AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
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Airwave45:
I have enjoyed reading your posts thus far. In general they are a welcomed balance to the forum, and I am pleased to see someone representing the 19 guys down the back actually spend a credible amount of time to-an-fro'ing with the likes of HC, a well respected contributor representing the two drivers up front. Please don't rush off.
My question to you, and the workforce, and those all spouting statistics and likelihood of this that or the other thing versus what the Noggies do on a different or similar type; all protesting that they will never board another Puma: what if it turns out that this accident was the result of pilot error?
Suddenly all the screaming about abandoning the type becomes nothing more than grudge, really. The catalyst of the current protests, and petitions is this most recent incident citing 5 accidents in 4 years and taking it out on the type. If it were pilot error what do you think the industry's response would be? Ground the pilots?
That is not an attack on the response of the offshore workforce, just a parallel application of logic. I'm genuinely curious whether that'd put some egg on faces, or if this might be the beginning of an unstoppable movement - regardless of outcome.
I have enjoyed reading your posts thus far. In general they are a welcomed balance to the forum, and I am pleased to see someone representing the 19 guys down the back actually spend a credible amount of time to-an-fro'ing with the likes of HC, a well respected contributor representing the two drivers up front. Please don't rush off.
My question to you, and the workforce, and those all spouting statistics and likelihood of this that or the other thing versus what the Noggies do on a different or similar type; all protesting that they will never board another Puma: what if it turns out that this accident was the result of pilot error?
Suddenly all the screaming about abandoning the type becomes nothing more than grudge, really. The catalyst of the current protests, and petitions is this most recent incident citing 5 accidents in 4 years and taking it out on the type. If it were pilot error what do you think the industry's response would be? Ground the pilots?
That is not an attack on the response of the offshore workforce, just a parallel application of logic. I'm genuinely curious whether that'd put some egg on faces, or if this might be the beginning of an unstoppable movement - regardless of outcome.
To be clear, you won't find any of my posts having a go at a specific aircraft.
They are in a thread about one particular incident, but tragic as the loss of life and aircraft is, this specific incident really is not what I'm posting for.
Now, if it does turn out to be CFIT, I really feel for the crew.
Which also comes back to the original reason I got brave enough to come in here in the first place.
Which is, Too Many, Too often.
And after looking at the numbers (Which, I know you can turn any way you want) but without getting too picky with them and being really rough.
One side of the N Sea puts 10x more helicopters in the water than the other.
This could well be a statistical anomoly, it may turn out as time goes past that the Scottish side of the operation doesn't put an aircraft in the water for the next 10 years.
Which will leave us scratching our heads and wondering what is going on (well, we won't, we'll all be fat happy and home for T and medals each night)
I feel that you are asking, Based on "If it is human error, then boo ya to the baying mob out to get the Puma"
Which is missing the point that, had there not been so many crashes, there would be no baying mob (which is dying off, people have short memories)
From the back of the bus, we care not a jot whether it is CFIT, or the elastic band that holds the gearbox to the airframe failing, what we see is another wet helicopter and another funeral to go to.
You are percieved (Helicopter + crew) as "one system" be that human or mechanical factors which cause an incident, it is beyond the remit of the slf to figure out what caused it, that is your job.
And if it is CFIT, it still comes down to Too many, too often.
Why do the Noggies not fly their helicopters into the oggin?
I'm 100% sure that the view from the pointy end is different, there is your personal proffesionalism and respect for the machinery.
Which you can differentiate.
If it is CFIT, why are we so good at that? (as it wouldn't be the first of those recently either)
A "Can do" attitude is great, in the right place. Maybe instead of the bears putting their big boy pants on, the pilots need to put on slippers and be a lot less willing to work up to limits.
It might be time to drop operational limits further?
Worse still, appropriate use of automation (AP) may have to extend further into the flight envelope and you become more like your plank flying brothers who only get to waggle the sticks for the first 45 and last 45 seconds of each flight.
From my perspective, last time I had to go offshore N Sea I did not sleep at all the night before I went and was a nervous wreck through the briefing.
Wasn't so bad going out to the helicopter and felt the flight was a non event.
Was offshore for about 10 days and from 2 days before coming back, started getting myself all worked up about getting on the helicopter again.
Were it just me who was like that, I would have my big boy pants on standby for such eventualities.
But it's not just me.
That baying mob out there is made up of old farts like me who have lost their bottle, there is a reason that the bottle has gone, but we don't know the root cause of that reason (Too many, too often)
I fly for fun, I've been on more plank flights and helicopter flights than is credible, Scottish helicopters scare the crap out of me.
Which is why, I'm not getting on another one.
I'm not going to say never, but I've manouvered myself to a place where I don't have to anytime soon.
Last edited by airwave45; 28th Aug 2013 at 05:43. Reason: put in last line
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OMONEZ
Why not save your thoughts for one post instead of shooting from the hip every few seconds. You are becoming tiresome and rude. We are not usually rude to each other on Rotorheads so pack it in.
Why not save your thoughts for one post instead of shooting from the hip every few seconds. You are becoming tiresome and rude. We are not usually rude to each other on Rotorheads so pack it in.
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Agree with SASless, I had an engine failure at 700' in an AB206A, afterwards I was asked to complete a report that asked for N1, EGT, oil Px and Temp etc. at time of failure! Sorry, wasn't looking, no idea, I may have seen something but all mental ability was directed to getting down safely. Sounds like this accident was a whole different ball game, possible control failure at 400' in poor viz, I wouldn't expect the pilots to remember much at all.
I would have hoped that the Royal Navy still had a helicopter with a sonar buoy that they could dunk near the accident site that would pick up the FDR.
I would have hoped that the Royal Navy still had a helicopter with a sonar buoy that they could dunk near the accident site that would pick up the FDR.
AW 45
A good post and having been a shuttle pilot most of my NS life living and eating with "the Bears" I do understand your fears. During my time spent offshore I always tried to answer any concerns you all had about line/shuttle flying but was still surprised how many people were terrified of their journey to work. This was long before the present cluster of incident/accidents. I think I managed to allay some fears but more needs to be done.
It would be interesting to know how many workers are unfortunately killed on their way to the heliport. I know of pilots killed/injured on their way in; interestingy mostly on motorbikes! Which is, therefore, more hazardous - flight or commute to flight?
As far as the present cluster goes I think we should discount the 225 gearbox problems as it is just a matter of luck as to who gets issued with a particular box, just like your new car may be a rogue one. We should concentrate on why the "preventable", used as a very loose description occurred.
As an "old salt" I agree with you that the use and complexity of the autopilot is a worry. I understand that the systems are not user friendly, perhaps because they may be fixed wing nav systems not altered for helicopter usage. I am retired so haven't used the new systems but I can give one example.
Fuel is a very important aspect of operations! On the 365N2 I could call up one page which would show me actual fuel at each way point I had in my route. Destination and diversion being the most important, and is was very accurate. This took alot of stress away if the weather was bad and I was operating to minimums. At least one of the modern a/c flying today you need multiple inputs/page fiddling just to get that info-why. Who in management signed off on a new piece of equipment which was less useful than the 20 yr old one we had before. Yes the new one may be able to do a complicated arrival into Heathrow but that is not required.
It is the same with use of the flying modes-yes they are useful and will protect you but there seems to be a rational to engage at the earliest possible moment. Hand flying skills will be lost.
I was lucky enough to have been in the RAF before joining the NS fraternity so I had lots of hands on flying but even so I did not feel that I was putting the 332L on, rather than just getting into it, until I shuttled with it in the 40s. A brand new co-pilot straight out of training may only have a few hundred hours and once online may accrue hand flying at only a few mins/4hr flight
The Capt who perfectly landed in the Hudson was also a glider pilot. The Air France pilot who didn't seem to know that if you kept the stick back you would stall and crash wasn't a recreational pilot.
There needs to be a bridge built between the users-pilot and procurers-management to make sure what is bought and how it is operated is improved. As a pilot I want a system that is intuitive and requires one button to activate - and that button only does ONE THING!
A good post and having been a shuttle pilot most of my NS life living and eating with "the Bears" I do understand your fears. During my time spent offshore I always tried to answer any concerns you all had about line/shuttle flying but was still surprised how many people were terrified of their journey to work. This was long before the present cluster of incident/accidents. I think I managed to allay some fears but more needs to be done.
It would be interesting to know how many workers are unfortunately killed on their way to the heliport. I know of pilots killed/injured on their way in; interestingy mostly on motorbikes! Which is, therefore, more hazardous - flight or commute to flight?
As far as the present cluster goes I think we should discount the 225 gearbox problems as it is just a matter of luck as to who gets issued with a particular box, just like your new car may be a rogue one. We should concentrate on why the "preventable", used as a very loose description occurred.
As an "old salt" I agree with you that the use and complexity of the autopilot is a worry. I understand that the systems are not user friendly, perhaps because they may be fixed wing nav systems not altered for helicopter usage. I am retired so haven't used the new systems but I can give one example.
Fuel is a very important aspect of operations! On the 365N2 I could call up one page which would show me actual fuel at each way point I had in my route. Destination and diversion being the most important, and is was very accurate. This took alot of stress away if the weather was bad and I was operating to minimums. At least one of the modern a/c flying today you need multiple inputs/page fiddling just to get that info-why. Who in management signed off on a new piece of equipment which was less useful than the 20 yr old one we had before. Yes the new one may be able to do a complicated arrival into Heathrow but that is not required.
It is the same with use of the flying modes-yes they are useful and will protect you but there seems to be a rational to engage at the earliest possible moment. Hand flying skills will be lost.
I was lucky enough to have been in the RAF before joining the NS fraternity so I had lots of hands on flying but even so I did not feel that I was putting the 332L on, rather than just getting into it, until I shuttled with it in the 40s. A brand new co-pilot straight out of training may only have a few hundred hours and once online may accrue hand flying at only a few mins/4hr flight
The Capt who perfectly landed in the Hudson was also a glider pilot. The Air France pilot who didn't seem to know that if you kept the stick back you would stall and crash wasn't a recreational pilot.
There needs to be a bridge built between the users-pilot and procurers-management to make sure what is bought and how it is operated is improved. As a pilot I want a system that is intuitive and requires one button to activate - and that button only does ONE THING!
Last edited by Hummingfrog; 28th Aug 2013 at 07:04.
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Shetland helicopter crash: Safety advice ignored
Shetland helicopter crash: Safety advice ignored - Transport - The Scotsman
HIGH-level flotation devices, which could have saved the four victims of Friday’s Super Puma disaster, were not fitted to North Sea helicopters despite a recommendation from the government’s Civil Aviation Authority eight years ago, it was revealed last night.
The potentially life-saving kit was designed to stop crashed helicopters from “rolling over, completely inverted” and retain an air pocket to help passengers escape.
The use of the devices was recommended in a major review of helicopter ditching and crash-worthiness research in the UK Continental Shelf. But it was never followed through, the British Airline Pilots Association (Balpa) disclosed yesterday.
The CAA report, published in December 2005, concluded: “The single most effective means of improving occupant survival in the event of a post-ditching capsize or a survivable water impact is through the provision of additional flotation devices to prevent total inversion following capsize.”
Captain Mike Buckley, Balpa’s spokesman on helicopters, revealed details of the failure to implement the system as the pilots’ union yesterday called for an industry-wide review of helicopter safety in the North Sea. The union is demanding a review to explore why helicopter operations in the Norwegian sector, which share the same geographic operational area, have a better safety record than helicopter flights in the UK Continental Shelf.
The potentially life-saving kit was designed to stop crashed helicopters from “rolling over, completely inverted” and retain an air pocket to help passengers escape.
The use of the devices was recommended in a major review of helicopter ditching and crash-worthiness research in the UK Continental Shelf. But it was never followed through, the British Airline Pilots Association (Balpa) disclosed yesterday.
The CAA report, published in December 2005, concluded: “The single most effective means of improving occupant survival in the event of a post-ditching capsize or a survivable water impact is through the provision of additional flotation devices to prevent total inversion following capsize.”
Captain Mike Buckley, Balpa’s spokesman on helicopters, revealed details of the failure to implement the system as the pilots’ union yesterday called for an industry-wide review of helicopter safety in the North Sea. The union is demanding a review to explore why helicopter operations in the Norwegian sector, which share the same geographic operational area, have a better safety record than helicopter flights in the UK Continental Shelf.
Try it next time you're in the hangar, wearing three layers of clothing, an immersion suit (ours, not yours) and a LAPP jacket. The handle is not above your head.
I would have thought that two experienced pilots would have been better witnesses to the actual occurrence than a CVFDR
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Originally Posted by Hummingfrog
As an "old salt" I agree with you that the use and complexity of the autopilot is a worry. I understand that the systems are not user friendly, perhaps because they may be fixed wing nav systems not altered for helicopter usage. I am retired so haven't used the new systems but I can give one example.
Originally Posted by Hummingfrog
Fuel is a very important aspect of operations! On the 365N2 I could call up one page which would show me actual fuel at each way point I had in my route. Destination and diversion being the most important, and is was very accurate. This took alot of stress away if the weather was bad and I was operating to minimums.
Originally Posted by Hummingfrog
As a pilot I want a system that is intuitive and requires one button to activate - and that button only does ONE THING!
I admit I am biased, I am a 225 Fanboy as is my wife as she feels safest when I fly the 225. Before people roll their eyes she has been in the industry for almost 20 years, helicopter operators as well as oil. The sooner I get on the 225 the better.
Si
Last edited by bigglesbutler; 28th Aug 2013 at 07:34.
Si, yes the GA levels the wings (or makes you track straight ahead if you press it at very low speed). The rate of roll back to wings level is only moderate so if you are in an unusual attitude near the surface, manual recovery is better, but otherwise as you say the GA takes you up and away regardless.
Its a pity that some other operators don't use it to its full potential, IIRC they ban its use below Vy. Crazy!
Its a pity that some other operators don't use it to its full potential, IIRC they ban its use below Vy. Crazy!
HC
It is good to hear that the 225 has a user friendly FMS, I have heard that the autopilot package in the L2/225 was superior to that of the 92.
What are your thoughts on overuse of the autopilot - depriving pilots of true hands on flying. I know that rig approaches are much more regimented than my day -500 straight in rather than a gentle curved approach around the back of the rig to arrive fully stabilised at deck +200ft. That approach, of course, required hand flying skills
HF
It is good to hear that the 225 has a user friendly FMS, I have heard that the autopilot package in the L2/225 was superior to that of the 92.
What are your thoughts on overuse of the autopilot - depriving pilots of true hands on flying. I know that rig approaches are much more regimented than my day -500 straight in rather than a gentle curved approach around the back of the rig to arrive fully stabilised at deck +200ft. That approach, of course, required hand flying skills
HF
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Cultural difference
I have been following this thread from the start with great interest, and not surprised to see a wide variety of opinions and views from the full spectrum of parties involved. It has been questioned several time as to why there might be such an apparent difference from the Norwegian side to the UK sector in relation to accident statistics. Firstly I would be slightly cautious with statistics. One bad month in Norway could change it all.
I am however familiar with operations on both sides of the North Sea and the differences are smaller than most might imagine. These days the larger operators are employing common OM’s and SOP’s. OMA, OMB and Emergency Checklists are standardized across the sea. I don’t know too much about the engineering procedures, but I imagine they are also similar if not the same.
That, however, is of no use, as there clearly is a difference in the final result if statistics are to be believed. From my experience, whilst everything on the surface is very similar there are some very fundamental differences in the way business is conducted. Whatever the final report on this accident finds, the result will be a complex human factors case. I despair when I see people calling for a simplified single root cause, as it just does not ever exist in aviation. To blame the pilot and say pilot error is a part of the cultural problem and one I thought we had moved away from. It will almost certainly be the case that the crew could have done something differently and the outcome would have been different. It is also very likely there was some form of technical problem be it a minor or major one. Certain phses and flight conditions don’t need much before a minor problem is a major one. If it is a pure technical issue, the same point arises. Why did it occur, and how far back could it have been prevented. It is slightly irrelevant that the last few ditchings have been Eurocopter. What is relevant is that ditchings and accidents have occurred and that the industry as a whole must identify what they can do to improve.
If they want to look at how things differ in Norway, I think it would be a good place to start. The culture is fundamentally different. I see a few key differences.
1. Positive and constructive working relationship between customer (oil company) and contractor (helicopter op). The customer has a good and realistic understanding of the aviation operation and maintains a positive form of communication.
2. Stronger Unions and acceptance of all companies and management to work with and hold constructive dialogue with unions. In this sense offshore unions have a good relationship and communication with pilots unions and management. So far management have not tried to bust unions.
3. Unions have pushed oil companies on safety with great effect. This results in oil companies setting higher safety requirement of their contractors. An example is higher simulator time and more training required annually for pilots.
4. Better working conditions for pilots and engineers - including proper equal time rosters and no “flex time” rosters, allowing proper rest periods away from the work environment. A happier work force?
5. Lack of blame culture in Norway. Norwegians are very open to dialogue and averse to conflict. The attitude is usually to try and move forward and not waste time on finding blame when it is not relevant. They recognised a long time ago that blame is never a simple concept in reality and is very often just an easy way out to close a case. Some poor sod gets the sack - move on - doesn’t work.
6. The understanding that “cheapest is not always cheapest”. This however is changing with new global management structures, and is in my view the single largest threat to safety anywhere in our industry. Fortunately as stated in point.3 the oil companies drive for the latest technology and most modern types. When management sit detached from the operation and whose sole focus is to cut cost, eventually safety will be compromised and by then it will be too late to go back. This, again purely in my own humble opinion, will likely be a major feature in any future report worth its salt. This is not purely the fault of the operator. They are often forced by the oil companies, however there is an element of joint ownership of this particular problem. This is one for the highest levels of management in oil companies and helicopter operators alike to sit around the table and set some basic rules again.
7. Finally - an Authority and a Union structure that protects the industry against cowboys! I am not saying for one minute that there are any cowboy outfits in the North Sea. However if the threat is there, the wolf is at the door and the operators will feel they need to do whatever possible to cut cost to keep the wolf at bay.
That is my take on it. Last friday was a tragic day for all of us who fly, maintain and work on the rigs. Quit the blame game. We are all to blame, every damn one of us in a small way. Now lets identify how we make it better for everyone.
I am however familiar with operations on both sides of the North Sea and the differences are smaller than most might imagine. These days the larger operators are employing common OM’s and SOP’s. OMA, OMB and Emergency Checklists are standardized across the sea. I don’t know too much about the engineering procedures, but I imagine they are also similar if not the same.
That, however, is of no use, as there clearly is a difference in the final result if statistics are to be believed. From my experience, whilst everything on the surface is very similar there are some very fundamental differences in the way business is conducted. Whatever the final report on this accident finds, the result will be a complex human factors case. I despair when I see people calling for a simplified single root cause, as it just does not ever exist in aviation. To blame the pilot and say pilot error is a part of the cultural problem and one I thought we had moved away from. It will almost certainly be the case that the crew could have done something differently and the outcome would have been different. It is also very likely there was some form of technical problem be it a minor or major one. Certain phses and flight conditions don’t need much before a minor problem is a major one. If it is a pure technical issue, the same point arises. Why did it occur, and how far back could it have been prevented. It is slightly irrelevant that the last few ditchings have been Eurocopter. What is relevant is that ditchings and accidents have occurred and that the industry as a whole must identify what they can do to improve.
If they want to look at how things differ in Norway, I think it would be a good place to start. The culture is fundamentally different. I see a few key differences.
1. Positive and constructive working relationship between customer (oil company) and contractor (helicopter op). The customer has a good and realistic understanding of the aviation operation and maintains a positive form of communication.
2. Stronger Unions and acceptance of all companies and management to work with and hold constructive dialogue with unions. In this sense offshore unions have a good relationship and communication with pilots unions and management. So far management have not tried to bust unions.
3. Unions have pushed oil companies on safety with great effect. This results in oil companies setting higher safety requirement of their contractors. An example is higher simulator time and more training required annually for pilots.
4. Better working conditions for pilots and engineers - including proper equal time rosters and no “flex time” rosters, allowing proper rest periods away from the work environment. A happier work force?
5. Lack of blame culture in Norway. Norwegians are very open to dialogue and averse to conflict. The attitude is usually to try and move forward and not waste time on finding blame when it is not relevant. They recognised a long time ago that blame is never a simple concept in reality and is very often just an easy way out to close a case. Some poor sod gets the sack - move on - doesn’t work.
6. The understanding that “cheapest is not always cheapest”. This however is changing with new global management structures, and is in my view the single largest threat to safety anywhere in our industry. Fortunately as stated in point.3 the oil companies drive for the latest technology and most modern types. When management sit detached from the operation and whose sole focus is to cut cost, eventually safety will be compromised and by then it will be too late to go back. This, again purely in my own humble opinion, will likely be a major feature in any future report worth its salt. This is not purely the fault of the operator. They are often forced by the oil companies, however there is an element of joint ownership of this particular problem. This is one for the highest levels of management in oil companies and helicopter operators alike to sit around the table and set some basic rules again.
7. Finally - an Authority and a Union structure that protects the industry against cowboys! I am not saying for one minute that there are any cowboy outfits in the North Sea. However if the threat is there, the wolf is at the door and the operators will feel they need to do whatever possible to cut cost to keep the wolf at bay.
That is my take on it. Last friday was a tragic day for all of us who fly, maintain and work on the rigs. Quit the blame game. We are all to blame, every damn one of us in a small way. Now lets identify how we make it better for everyone.
Being reported in the local press this morning that the pilot is being treated in hospital for a broken back.
HF brace yourself, long post coming up! The L2 and 92 autopilots are of similar capability in terms of precision and min IAS for use, although the 92 has more "bells and whistles" modes. The underlying technology is of error detection and correction, ie an error has to develop first, then the AP makes a correction.
The 225 is in a different league with the whole AP being driven by hybridised parameters of inertial data plus the parameter in question (eg inertial plus pressure altitude for ALT) with the emphasis on the inertial. This makes it incredibly precise in those inertia related modes (ALT, LOC, GS etc) and slightly less precise, but still very good in the likes of IAS - because gusts etc mean there isn't necessarily a direct correlation between IAS and inertial speed. Min IAS for a number of modes such as ALT, GA is zero, min for IAS is 30 kts. This allows the upper modes to be engaged until very late in eg a night offshore approach, down to 30kts IAS which might be very low ground speed.
As to the point about manual flying skills, it is a good one. Clearly one needs to have both manual skills and a good understanding of the behaviour of the automation. But how to set the balance?
The AP is so much better and more consistent at flying eg an instrument approach in bad weather, or a night takeoff, than the crews, that in my mind it would be criminal for the pilots to take the less safe option of flying these manually and reducing the safety of the flight with passengers, just for their own practice. That is why the Bristow OM requires use of automation in such conditions. Manual practice is only allowed in day VMC.
Does this degrade manual flying skills, well maybe BUT, for example when I learnt to fly on a Bell 47, to start with 99% of my attention was on maintaining the rrpm at 3050 to 3100 in the hover, using the throttle. Now I fly helicopters that don't have a throttle at all, so that skill is completely redundant.
Similarly, I fly a helicopter that, in its entire history with Bristow, has only had one event where a manual ILS had to be flown, and that was caused by a software bug now fixed. So just how much effort and increased risk to the passengers should go into maintaining superb ILS manual flying skills in bad weather? I would say that you just need to be able to struggle by, not put in a polished performance if the less than once in several lifetimes event occurs. There is just so much redundancy that its hard to imagine a situation where a coupled ILS couldn't be flown.
All that is fine for old codgers who can fly, what about those coming new into the industry. Clearly they do need to develop manual flying skills, but my view is that, whilst this can be done on the line in reasonable weather, anything more tricky must be done in the simulator, which we are fortunate enough to have on the doorstep. There is no rule that says pilots can only go into the Sim once every 6 months! I'm glad to see that after a bit of a hiatus, Bristow is once again providing copilot development sim trips in between the 6 monthly checks.
HC
The 225 is in a different league with the whole AP being driven by hybridised parameters of inertial data plus the parameter in question (eg inertial plus pressure altitude for ALT) with the emphasis on the inertial. This makes it incredibly precise in those inertia related modes (ALT, LOC, GS etc) and slightly less precise, but still very good in the likes of IAS - because gusts etc mean there isn't necessarily a direct correlation between IAS and inertial speed. Min IAS for a number of modes such as ALT, GA is zero, min for IAS is 30 kts. This allows the upper modes to be engaged until very late in eg a night offshore approach, down to 30kts IAS which might be very low ground speed.
As to the point about manual flying skills, it is a good one. Clearly one needs to have both manual skills and a good understanding of the behaviour of the automation. But how to set the balance?
The AP is so much better and more consistent at flying eg an instrument approach in bad weather, or a night takeoff, than the crews, that in my mind it would be criminal for the pilots to take the less safe option of flying these manually and reducing the safety of the flight with passengers, just for their own practice. That is why the Bristow OM requires use of automation in such conditions. Manual practice is only allowed in day VMC.
Does this degrade manual flying skills, well maybe BUT, for example when I learnt to fly on a Bell 47, to start with 99% of my attention was on maintaining the rrpm at 3050 to 3100 in the hover, using the throttle. Now I fly helicopters that don't have a throttle at all, so that skill is completely redundant.
Similarly, I fly a helicopter that, in its entire history with Bristow, has only had one event where a manual ILS had to be flown, and that was caused by a software bug now fixed. So just how much effort and increased risk to the passengers should go into maintaining superb ILS manual flying skills in bad weather? I would say that you just need to be able to struggle by, not put in a polished performance if the less than once in several lifetimes event occurs. There is just so much redundancy that its hard to imagine a situation where a coupled ILS couldn't be flown.
All that is fine for old codgers who can fly, what about those coming new into the industry. Clearly they do need to develop manual flying skills, but my view is that, whilst this can be done on the line in reasonable weather, anything more tricky must be done in the simulator, which we are fortunate enough to have on the doorstep. There is no rule that says pilots can only go into the Sim once every 6 months! I'm glad to see that after a bit of a hiatus, Bristow is once again providing copilot development sim trips in between the 6 monthly checks.
HC
Last edited by HeliComparator; 28th Aug 2013 at 08:49.
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AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
Both pilots are able to speak & have been since it happened. Ones at home & the other is still recovering from back injuries - not a broken back.
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Quote:
Try it next time you're in the hangar, wearing three layers of clothing, an immersion suit (ours, not yours) and a LAPP jacket. The handle is not above your head.
It was something that emerged in the G-REDU investigation, and explains why the starboard door was opened normally and not jetissoned. The AAIB were incredulous.
Try it next time you're in the hangar, wearing three layers of clothing, an immersion suit (ours, not yours) and a LAPP jacket. The handle is not above your head.
It was something that emerged in the G-REDU investigation, and explains why the starboard door was opened normally and not jetissoned. The AAIB were incredulous.
The training [briefing] material, however, did not focus on the difficulty of carrying out an emergency jettison of the starboard main door. It was not made clear that the emergency release handle may need to be operated by a passenger seated in a row further forward than the row adjacent to the door. The passengers were therefore unable to locate the starboard main door emergency release handle and subsequently it was not jettisoned. Instead they opened it normally, sliding it to its forward position and obstructing the two forward right cabin window exits.
Add to this the desire to get out fast, possible inattentiveness during the briefing and the reversion to ingrained actions that many experience during highly pressured situations (eg treating the control column on a light aircraft like a car's steering wheel) and you have a cocktail of reasons why the G-REDU door may have been opened in the normal manner.
Last edited by satsuma; 28th Aug 2013 at 08:51.
High Level Floats
I appreciate that any helicopter makes a far more stable boat when upside down and that this is the reason for studying the option of high level floats. However, I am not sure that I find the idea of inflatable air bags mounted just below a rotor disc reassuring.
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High level float bags - not a good idea
Gents,
The last helicopter I am aware of with high levels floats was the venerable Navy Saunders Roe Wasp.
Imagine ditching with high level floats. You are immediately accepting your head will likely be close too or under water even in a calm sea. Now you have to exit, complete with all your gear, and evade the massive float bags positioned alongside the fuselage above your head, body and life jacket.
If the plan is to supplement the low floats with high ones to stabilise the helicopter from rollover, now there is even less room to get out.
Maybe I have missed the point but really. Is this kind of issue relevant to what has just happened taking into account the success of all other ditchings.
DB
The last helicopter I am aware of with high levels floats was the venerable Navy Saunders Roe Wasp.
Imagine ditching with high level floats. You are immediately accepting your head will likely be close too or under water even in a calm sea. Now you have to exit, complete with all your gear, and evade the massive float bags positioned alongside the fuselage above your head, body and life jacket.
If the plan is to supplement the low floats with high ones to stabilise the helicopter from rollover, now there is even less room to get out.
Maybe I have missed the point but really. Is this kind of issue relevant to what has just happened taking into account the success of all other ditchings.
DB
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High level floatation devices
If you read the CAA report, you will see that the high level floatation systems were in addition to the standard floatation bags. Various options were considered, including high buoyancy foam incorporated into the cowlings etc. These would help to prevent a total capsize, holding the fuselage in a partially capsized position, creating a large air pocket inside the cabin. Admittedly, one side of the cabin would be low and one side high, but trials carried out using the system proved successful.
The floats were only one of the recommendations in the report: there were several others.
I suggest anyone interested have a look at the report.
CAA Paper 2005/06: Summary Report on Helicopter Ditching and Crashworthiness Research | Publications | About the CAA
bondu
The floats were only one of the recommendations in the report: there were several others.
I suggest anyone interested have a look at the report.
CAA Paper 2005/06: Summary Report on Helicopter Ditching and Crashworthiness Research | Publications | About the CAA
bondu