AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
Join Date: May 2010
Location: UK
Age: 79
Posts: 1,086
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If you have to ask "what is it doing now" you have already broken one of the golden rules - never let the aircraft get ahead of you.
Call me old fashioned if you like but at this point I prefer the paranoid option, the damn thing is probably trying to kill me so disconnect the fancy contraptions and fly the aircraft. There is unlikely to be time to figure out what it was doing so just get the hell out of there.
Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.
Abort the approach, get to a safe place and then worry about what went wrong.
Call me old fashioned if you like but at this point I prefer the paranoid option, the damn thing is probably trying to kill me so disconnect the fancy contraptions and fly the aircraft. There is unlikely to be time to figure out what it was doing so just get the hell out of there.
Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.
Abort the approach, get to a safe place and then worry about what went wrong.
HC your post
The autopilot does all the work. Its programmed (via the FMS) to fly the whole route to the rig (and back, if the pilot forgets to fiddle with the knobs). One pilot is rambling on and on about how hard done by he is, how little he gets paid, how the whole operation would fall apart without him, how the wife is giving him a hard time etc. the other pilot is pretending to listen to the same stories again and really can't believe the other pilot has forgotten he said these exact same things on their earlier flight together, and is in fact playing Angry Birds on his iPad hoping his colleague won't notice.
If this is reality then as an occasional SLF and OC representative I am horrified that technology has turned skilled pilots into highly paid "game players". Thankfully the H269 I fly hasn't got an autopilot and I can still be firmly in charge of my own destiny when flying.
What's gone wrong guys ?
The autopilot does all the work. Its programmed (via the FMS) to fly the whole route to the rig (and back, if the pilot forgets to fiddle with the knobs). One pilot is rambling on and on about how hard done by he is, how little he gets paid, how the whole operation would fall apart without him, how the wife is giving him a hard time etc. the other pilot is pretending to listen to the same stories again and really can't believe the other pilot has forgotten he said these exact same things on their earlier flight together, and is in fact playing Angry Birds on his iPad hoping his colleague won't notice.
If this is reality then as an occasional SLF and OC representative I am horrified that technology has turned skilled pilots into highly paid "game players". Thankfully the H269 I fly hasn't got an autopilot and I can still be firmly in charge of my own destiny when flying.
What's gone wrong guys ?
Join Date: Aug 2013
Location: Where my life takes me
Posts: 23
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
So, this was a CFIT (water) then, not unlike the Asiana crash at San Francisco.
Having a few thousand hours on the L2, I always found that in marginal weather, 4 axis coupling was a great work-load reducer enhancing situational awareness and thereby overall safety.
After all that has been said how good the 225 is, I still maintain that the L2 has a damn good autopilot as well. But as with all technology, pilots must understand the capabilities and limitations.
I don't want to speculate on why 4 axis wasn't used in this case, but CHC and other operators should take a long hard look at their policies, procedures and pilot training on the use of automation.
Having a few thousand hours on the L2, I always found that in marginal weather, 4 axis coupling was a great work-load reducer enhancing situational awareness and thereby overall safety.
After all that has been said how good the 225 is, I still maintain that the L2 has a damn good autopilot as well. But as with all technology, pilots must understand the capabilities and limitations.
I don't want to speculate on why 4 axis wasn't used in this case, but CHC and other operators should take a long hard look at their policies, procedures and pilot training on the use of automation.
Last edited by Jimmy 16; 6th Sep 2013 at 01:18.
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Sale, Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 3,832
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Without prejudging this accident, but possible CFIT has been mentioned, bolding mine
Industry Turns To Self-Help For Improving Pilot Monitoring
An informal industry working group is producing a data-rich study to convince airlines that deficient pilot-monitoring skills are a widespread safety threat, and it will provide straightforward recommendations for carriers to help remedy the problem.
Nothing I have read is not consistent with some form of loss of collective. Normal approach, a loss of thrust, a flare to arrest descent, and a plunge when stored energy is gone. The report stated the nose pitched up, rate of descent arrested, speed near the power bucket. No crew would still be playing with their IPAD's they would be over torquing to get out of a self made situation.
All the AAIB report really says is the engines did not explode, the rotor did not separate, and the Xmsn shaft was intact.
The Sultan
All the AAIB report really says is the engines did not explode, the rotor did not separate, and the Xmsn shaft was intact.
The Sultan
Join Date: Oct 2012
Location: Canada
Age: 53
Posts: 215
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Holy crap guys, no one is playing Angry Birds in the helicopter.
Bladegrabber, HC and SAS have a certain history of back and forth and in the context of the wider thread, it was clear to me he was making a 'joke'.
Bladegrabber, HC and SAS have a certain history of back and forth and in the context of the wider thread, it was clear to me he was making a 'joke'.
The Sultan
While I agree that the crew wouldn't be distracted by their IPAD's. There are, however, plenty of examples of crews loosing their situational awareness of what is happening when an autopilot starts to either misbehave or acts strangely because it is in the wrong mode for what it is required to do.
The Air France crew who failed to fly the a/c when their autopilot dropped out. If they had initially not touched the controls then the a/c would have carried on in stable flight as one assumes the autopilot had the a/c trimmed. After all in a fixed wing power, attitude, trim was a mantra I was taught and still use today. Yet one pilot pulled his sidestick all the way back - what did he expect to happen if he did that? You can easily stabilise an a/c if you set cruise power and attitude! I spent many an IF training sortie with the Squadron QFI sticking pads over flying instruments to limit what I could use and still managed to keep the a/c stable.
We have had 2 highly automated SPs end up, apparently fully serviceable, in the sea and we have to ask is the culture of over use of the autopilot to blame?
I am a dinosaur I suppose but I look upon automation as a tool to make my life easier in poor weather not as a way of making my life easier so I become disconnected from what I enjoy doing which is FLYING the a/c
HF
No crew would still be playing with their IPAD's they would be over torquing to get out of a self made situation.
The Air France crew who failed to fly the a/c when their autopilot dropped out. If they had initially not touched the controls then the a/c would have carried on in stable flight as one assumes the autopilot had the a/c trimmed. After all in a fixed wing power, attitude, trim was a mantra I was taught and still use today. Yet one pilot pulled his sidestick all the way back - what did he expect to happen if he did that? You can easily stabilise an a/c if you set cruise power and attitude! I spent many an IF training sortie with the Squadron QFI sticking pads over flying instruments to limit what I could use and still managed to keep the a/c stable.
We have had 2 highly automated SPs end up, apparently fully serviceable, in the sea and we have to ask is the culture of over use of the autopilot to blame?
I am a dinosaur I suppose but I look upon automation as a tool to make my life easier in poor weather not as a way of making my life easier so I become disconnected from what I enjoy doing which is FLYING the a/c
HF
Last edited by Hummingfrog; 6th Sep 2013 at 05:32.
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: N/A
Posts: 6
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Remember G-TIGH AS332L March 1992
Rig shuttle low airspeed then high rate of descent, maybe vortex ring state made situation worse
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...3%20G-TIGH.pdf
Will be interesting to read the aaib report when it eventually comes out
Same with the Asiana landing in SF
Rig shuttle low airspeed then high rate of descent, maybe vortex ring state made situation worse
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...3%20G-TIGH.pdf
Will be interesting to read the aaib report when it eventually comes out
Same with the Asiana landing in SF
Last edited by mark one eyeball; 6th Sep 2013 at 05:53.
Join Date: Aug 2012
Location: Hassocks, Mid-Sussex
Age: 67
Posts: 278
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Rig shuttle low airspeed then high rate of descent, maybe vortex ring state made situation worse.
If the METAR was telling them that the cloudbase was at 200ft then presumably CHC SOP's would instruct them to make an approach which would involve cloudbreak occurring in the final phase of the approach while on automatic and pointing down the middle of the Sumburgh centreline?
Apologies if recently discussed.
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: UK and MALTA
Age: 61
Posts: 1,297
Likes: 0
Received 18 Likes
on
4 Posts
JIMMY 16 - I think your post is absolutely on the mark.
For those posting opinions on autopilots, stating they disconnect the crew from the task, you clearly have not used modern DAFCS equipped machines.
In an AC such as EC225, flown by a properly trained crew with a complete understanding of the DAFCS, the FADEC and the display system, it is impossible for them to sit there wondering "what is it doing now". When there are no abnormal indications, it is doing exactly what it has been designed to do.
If the crew are not properly trained, expectation and delivery may not marry up.
In a modern DAFCS, use of the terms 3 AXIS and 4 AXIS coupling are no longer relevant. It is far more relevant to refer to Fully Coupled OR Mixed Mode flying.
Mixed Mode flying MEANS that one or more of the AXIS (vertical, lateral or longitudinal) are in the custody of the pilot. Knowledge of the display indications make it clear to the pilot which axis he is responsible for. This is a simple concept that is far too often not fully trained and ingrained into the crew.
During automatic mode engagements or switches, such as an ALT.A capture, where V/S is replaced by ALT, it is important the crew recognise, when mixed mode flying, which AXIS, and thus which flight control(s), are in their custody and finally, if they move that control(s), what effect it will have on the flight path.
Of course this is significantly simplified by flying fully coupled. Combine fully coupled mode with DAFCS complete flight envelope protection and now the pilot and passengers are protected from errors in bug selections. Add in terrain awareness displays, with aural and visual warnings, a radar to validate the real world, datamap overlay and now the lateral flight path is also protected. All these systems are fitted to the EC225/175.
In the first EC 225 inadvertant ditching close to the ETAP, the Commander failed to deploy the DAFCS modes AT ALL and the crew deselected the aural terrain warnings. I do not know why! However I would hazard a guess that Commander fits the profile of those of you posting on this thread who state they would decouple and fly manually when things get bad.
For those of us fully trained in modern DAFCS, and involed in teaching these concepts, decoupling close the surface is normally associated with very poor training and/or poor core flying skills.
The L2 has an extremely capable AP. it is a huge step forward from the previous generation. However it has its limitations such that all minimum visibility approaches should be flown fully coupled and NOT in mixed mode to ensure safety. This is required because, unlike the EC225, there are no flight envelope protections. Having flown the L2 for 3000 hours it is a very safe, very competant helicopter in the hands of a well trained, competant pilot. If his operating rules allow latitude for MIXED MODE FLIGHT approaches the first hole of the swiss cheese has already lined up against him.
However, the L2 is not an EC225. The single most significant difference is that in the L2 the Longitudinal Axis always takes priority over the vertical axis. Thus in the cruise, MIXED MODE flight is deployed to avoid unintentional descent under IAS longitudinal prioritisation. However, failure to mandate fully coupled approach procedures when the IAS does not defeat the power available, and by this I mean CAT A ICAO speeds, provides options of mixed mode flight for the crew, and this practice is complex and potentially dangerous at low speeds (as needed for a safe visual transition at MDA/DA), if the crew do not fully understand the axis in their control when in mixed mode flight.
The AAIB reports strongly suggest the helicopter was being flown in Mixed Mode, close to the surface. If you are an offshore pilot reading this, and you do not recognise how dangerous this practice can be, go to your TRI and ask to be retrained. If you a TRI/TRE allowing this practice to occur by pilots in your operation, take all steps you can to outlaw this practice.
Finally, for the hysterical uninformed multitude who bleat on that the pilot is no longer in control, know this, in all EC civil helicopters, no matter what the AP is doing, the pilot always has the option to place hands and feet on and "fly through". However, the entire point of his training procedures, operational SOPs and the underlying regulations are to expressly avoid him having to do so.
I do not really accept "Pilot Error" is ever really to blame for air accidents in proffessional crew. There are usually systemic or cultural factors that lead the crew into un favourable conditions and/or behaviours. I know the Commander of this flight very well. He is Pilot held in high regard by all who know and fly with him. It may be that Mixed Mode flight is the prime causal factor in this case. But reading some if the posts on this thread, by some crews, speaks volumes for the training, culture and practices currently deployed in the UK sector. Look inward and embrace change.
DB
For those posting opinions on autopilots, stating they disconnect the crew from the task, you clearly have not used modern DAFCS equipped machines.
In an AC such as EC225, flown by a properly trained crew with a complete understanding of the DAFCS, the FADEC and the display system, it is impossible for them to sit there wondering "what is it doing now". When there are no abnormal indications, it is doing exactly what it has been designed to do.
If the crew are not properly trained, expectation and delivery may not marry up.
In a modern DAFCS, use of the terms 3 AXIS and 4 AXIS coupling are no longer relevant. It is far more relevant to refer to Fully Coupled OR Mixed Mode flying.
Mixed Mode flying MEANS that one or more of the AXIS (vertical, lateral or longitudinal) are in the custody of the pilot. Knowledge of the display indications make it clear to the pilot which axis he is responsible for. This is a simple concept that is far too often not fully trained and ingrained into the crew.
During automatic mode engagements or switches, such as an ALT.A capture, where V/S is replaced by ALT, it is important the crew recognise, when mixed mode flying, which AXIS, and thus which flight control(s), are in their custody and finally, if they move that control(s), what effect it will have on the flight path.
Of course this is significantly simplified by flying fully coupled. Combine fully coupled mode with DAFCS complete flight envelope protection and now the pilot and passengers are protected from errors in bug selections. Add in terrain awareness displays, with aural and visual warnings, a radar to validate the real world, datamap overlay and now the lateral flight path is also protected. All these systems are fitted to the EC225/175.
In the first EC 225 inadvertant ditching close to the ETAP, the Commander failed to deploy the DAFCS modes AT ALL and the crew deselected the aural terrain warnings. I do not know why! However I would hazard a guess that Commander fits the profile of those of you posting on this thread who state they would decouple and fly manually when things get bad.
For those of us fully trained in modern DAFCS, and involed in teaching these concepts, decoupling close the surface is normally associated with very poor training and/or poor core flying skills.
The L2 has an extremely capable AP. it is a huge step forward from the previous generation. However it has its limitations such that all minimum visibility approaches should be flown fully coupled and NOT in mixed mode to ensure safety. This is required because, unlike the EC225, there are no flight envelope protections. Having flown the L2 for 3000 hours it is a very safe, very competant helicopter in the hands of a well trained, competant pilot. If his operating rules allow latitude for MIXED MODE FLIGHT approaches the first hole of the swiss cheese has already lined up against him.
However, the L2 is not an EC225. The single most significant difference is that in the L2 the Longitudinal Axis always takes priority over the vertical axis. Thus in the cruise, MIXED MODE flight is deployed to avoid unintentional descent under IAS longitudinal prioritisation. However, failure to mandate fully coupled approach procedures when the IAS does not defeat the power available, and by this I mean CAT A ICAO speeds, provides options of mixed mode flight for the crew, and this practice is complex and potentially dangerous at low speeds (as needed for a safe visual transition at MDA/DA), if the crew do not fully understand the axis in their control when in mixed mode flight.
The AAIB reports strongly suggest the helicopter was being flown in Mixed Mode, close to the surface. If you are an offshore pilot reading this, and you do not recognise how dangerous this practice can be, go to your TRI and ask to be retrained. If you a TRI/TRE allowing this practice to occur by pilots in your operation, take all steps you can to outlaw this practice.
Finally, for the hysterical uninformed multitude who bleat on that the pilot is no longer in control, know this, in all EC civil helicopters, no matter what the AP is doing, the pilot always has the option to place hands and feet on and "fly through". However, the entire point of his training procedures, operational SOPs and the underlying regulations are to expressly avoid him having to do so.
I do not really accept "Pilot Error" is ever really to blame for air accidents in proffessional crew. There are usually systemic or cultural factors that lead the crew into un favourable conditions and/or behaviours. I know the Commander of this flight very well. He is Pilot held in high regard by all who know and fly with him. It may be that Mixed Mode flight is the prime causal factor in this case. But reading some if the posts on this thread, by some crews, speaks volumes for the training, culture and practices currently deployed in the UK sector. Look inward and embrace change.
DB
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY; 6th Sep 2013 at 07:49.
Let me see if I can get that logic....... No, I definitely can't!
If there had been a control problem, that's the first thing the pilots would have said to the AAIB, and the AAIB would not then have put out a report which rather implies pilot error as the cause.
Join Date: Jan 2012
Location: Royal Leamington Spa
Age: 78
Posts: 440
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Is it possible that the captain having seen a hole in the cloud, slowed down and tried to descend while maintaining visual contact with the surface with the intention of making the final run into LSI low level visual or something along those lines?
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: UK and MALTA
Age: 61
Posts: 1,297
Likes: 0
Received 18 Likes
on
4 Posts
For the sake of clarity and the sanity of SASSLESS and our passengers, the regulations require a "PILOT FLYING" and a "PILOT MONITORING" no matter what the AP is doing.
SAS, breathe man, We have not all succumbed to monitoring "George" instead of using him and supervising his actions. (Still called flying.......I think!!!)
DB
SAS, breathe man, We have not all succumbed to monitoring "George" instead of using him and supervising his actions. (Still called flying.......I think!!!)
DB
Join Date: Feb 2005
Location: On the green bit near the blue wobbly stuff
Posts: 674
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
Double B - I teach on a different (but modern) type, and I absolutely agree. Company SOPs nowadays generally require flying fully using the automation as the norm for good reason. Training is absolutely the key because lax monitoring skills, poor mode awareness, automation complacency and poor application of automation SOPs are increasingly the issues which I am needing to confront in recurrent training - not handling skills.
So can one of you autopilot gurus just clarify -on the L2 the VS mode is a cyclic control (a la fixed wing - nose down to increase RoD, nose up to reduce it) and that the collective channel would be manually flown or in an altitude acquire mode (presumable set just above MDH).
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 206
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That VRS should occur on a flight such as this (inbound to a NAV AIDS equipped airport) is, at the moment, difficult to understand as is the reason for the helicopter approaching 30kts with two miles left to run?
If the METAR was telling them that the cloudbase was at 200ft then presumably CHC SOP's would instruct them to make an approach which would involve cloudbreak occurring in the final phase of the approach while on automatic and pointing down the middle of the Sumburgh centreline?
There may be instructions as to Rad Alt bug settings or upper mode selections, or sterile cockpits, that sort of thing, but what you describe, apart from the "on automatic" bit, is simply flying an instrument approach, which shouldn't need a specific procedure in an Ops Manual to address.
Crab, in 3-axis, (or Mixed Mode a la DB above), the VS or ALT is on the cyclic. In that instance airspeed is controlled manually with collective. In 4-axis (or Fully Coupled) the VS (or ALT if in that vertical mode) jumps on to the collective and the cyclic then controls the IAS mode.
On 225, the VS/ALT is always on the collective, and IAS is always on the cyclic, irrespective of whether you are 3 or 4 axis.
Last edited by obnoxio f*ckwit; 6th Sep 2013 at 08:35.
Join Date: Aug 2013
Location: Northern Lights
Posts: 48
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TAG
Call me old fashioned if you like but at this point I prefer the paranoid option, the damn thing is probably trying to kill me so disconnect the fancy contraptions and fly the aircraft. There is unlikely to be time to figure out what it was doing so just get the hell out of there.
If fully coupled then dumping all the upper modes at 200' and 0.75nm from a rig isn't going to improve matters.