Canada: Cormorant & Cyclone thread
Canada mulls Cyclone alternatives
Canada mulls Cyclone alternatives
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By: DOMINIC PERRY LONDON
Canada's purchase of maritime helicopters for its air force has lurched from bad to worse with the revelation that it may abandon its existing deal with Sikorsky and reopen the acquisition process.
The US airframer in 2004 won a $1.8 billion deal to supply 28 CH-148 Cyclones – a militarised and marinised version of its commercial S-92 – to the Royal Canadian Air Force. However, Sikorsky has been consistently unable to produce a helicopter that is acceptable to Ottawa. Deliveries of the final versions of the Cyclone were due to start in June 2012.
Four CH-148s produced to an interim standard are stationed at the air force's 12 Wing Shearwater base. However, no flight activities are taking place with the aircraft.
Procurement body Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) says: "The government expects suppliers to meet their contractual obligations, and Canada will not accept the helicopters until contractual requirements are met.
"Sikorsky has yet to deliver contractually compliant helicopters to Canada."
Ottawa has already levied fines of $88.6 million on Sikorsky, which it intends to offset against payments due under a support contract for sustainment of the helicopters.
However, the US manufacturer could face the ultimate sanction of being dismissed from the contract entirely. PWGSC has already tasked an external consultant to report on "the viability" of the Cyclone programme – in other words, whether Sikorsky will ever be able to deliver fully compliant aircraft.
"The review by the consultant is not yet finalised," says PWGSC. "Upon completion the government will carefully consider the recommendations as well as consider all options, to ensure we protect taxpayers' interests and get the right helicopter for our men and women in uniform."
But other manufacturers are already circling. Anglo-Italian airframer AgustaWestland is keen to offer its AW101, should the competition be rerun. It says: "AgustaWestland understands the government of Canada is considering an alternate solution to the CH-148 Cyclone for the Royal Canadian Air Force maritime helicopter replacement programme.
"Events in Canada in recent years have clearly demonstrated the AW101 is still the only helicopter which remains compliant and true to all the [original] requirements."
AgustaWestland was victorious with the AW101 in an earlier contest for the requirement, but that programme was cancelled in 1993.
And to add even more weight to AgustaWestland's argument, an earlier variant of the rotorcraft is already in service with the air force, operating search and rescue missions as the CH-149 Cormorant.
Canada's need for new maritime helicopters is becoming ever-more pressing as its fleet of Sikorsky CH-124 Sea Kings marks a half-century of service this year.
Sikorsky was not immediately available to comment.
By: DOMINIC PERRY LONDON
Canada's purchase of maritime helicopters for its air force has lurched from bad to worse with the revelation that it may abandon its existing deal with Sikorsky and reopen the acquisition process.
The US airframer in 2004 won a $1.8 billion deal to supply 28 CH-148 Cyclones – a militarised and marinised version of its commercial S-92 – to the Royal Canadian Air Force. However, Sikorsky has been consistently unable to produce a helicopter that is acceptable to Ottawa. Deliveries of the final versions of the Cyclone were due to start in June 2012.
Four CH-148s produced to an interim standard are stationed at the air force's 12 Wing Shearwater base. However, no flight activities are taking place with the aircraft.
Procurement body Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) says: "The government expects suppliers to meet their contractual obligations, and Canada will not accept the helicopters until contractual requirements are met.
"Sikorsky has yet to deliver contractually compliant helicopters to Canada."
Ottawa has already levied fines of $88.6 million on Sikorsky, which it intends to offset against payments due under a support contract for sustainment of the helicopters.
However, the US manufacturer could face the ultimate sanction of being dismissed from the contract entirely. PWGSC has already tasked an external consultant to report on "the viability" of the Cyclone programme – in other words, whether Sikorsky will ever be able to deliver fully compliant aircraft.
"The review by the consultant is not yet finalised," says PWGSC. "Upon completion the government will carefully consider the recommendations as well as consider all options, to ensure we protect taxpayers' interests and get the right helicopter for our men and women in uniform."
But other manufacturers are already circling. Anglo-Italian airframer AgustaWestland is keen to offer its AW101, should the competition be rerun. It says: "AgustaWestland understands the government of Canada is considering an alternate solution to the CH-148 Cyclone for the Royal Canadian Air Force maritime helicopter replacement programme.
"Events in Canada in recent years have clearly demonstrated the AW101 is still the only helicopter which remains compliant and true to all the [original] requirements."
AgustaWestland was victorious with the AW101 in an earlier contest for the requirement, but that programme was cancelled in 1993.
And to add even more weight to AgustaWestland's argument, an earlier variant of the rotorcraft is already in service with the air force, operating search and rescue missions as the CH-149 Cormorant.
Canada's need for new maritime helicopters is becoming ever-more pressing as its fleet of Sikorsky CH-124 Sea Kings marks a half-century of service this year.
Sikorsky was not immediately available to comment.
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Sounds like they've ramped up the search a little
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Hard to reconcile this:
Canada eyes defense procurement overhaul
with this:
Canada may boost SAR fleet with former US presidential helicopters
No s**t!
I/C
Canada eyes defense procurement overhaul
with this:
Canada may boost SAR fleet with former US presidential helicopters
The VH-71s are not in a flyable condition, [the DND] says, noting that "to bring these helicopters to an airworthy SAR configuration would be a major undertaking".
I/C
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I/C,
I'm not sure what your point is. The first article is about a government process to purchase equipment, the second is about airworthiness certification. Nearly unrelated.
The effort involved in getting any aircraft set up for a specific role includes the obvious inclusion of necessary mission kits (relatively easy) and setting up the support organization (can be very difficult). The VH-71s are a considerably different design and will need different manuals, different training, different parts. Establishing airworthiness may also become a player in that not all of the CH149 certification data may be valid for the VH-71.
I'm not sure what your point is. The first article is about a government process to purchase equipment, the second is about airworthiness certification. Nearly unrelated.
The effort involved in getting any aircraft set up for a specific role includes the obvious inclusion of necessary mission kits (relatively easy) and setting up the support organization (can be very difficult). The VH-71s are a considerably different design and will need different manuals, different training, different parts. Establishing airworthiness may also become a player in that not all of the CH149 certification data may be valid for the VH-71.
Last edited by Matthew Parsons; 12th Oct 2013 at 15:59.
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Matthew,
The point was the irony of the DND considering something as complex as a rebuild of one or more VH-71s to CH-149 specs, at the same time as attempting to fix a procurement system "burdened with inefficiencies and unnecessary delays and costs." The DN article only listed a few of the recent program SNAFUs, others including the Victoria-class SSKs and the Joint Support Ship Project.
Personally I doubt that the VH-71-to-CH-149 conversion idea will progress: aside from the fact that the aircraft were acquired for the very real need to address the CH-149's low (<50%) operational availability, I doubt that any of the airframes are in much of a state to be rebuilt, given that IMP has been cannibalizing them for over two years.
The "We can rebuild them...we have the technology!" idea has actually been floated since the assets were originally acquired, but the lack of any airworthiness cert is likely to prove a major obstacle. The DND has already come under fire for the existing compatibility issues regarding the multi-variant Leopard 2 MBT force, so its appetite for opening a similar Pandora's box with the VH-71s may be limited.
I/C
The point was the irony of the DND considering something as complex as a rebuild of one or more VH-71s to CH-149 specs, at the same time as attempting to fix a procurement system "burdened with inefficiencies and unnecessary delays and costs." The DN article only listed a few of the recent program SNAFUs, others including the Victoria-class SSKs and the Joint Support Ship Project.
Personally I doubt that the VH-71-to-CH-149 conversion idea will progress: aside from the fact that the aircraft were acquired for the very real need to address the CH-149's low (<50%) operational availability, I doubt that any of the airframes are in much of a state to be rebuilt, given that IMP has been cannibalizing them for over two years.
The "We can rebuild them...we have the technology!" idea has actually been floated since the assets were originally acquired, but the lack of any airworthiness cert is likely to prove a major obstacle. The DND has already come under fire for the existing compatibility issues regarding the multi-variant Leopard 2 MBT force, so its appetite for opening a similar Pandora's box with the VH-71s may be limited.
I/C
Last edited by Ian Corrigible; 15th Oct 2013 at 15:25.
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Smaller Sea King replacement...
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Government expected to give Sikorsky another shot at delivering Cyclone helicopters
Whats that old quote about insanity as doing the same thing releatedly expecting different results...
Government expected to give Sikorsky another shot at delivering Cyclone helicopters
BY DAVID PUGLIESE, OTTAWA CITIZEN OCTOBER 27, 2013
STORYPHOTOS ( 1 )
Government expected to give Sikorsky another shot at delivering Cyclone helicopters
A Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone conducts test flights with HMCS Montreal in Halifax harbour in this 2010 photo. Documents obtained by the Citizen under the Access to Information law, show that the Canadian government and Sikorsky reached a deal in principle in January 2012 on interim helicopters. Fully-compliant versions might be delivered in 2015.
Photograph by: ANDREW VAUGHAN , THE CANADIAN PRESS
OTTAWA — Department of National Defence officials are expecting the government to once again give a U.S. aerospace firm another chance to deliver aircraft to replace the military’s aging Sea King helicopters, according to DND documents.
DND officials are waiting for Public Works and Government Services Canada to OK the necessary changes that would see the acceptance of interim Cyclone helicopters from aircraft manufacturer Sikorsky.
The company was supposed to deliver the Cyclones to the Canadian military starting in November 2008. Deliveries of all 28 aircraft, to replace the air force’s Sea Kings, were to be completed by early 2011. But Sikorsky has yet to turn over a single helicopter to Canada and the $5-billion project has been saddled with various problems.
Instead, Sikorsky is offering to provide Canada with what the firm is calling interim helicopters; aircraft not fully outfitted with all of the necessary equipment. It would then deliver fully-compliant aircraft starting in 2015.
Senior government officials, including deputy ministers at DND and Public Works, have been meeting regularly since December 2011 with Sikorsky representatives to pave the way for the delivery of the interim helicopters, according to the DND briefing notes from December 2012 and February and March 2013.
Publicly, the Conservative government has taken a hard-line — stating that it won’t accept the interim helicopters because they don’t meet specifications. Government officials also leaked out details to the news media this summer about the possibility of buying a different helicopter and scrapping the Cyclones.
Behind the scenes, however, it was a different story.
The March 2013 documents, obtained by the Citizen under the Access to Information law, pointed out that the government and Sikorsky reached a deal in principle in January 2012 on interim helicopters.
That agreement was to be dealt with through another contract amendment, noted the DND briefing prepared by maritime helicopter project official Doug Baker and Assistant Deputy Minister for Materiel John Turner.
Both DND and Sikorsky had also worked out measures to address unexpected minor delays for those deliveries. “Public Works is expected to advise Sikorsky of the pre-conditions for further amendment to the contract,” the DND documents noted.
Public Works has already amended the Cyclone contract twice before to give Sikorsky more time to deliver the aircraft, but the firm missed both of those amended deadlines.
Public Works spokesman Pierre-Alain Bujold sent an email pointing out that the government is not engaged in “contract negotiations” with Sikorsky on a new deal. “The Government of Canada is not engaged, has not been engaged, and is not starting to be engaged in contract negotiations with Sikorsky,” the email stated.
But industry sources say there are indeed discussions underway. The DND documents indicate that government officials were concerned that only specific words be used in public to describe the ongoing meetings with Sikorsky.
“Public Works reaffirmed to Sikorsky that the dialogue with the government must be characterized as ‘discussions’ vice ‘negotiations,’ ” the documents noted.
In late June, then-Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose accused Sikorsky of not living up to its contract. She said that the interim helicopters did not meet air force requirements and the government was not going to accept those aircraft.
Again the DND documents tell a different story.
“Steady progress has been made towards delivery of the Interim Maritime Helicopters, and a realistic schedule has been developed,” one of the briefings noted.
“We will continue to support Public Works and Government Services efforts to secure an acceptable agreement to enable delivery of the Interim Maritime Helicopter.”
Sikorsky spokesman Paul Jackson said the firm is working closely with the Canadian government and making progress in completing the Cyclone program.
Sikorsky has delivered four Cyclones to a Nova Scotia base, but they still remain property of the firm.
In the summer, the Conservative government announced it would allow pilots and technicians to train on those Cyclone helicopters, but said they would not accept ownership of the choppers because they don’t meet the air force’s requirements.
Neither DND nor Public Works could explain the reasoning behind allowing air crews to train on the Cyclones even though the government says the aircraft are unacceptable.
BY DAVID PUGLIESE, OTTAWA CITIZEN OCTOBER 27, 2013
STORYPHOTOS ( 1 )
Government expected to give Sikorsky another shot at delivering Cyclone helicopters
A Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone conducts test flights with HMCS Montreal in Halifax harbour in this 2010 photo. Documents obtained by the Citizen under the Access to Information law, show that the Canadian government and Sikorsky reached a deal in principle in January 2012 on interim helicopters. Fully-compliant versions might be delivered in 2015.
Photograph by: ANDREW VAUGHAN , THE CANADIAN PRESS
OTTAWA — Department of National Defence officials are expecting the government to once again give a U.S. aerospace firm another chance to deliver aircraft to replace the military’s aging Sea King helicopters, according to DND documents.
DND officials are waiting for Public Works and Government Services Canada to OK the necessary changes that would see the acceptance of interim Cyclone helicopters from aircraft manufacturer Sikorsky.
The company was supposed to deliver the Cyclones to the Canadian military starting in November 2008. Deliveries of all 28 aircraft, to replace the air force’s Sea Kings, were to be completed by early 2011. But Sikorsky has yet to turn over a single helicopter to Canada and the $5-billion project has been saddled with various problems.
Instead, Sikorsky is offering to provide Canada with what the firm is calling interim helicopters; aircraft not fully outfitted with all of the necessary equipment. It would then deliver fully-compliant aircraft starting in 2015.
Senior government officials, including deputy ministers at DND and Public Works, have been meeting regularly since December 2011 with Sikorsky representatives to pave the way for the delivery of the interim helicopters, according to the DND briefing notes from December 2012 and February and March 2013.
Publicly, the Conservative government has taken a hard-line — stating that it won’t accept the interim helicopters because they don’t meet specifications. Government officials also leaked out details to the news media this summer about the possibility of buying a different helicopter and scrapping the Cyclones.
Behind the scenes, however, it was a different story.
The March 2013 documents, obtained by the Citizen under the Access to Information law, pointed out that the government and Sikorsky reached a deal in principle in January 2012 on interim helicopters.
That agreement was to be dealt with through another contract amendment, noted the DND briefing prepared by maritime helicopter project official Doug Baker and Assistant Deputy Minister for Materiel John Turner.
Both DND and Sikorsky had also worked out measures to address unexpected minor delays for those deliveries. “Public Works is expected to advise Sikorsky of the pre-conditions for further amendment to the contract,” the DND documents noted.
Public Works has already amended the Cyclone contract twice before to give Sikorsky more time to deliver the aircraft, but the firm missed both of those amended deadlines.
Public Works spokesman Pierre-Alain Bujold sent an email pointing out that the government is not engaged in “contract negotiations” with Sikorsky on a new deal. “The Government of Canada is not engaged, has not been engaged, and is not starting to be engaged in contract negotiations with Sikorsky,” the email stated.
But industry sources say there are indeed discussions underway. The DND documents indicate that government officials were concerned that only specific words be used in public to describe the ongoing meetings with Sikorsky.
“Public Works reaffirmed to Sikorsky that the dialogue with the government must be characterized as ‘discussions’ vice ‘negotiations,’ ” the documents noted.
In late June, then-Public Works Minister Rona Ambrose accused Sikorsky of not living up to its contract. She said that the interim helicopters did not meet air force requirements and the government was not going to accept those aircraft.
Again the DND documents tell a different story.
“Steady progress has been made towards delivery of the Interim Maritime Helicopters, and a realistic schedule has been developed,” one of the briefings noted.
“We will continue to support Public Works and Government Services efforts to secure an acceptable agreement to enable delivery of the Interim Maritime Helicopter.”
Sikorsky spokesman Paul Jackson said the firm is working closely with the Canadian government and making progress in completing the Cyclone program.
Sikorsky has delivered four Cyclones to a Nova Scotia base, but they still remain property of the firm.
In the summer, the Conservative government announced it would allow pilots and technicians to train on those Cyclone helicopters, but said they would not accept ownership of the choppers because they don’t meet the air force’s requirements.
Neither DND nor Public Works could explain the reasoning behind allowing air crews to train on the Cyclones even though the government says the aircraft are unacceptable.
Last edited by SansAnhedral; 28th Oct 2013 at 15:11.
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Here at the Yeovil site you can still find many lockers with 23 year old stickers on them saying "EH-101, the right helicopter for Canada" I'm thinking of having an amendment sticker made so I can update them to read "STILL the right helicopter for Canada"! 
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Here at the Yeovil site you can still find many lockers with 23 year old
stickers on them saying "EH-101, the right helicopter for Canada" I'm thinking
of having an amendment sticker made so I can update them to read "STILL the
right helicopter for Canada"!
stickers on them saying "EH-101, the right helicopter for Canada" I'm thinking
of having an amendment sticker made so I can update them to read "STILL the
right helicopter for Canada"!
http://www.informs-sim.org/wsc08papers/142.pdf
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Here is the latest news on the subject of "the right helicopter for Canada":
DND knew Cyclones might not measure up, red flagged troubles in 2004:...
Nov 03 2013 17:15:00 - Source: The Canadian Press
DND knew Cyclones might not measure up, red flagged troubles in 2004: documents
By Murray Brewster
THE CANADIAN PRESS
OTTAWA _ Canadian air force evaluators warned nearly a decade ago that the CH-148 Cyclone helicopter might not measure up in terms of engine performance, acoustic noise and its ability to resist electronic interference, The Canadian Press has learned.
Previously unreleased National Defence reports that date back to September 2004, recently viewed by CP, cite a litany of concerns about Sikorsky's plan to convert its existing S-92 helicopter for maritime and military missions.
The highly technical appraisals were conducted by a team of dozens of air force engineers before then-prime minister Paul Martin awarded what was at the time a $1.8-billion contract.
Yet, despite the concerns and the fact that some aspects of Sikorsky's plan were declared ``non-compliant,'' the bid was allowed to proceed based on the assumption the company would be able to overcome the existing problems.
The red flags that were set down by engineers, based on some 475 different evaluation criteria, proved prescient in identifying major issues that have plagued and ultimately delayed the program to the point where the Harper government is now considering scrapping it.
Nonetheless, the program has progressed significantly since the evaluation documents were first produced nearly 10 years ago, Paul Jackson, a spokesman for the U.S. aircraft maker, said Sunday.
``Sikorsky has either demonstrated ready solutions or fully resolved any technical issues raised in early technical reports,'' Jackson said in an email.
``The CH-148 Cyclone is the world's most advanced maritime helicopter, bar none. We continue to make solid progress toward completing this program and delivering unrivalled capability to the Canadian Forces.''
Officials from the Department of National Defence did not respond to a detailed series of written questions provided Friday about the technical reports, as well as the possible implications of scrapping the deal.
The Harper government, which is looking at other helicopters, is expected to decide later this month whether to continue with the program.
In terms of the evaluation of the Cyclone engine's airworthiness, the reports show the company was given the benefit of the doubt in 2004 since it had not yet built a military version of the aircraft.
"Sikorsky did not provide some of the (proof of certification) material as required,'' said the evaluation. "However, the material presented is generally judged to meet the intent of the (Maritime Helicopter Requirement Specifications) requirement.''
Evaluators were skeptical about the amount of testing hours devoted to the engine, and rated the risk to the bid as "medium'.'
Years later, however, the issue resurfaced when it became clear the heavier military requirements made the Cyclones sluggish and less efficient in the air. In 2010, Sikorsky announced it would upgrade the engine to a more powerful model, the CT7-8A7, and the Harper government agreed to spend an additional $117 million to support the plan.
Evaluators also raised questions about the helicopter's ability to stay airborne in the event of a catastrophic loss of oil. The report noted that the S-92 "failed on the initial test and did not meet the 30-minute'' run-dry requirement _ something that would become significant in 2009 with the crash of an S-92 off Newfoundland that killed 17 oil workers and flight crew.
A Transportation Safety Board investigation concluded that two of three titanium studs that secure the oil filter bowl assembly to the helicopter's main gearbox sheared off mid-flight. The board's final report said the resulting loss of oil pressure was one of a "complex web'' of factors that contributed to the crash.
It also recommended that all Sikorsky S-92 helicopters be able to run without oil in their main gearboxes for 30 minutes.
Defence sources recently questioned the Cyclone's ability to withstand intense electromagnetic fields, the kind generated by military-grade radar. In 2004, air force engineers raised questions about the interference, which has the potential to blank out instruments.
"The (High Intensity Radiated Fields) has still not been rectified to match up with the (Maritime Helicopter Requirement
Specifications),'' one of the evaluators wrote on Sept. 8 2004.
Since Sikorsky had not yet converted the helicopter to military specifications, it acknowledged the government would have to trust it to meet the requirement.
"The bidder has stated here that the testing cannot be completed until final aircraft assembly, at a proper site (in this case Patuxent River, Maryland, USA or Canadian equivalent).''
The evaluation report also raised questions about acoustic noise and the Cyclone's ability to land and take off from the pitching deck of a warship at sea.
In some cases, Sikorsky told National Defence it would provide more information after the contract was signed, leading one evaluator to note that "it was up to DND management to decide if DND is ready to accept the risk of not having a (basis of compliance) as clearly defined as possible before signing a contract with the winning bidder.''
After Sikorsky won the contract, rival bidder AgustaWestland cried foul, citing politics: 10 years before the Martin government, Jean Chretien's Liberals cancelled a contract with the company to buy EH-101 helicopters. In 2004, the company offered up the AW-101 _ a variant of the original, but still close enough to be politically uncomfortable.
Alan Williams, the senior defence bureaucrat in charge of the Cyclone purchase at the time, said AgustaWestland's bid was "non-compliant'' and dismissed as nonsense any suggestion that the political fix was in for Sikorsky.
"They blew it. They were clearly non-compliant and they know it,'' Williams said in an interview with The Canadian Press. "They didn't do a good enough job.''
Officials from AgustaWestland were not immediately available for comment Sunday.
What exactly the company did wrong, Williams was not prepared to say, but he insisted the Liberal government of the day never exerted pressure on him to favour one bid over another.
He acknowledged the concerns presented in the pre-qualification report, but noted that it was just the first kick at the tires.
"Unless it's a really, really black and white thing, in the pre-qualification you're not going to eliminate people.''
Williams said he pressured engineers in a number of closed-door meetings to assure him that Sikorsky could make the leap from civilian to maritime military helicopter.
"They said: 'It's not a slam dunk.' But the thinking was that it could be done, and so I didn't feel we didn't have cause to rule them non-compliant even though I knew that this wasn't a slam dunk.''
Williams acknowledged that he could be blamed for "picking something that turns out to be non-deliverable.''
He left the defence purchasing office shortly after the contract award, but added that had he been there in 2006 when it became apparent the program was in trouble, he would have recommended it be cancelled.
"If the government thought the contract was non-deliverable, it did the one thing it should never have done, it let (Sikorsky) off the hook,'' Williams said. "It would have been much smarter to do what they might do now'' and cancel it.
When former defence minister Peter MacKay described the Cyclones as the "worst'' procurement in government history, "quite frankly he made it into the worst procurement,'' Williams added.
The Cyclones were supposed to be on the flight line in 2008, but Sikorsky has delivered only a handful of choppers for testing.
The federal government has refused to accept those helicopters, currently parked at the Canadian Forces facility in Shearwater, N.S., on the basis they are "non-compliant.''
Former auditor general Sheila Fraser trashed the program a few years ago in a report that set out in painstaking detail how Martin's Liberal government agreed to buy what are essentially undeveloped helicopters.
The theme cropped up again last month in a leaked independent report that the Harper government commissioned. The analysis said the helicopters were essentially still in development and the federal government should attempt to salvage the program within 90 days.
So far, the federal government claims it is owed $88.6 million by Sikorsky in penalties for contract violations.
Nov 03 2013 17:15:00 - Source: The Canadian Press
DND knew Cyclones might not measure up, red flagged troubles in 2004: documents
By Murray Brewster
THE CANADIAN PRESS
OTTAWA _ Canadian air force evaluators warned nearly a decade ago that the CH-148 Cyclone helicopter might not measure up in terms of engine performance, acoustic noise and its ability to resist electronic interference, The Canadian Press has learned.
Previously unreleased National Defence reports that date back to September 2004, recently viewed by CP, cite a litany of concerns about Sikorsky's plan to convert its existing S-92 helicopter for maritime and military missions.
The highly technical appraisals were conducted by a team of dozens of air force engineers before then-prime minister Paul Martin awarded what was at the time a $1.8-billion contract.
Yet, despite the concerns and the fact that some aspects of Sikorsky's plan were declared ``non-compliant,'' the bid was allowed to proceed based on the assumption the company would be able to overcome the existing problems.
The red flags that were set down by engineers, based on some 475 different evaluation criteria, proved prescient in identifying major issues that have plagued and ultimately delayed the program to the point where the Harper government is now considering scrapping it.
Nonetheless, the program has progressed significantly since the evaluation documents were first produced nearly 10 years ago, Paul Jackson, a spokesman for the U.S. aircraft maker, said Sunday.
``Sikorsky has either demonstrated ready solutions or fully resolved any technical issues raised in early technical reports,'' Jackson said in an email.
``The CH-148 Cyclone is the world's most advanced maritime helicopter, bar none. We continue to make solid progress toward completing this program and delivering unrivalled capability to the Canadian Forces.''
Officials from the Department of National Defence did not respond to a detailed series of written questions provided Friday about the technical reports, as well as the possible implications of scrapping the deal.
The Harper government, which is looking at other helicopters, is expected to decide later this month whether to continue with the program.
In terms of the evaluation of the Cyclone engine's airworthiness, the reports show the company was given the benefit of the doubt in 2004 since it had not yet built a military version of the aircraft.
"Sikorsky did not provide some of the (proof of certification) material as required,'' said the evaluation. "However, the material presented is generally judged to meet the intent of the (Maritime Helicopter Requirement Specifications) requirement.''
Evaluators were skeptical about the amount of testing hours devoted to the engine, and rated the risk to the bid as "medium'.'
Years later, however, the issue resurfaced when it became clear the heavier military requirements made the Cyclones sluggish and less efficient in the air. In 2010, Sikorsky announced it would upgrade the engine to a more powerful model, the CT7-8A7, and the Harper government agreed to spend an additional $117 million to support the plan.
Evaluators also raised questions about the helicopter's ability to stay airborne in the event of a catastrophic loss of oil. The report noted that the S-92 "failed on the initial test and did not meet the 30-minute'' run-dry requirement _ something that would become significant in 2009 with the crash of an S-92 off Newfoundland that killed 17 oil workers and flight crew.
A Transportation Safety Board investigation concluded that two of three titanium studs that secure the oil filter bowl assembly to the helicopter's main gearbox sheared off mid-flight. The board's final report said the resulting loss of oil pressure was one of a "complex web'' of factors that contributed to the crash.
It also recommended that all Sikorsky S-92 helicopters be able to run without oil in their main gearboxes for 30 minutes.
Defence sources recently questioned the Cyclone's ability to withstand intense electromagnetic fields, the kind generated by military-grade radar. In 2004, air force engineers raised questions about the interference, which has the potential to blank out instruments.
"The (High Intensity Radiated Fields) has still not been rectified to match up with the (Maritime Helicopter Requirement
Specifications),'' one of the evaluators wrote on Sept. 8 2004.
Since Sikorsky had not yet converted the helicopter to military specifications, it acknowledged the government would have to trust it to meet the requirement.
"The bidder has stated here that the testing cannot be completed until final aircraft assembly, at a proper site (in this case Patuxent River, Maryland, USA or Canadian equivalent).''
The evaluation report also raised questions about acoustic noise and the Cyclone's ability to land and take off from the pitching deck of a warship at sea.
In some cases, Sikorsky told National Defence it would provide more information after the contract was signed, leading one evaluator to note that "it was up to DND management to decide if DND is ready to accept the risk of not having a (basis of compliance) as clearly defined as possible before signing a contract with the winning bidder.''
After Sikorsky won the contract, rival bidder AgustaWestland cried foul, citing politics: 10 years before the Martin government, Jean Chretien's Liberals cancelled a contract with the company to buy EH-101 helicopters. In 2004, the company offered up the AW-101 _ a variant of the original, but still close enough to be politically uncomfortable.
Alan Williams, the senior defence bureaucrat in charge of the Cyclone purchase at the time, said AgustaWestland's bid was "non-compliant'' and dismissed as nonsense any suggestion that the political fix was in for Sikorsky.
"They blew it. They were clearly non-compliant and they know it,'' Williams said in an interview with The Canadian Press. "They didn't do a good enough job.''
Officials from AgustaWestland were not immediately available for comment Sunday.
What exactly the company did wrong, Williams was not prepared to say, but he insisted the Liberal government of the day never exerted pressure on him to favour one bid over another.
He acknowledged the concerns presented in the pre-qualification report, but noted that it was just the first kick at the tires.
"Unless it's a really, really black and white thing, in the pre-qualification you're not going to eliminate people.''
Williams said he pressured engineers in a number of closed-door meetings to assure him that Sikorsky could make the leap from civilian to maritime military helicopter.
"They said: 'It's not a slam dunk.' But the thinking was that it could be done, and so I didn't feel we didn't have cause to rule them non-compliant even though I knew that this wasn't a slam dunk.''
Williams acknowledged that he could be blamed for "picking something that turns out to be non-deliverable.''
He left the defence purchasing office shortly after the contract award, but added that had he been there in 2006 when it became apparent the program was in trouble, he would have recommended it be cancelled.
"If the government thought the contract was non-deliverable, it did the one thing it should never have done, it let (Sikorsky) off the hook,'' Williams said. "It would have been much smarter to do what they might do now'' and cancel it.
When former defence minister Peter MacKay described the Cyclones as the "worst'' procurement in government history, "quite frankly he made it into the worst procurement,'' Williams added.
The Cyclones were supposed to be on the flight line in 2008, but Sikorsky has delivered only a handful of choppers for testing.
The federal government has refused to accept those helicopters, currently parked at the Canadian Forces facility in Shearwater, N.S., on the basis they are "non-compliant.''
Former auditor general Sheila Fraser trashed the program a few years ago in a report that set out in painstaking detail how Martin's Liberal government agreed to buy what are essentially undeveloped helicopters.
The theme cropped up again last month in a leaked independent report that the Harper government commissioned. The analysis said the helicopters were essentially still in development and the federal government should attempt to salvage the program within 90 days.
So far, the federal government claims it is owed $88.6 million by Sikorsky in penalties for contract violations.
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Apparently, the Canadian Press was able to reach AgustaWestland for comment overnight because the following appeared in a revised story published in this morning's papers:
Alan Williams, the senior defence bureaucrat in charge of the Cyclone purchase at the time, said AgustaWestland’s bid was “non-compliant” and dismissed as nonsense any suggestion that the political fix was in for Sikorsky.
“They blew it. They were clearly non-compliant and they know it,” Williams said in an interview with The Canadian Press. “They didn’t do a good enough job.”
Williams’ comment was met with a firm denial by AgustaWestland, which said in a statement late Sunday that “at no point did the Government of Canada declare that the AW101 was non-compliant.”
“The aircraft met all of the performance and equipment requirements of the original Request for Proposals, then and now, and Mr. Williams knows this,” the statement said.
What exactly the company did wrong, Williams was not prepared to say, but he insisted the Liberal government of the day never exerted pressure on him to favour one bid over another.
Alan Williams, the senior defence bureaucrat in charge of the Cyclone purchase at the time, said AgustaWestland’s bid was “non-compliant” and dismissed as nonsense any suggestion that the political fix was in for Sikorsky.
“They blew it. They were clearly non-compliant and they know it,” Williams said in an interview with The Canadian Press. “They didn’t do a good enough job.”
Williams’ comment was met with a firm denial by AgustaWestland, which said in a statement late Sunday that “at no point did the Government of Canada declare that the AW101 was non-compliant.”
“The aircraft met all of the performance and equipment requirements of the original Request for Proposals, then and now, and Mr. Williams knows this,” the statement said.
What exactly the company did wrong, Williams was not prepared to say, but he insisted the Liberal government of the day never exerted pressure on him to favour one bid over another.
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Alan Williams certainly seems to have the kind of 20/20 hindsight only a beaurocrat could possess doesn't he?!? And I love Sikorsky's "best bar none" line! It neatly manages to ignore the fact that they've yet to actually deliver a single useable helicopter. So far it's the best at nothing, because it doesn't exist!
What concerned me from day one was this: Why on God's earth does a country like Canada need or want the most advanced rotorcraft out there? More specifically: why does it need to be fly by wire for God's sake??? Leave cutting edge research to mega rich naive countries like KSA or USA and learn from their mistakes...but Canada...c'mon. THUS you have (to a greater extent) brought this on yourselves have you not? You reap what you sow
No wonder Sikorsky are struggling with EM interference and shielding???
My biggest worry however is reserved for the government (not the military - who are probably one of the most professional services I have had the honour to serve with). The government,s history of procurement is littered with dreadful decision making and choices. My fear is that they (having been bitten by the 101 and now the 92) will go wildly off into another direction and buy something completely inappropriate for the task in hand.
Fingers crossed - they will take a deep breath, put the Sikorsky debacle to rest and look and learn across the military environ and pick something tried and tesed yet relatively modern. Perhaps even the S92 without FBW??????
No wonder Sikorsky are struggling with EM interference and shielding???
My biggest worry however is reserved for the government (not the military - who are probably one of the most professional services I have had the honour to serve with). The government,s history of procurement is littered with dreadful decision making and choices. My fear is that they (having been bitten by the 101 and now the 92) will go wildly off into another direction and buy something completely inappropriate for the task in hand.
Fingers crossed - they will take a deep breath, put the Sikorsky debacle to rest and look and learn across the military environ and pick something tried and tesed yet relatively modern. Perhaps even the S92 without FBW??????