AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
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Two weeks before the first EC225 inadvetent ditching at the ETAP I also had a close call with the sea. This prompted me to explore develop and eventually produce the Offshore Night Stabilised Approach concept. Whilst I am not claiming complete responsibility for the procedures its merits stand alone.
During my research I found evidence worldwide of 27 inadvertent CFIT into the water. It is not a new problem. One of them led to the mandating of RADALTS and Aural Warnings in Offshore Helicopters (Can you believe they were not fitted before).
Automation done correctly is the single most improvement in safety during over water operations. Note my use of the word "Correctly".
Education, Training and Regular practice is the key.
Train Hard - Fight Easy. Why would you not fly the same procedue in good weather as you would in bad. One procedure. One set of data. One concept. One mindset. One outcome.
The exception surely must be the degraded mode. This is the one we should be training in the SIM (for EC225 this is SEMA - not uncoupled mode - CAA please take note), backed up of course during aircraft training and checks.
The current offshore night stabilised approach procedures are a step forward.......BUT.......corrupted by the confusion created by Operator's who insist in beginning the approach at a fixed height above the water in defference to the variable hieght of the target helideck.
It should be a fixed height above the helideck. This way the trigonometry involved for the individual type is consistent for each and every approach. The data gathered by the brain is consistant which leads to much greater flightpath deviation detection when finally established in the descent beyond the HDP. One procedure. One set of data. One concept. One mindset. One outcome.
Discipline is the word that springs to my mind when I am flying offshore. If pilots still want to fly manually, at night, or worse, in IMC, with PAX behind them, then I suggest they start looking elsewhere for their paypacket because that is not what the passengers want, deserve or should be subjected to. WHY - because it is far less safe than flying 4-axis coupled PROVIDED the Pilot fully and completely understands his autopilot, display system and intergration with any associated engine power management system.
One final point. Automation in fixed wing FBW aeroplanes means the Pilots hands are never physically connected to the flight controls. To be clear, this is never the case in an EC Offshore model. Whatever the AP is doing we can always place are hands on the controls and directly manouver the flight surfaces. We do not suffer the same phenomenom as our FW Brethren.
DB
During my research I found evidence worldwide of 27 inadvertent CFIT into the water. It is not a new problem. One of them led to the mandating of RADALTS and Aural Warnings in Offshore Helicopters (Can you believe they were not fitted before).
Automation done correctly is the single most improvement in safety during over water operations. Note my use of the word "Correctly".
Education, Training and Regular practice is the key.
Train Hard - Fight Easy. Why would you not fly the same procedue in good weather as you would in bad. One procedure. One set of data. One concept. One mindset. One outcome.
The exception surely must be the degraded mode. This is the one we should be training in the SIM (for EC225 this is SEMA - not uncoupled mode - CAA please take note), backed up of course during aircraft training and checks.
The current offshore night stabilised approach procedures are a step forward.......BUT.......corrupted by the confusion created by Operator's who insist in beginning the approach at a fixed height above the water in defference to the variable hieght of the target helideck.
It should be a fixed height above the helideck. This way the trigonometry involved for the individual type is consistent for each and every approach. The data gathered by the brain is consistant which leads to much greater flightpath deviation detection when finally established in the descent beyond the HDP. One procedure. One set of data. One concept. One mindset. One outcome.
Discipline is the word that springs to my mind when I am flying offshore. If pilots still want to fly manually, at night, or worse, in IMC, with PAX behind them, then I suggest they start looking elsewhere for their paypacket because that is not what the passengers want, deserve or should be subjected to. WHY - because it is far less safe than flying 4-axis coupled PROVIDED the Pilot fully and completely understands his autopilot, display system and intergration with any associated engine power management system.
One final point. Automation in fixed wing FBW aeroplanes means the Pilots hands are never physically connected to the flight controls. To be clear, this is never the case in an EC Offshore model. Whatever the AP is doing we can always place are hands on the controls and directly manouver the flight surfaces. We do not suffer the same phenomenom as our FW Brethren.
DB
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A few points to make.
1. High level floats.
A long time ago I got 650 hours on the Westland Wasp. The high level floats were mounted above the doors in clam shell pods on a large frame which went right round the fuselage. The floats were attached to the upper clam shell and when inflated they extended down to about halfway down the doors. The aircraft floated with the water level about mouth height - if you were tall like me. Some of our shorter bretheren would have had to hold their breath. If the doors were fitted, you would have to jettison by releasing the jettison mechanism on the door hinges, opening the normal handle and pushing the door down away from the floats, before exiting by releasing harness and ducking down under the floats before coming back to the surface. I believe the late Ben Caesar just stood up from his seat and put his head straight through the overhead canopy - which had no pull out strip and went out vertically, but he was a big strong boy. When we were embarked at sea we never fitted the cockpit doors but flew with wind deflectors fitted to the door hinges - that took 10 knots off our airspeed. It was pretty chilly in the winter time I can assure you, especially in the Falklands in 1982. Fortunately I never had to use the system for real, but we practised it in the hangar as part of our abandon aircraft drills - with a personal survival pack strapped to our backside just to make things more interesting.
2. The Norwegian way.
Great post on their philosophy above. One of the other factors is that Norwegian law compels companies to have 2 members of the workforce on the board of directors. They are bound by the normal confidentiality of boardroom discussions. Their presence especially in an aviation company brings a sense of realism about what the work actually entails to the boardroom table, and ensures that safety and what the implications of decisions will mean in practice to the aviation operation. I have trained 2 of our Norwegian colleagues who have done stints as company directors of our Norwegian enterprise and whose views were given due weight in all boardroom discussions.
3. Use of 225 autopilot upper modes in low viz, low cloud alpproaches.
The 225 is without doubt the finest and safest aircraft I have ever flown in the 36 years I have been doing the job both in the RN and for 2 of the NS operators. It is so unfortunate that the two forced landings/controlled ditchings took place last year, because they resulted in the removal of the best aircraft on the North Sea for almost a year. I am convinced that had the faulty shafts been fitted to one of our aircraft, the aircraft would not have been dispatched for flight due to our downloading of IHUMS/MARMS info after every flight at which point the increased vibration levels of the propagating cracks would have been detected. The level of precise control available at low speed low altitude at night over the sea is superb, and had it been used by the crew, the ETAP crash would not have occurred either.
I cannot wait to get back on to the EC225, especially with winter on its way.
1. High level floats.
A long time ago I got 650 hours on the Westland Wasp. The high level floats were mounted above the doors in clam shell pods on a large frame which went right round the fuselage. The floats were attached to the upper clam shell and when inflated they extended down to about halfway down the doors. The aircraft floated with the water level about mouth height - if you were tall like me. Some of our shorter bretheren would have had to hold their breath. If the doors were fitted, you would have to jettison by releasing the jettison mechanism on the door hinges, opening the normal handle and pushing the door down away from the floats, before exiting by releasing harness and ducking down under the floats before coming back to the surface. I believe the late Ben Caesar just stood up from his seat and put his head straight through the overhead canopy - which had no pull out strip and went out vertically, but he was a big strong boy. When we were embarked at sea we never fitted the cockpit doors but flew with wind deflectors fitted to the door hinges - that took 10 knots off our airspeed. It was pretty chilly in the winter time I can assure you, especially in the Falklands in 1982. Fortunately I never had to use the system for real, but we practised it in the hangar as part of our abandon aircraft drills - with a personal survival pack strapped to our backside just to make things more interesting.
2. The Norwegian way.
Great post on their philosophy above. One of the other factors is that Norwegian law compels companies to have 2 members of the workforce on the board of directors. They are bound by the normal confidentiality of boardroom discussions. Their presence especially in an aviation company brings a sense of realism about what the work actually entails to the boardroom table, and ensures that safety and what the implications of decisions will mean in practice to the aviation operation. I have trained 2 of our Norwegian colleagues who have done stints as company directors of our Norwegian enterprise and whose views were given due weight in all boardroom discussions.
3. Use of 225 autopilot upper modes in low viz, low cloud alpproaches.
The 225 is without doubt the finest and safest aircraft I have ever flown in the 36 years I have been doing the job both in the RN and for 2 of the NS operators. It is so unfortunate that the two forced landings/controlled ditchings took place last year, because they resulted in the removal of the best aircraft on the North Sea for almost a year. I am convinced that had the faulty shafts been fitted to one of our aircraft, the aircraft would not have been dispatched for flight due to our downloading of IHUMS/MARMS info after every flight at which point the increased vibration levels of the propagating cracks would have been detected. The level of precise control available at low speed low altitude at night over the sea is superb, and had it been used by the crew, the ETAP crash would not have occurred either.
I cannot wait to get back on to the EC225, especially with winter on its way.
DB well said, I think you and I are on the same wavelength! I am amazed that some operators are using a fixed height above the sea, thus making every offshore approach look different! What is the sense in that?
To be precise, Bristow does have a minimum of 300' above the sea, this was to avoid being very low before starting the approach when landing on a deck with a deck height below 100', but there aren't too many of them.
We all fly the same types but it never fails to amaze me the differences in operating procedures between the 3 companies.
To be precise, Bristow does have a minimum of 300' above the sea, this was to avoid being very low before starting the approach when landing on a deck with a deck height below 100', but there aren't too many of them.
We all fly the same types but it never fails to amaze me the differences in operating procedures between the 3 companies.
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HF
you may be referring to the type that I fly. It is indeed SOP to fully couple at Vy. That is what the aircraft is designed to do and it does it very well.
It is perfectly acceptable, if briefed, to manually fly it all the way. It will do it, just not as well.
What is not acceptable is to 'mix-mode'. Coupling to ROC without IAS is a no-no as, in the event of engine failure you will be at great risk of rapidly getting on the back of the drag curve.
When the aircraft was new, pilots converting from steam driven types would, anytime the AFCS/FD wasn't doing exactly as they wanted, pickle it and go for full manual. Trainers had to emphasise the benefits of being fully coupled and encourage its use. Now we have learned the foibles of the system, we can fine tune it and, if necessary de-couple unrequired modes. Perhaps, with a new generation of pilots who have not had the benefit of thousands of hours of uncoupled flight, we should be changing the emphasis back the other way.
you may be referring to the type that I fly. It is indeed SOP to fully couple at Vy. That is what the aircraft is designed to do and it does it very well.
It is perfectly acceptable, if briefed, to manually fly it all the way. It will do it, just not as well.
What is not acceptable is to 'mix-mode'. Coupling to ROC without IAS is a no-no as, in the event of engine failure you will be at great risk of rapidly getting on the back of the drag curve.
When the aircraft was new, pilots converting from steam driven types would, anytime the AFCS/FD wasn't doing exactly as they wanted, pickle it and go for full manual. Trainers had to emphasise the benefits of being fully coupled and encourage its use. Now we have learned the foibles of the system, we can fine tune it and, if necessary de-couple unrequired modes. Perhaps, with a new generation of pilots who have not had the benefit of thousands of hours of uncoupled flight, we should be changing the emphasis back the other way.
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Earlier one poster suggested that bad weather training should only be conducted in the simulator. If North Sea drivers return from a platform without any passengers, couldn't they turn that transit into a training sortie and put each other through their paces? Simulated emergencies, dummy approaches etc. Even better in bad weather one would think. Or do North Sea drivers tend not to return with empty aircraft?
What is not acceptable is to 'mix-mode'. Coupling to ROC without IAS is a no-no as, in the event of engine failure you will be at great risk of rapidly getting on the back of the drag curve.
<Naughty! Dont start that again!>
Ooooh scratch your eyes out too!
Mind you, I asked for it!
Anyway, what are you doing on Prune, you should be busy flying your tractor all the hours god sends to keep the revenue coming in, whilst we relax at home
Mind you, I asked for it!
Anyway, what are you doing on Prune, you should be busy flying your tractor all the hours god sends to keep the revenue coming in, whilst we relax at home
Last edited by HeliComparator; 28th Aug 2013 at 13:28.
I hope that this accident, whatever the cause, generates good healthy debate on how all companies operate their autopilot procedures in the NS so they are as safe and as consistent as possible. The best practice of one operator being adopted by the rest.
I was a shuttle pilot on ETAP for several years and was amazed how a second generation SP could end up in the water. ETAP is one of the bigger rigs in the NS with a modern, large, well lit helideck with little turbulence. I can't remember the outcome of the AIB report, if it has been published, but I guess the modern autopilot didn't save the day - if used - or the manual flying skills had been degraded.
Having made 100s of manual night landings on there it was never a problem, difficult sometimes in zero wind at night viz/cb limits.
Let us hope they find the tail soon so we can get to the bottom of what happened.
HF
I was a shuttle pilot on ETAP for several years and was amazed how a second generation SP could end up in the water. ETAP is one of the bigger rigs in the NS with a modern, large, well lit helideck with little turbulence. I can't remember the outcome of the AIB report, if it has been published, but I guess the modern autopilot didn't save the day - if used - or the manual flying skills had been degraded.
Having made 100s of manual night landings on there it was never a problem, difficult sometimes in zero wind at night viz/cb limits.
Let us hope they find the tail soon so we can get to the bottom of what happened.
HF
Vie sans frontieres During flights which have no pax on board, the chances of being crewed with a training captain at the same time are very, very small. We're not allowed to practice emergencies without a trainer and from the client's point of view, they're paying for us to get out and back without undue delay.
Furthermore the passengers offshore waiting for that aircraft to come back offshore again and take them home, wouldn't be thrilled to know that such training is delaying their escape by many minutes or longer. Sometimes the difference between being first down the ILS back to Aberdeen in bad weather, or joining the back of a queue, can be the difference in who calls first on the radio. Similarly who gets the fuel bowser first, back at base and who gets taxi clearance first from Ground Control to avoid delays at the runway holding point. Seconds can count!
Finally I'm not sure of the insurance implications of mixing training into revenue flying, should anything go wrong.
Furthermore the passengers offshore waiting for that aircraft to come back offshore again and take them home, wouldn't be thrilled to know that such training is delaying their escape by many minutes or longer. Sometimes the difference between being first down the ILS back to Aberdeen in bad weather, or joining the back of a queue, can be the difference in who calls first on the radio. Similarly who gets the fuel bowser first, back at base and who gets taxi clearance first from Ground Control to avoid delays at the runway holding point. Seconds can count!
Finally I'm not sure of the insurance implications of mixing training into revenue flying, should anything go wrong.
Last edited by Colibri49; 28th Aug 2013 at 14:03.
Some very good posts to read this morning.
I recall the great work Double Bogey did on the Night Approaches and he should be commended for that initiative.
I am surprised to learn the Aberdeen Simulator(s) are not working nearly 24 hours each and every day. I would think every pilot, but especially newer pilots would be encouraged to make use of the Sim(s) anytime they were not scheduled for Required Training.
When going through the US Army Instrument Flying Course on Huey's....my Stick Buddy and I would take a Six Pack of Beer....climb into the Sim in the Evening on our own time....and FLY. We got lots of hours, flew lots of approaches, experienced lots of Turbulence.....and generally just had a hell of a lot of fun. None of that hurt us one bit in the course.....and certainly made the "Legitimate" training much easier and more effective as we had the "pole shaking" down pat.
While teaching in the Sim at two different OEM Training Centers....I would do much the same. Whenever there was a vacant Sim....I would climb in and duplicate routes I had flown or were flying on my other job as a Line Pilot. I did them real time usually....input malfunctions...and always flew in weather that required approaches to minimums....and almost always flew them manually.
On use of Automation.....absolutely use it to the maximum...for continuity of training if nothing else. Hand fly on Revenue trips....why not so long as you do so in decent weather. If the weather is near minimums or at Night Off shore...by all means use the Autopilot system.
Coordination between Flight Departments from Operators.....why not have quarterly meetings by Training Staff and Ops Staff to work at finding the Best Practices for similar aircraft. Let the Commercial Staff compete for business but the Pilots and Engineers should be able to work towards standard Safety Practices and Flying Standards. You share the same sky, fly the same aircraft, why would you not benefit from the other guy's experiences?
Emergency exits.....some problems being reported about Opening Doors that block Emergency Exits because of a Door Handle being in a bad position.....and that has not been addressed and resolved yet? Or did I miss something?
Working Engineers and Pilots on the Corporate Board....now that would really rock the US and UK Operators World wouldn't it!
PA....I applaud you for telling us about your experience with the CFIT. That is the kind of courage we need to see more often as others can benefit from what would otherwise have been just a tragic day otherwise. Every time I read of a friend being involved in an Accident....I understand very well it could have been me instead of them....and I also know that no matter how good we think we are....none of us are immune.
I recall the great work Double Bogey did on the Night Approaches and he should be commended for that initiative.
I am surprised to learn the Aberdeen Simulator(s) are not working nearly 24 hours each and every day. I would think every pilot, but especially newer pilots would be encouraged to make use of the Sim(s) anytime they were not scheduled for Required Training.
When going through the US Army Instrument Flying Course on Huey's....my Stick Buddy and I would take a Six Pack of Beer....climb into the Sim in the Evening on our own time....and FLY. We got lots of hours, flew lots of approaches, experienced lots of Turbulence.....and generally just had a hell of a lot of fun. None of that hurt us one bit in the course.....and certainly made the "Legitimate" training much easier and more effective as we had the "pole shaking" down pat.
While teaching in the Sim at two different OEM Training Centers....I would do much the same. Whenever there was a vacant Sim....I would climb in and duplicate routes I had flown or were flying on my other job as a Line Pilot. I did them real time usually....input malfunctions...and always flew in weather that required approaches to minimums....and almost always flew them manually.
On use of Automation.....absolutely use it to the maximum...for continuity of training if nothing else. Hand fly on Revenue trips....why not so long as you do so in decent weather. If the weather is near minimums or at Night Off shore...by all means use the Autopilot system.
Coordination between Flight Departments from Operators.....why not have quarterly meetings by Training Staff and Ops Staff to work at finding the Best Practices for similar aircraft. Let the Commercial Staff compete for business but the Pilots and Engineers should be able to work towards standard Safety Practices and Flying Standards. You share the same sky, fly the same aircraft, why would you not benefit from the other guy's experiences?
Emergency exits.....some problems being reported about Opening Doors that block Emergency Exits because of a Door Handle being in a bad position.....and that has not been addressed and resolved yet? Or did I miss something?
Working Engineers and Pilots on the Corporate Board....now that would really rock the US and UK Operators World wouldn't it!
PA....I applaud you for telling us about your experience with the CFIT. That is the kind of courage we need to see more often as others can benefit from what would otherwise have been just a tragic day otherwise. Every time I read of a friend being involved in an Accident....I understand very well it could have been me instead of them....and I also know that no matter how good we think we are....none of us are immune.
HF - with the ETAP accident, the upper modes weren't being used, the AVAD (EGPWS) had been suspended, and the Ops Man night approach procedure was pretty loose. The AAIB report was published in 2011, worth a look.
Meeting underway in Stavanger about the UK Situation and SP Family of aircraft. Expect news reports on the outcome upon completion of the meetings.
Dødsulykke forsinker norsk offshoretrafikk - Aftenbladet.no
Dødsulykke forsinker norsk offshoretrafikk - Aftenbladet.no
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Start looking at the top
In the past many of the AAIB have focussed the majority of the time and effort on the bottom of the pyramid - ie the pilot and engineer and their SOP's. I really hope that this time we might see a more rounded investigation examining and pressing those who are actually owning and running these businesses. That is where the pressure begins and it multiplies and diversifies as it filters down.
There is no doubt for the most part our business is being run in a professional manner, but the question is - despite the improvement of technology and training, why are these accidents still happening?
Where in the chain from cleaner to CEO is it going wrong? The relatively recent phenomenon across all the major operators is the hiring of management from outside aviation, and with no aviation experience. Is this wise? It is someone relying entirely on advice from his minions to make a decision. They will more than likely often only tell him what he wants to hear anyway as they are in a career stepping stone. Nobody wants to tell the boss reality when it is negative, as that gets him the sack. You think that is overly cynical? I assure you it is not. I would never dream of going into a large fizzy drinks company or IT company and try expect to know what I was doing as the CEO - so why does it seem appropriate in aviation? Something that really struck me was the insistence of PR statements to consistently refer to last friday as an “incident”. It was absolutely by clear definition in aviation terms an “accident”. Unfortunately this shows a clear lack of understanding at the very top of the basics of our industry. Yes we are still a business, but any business relies on its top man or lady to really understand their business. One of the large operators recently bought out by an investment company has undergone a large management and structure change, and its main, number one aim was to save 100 million dollars and increase productivity by 100 million dollars. This was all wrapped up with a large PR company and management consultancy company complete with post-it notes on the wall. It was only later on someone maybe realised that safety had featured very low down and another sideline PR publicity campaign and slogan was produced to with a reference to safety, but very little real substance. The really bitter irony was that on the campaign launch day one 225 did not come home safely, although fortunately that time no one lost their lives. The warnings have been there all the time, we are just looking the wrong way, distracted by complications we have created elsewhere. I do not blame that particular company. These are competitive times and the operators have to make money, but when your number one drive and priority is to save money and increase productivity - don’t be surprised when things begin to break. How much breakage is acceptable in pursuit of this financial nirvana?
If we take a sliding scale - left of scale - all the money and resources in the world. Accidents would not happen. We really can prevent all accidents in an ideal world. Right of scale - no money and no resources. Accidents would happen every week, and it would be down to luck whether or not you made it home safely. Where are we on that scale now? How far to the right are our authorities, customers, management prepared to let it go in order to undercut the next contract and save money and cover backsides? These are changing times, but it is not too late. Start looking at the top though and work down with a fine tooth comb and the answers will fall out all around us.
There is no doubt for the most part our business is being run in a professional manner, but the question is - despite the improvement of technology and training, why are these accidents still happening?
Where in the chain from cleaner to CEO is it going wrong? The relatively recent phenomenon across all the major operators is the hiring of management from outside aviation, and with no aviation experience. Is this wise? It is someone relying entirely on advice from his minions to make a decision. They will more than likely often only tell him what he wants to hear anyway as they are in a career stepping stone. Nobody wants to tell the boss reality when it is negative, as that gets him the sack. You think that is overly cynical? I assure you it is not. I would never dream of going into a large fizzy drinks company or IT company and try expect to know what I was doing as the CEO - so why does it seem appropriate in aviation? Something that really struck me was the insistence of PR statements to consistently refer to last friday as an “incident”. It was absolutely by clear definition in aviation terms an “accident”. Unfortunately this shows a clear lack of understanding at the very top of the basics of our industry. Yes we are still a business, but any business relies on its top man or lady to really understand their business. One of the large operators recently bought out by an investment company has undergone a large management and structure change, and its main, number one aim was to save 100 million dollars and increase productivity by 100 million dollars. This was all wrapped up with a large PR company and management consultancy company complete with post-it notes on the wall. It was only later on someone maybe realised that safety had featured very low down and another sideline PR publicity campaign and slogan was produced to with a reference to safety, but very little real substance. The really bitter irony was that on the campaign launch day one 225 did not come home safely, although fortunately that time no one lost their lives. The warnings have been there all the time, we are just looking the wrong way, distracted by complications we have created elsewhere. I do not blame that particular company. These are competitive times and the operators have to make money, but when your number one drive and priority is to save money and increase productivity - don’t be surprised when things begin to break. How much breakage is acceptable in pursuit of this financial nirvana?
If we take a sliding scale - left of scale - all the money and resources in the world. Accidents would not happen. We really can prevent all accidents in an ideal world. Right of scale - no money and no resources. Accidents would happen every week, and it would be down to luck whether or not you made it home safely. Where are we on that scale now? How far to the right are our authorities, customers, management prepared to let it go in order to undercut the next contract and save money and cover backsides? These are changing times, but it is not too late. Start looking at the top though and work down with a fine tooth comb and the answers will fall out all around us.
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from the client's point of view, they're paying for us to get out and back without undue delay
who gets the fuel bowser first, back at base and who gets taxi clearance first from Ground Control to avoid delays at the runway holding point. Seconds can count
Last edited by Vie sans frontieres; 28th Aug 2013 at 15:35.
Texaco in Escravos, Nigeria complained about the standard routing used to return to the airfield, a method that had been used for may years when Chevron ran the place, and demanded it be changed because it added time to the flights. We are talking "seconds" here....not minutes.
Yes....some Oil Companies are damned cheap!
Yes....some Oil Companies are damned cheap!
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SAS coming from you I consider that praise indeed. Thank you Sir.
HC we are and I think always were on the same page. Come back already you are missed sorely. Pop in for coffee when you have some time.
DB
HC we are and I think always were on the same page. Come back already you are missed sorely. Pop in for coffee when you have some time.
DB