain holding point, does he have to go all the way up to that point without delay?
You are cruising at FL370 and I clear you to FL270...sometimes I may say "descend" FL270.....a common response to the latter is "now or at pilot's discretion?"
In earlier years there was a difference but this has been eroded by time. Now I have to add a qualifier, such as "descend now" or "cleared when ready".
One is an executive instruction, one is a clearance [permission].
So when you are issued with a ground movement clearance do you pilots believe that you have been given a clearance to do something i.e. at your discretion/when ready ..or do you believe that you have been given a mandatory instruction i.e. compulsory.
The meaning of ATC words should not go through a transformation depending on whether you are in the air or on the ground.
If a pilot is "cleared" to a certain holding point, does he have to go all the way up to that point without delay?
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MOR et al...
The AAIB have reiterated, in a report today, the "responsibility", whether or not you can see your wingtips:
The AAIB have reiterated, in a report today, the "responsibility", whether or not you can see your wingtips:
Like the towing crew, it might be expected that ATC should have predicted the collision and provided forewarning to the crew towing G-BNLK. However, the vantage point provided to the ground controller only enables the identification of obvious potential collisions and therefore the onus for obstacle clearance must rest with the person responsible for the aircraft, be it the towing crew or flight crew. This is borne out by the instructions in CAP 493 Manual of Air Traffic Services in which an ATC service is provided to assist in preventing collision between aircraft on the manoeuvring area.
Just a numbered other
MOR,
Firstly, I apologise for the language in my last night's post. End of a long day and all that.
1, yes I do. 2. The 767 captain (who I have not blamed for anything) was taxying past an object which was stationary. The Shed at CDG was cleared to line up from a high-speed turn off and was struck from the 4 o'clock position by an aircraft aproaching take off speed. Note; I don't blame the MD crew either.
If you can’t see the difference, then there’s not much more to be said
You know this do you. A little insensitive, might you agree? Can I join your next séance.
Calm down old chap. And do try to remain detached and professional.
Firstly, I apologise for the language in my last night's post. End of a long day and all that.
And you call yourself a professional? So, according to you, our 767 captain is at fault because he didn't ensure that he could pass the 737, but your mate, who made no effort to check that the active runway was clear, is not?
If you can’t see the difference, then there’s not much more to be said
but your mate, who made no effort to check that the active runway was clear, is not?
Since we now apparently qualify the causes of accidents according to who you know and who you don't, I will - in some disgust - leave you to it.
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Arkroyal,
Generally I am in agreement with all you have said on this thread. I must add though I do not agree that the CDG incident was completely ATC's fault. I think the crew of the Shorts (putting aside the tragic outcome for a moment) still had a part to play in the events. Regardless of what language the Take-off clearance was issued in, I believe if you are at an intersection departure point and are cleared to line up "number 2", you should make sure you know whereabouts of number 1. If they are not in sight (in this case in front of them) a rat should be smelt.
I believe they where suffering, for whatever reason, from a dose of reduced situational awareness that we can all take as a wake up call.
Generally I am in agreement with all you have said on this thread. I must add though I do not agree that the CDG incident was completely ATC's fault. I think the crew of the Shorts (putting aside the tragic outcome for a moment) still had a part to play in the events. Regardless of what language the Take-off clearance was issued in, I believe if you are at an intersection departure point and are cleared to line up "number 2", you should make sure you know whereabouts of number 1. If they are not in sight (in this case in front of them) a rat should be smelt.
I believe they where suffering, for whatever reason, from a dose of reduced situational awareness that we can all take as a wake up call.
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I'm not current with MAN, other than looking at aerodrome charts. We have heard the argument about being cleared to a holding point and you might be number xx in the queue; so, in turn, you eventually make it to the hold without further ATC instruction.
I presume the 767 was cleared via V to another Hold point. What was ahead of the 767 on V? Therefore, excepting the arguments put forward, one might assume that V was clear, subject any traffic ahead on V itself....not on S.
Assuming 24R was the landing runway and the 767 had crossed 24R, where did it physically have to get to (tail in particular, bearing in mind the height), to clear the ILS critical area?
If any of this relates to the fact, was there in fact any space for the 767 on the south side of 24R to have been cleared to, bearing in mind the location of the 737? If not, perhaps you need to go back and ask why it was cleared to cross in the first place.
I have seen incidents in the past that relate to ATC clearances and inappropriate use of hold bars. I once saw an aircraft vacate the active following an emergency stopping the wrong side of a uni-directional runway stop bar and disgorge pax whilst the rwy remained active.
I presume the 767 was cleared via V to another Hold point. What was ahead of the 767 on V? Therefore, excepting the arguments put forward, one might assume that V was clear, subject any traffic ahead on V itself....not on S.
Assuming 24R was the landing runway and the 767 had crossed 24R, where did it physically have to get to (tail in particular, bearing in mind the height), to clear the ILS critical area?
If any of this relates to the fact, was there in fact any space for the 767 on the south side of 24R to have been cleared to, bearing in mind the location of the 737? If not, perhaps you need to go back and ask why it was cleared to cross in the first place.
I have seen incidents in the past that relate to ATC clearances and inappropriate use of hold bars. I once saw an aircraft vacate the active following an emergency stopping the wrong side of a uni-directional runway stop bar and disgorge pax whilst the rwy remained active.
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I agree with Arkroyal and NOD.
There is nothing that absolves a Commander from ensuring the safety of his aircraft - irrespective of size. The final responsibility rests with him.
It wil be interesting to hear some of the peripheral aspects in the error chain. Were the numerous freq. changes taking one pilot out of the loop? Were they on a tight slot? That is where the AAIB excel.
Anne
There is nothing that absolves a Commander from ensuring the safety of his aircraft - irrespective of size. The final responsibility rests with him.
It wil be interesting to hear some of the peripheral aspects in the error chain. Were the numerous freq. changes taking one pilot out of the loop? Were they on a tight slot? That is where the AAIB excel.
Anne
