cdnnighthawk

In response to dmanton300 -- I agree with you. In fact, the inside joke in Canada is that the aircraft is actually called the Sikorsky Unicorn (i.e. mythical).

In response to Tom Coupling, Canada never requested the technology (eg FBW) that Sikorsky proposed. Sikorsky proposed FBW because the handling qualities of the S-92 as assessed by AETE test pilots in March 2003 were determined to be unacceptable for shipborne operations. The Sikorsky proposal in 2003 to use a new FBW approach for Canada's MH requirement duped everyone here into believing that Sikorsky could/would deliver a capable shipborne helicopter. As it turns out, the unfolding incompatibility of the Cyclone FBW flight control system with the hauldown system is causing a lot of grief. This is the main reason (not the only one) why Cyclone ship trials are still incomplete.

Thomas coupling

Dmanton are you serious?? Jean chretien saw to the demise of the EH101 order in 1993. Where have you been?
The a/c never got off the starting blocks because of spares and reliability issues and only a few slipped past the politicians to replace the knackered old labrador. It cost the Canadian public a massive fortune in penalty payments.

While we are on the subject of procurement disasters, what about the F35 order?

dmanton300

Yes, I'm VERY aware of all that, but your wording makes it appear that somehow AgustaWestland or the -101 were somehow to blame, when in fact the Canadians weren't bitten by the 101 so much as repeatedly shot themselves in the foot over it, finally appearing to get bored of the foot shooting and actually placing the gun at their temple with the S-92/CH-148 debacle.

As for the spares and reliability issues, one was a direct result of the other. As the independent report on the CH-149 fleet's ability to operate successfully made clear, actual problems "on the line" were and are rare, because of the -101's inherent reliability, it's in the deeper servicing and maintenance that things go south because of a:/insufficent spares (all that needs is money!) b:/insufficent airframes for the expected availability rates (see a for answer). The Portuguese suffered exactly the same way with their -101 SAR fleet, and for much the same reasons. What I'm not aware of is how much of that issue is from the vendor promising a spares and support package for a price that is competitive but unable to meet the demands of the customer, or the customer (in this case the DND?) cheaping out and not being prepared to pay for a package that was suitable for the job in spite of warnings in the first place? Perhaps others know more? Because if it's the first assertion then the vendor has a clear culpability and responsibility for availability issues, and if it's the second then the Canadians bit themselves, none else did.

So yes, I'm totally aware of the history of the Canadians and the EH-101 (the helicopter having been a huge part of my working life since 1986 when I was first apprenticed at the Yeovil site), I'm just seeking clarification on your assertion that it bit the Canadians, when it could be argued it was self inflicted?

dangermouse

I am afraid TC has his timings wrong.

When the 101 order for Canada was cancelled in 1993 there weren't any in service anywhere in the world, just the 9 PP prototypes. The RN had the first declared IOC for any service and that was in 1998 so until that time no availability data existed. The maturity proving programme only started in summer 1998.

In 1993 the aircraft was still in development (Type Certification was 1994, first prod aircraft flew in late 1995) so any decision to cancel a contract could only have been made on;

1) Technical reasons such as that that the aircraft didn't meet the spec (never to the best of my knowledge stated as the reason)
2) Budgetry reasons ('we can't afford them', which would be at least be a credible reason and may have been the motivation for Chretians attitude to the aircraft)
3) Poltically motivated reasons (which seems to be the actual case for Chretians decision as it was one of his stated pre election policies, possibly based on 2) above).

The cost of penalty payments cannot be placed at the door of a supplier who was working to a fully signed and legally binding contract that they weren't in breach of. The Canadian Govt HAD to pay the penalty clauses because they cancelled the contract without due cause, I am sure that if there had been due cause the DND would have used it to avoid the payments.

The debacle over this procurement is entirely the Canadian Govts fault. By now, the aircraft as originally ordered would be like the RN aircraft and have been proven a mature type would be entering an upgrade programme to 'the latest technology'. Instead the poor line pilots are flying ancient aircraft with realistically NO firm timescales for anything like the similar capability being available, let alone 'the latest technology' promised by a supplier who has consistently managed to fail to meet every milestone set for it.

Monty Python could have written this script!

DM

Thomas coupling

Errm DM: Where is my timing wrong then? Is it 1993 when cancelled or was it 1993 when the order was cancelled? I believe it was 1993 in fact.
It was cancelled because of cost and politics, everyone knows that. BUT ever since the sole 15 airframes arrived out of an order of 50 originally, all those cabs have been dogged by reliability and spares issues.

dmanton300

That's where your timings are wrong. No aircraft were in service ANYWHERE at the time of cancellation, and any spares and reliability issues (addressed in my last post) lay well in the future - like a decade or so and in relation to a different procurement programme, and so is irrelevant in terms of the Chimo/Petrel cancellation, which was a political decision hiding behind a financial one. So yes, it was cancelled in 1993, but there were no reliability or spares aspects to it.

cdnnighthawk

Maybe this additional info might help to quell the dispute and further some understanding...

In 1998, Canada stupidly decided that it would outsource the In-Services-Support (ISS) for the Cormorant and also, that the OEM AgustaWestland (then-EHI) would be prohibited from bidding on the ISS contract (because it would have an advantage over other bidders).

To make a long story short, the lowest cost bidder was selected to provide the Cormorant ISS. This bidder (still in charge of Cormorant ISS btw) did not/has not committed a penny to the maintenance of an in-country inventory of Cormorant spares. Additionally, the ISS contractor selected by Canada was not the design authority (DA) for the 101 and, as anyone can imagine, had no authority or ability to make maintenance or support procedure changes without referring same back to the OEM for approval (a very time-consuming process).

The made-in-Canada Cormorant support calamity is why Canada has ever since (including for the Cyclone) demanded that the OEM (not a third party) be in charge of ISS.

dmanton300

Nighthawk, I found that report on Cormorant reliability and maintenance to be interesting reading . . . it seems to suggest that no blame for the issues (save for the cracking in the tail rotors) is attached to either the helicopter or the OEM, but is almost exclusively a fault of the procurement process, and over ambitious expectations of a fleet simply too small to do what has been asked of it in terms of basing.

Shawn Coyle

Chretien made the right decision but for the wrong reason!
The original EH-101 contract had (in my opinion) 'PROBLEM' written all over it in capital, bold, italic red ink.
The Air Force was going to accept the helicopters in Yeovil, fly them to Bristol, have them shipped across the Atlantic to Halifax harbor, fly them to Halifax International, hand them over to the prime contractor, who would them hand them over to the avionics installer, who would then install the government furnished avionics, and then hand them back to the prime contractor who would hand them back to the Air Force for acceptance. So if anything didn't work, the amount of finger pointing as to who was to blame would have taken a 10 armed Hindu deity.
But the 101 was the best machine for the mission as then defined.

Thomas coupling

Hi Shawn - beautifully put.....until the last sentence.
The 101 must possibly be the least financially effective SAR cab on the planet. To this very day it has proven time and time again to be the biggest white elephant every operator dreads.
One has to have deep pockets or a labotomy to pick the Merlin for ANYTHING let alone a SAR cab.

cdnnighthawk

I believe Mr. Coyles' very accurate description of the original situation was referring to the MH (NSA) portion of the original 1992 contract... the NSH portion was slightly less combobulated. At any rate, despite the support difficulties, the Canadian SAR Cormorant fleet's outstanding SAR record at extreme ranges and in some of the most dreadful conditions imaginable stands on its own. I find it impossible to agree with you that the 101 is a financially ineffective white elephant in the SAR role.

Thomas coupling

CD nighthawk: I question not the integrity of this might battleship. A colleague of mine crashed one during trials one night, straight into the sea at 90kts and escaped without a bruise
What I will question is this: how can anyone, even the military, justify spending upwards of 40 million pounds on one airframe when there are several others out there that are atleast as capable as the Merlin in every respect, that cost less than a quarter of this?
Massively over redundant systems, prohibitive carbon fibre repair procedures, hugely inflated repair down times for every hour airborne and ask the Canuks about spares
People who even consider the 101 need their heads seeing to or are sublimely rich...

Xmit

Thomas I must say that, having spent a large proportion of my flying career operating over water and inhospitable terrain, I find the concept of 'massively over redundant systems' difficult to understand...........

heli1

What sort of chip does TC hold?
Th EH101 ditching he refers to was due to the rotor brake coming on in flight following a hydraulic leak I believe. Any lesser helicopter would have broken up!

John Eacott

TC: maybe you should read this from cdnnighthawk and reflect on the apparent reason for the troubles you are so scathingly blaming on the airframe? My bold:

espresso drinker

At least the AW101 has a true 30 minute run dry time!

All new models will have 'teething troubles', something to do with something known as the 'bath tub reliability curve'.

espresso drinker

If we're talking cost comparisons between the two aircraft, please can someone tell what it costs the operator when they 'lose' 17 passengers?

espresso drinker

Oh, and forgive me if I'm wrong the EH101 (now AW101) was a result of a military requirement for an extended range helicopter to operate from the back of a ship and find Russian, sorry enemy, subs.

Not a modification from a civil aircraft.

I also under that is very good at finding subs, ask the Americans. They were pretty pissed off when they couldn't hid their fish.

True, it's had it's technical issues. But now it's a mature aircraft and with the correct support package not doing too badly in the role for which it was intend.

Xmit

TC, I'm interested to know which SAR (or maritime) rotary platforms match the AW101's unrefuelled radius of action - one of the key capabilities which I'm sure led to its selection by Canada and other nations (eg Portugal).

I understand that UK-based S92s need internal cabin-mounted tanks to exceed the Sea King's notional 240nm ROA (can any S92 operators out there confirm this?).

TorqueOfTheDevil

Also could someone confirm how much the Cyclone debacle is costing the Canadians when you factor in life extensions for the Sea King, reverse-modifying ships to take the Sea King again instead of the Cyclone etc?