Chinook - Mull of Kintyre
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DOUBLE BOGEY
I'm not sure it is easy to be prescriptive. In general terms, personally I would like every piece of equipment known to man to be on board any aircraft I fly. Including EGPWS which is specifically designed to counter CFIT. AFAIK that's not fitted to any British military helicopters.
I'm not sure it is easy to be prescriptive. In general terms, personally I would like every piece of equipment known to man to be on board any aircraft I fly. Including EGPWS which is specifically designed to counter CFIT. AFAIK that's not fitted to any British military helicopters.
Double Bogey
Thank you. The point many very knowledgeable people here make is that the actual cause of the accident is in many ways irrelevant, and certainly I have never thought to speculate. My very simple position is that I knew the pilots were wrongly blamed, by the people who knowingly made them fly an unairworthy aircraft; but who did not tell them it was not airworthy.
This simple, demonstrable and now accepted fact (confirmed by Lord Philip) meant that, by definition, there existed doubt, when the MoD's regulations required no doubt whatsoever. They may have made an error of judgement, I do not know. But I have demonstrated beyond any doubt whatsoever that various VSOs committed serious offences. They were a directing influence on events. You may choose to conclude the blaming of the pilots conveniently detracted attention from their actions. I have always said, follow the lies. What MoD consistently lied about was airworthiness.
Despite MoD's claims, there were many known faults and defects (two entirely different things) in the aircraft. There was a significant and unexplained safety issue with UFCMs. There was a mandatory DASH modification outstanding, yet ACAS stated in the RTS it was not. (This need arose from a previous fatal Chinook crash, and its omission was one reason why Boscombe would/could not declare the aircraft airworthy). Parts of the transmission were being maintained using captured Argentine publications from 1982, as ours were no use. The FADEC software implementation was "positively dangerous". The complications arising from that prevented proper testing and trials, hence the statement by Controller Aircraft that the aircraft could not to be released to service. Lord Philip confirmed this was mandated upon ACAS.
THIS damning confirmation is what most commentators completely miss, and is the "new" evidence that called MoD's bluff. Lord Philip clearly stated Bagnall was not permitted to issue an RTS permitting operational flight. At best (according to respected pilots) the constraints meant one could do a rotors turning ground run, which requires the aircraft to be able to take off. But anything else? Don't ask me, ask a pilot. Would you fly operationally when you are not permitted to rely upon the entire aircraft in any way whatsoever? (The Switch On Only clearance applied to the whole aircraft, but was led by the FADEC, Nav and Comms SIL immaturity). Tapper and Cook weren't afforded the option, because this information was withheld from them and they were told the aircraft was airworthy.
In summary, this is entirely relevant, because if ACAS had met his legal obligations, the Mk2 would not have been flying on 2.6.94. That Wratten knew of this is beyond doubt, because AFTER the accident he wrote to Bagnall pressing him to have Boscombe declare it airworthy. How astonishingly stupid to place in writing that he, a Reviewing Officer, knew the aircraft was not airworthy! But entirely typical of their arrogance. Both he and Bagnall, and many others, were duty bound to come forward with this evidence. None did. I can't speak for anyone else, but in 2010 when the new Review was being mooted both MoD and plod approached me with polite warnings that I should cease and desist. I told them to **** ***. Those people are equally guilty.
Thank you. The point many very knowledgeable people here make is that the actual cause of the accident is in many ways irrelevant, and certainly I have never thought to speculate. My very simple position is that I knew the pilots were wrongly blamed, by the people who knowingly made them fly an unairworthy aircraft; but who did not tell them it was not airworthy.
This simple, demonstrable and now accepted fact (confirmed by Lord Philip) meant that, by definition, there existed doubt, when the MoD's regulations required no doubt whatsoever. They may have made an error of judgement, I do not know. But I have demonstrated beyond any doubt whatsoever that various VSOs committed serious offences. They were a directing influence on events. You may choose to conclude the blaming of the pilots conveniently detracted attention from their actions. I have always said, follow the lies. What MoD consistently lied about was airworthiness.
Despite MoD's claims, there were many known faults and defects (two entirely different things) in the aircraft. There was a significant and unexplained safety issue with UFCMs. There was a mandatory DASH modification outstanding, yet ACAS stated in the RTS it was not. (This need arose from a previous fatal Chinook crash, and its omission was one reason why Boscombe would/could not declare the aircraft airworthy). Parts of the transmission were being maintained using captured Argentine publications from 1982, as ours were no use. The FADEC software implementation was "positively dangerous". The complications arising from that prevented proper testing and trials, hence the statement by Controller Aircraft that the aircraft could not to be released to service. Lord Philip confirmed this was mandated upon ACAS.
THIS damning confirmation is what most commentators completely miss, and is the "new" evidence that called MoD's bluff. Lord Philip clearly stated Bagnall was not permitted to issue an RTS permitting operational flight. At best (according to respected pilots) the constraints meant one could do a rotors turning ground run, which requires the aircraft to be able to take off. But anything else? Don't ask me, ask a pilot. Would you fly operationally when you are not permitted to rely upon the entire aircraft in any way whatsoever? (The Switch On Only clearance applied to the whole aircraft, but was led by the FADEC, Nav and Comms SIL immaturity). Tapper and Cook weren't afforded the option, because this information was withheld from them and they were told the aircraft was airworthy.
In summary, this is entirely relevant, because if ACAS had met his legal obligations, the Mk2 would not have been flying on 2.6.94. That Wratten knew of this is beyond doubt, because AFTER the accident he wrote to Bagnall pressing him to have Boscombe declare it airworthy. How astonishingly stupid to place in writing that he, a Reviewing Officer, knew the aircraft was not airworthy! But entirely typical of their arrogance. Both he and Bagnall, and many others, were duty bound to come forward with this evidence. None did. I can't speak for anyone else, but in 2010 when the new Review was being mooted both MoD and plod approached me with polite warnings that I should cease and desist. I told them to **** ***. Those people are equally guilty.
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Tandem I do not know what you do for a living these days but......
GPWS - is a database linked to a GPS. It is not and never will represent the real world. It is a good awareness and alert tool if its limitations are properly understood.
RADAR - the most reliable indication of obstacles and coastline when offshore. Used in conjunction with GPWS it can validate at least in part, that the GPWS coastline is accurate.
HOWEVER - I specifically excluded GPWS from my post. Not only for the reasons above but because, to the best of my knowledge. It was not available on helicopters at the time of the Mull crash, therefore it is irrelevant to the subject matter in hand.
But nice try yet again attempting to deflect the object of my post from its original, and valid purpose and avoiding having to answer the most simplistic of questions.
Like I said, I do not know what you do but if you are in current flying practice, in respect of the various merits of GPWS and WX Radar, when over water, you can take the radar information to the Bank! The GPWS, well she comes second, always.
Over the land of course, the priority reverses but only to the extent that the red blobs on the GPWS are database blobs. Not real world radary type blobs.
What else have you got!
DB
GPWS - is a database linked to a GPS. It is not and never will represent the real world. It is a good awareness and alert tool if its limitations are properly understood.
RADAR - the most reliable indication of obstacles and coastline when offshore. Used in conjunction with GPWS it can validate at least in part, that the GPWS coastline is accurate.
HOWEVER - I specifically excluded GPWS from my post. Not only for the reasons above but because, to the best of my knowledge. It was not available on helicopters at the time of the Mull crash, therefore it is irrelevant to the subject matter in hand.
But nice try yet again attempting to deflect the object of my post from its original, and valid purpose and avoiding having to answer the most simplistic of questions.
Like I said, I do not know what you do but if you are in current flying practice, in respect of the various merits of GPWS and WX Radar, when over water, you can take the radar information to the Bank! The GPWS, well she comes second, always.
Over the land of course, the priority reverses but only to the extent that the red blobs on the GPWS are database blobs. Not real world radary type blobs.
What else have you got!
DB
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Tucumseh - I hear you but....if, and I recognise it is a speculative if, there was no failures then the crew determined their final flight path that ended in the crash.
Even with a minor failure, and you should recognise that to me a simplex FADEC failure, including run up, is relatively minor once the crew is beyond TDP and before LDP, and should never result in a crash.
In fact, in my view, no more no less, only catastrophic control failure, occurring 5.5 km from cloud, leading to an inadvertent flight path to the crash site, would completely absolve the crew of responsibility. This is a very harsh black and white statement. However, to those of us actively engaged in such operations, I would say it is the grim reality of our responsibilities as pilots and Aircraft Commanders.
I respect your incredible knowledge and insight into the paperwork debacle and I have accepted it at face value. However I do not readily accept that it had any direct influence on the outcome without being aided and abetted by some poor airmanship along the way.
DB
Even with a minor failure, and you should recognise that to me a simplex FADEC failure, including run up, is relatively minor once the crew is beyond TDP and before LDP, and should never result in a crash.
In fact, in my view, no more no less, only catastrophic control failure, occurring 5.5 km from cloud, leading to an inadvertent flight path to the crash site, would completely absolve the crew of responsibility. This is a very harsh black and white statement. However, to those of us actively engaged in such operations, I would say it is the grim reality of our responsibilities as pilots and Aircraft Commanders.
I respect your incredible knowledge and insight into the paperwork debacle and I have accepted it at face value. However I do not readily accept that it had any direct influence on the outcome without being aided and abetted by some poor airmanship along the way.
DB
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What else have I got?
Take it from me I use EGPWS (GPWS before that) and weather radar every day of my working life, in Class 'A' airspace. (EGPWS is of course based on a system accurate enough to post a cruise missile through a letterbox!) I held a procedural Master Green instrument rating when I flew Chinook.
Because at that time, the majority of Chinook flying was entirely overland at low level, for 90+% of the flying weather radar would have been useless! Even when IFR airliners can despatch without weather radar (and I have) it's just that weather restrictions become a little more limiting.
Perhaps your flying experience is less wide-ranging?
Take it from me I use EGPWS (GPWS before that) and weather radar every day of my working life, in Class 'A' airspace. (EGPWS is of course based on a system accurate enough to post a cruise missile through a letterbox!) I held a procedural Master Green instrument rating when I flew Chinook.
Because at that time, the majority of Chinook flying was entirely overland at low level, for 90+% of the flying weather radar would have been useless! Even when IFR airliners can despatch without weather radar (and I have) it's just that weather restrictions become a little more limiting.
Perhaps your flying experience is less wide-ranging?
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DB also knows he could depart sans Radar but had to have his Decca in the old days and I am comfortable that might hold yet today but with some restrictions now that the miracle of GPS is with us.
Radar is a very nice thing to have but it is not a necessity.
That being said I would have gladly launched without the Decca if I had the Radar which I consider an electronic eyeball that sees through cloud, rain, snow, and fog and most importantly is User Friendly compared to the Decca Products.
Radar is a very nice thing to have but it is not a necessity.
That being said I would have gladly launched without the Decca if I had the Radar which I consider an electronic eyeball that sees through cloud, rain, snow, and fog and most importantly is User Friendly compared to the Decca Products.
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Tandem and Bob yet again you wax lyrical and completely miss the point.
Departing with something U/S under an MEL generally involves restrictions. Risk based alleviations based on experience and mission requirements.
RADAR - is the only reliable source of obstacle information, IMC, over the sea. The point being, had the crew observed their 5.5 km COCIS rule the need for Radar is extant. However, if you are going to fly at 150 KIAS over water, less than a mile from a mountain in fog, aiming at it, Radar is definitely required.
Tandem, the EGPWS is geographically accurate but the database might be bollocks or the baralt ****e. You could post your missile but it might not hit the bit on the screen you are looking at. I thing GPWS is a great tool but it is second fiddle to the radar over water.
I do not feel the need to enter an argument about my experience or otherwise. Suffice to say I am well qualified to discuss this subject.
Yet again a nice try to deflect the issue from the relevant to the irrelevant.
What else have you got the relates to this thread subject.
Departing with something U/S under an MEL generally involves restrictions. Risk based alleviations based on experience and mission requirements.
RADAR - is the only reliable source of obstacle information, IMC, over the sea. The point being, had the crew observed their 5.5 km COCIS rule the need for Radar is extant. However, if you are going to fly at 150 KIAS over water, less than a mile from a mountain in fog, aiming at it, Radar is definitely required.
Tandem, the EGPWS is geographically accurate but the database might be bollocks or the baralt ****e. You could post your missile but it might not hit the bit on the screen you are looking at. I thing GPWS is a great tool but it is second fiddle to the radar over water.
I do not feel the need to enter an argument about my experience or otherwise. Suffice to say I am well qualified to discuss this subject.
Yet again a nice try to deflect the issue from the relevant to the irrelevant.
What else have you got the relates to this thread subject.
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Oh I posted that some while earlier today. When I told you the only known facts in this sad case. I guess you didn't bother reading it?
Last edited by Tandemrotor; 9th Apr 2014 at 20:17.
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Tandem I read it, agree with all that you stated as they are facts and it is a Sad case. I respect your hard fight to remove the BOIs conclusion of Negligence and I agree that the BOIs conclusion was unfair given the circumstances you, Tucumeh and Jayteeto have described. I am sure I might have fought alongside you if circumstances were different.
But this debate is not about any of that. It's about the most probable cause and what can be learned from that. Each person has a different opinion. Based on all you have stated, you do not seem to have an opinion on the most probable cause and I respect that too and fully understand given that you fought so hard, for so long, to get justice for those two guys. It would be crass of me to expect you to express any opinion on the subject.
Maybe I have been wrong to press you on it.
In fact I will go further and say I was wrong and I apologise.
However, please do not interpret my interest in the human factors elements that may have been at work that day in that cockpit as trying to blame the crew. Every accident is the end of a long chain of minor contributory events. By definition apportioning blame is not only inappropriate it distorts the reasoning needed to assess and prevent further similar tragedies.
I hope this can put an end to the pointless tit for tat postings that serve no purpose but to cause further upset to those of you most closely connected with the event.
DB
But this debate is not about any of that. It's about the most probable cause and what can be learned from that. Each person has a different opinion. Based on all you have stated, you do not seem to have an opinion on the most probable cause and I respect that too and fully understand given that you fought so hard, for so long, to get justice for those two guys. It would be crass of me to expect you to express any opinion on the subject.
Maybe I have been wrong to press you on it.
In fact I will go further and say I was wrong and I apologise.
However, please do not interpret my interest in the human factors elements that may have been at work that day in that cockpit as trying to blame the crew. Every accident is the end of a long chain of minor contributory events. By definition apportioning blame is not only inappropriate it distorts the reasoning needed to assess and prevent further similar tragedies.
I hope this can put an end to the pointless tit for tat postings that serve no purpose but to cause further upset to those of you most closely connected with the event.
DB
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DOUBLE BOGEY
I'm very grateful for your post, and I'm sure I too have things for which I should apologise. Please take the following simply as an explanation of my position rather than a criticism of yours.
I am as desperate as it is possible to imagine, to know and understand what caused the loss of my dearest friend in life. I know he would have felt precisely the same, but he has been denied the opportunity to posthumously present his evidence by way of CVR and FDR. It is not for lack of imagination that I say, I must accept I will never know.
I understand that some people's opinions are that this was CFIT in poor weather, pure and simple. But if that is your view, then please be certain that every step of that theory is supported by the limited available evidence. In my view it is not. Of course some are not too worried about the limitations of the evidence, and are prepared to judge on little more than 'intuition'. See my earlier quote on how we make decisions.
Not because of my loyalties, but genuinely because I have taken it upon myself to sift and understand every scrap of related evidence, (I scrutinised the wreckage in which my friend perished, twice in my role as technical advisor for the FAI. I visited the accident site. I too was an SF Chinook pilot. I was present at every day of the four week FAI.) it is my genuinely held belief that it is difficult, bordering on impossible, to determine which of the potential causes is most probable.
I would also say that I don't particularly see any value, in even attempting to guess. What can we learn from guessing? What would we miss from mis-identifying the ACTUAL cause?
Allow me to give you an example:
The only weather evidence we have suggests the aircraft approached the cloud shrouded Mull in clear, sunny weather conditions. Flying at about 200-400 feet, the cloud base around the coast of the Mull was described by the yachtsman as around 600-700 feet. Perfect for a low level transit around the coast. No requirement whatsoever to enter a climb into IMC. That is the evidence!
So what could have caused it to commence a climb? Which it clearly did, and very probably into IMC, whilst failing to initiate the turn indicated by Supertans to the next waypoint.
I postulated earlier that amongst numerous, a possible cause of the accident was a UFCM related to un-demanded movement of the Differential Air Speed Hold actuators in the 'pitch' control run. This phenomenon is why, at that time the CA Release to service recommended that extended low level operations be avoided. IN AN ARMY SUPPORT HELICOPTER!
The effect of a double DASH runaway which happens without warning, and has occurred on numerous occasions previously, is to cause the aircraft to 'porpoise' very violently. Indeed when IMC, almost uncontrollably. Please feel free to do the spadework, but take it from me there is nothing whatsoever in the available evidence to positively EXCLUDE this as a perfectly possible cause of this accident.
I say again, it's happened before!
So one person's most probable cause, can easily be another's least likely. Knowing the crew as I did, and understanding that the 'cruise climb' suggested is best described as unrecognisable as a Chinook technique, leaves me totally unsure as to what was happening in those final seconds.
So could it have been as Wrattan and Day believe? Possibly. Are there any other equally plausible causes. In the context of the Mk2 Chinook. Most definitely yes. At that time the Mark 2 was a disgrace. Not like any aircraft you or I have ever had the misfortune to fly.
The official position now gives my friends what they always deserved. The benefit of the very significant doubt that they should have been granted from the very beginning of this disgraceful episode twenty years ago!
But of course it was only two men then that wouldn't give them that benefit!
Every single subsequent inquiry (there have been many!) have found their position deficient.
I'm very grateful for your post, and I'm sure I too have things for which I should apologise. Please take the following simply as an explanation of my position rather than a criticism of yours.
I am as desperate as it is possible to imagine, to know and understand what caused the loss of my dearest friend in life. I know he would have felt precisely the same, but he has been denied the opportunity to posthumously present his evidence by way of CVR and FDR. It is not for lack of imagination that I say, I must accept I will never know.
I understand that some people's opinions are that this was CFIT in poor weather, pure and simple. But if that is your view, then please be certain that every step of that theory is supported by the limited available evidence. In my view it is not. Of course some are not too worried about the limitations of the evidence, and are prepared to judge on little more than 'intuition'. See my earlier quote on how we make decisions.
Not because of my loyalties, but genuinely because I have taken it upon myself to sift and understand every scrap of related evidence, (I scrutinised the wreckage in which my friend perished, twice in my role as technical advisor for the FAI. I visited the accident site. I too was an SF Chinook pilot. I was present at every day of the four week FAI.) it is my genuinely held belief that it is difficult, bordering on impossible, to determine which of the potential causes is most probable.
I would also say that I don't particularly see any value, in even attempting to guess. What can we learn from guessing? What would we miss from mis-identifying the ACTUAL cause?
Allow me to give you an example:
The only weather evidence we have suggests the aircraft approached the cloud shrouded Mull in clear, sunny weather conditions. Flying at about 200-400 feet, the cloud base around the coast of the Mull was described by the yachtsman as around 600-700 feet. Perfect for a low level transit around the coast. No requirement whatsoever to enter a climb into IMC. That is the evidence!
So what could have caused it to commence a climb? Which it clearly did, and very probably into IMC, whilst failing to initiate the turn indicated by Supertans to the next waypoint.
I postulated earlier that amongst numerous, a possible cause of the accident was a UFCM related to un-demanded movement of the Differential Air Speed Hold actuators in the 'pitch' control run. This phenomenon is why, at that time the CA Release to service recommended that extended low level operations be avoided. IN AN ARMY SUPPORT HELICOPTER!
The effect of a double DASH runaway which happens without warning, and has occurred on numerous occasions previously, is to cause the aircraft to 'porpoise' very violently. Indeed when IMC, almost uncontrollably. Please feel free to do the spadework, but take it from me there is nothing whatsoever in the available evidence to positively EXCLUDE this as a perfectly possible cause of this accident.
I say again, it's happened before!
So one person's most probable cause, can easily be another's least likely. Knowing the crew as I did, and understanding that the 'cruise climb' suggested is best described as unrecognisable as a Chinook technique, leaves me totally unsure as to what was happening in those final seconds.
So could it have been as Wrattan and Day believe? Possibly. Are there any other equally plausible causes. In the context of the Mk2 Chinook. Most definitely yes. At that time the Mark 2 was a disgrace. Not like any aircraft you or I have ever had the misfortune to fly.
The official position now gives my friends what they always deserved. The benefit of the very significant doubt that they should have been granted from the very beginning of this disgraceful episode twenty years ago!
But of course it was only two men then that wouldn't give them that benefit!
Every single subsequent inquiry (there have been many!) have found their position deficient.
Last edited by Tandemrotor; 9th Apr 2014 at 20:54.
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On the day of the accident, Jon showed me a document, aircrew handling notes. Blank pages stamped 'to be issued'. His description???
"This aircraft is a joke, look at our handling advice"
"This aircraft is a joke, look at our handling advice"
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Tandem - thanks for your honest and forthright post.
For what it is worth, on the balance of probabilities I believe it was inadvertent IMC leading to CFIT. However I do not believe they simply forgot where the Mull was, blundered into a cloud and hit the hill.
I believe they were distracted sufficiently to momentarily loose the SA allowing the final flight path to occur.
Looking at the limited evidence available, I would hazard a guess that as the final flight path came IMMEDIATLEY after the very first waypoint change, that unfamiliarity, caused by a combination of poor training, lack of variant recency and possibly a misbehaving AP/Navaids/display was just enough to suck them both in and cause the event.
Reading yours, Jayteetos and Tucumsehs post and the official reports I think anyone looking coldly at the evidence might reasonably conclude the same.
It's easy to critise a crew for minor discrepancies that combine with other more sinister events to generate a serious incident or accident. I think we all make at least one such mistake each time we fly. It is also very easy to sit in an armchair and pontificate about limits. Especially weather!
However, if we were to critically analyse the minutiae of this flight, the crews apparent closure with clouds at high speed, not compliant with their required wx limits, must surely be considered. In my experience, this kind of non compliant act in an informed and generally compliant crew is nearly always related to experience. In this case experience on the variant. Over the sea it's not that easy to recognise just how fast you are going as the surface texture of the sea is infinitely variable and when the displays, controls and feel of the aircraft is unfamiliar the cues available to instinctively recognise when we are going too fast are degraded.
I think that assessment is fair, reasonable in the light of the evidence and most importantly highlights some serious inadequacies in the crews training and their subsequent management of the flight path.
For what it is worth, on the balance of probabilities I believe it was inadvertent IMC leading to CFIT. However I do not believe they simply forgot where the Mull was, blundered into a cloud and hit the hill.
I believe they were distracted sufficiently to momentarily loose the SA allowing the final flight path to occur.
Looking at the limited evidence available, I would hazard a guess that as the final flight path came IMMEDIATLEY after the very first waypoint change, that unfamiliarity, caused by a combination of poor training, lack of variant recency and possibly a misbehaving AP/Navaids/display was just enough to suck them both in and cause the event.
Reading yours, Jayteetos and Tucumsehs post and the official reports I think anyone looking coldly at the evidence might reasonably conclude the same.
It's easy to critise a crew for minor discrepancies that combine with other more sinister events to generate a serious incident or accident. I think we all make at least one such mistake each time we fly. It is also very easy to sit in an armchair and pontificate about limits. Especially weather!
However, if we were to critically analyse the minutiae of this flight, the crews apparent closure with clouds at high speed, not compliant with their required wx limits, must surely be considered. In my experience, this kind of non compliant act in an informed and generally compliant crew is nearly always related to experience. In this case experience on the variant. Over the sea it's not that easy to recognise just how fast you are going as the surface texture of the sea is infinitely variable and when the displays, controls and feel of the aircraft is unfamiliar the cues available to instinctively recognise when we are going too fast are degraded.
I think that assessment is fair, reasonable in the light of the evidence and most importantly highlights some serious inadequacies in the crews training and their subsequent management of the flight path.
Avoid imitations
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I have always been surprised that little has been made of the fact that in the wreckage the co pilot's intercom was found to be in the emergency position.
It is possible that there a crew communication problem at the critical stage. The copilot would have been responsible for navigation.
Also, regarding UFCM, I understand that the fixing of a critical part of the flying controls on the aircraft (the control pallet) had previously proved to be suspect and had actually detached, or partly detached on another example. This appeared to have been largely dismissed, although it was found to be detached in the wreckage, probably because of the high impact forces experienced during the accident.
Gp Capt. Pete Crawford, at the time the Station Commander RAF Odiham, commented that the very high speed cruise climb was not a recognised technique in the Chinook (or any other helicopter I've ever flown because it makes no sense). My interpretation of his comment was that he couldn't understand how the aircraft got into that situation because it was illogical that it was deliberately flown in that way.
It is possible that there a crew communication problem at the critical stage. The copilot would have been responsible for navigation.
Also, regarding UFCM, I understand that the fixing of a critical part of the flying controls on the aircraft (the control pallet) had previously proved to be suspect and had actually detached, or partly detached on another example. This appeared to have been largely dismissed, although it was found to be detached in the wreckage, probably because of the high impact forces experienced during the accident.
Gp Capt. Pete Crawford, at the time the Station Commander RAF Odiham, commented that the very high speed cruise climb was not a recognised technique in the Chinook (or any other helicopter I've ever flown because it makes no sense). My interpretation of his comment was that he couldn't understand how the aircraft got into that situation because it was illogical that it was deliberately flown in that way.
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DB
You use the term "balance of probabilities", which is of course a fairly low standard of proof. Particularly so when the evidence is thin, and the individuals concerned are denied the right of reply.
Just interested to know what you think the probability is? Clearly more than 50/50? So 60/40? 80/20? 90/10? How do you make that assessment?
What enables you to dismiss the probability of other possibilities?
Of what value is such an 'intuitive' (rather than factual) determination to Flight Safety?
Thanks
For what it is worth, on the balance of probabilities I believe it was inadvertent IMC leading to CFIT. However I do not believe they simply forgot where the Mull was, blundered into a cloud and hit the hill.
Just interested to know what you think the probability is? Clearly more than 50/50? So 60/40? 80/20? 90/10? How do you make that assessment?
What enables you to dismiss the probability of other possibilities?
Of what value is such an 'intuitive' (rather than factual) determination to Flight Safety?
Thanks
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The G-LBAL initial report brings the lack of CVR/FDR on military and police aircraft into sharp focus. In my experience it's long been the military ethos to manage with the minimum equipment required for legal flight in civilian airspace. The real money has to be spent on the aircrafts ability to fly, fight, and survive in the 'battle space'. Whilst it would be nice to have wx radar, I can't see a change in that ethos to fit items that do not contribute to the ability to fight. I think the attitude from above is still 'avoid iimc', land and wait for it to clear if you have to, it's certainly the way the police avoid any sort of instrument qualification requirement.
Certainly from a tactical point of view (with my EWI/EWO/ACTI hat on) a wx radar would be a beacon to the ememy defence sytems in a slow moving aircraft that relies on remaining undetected by using terrain masking, so would not be used in a 'fighting' scenario.
Certainly from a tactical point of view (with my EWI/EWO/ACTI hat on) a wx radar would be a beacon to the ememy defence sytems in a slow moving aircraft that relies on remaining undetected by using terrain masking, so would not be used in a 'fighting' scenario.
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Shy,
The Chinook Cockpit is a very noisy place. Yelling and arm waving is fine so long as standard signals and lip reading skills are practiced.
That being said, in light of the impact forces is it not possible the Intercom selector might have been shifted around from normal due to external reasons or if the Co-Pilot's hand had been on the selector at time of impact?
Even with an Intercom failure, would not the Co-Pilot (or whoever was handling the TANs), have been able to switch to the new waypoint, slew the Nav pointers to that waypoint, and merely used hand signals of some kind to inform the Handling Pilot?
Also, just how accurate was the TAN's indications as compared to actual location and speed?
Much mention was made about the programmed waypoint being 285 meters (or some such distance) from the actual Lighthouse. It would seem to me that would be good enough for Government Work and not in itself have a bearing upon the outcome of the flight.
I also wonder about the 140 Knot Speed Limit imposed by the RAF rules. Besides using Dad's Slide Rule, what method was used to calculate that particular number? Stall Speed of a Piston Prevost?
It seems quite an arbitrary number somehow as 140 Knots is still clipping right along if one's concern is about being able to stop or avoid obstacles.
That high a speed does not comport with the Bush Pilot's "Hover Mosey" technique of going only as fast as one can see ahead which is a variable speed that derives from how far ahead one can actually see.
Again, I am seeing Arbitrary Rules that attempt to fit all occasions when in real life that concept just does not work.
DB keeps banging his Drum over that Rule despite no evidence exists to confirm what distance the Crew could see ahead of the aircraft.
What is it about the RAF Chinooks that caused them to be so unreliable? We do not hear such issues being raised about the US Army Chinook Fleet. There is probably a very sad story behind that which is far from being "Public" knowledge.
I recall the RAF had a Shed full of Chinooks that were put into storage for Years before they could be sorted out well enough to be put into Service. Was this one of them?
The Chinook Cockpit is a very noisy place. Yelling and arm waving is fine so long as standard signals and lip reading skills are practiced.
That being said, in light of the impact forces is it not possible the Intercom selector might have been shifted around from normal due to external reasons or if the Co-Pilot's hand had been on the selector at time of impact?
Even with an Intercom failure, would not the Co-Pilot (or whoever was handling the TANs), have been able to switch to the new waypoint, slew the Nav pointers to that waypoint, and merely used hand signals of some kind to inform the Handling Pilot?
Also, just how accurate was the TAN's indications as compared to actual location and speed?
Much mention was made about the programmed waypoint being 285 meters (or some such distance) from the actual Lighthouse. It would seem to me that would be good enough for Government Work and not in itself have a bearing upon the outcome of the flight.
I also wonder about the 140 Knot Speed Limit imposed by the RAF rules. Besides using Dad's Slide Rule, what method was used to calculate that particular number? Stall Speed of a Piston Prevost?
It seems quite an arbitrary number somehow as 140 Knots is still clipping right along if one's concern is about being able to stop or avoid obstacles.
That high a speed does not comport with the Bush Pilot's "Hover Mosey" technique of going only as fast as one can see ahead which is a variable speed that derives from how far ahead one can actually see.
Again, I am seeing Arbitrary Rules that attempt to fit all occasions when in real life that concept just does not work.
DB keeps banging his Drum over that Rule despite no evidence exists to confirm what distance the Crew could see ahead of the aircraft.
What is it about the RAF Chinooks that caused them to be so unreliable? We do not hear such issues being raised about the US Army Chinook Fleet. There is probably a very sad story behind that which is far from being "Public" knowledge.
I recall the RAF had a Shed full of Chinooks that were put into storage for Years before they could be sorted out well enough to be put into Service. Was this one of them?
Avoid imitations
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Bob, there is a lot of history to the standard of the Chinook aircraft delivered to the RAF and the standard of spare parts sold to maintain them.
I lost a good friend and colleague to the one which nose-dived in vertically from 1,000 feet during a maintenance air test in the Falkland Islands. The quality of certain critical components was found to be the cause.
I lost a good friend and colleague to the one which nose-dived in vertically from 1,000 feet during a maintenance air test in the Falkland Islands. The quality of certain critical components was found to be the cause.
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I do believe there is far more to the story than just the Parts.
As I recall Maintenance Manuals, Maintenance Procedures, and a desire to "Go it Alone" also played a role in the problems. RAF Engineering Quality Control and Management of the Spares, Engineering procedures, updates on Service Bulletins and related issues created an environment that set up a dangerous situation.
Putting it down to shoddy parts grossly understates the situation.
I have looked into the smoking hole made by a US Army Chinook at one end of Goldberg Heliport at Fort Rucker many times as it was at the point where One turned Cross Wind in the Circuit so I understand what it is like to lose friends in a crash.
Anytime an organization starts with a Zero Knowledge Base on a new Aircraft that has been in service for decades with other Military units, taking stock of their Lessons Learned beats re-inventing the wheel on ones on time.
The RAF certainly cannot brag upon its performance in bringing the various Marks of Chinook into Service if one takes an honest look at the history of those endeavors.
Just the information surfaced in the multiple investigations into the Mull Tragedy proves that.
As I recall Maintenance Manuals, Maintenance Procedures, and a desire to "Go it Alone" also played a role in the problems. RAF Engineering Quality Control and Management of the Spares, Engineering procedures, updates on Service Bulletins and related issues created an environment that set up a dangerous situation.
Putting it down to shoddy parts grossly understates the situation.
I have looked into the smoking hole made by a US Army Chinook at one end of Goldberg Heliport at Fort Rucker many times as it was at the point where One turned Cross Wind in the Circuit so I understand what it is like to lose friends in a crash.
Anytime an organization starts with a Zero Knowledge Base on a new Aircraft that has been in service for decades with other Military units, taking stock of their Lessons Learned beats re-inventing the wheel on ones on time.
The RAF certainly cannot brag upon its performance in bringing the various Marks of Chinook into Service if one takes an honest look at the history of those endeavors.
Just the information surfaced in the multiple investigations into the Mull Tragedy proves that.
