N72EX (Kobe Bryant) Crash Update-
It still seems to me that, however legal and FAA approved it might be, training for IIMC in an environment where visual cues are still available (foggles) compared to proper simulator or best of all, actual cloud - is just paper-safety and could go a long way to explaining why there are so many IIMC accidents amongst professional pilots.
I finished a NVG sortie last night by pulling up into cloud and flying an ILS - I was thinking at the time that only years of proper training and constant practice have allowed me to do that that in complete confidence and safety - finding yourself in that environment when you haven't been properly prepared is just relying on luck.
I finished a NVG sortie last night by pulling up into cloud and flying an ILS - I was thinking at the time that only years of proper training and constant practice have allowed me to do that that in complete confidence and safety - finding yourself in that environment when you haven't been properly prepared is just relying on luck.
Now that we have finished bumbling our way through some of that, it seems illogical to me, for the POI, after being tasked to perform a focused review of IIMC training and checking, that he would miss the fact that the procedures didn’t exist. This is especially remarkable, given the fact that the POI had also conducted the 2 previous 293/299 checks with the accident pilot. Read the interview (Doty), it’s almost comical in the evasion to actually answer anything with any specificity.
How can the FAA expect a pilot to perform or check airmen to evaluate a maneuver that has no direction, description or standard? Absent proof otherwise, I find it nearly impossible not to put some blame on the FAA.
How can the FAA expect a pilot to perform or check airmen to evaluate a maneuver that has no direction, description or standard? Absent proof otherwise, I find it nearly impossible not to put some blame on the FAA.
Last edited by JimEli; 17th Feb 2021 at 15:04.
Rules and reality. Crab nailed it, no sub for actually flying when you can't see the ground. And regular. And knowing what the autopilot does in what modes and what can save and what can kill you. Teaching IFR if they could see the ground through one square inch of chin bubble they were visual. A quick test: in cloud turn both AP's off (yes, even on a 139) and see if they can hold an airspeed and heading. Whether or not the paper box tick was done in "simulated" conditions is academic. As in regulatory compliance, but doesn't keep anybody alive.
Guys, all this talk of UA recovery and I-IMC training is all very well and good. But it's also very moot - just senseless jibber-jabber. Does any real helicopter pilot think that Ara could've recovered 72EX from that UA once he went inadvertent so close to the ground? Come on, man. It's...silly to even suggest that he could. Once that ship began its uncommanded (and probably undetected) left roll it was game-over.
Add to that the fact that in VFR Part-135 operations in the U.S. pilots are not even required to have an Instrument Rating, much less be familiar with how an autopilot works. Strip away all of the B.S., and Ara might as well have been a VFR line charter pilot in a 206 who "inadvertently" punched into a cloud and lost it. Wasn't the first; won't be the last.
Add to that the fact that in VFR Part-135 operations in the U.S. pilots are not even required to have an Instrument Rating, much less be familiar with how an autopilot works. Strip away all of the B.S., and Ara might as well have been a VFR line charter pilot in a 206 who "inadvertently" punched into a cloud and lost it. Wasn't the first; won't be the last.
Guys, all this talk of UA recovery and I-IMC training is all very well and good. But it's also very moot - just senseless jibber-jabber. Does any real helicopter pilot think that Ara could've recovered 72EX from that UA once he went inadvertent so close to the ground? Come on, man. It's...silly to even suggest that he could. Once that ship began its uncommanded (and probably undetected) left roll it was game-over.
Add to that the fact that in VFR Part-135 operations in the U.S. pilots are not even required to have an Instrument Rating, much less be familiar with how an autopilot works. Strip away all of the B.S., and Ara might as well have been a VFR line charter pilot in a 206 who "inadvertently" punched into a cloud and lost it. Wasn't the first; won't be the last.
Add to that the fact that in VFR Part-135 operations in the U.S. pilots are not even required to have an Instrument Rating, much less be familiar with how an autopilot works. Strip away all of the B.S., and Ara might as well have been a VFR line charter pilot in a 206 who "inadvertently" punched into a cloud and lost it. Wasn't the first; won't be the last.
I guess its kinda like the way we always practiced the old "settling with power" recovery,...I mean come on,...when have I ever (in the real world) flown at 3,000' AGL (let alone) then suddenly decided to pull it into a hover?
,...
A recovery is an intentional action once you have realised your mistake or can identify the problem.
If you are determined to push on, or are disoriented and think you are wings level, all the recovery training in the world would be pointless.
Training only helps people who intend applying it.
This vfr flight should never have left the ground, that’s not something that seems to have been in the checklist or training.
If you are determined to push on, or are disoriented and think you are wings level, all the recovery training in the world would be pointless.
Training only helps people who intend applying it.
This vfr flight should never have left the ground, that’s not something that seems to have been in the checklist or training.
Does any real helicopter pilot think that Ara could've recovered 72EX from that UA once he went inadvertent so close to the ground?
Roll the wings level concentrating all your attention on the AI/AH and bring the nose up to a climbing attitude then apply full power and check balance - it's a basic technique that works every time. WASP - Wings level, select the pitch Attitude to adjust the Speed and then add Power.
If your speed is high when you recognise the UA then zoom climbing can gain you a healthy height very quickly.
I have IF aborted from low level in turns - and it works.
Even better if you have prepared properly and have your AP up and running and local navaids already selected but the MOST important thing is to get safely away from the ground and above safety alt.
On my recent sortie I initiated the climb in SAS mode but, once established in the climb, selected ATT mode and selected HDG and, once level, ALT. Using HDG to steer towards the ILS I then coupled ILS once close to the localiser. Easy peasy if you know your AP and have thought about the process first.
There were plenty of times during the sortie that Ara could have prevented the tragedy but even as he entered the cloud, the route to safety was absolutely available to him.
Do we know how many hours of real IMC the pilots who provided the training for IEH have between them? Anyone can all themselves an instrument pilot but there is only one acid test.
Crab, its easy as an IF pilot to point out how you identified your situation and corrected it while using automation and being on instruments.
That is meaningless to anyone flying visually and who has no idea where the wings are.
There is no caution on the panel that highlights an impending sense of doom.
By the time someone realises they are in the dwang it is too late.
Prevention is better than cure.
That is meaningless to anyone flying visually and who has no idea where the wings are.
There is no caution on the panel that highlights an impending sense of doom.
By the time someone realises they are in the dwang it is too late.
Prevention is better than cure.
True, but this was a previously instrument rated pilot with a whole bunch of hours in an IFR twin - not some newbie in a Robbie
If you are flying around without an attitude indicator/artificial horizon, then get one fitted, it might just save your life.
I only mentioned what I did in terms of the pull up because I was asked to detail it in order to highlight how proper use of automation makes things so easy.
If you are flying around without an attitude indicator/artificial horizon, then get one fitted, it might just save your life.
I only mentioned what I did in terms of the pull up because I was asked to detail it in order to highlight how proper use of automation makes things so easy.
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Florida
Age: 58
Posts: 269
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I have a feeling he started the turn in marginal VMC and then went inadvertent shortly thereafter. You will get the leans immediately and have to force yourself to believe the instruments as the turn now becomes your "straight and level". It takes A LOT of will to force yourself to commit to what the the attitude indicator is telling you. I experienced this first hand many years ago. I transitioned to instruments, took my eyes off them momentarily and was right back in the turn. Would have sworn on my mother I was level. Got things right again, started a climb and popped out on top. I was only at about 400' when the fun started, Quite a bit of pressure to know if you screw this up, you're dead. It's a shame all he had to do was hit the heading bug and ALT and then start a climb. If the heading bug wasn't centered, center it. The force trim probably would have saved him, too but I'm thinking most of his flying was hand flying without it. Too bad he didn't have more training.
Last edited by helonorth; 18th Feb 2021 at 00:03.
The trouble with this fascinating accident is that there are so many things we don't and just cannot know. We *do* know that Ara was scooting along at a pretty good clip in fairly bad weather, which is incautious. His course along his route of flight was full of heading changes both large and small, and I strongly suspect that his eyes were outside the cockpit, not constantly centering the heading bug on the HSI. When he reported to ATC that he was climbing to 4,000, I assume that his intention was to continue toward Camarillo on top of whatever scud layer he just encountered. I doubt that he was intentionally making a 180. But again, who knows? My guess as a pilot is that Ara had not considered the possibility of performing a 180, because if he had, he probably would not have been cruising along at 140 knots. I think he really thought he could make it to Camarillo VFR.
When Ara cleared out of Van Nuys' airspace, he reported that he was in "VFR conditions" at 1500 feet. Well...maybe. (Van Nuys was only reporting 2.5 vis.) We can presume that he was just under the overcast. As he got into the foothills around Calabasas, the ground was coming up, squeezing him into a narrow slot. He obviously ran into the low fog/cloud deck just as he got to the intersection of Route 101 and Las Virgenes Road. The 101 cuts through a pass right there. If Ara was down low over the road, then he would have had hills rising up on both sides of him, the tops of which were likely obscured by clouds/fog. At some point he must have punched-in, because he reported to SoCal Approach that he was climbing to 4000 feet. Now we *know* he had to be IMC. And that's where it all came apart. The S-76 reached an altitude of 2370 feet and began a descending, ever-steepening left turn. It impacted a hill at 1100 feet MSL, slightly below the peak. I doubt that he would have had any visual reference until a millisecond or so prior to impact. I maintain that Ara's eyes were probably not on the AI, and when (or if) they ever returned to the panel, it was way too late to do anything.
Maybe some of you super-heroes could've pulled off that save (depending on at what point you realized it was all going pear-shaped). But for the rest of us mere mortal pilots, I think it would've been a real - and probably unsuccessful - challenge to get the thing wings-level and climbing before smashing into something solid...like Earth.
When Ara cleared out of Van Nuys' airspace, he reported that he was in "VFR conditions" at 1500 feet. Well...maybe. (Van Nuys was only reporting 2.5 vis.) We can presume that he was just under the overcast. As he got into the foothills around Calabasas, the ground was coming up, squeezing him into a narrow slot. He obviously ran into the low fog/cloud deck just as he got to the intersection of Route 101 and Las Virgenes Road. The 101 cuts through a pass right there. If Ara was down low over the road, then he would have had hills rising up on both sides of him, the tops of which were likely obscured by clouds/fog. At some point he must have punched-in, because he reported to SoCal Approach that he was climbing to 4000 feet. Now we *know* he had to be IMC. And that's where it all came apart. The S-76 reached an altitude of 2370 feet and began a descending, ever-steepening left turn. It impacted a hill at 1100 feet MSL, slightly below the peak. I doubt that he would have had any visual reference until a millisecond or so prior to impact. I maintain that Ara's eyes were probably not on the AI, and when (or if) they ever returned to the panel, it was way too late to do anything.
Maybe some of you super-heroes could've pulled off that save (depending on at what point you realized it was all going pear-shaped). But for the rest of us mere mortal pilots, I think it would've been a real - and probably unsuccessful - challenge to get the thing wings-level and climbing before smashing into something solid...like Earth.
Maybe some of you super-heroes could've pulled off that save (depending on at what point you realized it was all going pear-shaped). But for the rest of us mere mortal pilots, I think it would've been a real - and probably unsuccessful - challenge to get the thing wings-level and climbing before smashing into something solid...like Earth
It's interesting that the NTSB findings in the abstract says,
None of the following safety issues were identified for the accident flight: (1) pilot qualification deficiencies
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Doc...G-abstract.pdf
Originally Posted by [email protected]
I only mentioned what I did in terms of the pull up because I was asked to detail it in order to highlight how proper use of automation makes things so easy.
How does that factor into their upset/IIMC training?
Not sure about US regs, but many authorities require SPIF to use a 3-axis auto pilot.
So why is it, in such a capable ship, that there seems to have been so little training to use it?
The FAA minion squirmed his way through the interview, shrugging his shoulders at most questions. His contribution seems to have been little short of a box-ticker.
It becomes more apparent with every high-profile crash, that behind the scenes is a limp-wristed authority, whose value is providing ballast and bureaucracy and doesn't improve safety.
Completely agree Bellringer - just looking at this one plus the 139 crashes in UK and the Bahamas - all crew ticked all the regulatory boxes but took perfectly serviceable aircraft in marginal weather conditions and flew them into the ground/sea, killing themselves and their pax.
What is wrong with the training and checking that lets pilots make such bad decisions and then not have the skills to recover them?
Many of the professional exams required for licencing are ridiculously complex and poorly written with little practical application in modern aviation and it seems like there is a lot of box-ticking going on out there in simulator world because no-one wants to lose clients and the regulatory system is just a satis/unsatis box with little qualitative assessment required.
What is wrong with the training and checking that lets pilots make such bad decisions and then not have the skills to recover them?
Many of the professional exams required for licencing are ridiculously complex and poorly written with little practical application in modern aviation and it seems like there is a lot of box-ticking going on out there in simulator world because no-one wants to lose clients and the regulatory system is just a satis/unsatis box with little qualitative assessment required.
I maintain that Ara's eyes were probably not on the AI, and when (or if) they ever returned to the panel, it was way too late to do anything.
When I was in basic training on the Provost T1, the radial engined original, my instructor during the instrument training stage used to give me UAs in a fully developed spin. Having a vacuum powered AH that toppled at 60 degrees of bank you were reliant on the T/S and altimeter.
Seemed to get out of it OK.
Seemed to get out of it OK.
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Florida
Age: 58
Posts: 269
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
When I was in basic training on the Provost T1, the radial engined original, my instructor during the instrument training stage used to give me UAs in a fully developed spin. Having a vacuum powered AH that toppled at 60 degrees of bank you were reliant on the T/S and altimeter.
Seemed to get out of it OK.
Seemed to get out of it OK.
I think FED has more than enough real-world experience of IMC, I believe his point was that you don't necessarily need an AI/AH to recover from a UA - however that was in a FW not RW.
