Chinook - Mull of Kintyre
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Umpteen Million Pounds a Chinook costs and the MOD cannot fit a CVR?
Penny wise and Pound foolish I would say.
But then again, how many Military aircraft have CVR's particularly in the Helicopter Fleets of every Nation?
Reading the Accident Report and related documents suggests that anyone that tries to lay blame on the Crew alone is in denial of reality.
That it was attempted at all is a gross miscarriage of justice.
An old fashioned Radar in the nose of the aircraft would not cost all that much one would think. It is not as though the Chinook doesn't fly in IMC conditions ever.
The American Army for way too many decades considered Helicopters to be aerial Trucks of various sizes. How many Lives has that cost over the Years?
Penny wise and Pound foolish I would say.
But then again, how many Military aircraft have CVR's particularly in the Helicopter Fleets of every Nation?
Reading the Accident Report and related documents suggests that anyone that tries to lay blame on the Crew alone is in denial of reality.
That it was attempted at all is a gross miscarriage of justice.
An old fashioned Radar in the nose of the aircraft would not cost all that much one would think. It is not as though the Chinook doesn't fly in IMC conditions ever.
The American Army for way too many decades considered Helicopters to be aerial Trucks of various sizes. How many Lives has that cost over the Years?
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DOUBLE BOGEY you said:
Would you please be so kind as to tell me where I can find the evidence that anything at all "was recorded on radar"? It's just that I can't ever recall seeing any such thing.
Many thanks TR.
Tandem, clearly you have nothing to offer beyond the official reports. My meaning is simple. Once clear of the Irish coast the aircraft descended to below 1000 feet. That was recorded on Radar.
Many thanks TR.
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DOUBLE BOGEY
You are mistaken.
Further, the Pulford Board concluded that nobody was in a position to give a precise description of the cloud situation over the south end of the Mull at the time of the accident, and they did not attempt to do so.
Estimates of aircraft heights by non-aviators are notoriously unreliable. (Estimates by aviators are also often inaccurate but, generally, not as far out as those of non-aviators.)
Post-accident examination of the SuperTANS revealed that it was at 468 feet above sea level +/- 50' a few seconds after the waypoint change/about 15-18 seconds prior to impact.
The aircraft struck a rocky outcrop on the side of Beinn na Lice, approximately 0.28 nm east of the lighthouse, at 810 feet amsl.
There was a forecast 30% risk of conditions below VFR limits around the Mull of Kintyre.
The captain planned the sortie as a VFR flight at low level on the way out and at medium level on the return to RAF Aldergrove. The decision to fly a low level VFR sortie was consistent with the weather forecast provided by the Belfast International Airport Met Office for the area around RAF Machrihanish (some 17 km to the north of the lighthouse) and operationally acceptable but required contingency options to avoid any bad weather.
The helicopter continued almost 200m from the initial impact point before impacting the ground while inverted. It manoeuvred violently while being struck by the rotor blades, breaking into two with substantial parts breaking off during the crash. Fuel tanks on both sides were ruptured at initial impact resulting in extensive ground fire which severely damaged much of the wreckage.
Tony Cable (Senior Inspector of Air Accidents - Engineering) with 18 years experience as a crash investigator told the House of Lords Select Committee and the Review that: “... throughout this investigation the evidence was remarkably thin, from my point of view, I must say. We spent a great deal of time trying to find evidence.”
He could not dismiss the possibility that a malfunction had occurred but had left no evidence in the wreckage.
NB: Absence of evidence is very different from evidence of absence.
You ask the campaigners:
jayteeto has already explained this to you.
It's all in the report of the independent Review. You would have seen it for yourself if you'd read it with an open mind.
It took a very long time but the campaigners were eventually vindicated by the independent Review.
The campaign might not have been necessary if the senior Reviewing Officers had accepted the findings of the Board presided over by Andy Pulford.
Why do you regard it as an 'irrational response" to try to achieve justice for deceased colleagues?
Flying Lawyer - I may be mistaken but the lighthouse staff reported the lighthouse in fog???
Further, the Pulford Board concluded that nobody was in a position to give a precise description of the cloud situation over the south end of the Mull at the time of the accident, and they did not attempt to do so.
The yachtsman saw the aircraft estimated at 200-400 feet
Post-accident examination of the SuperTANS revealed that it was at 468 feet above sea level +/- 50' a few seconds after the waypoint change/about 15-18 seconds prior to impact.
The aircraft struck a rocky outcrop on the side of Beinn na Lice, approximately 0.28 nm east of the lighthouse, at 810 feet amsl.
The forecast mentioned possible DVS at the mainland coast.
The captain planned the sortie as a VFR flight at low level on the way out and at medium level on the return to RAF Aldergrove. The decision to fly a low level VFR sortie was consistent with the weather forecast provided by the Belfast International Airport Met Office for the area around RAF Machrihanish (some 17 km to the north of the lighthouse) and operationally acceptable but required contingency options to avoid any bad weather.
The only Unserviceability found by the investigation was a possible malfunction of the RADALT.
80% of the fuselage was damaged by fire but only 20% destroyed
Tony Cable (Senior Inspector of Air Accidents - Engineering) with 18 years experience as a crash investigator told the House of Lords Select Committee and the Review that: “... throughout this investigation the evidence was remarkably thin, from my point of view, I must say. We spent a great deal of time trying to find evidence.”
He could not dismiss the possibility that a malfunction had occurred but had left no evidence in the wreckage.
NB: Absence of evidence is very different from evidence of absence.
You ask the campaigners:
Why ….. did you feel the need to spend 17 years trying to prove the crew were not to blame. How do you know? Enlighten me so I can begin to understand the seemingly irrational response to this accident! What do you know that is not in the report?
It's all in the report of the independent Review. You would have seen it for yourself if you'd read it with an open mind.
It took a very long time but the campaigners were eventually vindicated by the independent Review.
The campaign might not have been necessary if the senior Reviewing Officers had accepted the findings of the Board presided over by Andy Pulford.
Why do you regard it as an 'irrational response" to try to achieve justice for deceased colleagues?
Last edited by Flying Lawyer; 8th Apr 2014 at 00:29.
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Go down slow down
More in search of others opinions rather than any claimed knowledge, I also hope I haven't missed the answer in a previous post too, but something that's always seemed in favour of a last minute issue causing the aircraft to become inadvertent IMC is that SH phrase "go down slow down". It's not in any crews mentality to press on IMC below safety altitude when other options are available. We're an inadvertent IMC event handled where an icing clearance and IFR option were available a pull up in cloud to Safety altitude and a turn to a safe heading of course would be logical and unquestioned. That said with neither and if the aircraft was seen VFR, VMC below cloud by the yatch, wether it was 4, 5 or 600ft above the sea a descent to stay VMC would be automatic for crews used to flying a lot lower level than where they were, like wise a slow down for the prevailing visibility also. Unless of course from contentedly cruising VMC below something occurred and put them IMC at minimal if any notice while dealing with an internal issue at the same time perhaps.... NR runaway up? FADEC issues as reported by the Odiham TP?
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ALL - I cannot get past this all encompassing suggestion that any intimation of inadvertent IMC leading to CFIT was the prime causal factor in this accident AUTOMATICALLY MEANS the crew were to blame.
FL - witnesses on the Mull reported low cloud and poor visibility. The Yachtsman saw the helicopter flying below the cloud! Are you really suggesting the accident happened in VMC!
Bob - I agree 100% re the WX radar BECAUSE I believe it was an IMC CFIT.
Malfunctions - the aircraft had flown a lot that day. No evidence of malfunction was found in wreckage that was assessable. No MAYDAY call. No further HC-2 catastrophic accidents. No significant deviation of flight path ( the TANS evidence had it climbing at 1000 fpm at 150 knots, CONSISTANT with a cruise climb, until the very last moment before impact. Cyclic flare, sharp turn, pancake impact damaging rear fuselage and sponsons, leading to blade strikes and disintegration.
I agree with the review findings. There is insufficient evidence to meet the legal burden of proof for negligence or blame.
I come back to Bobs point and original issue. In most legal battles the first casualty is often the truth. In this case the truth is that military aircraft, certainly at that time, were very poorly equipped for IMC flight. I remember well flying IMC, in a Gazelle, unstabilsed, with only Doppler mini-tans, with VIPs in the back (well, Generals etc).
In the Mull Tragedy, WX Radar and data NAV would have made a huge difference BUT only if you accept the most probable cause was IMC CFIT.
It is therefore a crass disservice to military crew that the review, investigation and the continued crys solely to exonerate the crew, combined, have singularly failed to call for improvements in navigation and avionics equipment fits in military aircraft. I recently had a look at a Merlin. Shocked at the lack of avionics.
In the absence of clear evidence we should consider the principles of Occums razor! The most simplistic explanation is the most probable. Given the evidence available in the report the investigation concluded inadvertent IMC and CFIT. The review does does specifically disagree with this conclusion. it simply identifies that there is no evidence to suggest that the crew were negligent in their duties at the time.
Furthermore the crew were at the end of a long days duty and extending. The report indicates they may not have had current training on the HC-2 and that the Captain had asked to delay the HC -2 into service. Notwithstanding this they accepted the task. This reads like very poor management and culture conspiring to place the crew in unfavourable conditions from the outset.
Like I have consistently stated. I do not blame the crew. They were hand picked special forces pilots of extremely high calibre not prone to recklessness or mistakes. This does not mean that given the right (or wrong) circumstances such crews will not make an unforced error. Tiredness, time pressure, poor training leading to unfamiliarity and an aircraft prone to spurious engine indications in a culture of "get on with it" might just be enough to force an error.
With the exception of deliberate "wazzing" blaming a crew for an accident will always mask the underlying causes and deficiencies in the system.
If the HC-2 was cleared IMC and had its proper (eventual) icing clearance, the safest way to Inverness that day would be IFR at or above safety altitude. This is also missed by the investigation and the review.
Jayteeto - "Privatley many of us who fought thought it was a CFIT". If this is the case what did you believe at the time caused the CFIT.
FL - witnesses on the Mull reported low cloud and poor visibility. The Yachtsman saw the helicopter flying below the cloud! Are you really suggesting the accident happened in VMC!
Bob - I agree 100% re the WX radar BECAUSE I believe it was an IMC CFIT.
Malfunctions - the aircraft had flown a lot that day. No evidence of malfunction was found in wreckage that was assessable. No MAYDAY call. No further HC-2 catastrophic accidents. No significant deviation of flight path ( the TANS evidence had it climbing at 1000 fpm at 150 knots, CONSISTANT with a cruise climb, until the very last moment before impact. Cyclic flare, sharp turn, pancake impact damaging rear fuselage and sponsons, leading to blade strikes and disintegration.
I agree with the review findings. There is insufficient evidence to meet the legal burden of proof for negligence or blame.
I come back to Bobs point and original issue. In most legal battles the first casualty is often the truth. In this case the truth is that military aircraft, certainly at that time, were very poorly equipped for IMC flight. I remember well flying IMC, in a Gazelle, unstabilsed, with only Doppler mini-tans, with VIPs in the back (well, Generals etc).
In the Mull Tragedy, WX Radar and data NAV would have made a huge difference BUT only if you accept the most probable cause was IMC CFIT.
It is therefore a crass disservice to military crew that the review, investigation and the continued crys solely to exonerate the crew, combined, have singularly failed to call for improvements in navigation and avionics equipment fits in military aircraft. I recently had a look at a Merlin. Shocked at the lack of avionics.
In the absence of clear evidence we should consider the principles of Occums razor! The most simplistic explanation is the most probable. Given the evidence available in the report the investigation concluded inadvertent IMC and CFIT. The review does does specifically disagree with this conclusion. it simply identifies that there is no evidence to suggest that the crew were negligent in their duties at the time.
Furthermore the crew were at the end of a long days duty and extending. The report indicates they may not have had current training on the HC-2 and that the Captain had asked to delay the HC -2 into service. Notwithstanding this they accepted the task. This reads like very poor management and culture conspiring to place the crew in unfavourable conditions from the outset.
Like I have consistently stated. I do not blame the crew. They were hand picked special forces pilots of extremely high calibre not prone to recklessness or mistakes. This does not mean that given the right (or wrong) circumstances such crews will not make an unforced error. Tiredness, time pressure, poor training leading to unfamiliarity and an aircraft prone to spurious engine indications in a culture of "get on with it" might just be enough to force an error.
With the exception of deliberate "wazzing" blaming a crew for an accident will always mask the underlying causes and deficiencies in the system.
If the HC-2 was cleared IMC and had its proper (eventual) icing clearance, the safest way to Inverness that day would be IFR at or above safety altitude. This is also missed by the investigation and the review.
Jayteeto - "Privatley many of us who fought thought it was a CFIT". If this is the case what did you believe at the time caused the CFIT.
the Mull accident is relatively unremarkable save for the appalling loss of life.
The CAR stated the aircraft (Chinook HC Mk2) is NOT airworthy and CANNOT be released to service. The primary reasons are (a) FADEC is not permitted in the aircraft (b) the entire Comms and Nav systems are NOT to be relied upon in any way whatsoever. The Comms bit was actually largely irrelevant, because the Intercom was NOT cleared to be fitted to the aircraft. I'm not a pilot, but I suspect this would prevent the aircraft taking off.
Despite this, and the legal obligation he was under, ACAS withheld this rather "remarkable" information from the rest of the RAF and signed to say the aircraft was compliant in every respect. He also withheld, from the BoI, AAIB, Police and all subsequent inquiries that he was sitting on a 1992 report detailing precisely the systemic failings reiterated by Haddon-Cave some 17 years later.
"Unremarkable" is not a word I'd associate with these actions. Criminal, yes. Please don't fall into the MoD trap of only looking at the final act.
Added:
Sorry, I noticed you mention "Icing Clearance" again. What Icing Clearance? A properly amended RTS had no Icing Section in it on 2nd June 1994!! This was an administrative error, but nevertheless it did occur.
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Flying Lawyer:
Yachtsman estimated the AC height at between 200-400 feet
SUPER- TANS data has AC at 468+ or - 50 feet.
You state non aviators AC Height estimates are notoriously inaccurate!
Is this just "Lawyers" accuracy we are discussing?
Yachtsman estimated the AC height at between 200-400 feet
SUPER- TANS data has AC at 468+ or - 50 feet.
You state non aviators AC Height estimates are notoriously inaccurate!
Is this just "Lawyers" accuracy we are discussing?
Double Bogey
The necessary testing and clearance of the Safety Critical Software had hardly begun before it was halted. The reasons are well documented. Essentially, Boscombe were following mandated regulations; parts of the MoD were telling them to ignore them.
Therefore, there was no Certificate of Design for FADEC, therefore it was not permitted to be fitted in a Service aircraft. Under MoD(PE) rules, it was only permitted in the PE Fleet aircraft for trials and testing. As advised to both MoD(PE) and RAF, that trials aircraft was not a recognisable Chinook HC Mk2, and Boscombe awaited delivery of one. Therefore, valid testing and trials in general could not be conducted as the results would be of no relevance to the Mk2 CAR recommendations. Hence, Boscombe declined, correctly, to recommend CAR be granted. The aircraft had Switch On Only clerance, which means (as stated above) you are not permitted to rely upon it in any way whatsoever. All testing and trials activity had ceased on the day of the crash.
You must follow the lies. MoD consistently claimed the FADEC software was not Safety Critical. This was debunked once and for all during the Philip Review, when the policy document showing it WAS Safety Critical was produced in evidence. It also helped that the author of the relevant Defence Standards of the day, an RAF officer at Boscombe, was tracked down and his original copies of these "missing" Standards produced. (Hitherto, MoD had declined to acknowledge their existence and, in fact, still do).
Upon production of this evidence, MoD's 17 year campaign against the pilots stopped overnight and they put up no further argument. It must have come as a bit of a shock that their challenge for "new" evidence to be produced was met head-on.
Hope this helps.
The necessary testing and clearance of the Safety Critical Software had hardly begun before it was halted. The reasons are well documented. Essentially, Boscombe were following mandated regulations; parts of the MoD were telling them to ignore them.
Therefore, there was no Certificate of Design for FADEC, therefore it was not permitted to be fitted in a Service aircraft. Under MoD(PE) rules, it was only permitted in the PE Fleet aircraft for trials and testing. As advised to both MoD(PE) and RAF, that trials aircraft was not a recognisable Chinook HC Mk2, and Boscombe awaited delivery of one. Therefore, valid testing and trials in general could not be conducted as the results would be of no relevance to the Mk2 CAR recommendations. Hence, Boscombe declined, correctly, to recommend CAR be granted. The aircraft had Switch On Only clerance, which means (as stated above) you are not permitted to rely upon it in any way whatsoever. All testing and trials activity had ceased on the day of the crash.
You must follow the lies. MoD consistently claimed the FADEC software was not Safety Critical. This was debunked once and for all during the Philip Review, when the policy document showing it WAS Safety Critical was produced in evidence. It also helped that the author of the relevant Defence Standards of the day, an RAF officer at Boscombe, was tracked down and his original copies of these "missing" Standards produced. (Hitherto, MoD had declined to acknowledge their existence and, in fact, still do).
Upon production of this evidence, MoD's 17 year campaign against the pilots stopped overnight and they put up no further argument. It must have come as a bit of a shock that their challenge for "new" evidence to be produced was met head-on.
Hope this helps.
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Tecumseh - really interesting read your last post and a bit shocking!
Was their any evidence of potential serious malfunctions arising from that original FADEC software?
Was their any evidence of potential serious malfunctions arising from that original FADEC software?
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Dahdaaaahhhhhhhh!!! G'day mate, welcome to Oz!
What do I think caused it????
I DON'T KNOW, therefore innocent until proved guilty.
My hunch? Before the flight, they were worried about two things (a fact I discussed with them). No IF clearance and FADEC run-up/down. They even spent 10 mins running through the drills. What could cause an aircraft to climb into cloud, go balls out 165kts and prevent slowing down? A FADEC run-up at the worst moment. A lack of IF/ICING clearances would discourage a climb to SA.
PS. They did the morning tasking in a Mk 1 Chinook that was not available for this task.
I am currently weighing up the pros and cons of my next insult, I think in this case it may be worth a ban from the site......
What do I think caused it????
I DON'T KNOW, therefore innocent until proved guilty.
My hunch? Before the flight, they were worried about two things (a fact I discussed with them). No IF clearance and FADEC run-up/down. They even spent 10 mins running through the drills. What could cause an aircraft to climb into cloud, go balls out 165kts and prevent slowing down? A FADEC run-up at the worst moment. A lack of IF/ICING clearances would discourage a climb to SA.
PS. They did the morning tasking in a Mk 1 Chinook that was not available for this task.
I am currently weighing up the pros and cons of my next insult, I think in this case it may be worth a ban from the site......
SUPER- TANS data has AC at 468+ or - 50 feet.
But was SuperTANS displaying information after waypoint acceptance? That question has never been addressed (except in the evidence to Lord Philip) and both Racal and MoD have studiously avoided the issue. If I switch my PC monitor off now the system is no use to me, but the computational part of it still works. The existence of data on my hard drive does not mean I have seen it.
According to the AAIB report SuperTANS was switched off before impact. Photographs clearly show the switch off. Switching off was a recognised means of clearing EMC problems. SuperTANS had a battery backup which meant (I believe) it continued processing in the background, just like my PC would. The dangers of letting Racal write their own report. It is very selective. And for many years key parts of it were withheld. Yet, Trimble were not permitted to write the report on their GPS, which had multiple faults including no Time of Day output; something perhaps significant in a crash where the timeline is of such import.
May I strongly suggest reading the evidence to Lord Philip. It really does make you think more deeply about the underlying failures and why MoD would seek to blame the pilots.
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DOUBLE BOGEY
If you read what I said more carefully and with an open mind you will see that I did not suggest that.
Based upon the S-T data, the yachtsman's upper estimate was not far out. You will, I hope, have noticed that I posted all the available evidence relating to height.
Feel free to make quips about lawyers if you wish.
FL
FL - Are you really suggesting the accident happened in VMC!
Flying Lawyer:
Yachtsman estimated the AC height at between 200-400 feet
SUPER- TANS data has AC at 468+ or - 50 feet.
You state non aviators AC Height estimates are notoriously inaccurate!
Is this just "Lawyers" accuracy we are discussing?
Yachtsman estimated the AC height at between 200-400 feet
SUPER- TANS data has AC at 468+ or - 50 feet.
You state non aviators AC Height estimates are notoriously inaccurate!
Is this just "Lawyers" accuracy we are discussing?
Feel free to make quips about lawyers if you wish.
FL
Last edited by Flying Lawyer; 8th Apr 2014 at 08:14.
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Jayteeto - why are you so angry again - what you have written in your last post is exactly what I have been saying from the outset. You need to read your own handle and "Calm down kidda"
Now you are telling me they used two variants on the same day, one of which (the accident aircraft) they felt ill prepared to operate. It just gets worse. Maybe you need to take a time out before you dig a hole to Australia!
Now you are telling me they used two variants on the same day, one of which (the accident aircraft) they felt ill prepared to operate. It just gets worse. Maybe you need to take a time out before you dig a hole to Australia!
Was their any evidence of potential serious malfunctions arising from that original FADEC software?
In 1993 MoD sent a team to Boeing to learn as much as they could about FADEC, so they could "train the trainers". A misunderstanding meant they were greeted by Boeing staff who thought MoD were there to teach THEM!! Again, a former RAF officer who led this team came forward during the Philip Review. This tells you much about why FADEC was such a mess. Boeing had little to do with it due to the contracting arrangement. They were expected to simply sit back and wait for MoD to deliver it. Compounded by the LRU hosting the Safety Critical Software (DECU) being managed by a mechanical committee, not the correct electronic committee, which would never, in a million years, have permitted such a nonsense. Again, the evidence to Lord Philip explains this in detail, with a quote from the deputy chair of that committee.
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Flying Lawyer - Sorry Sir but you do not fool me! Using carefully crafted script to illustrate a point you wish to make will not hoodwink me.
So we are now a little clearer, the AC was almost certainly low level 468 feet when the yachtsman saw it. They climbed shortly thereafter and hit the hill around 800 feet. People in the vicinity of the lighthouse reported low visibility on the Mull.
Feel free to postulate and drawn reference to minor inaccuracies BUT the AVAILABLE evidence strongly suggests inadvertent IMC leading to CFIT.
Before you try to draw me again bear in mind I personally have a substantial amount of experience, in the air, in a helicopter, in similar conditions. I know what it looks, smells and feels like. Not the rarified atmosphere of the barrack room lawyer......or other kind. I know well the pressure, thought processes and strict priority of action required to survive in such situations especially when dealing with a malfunction.
It is pricesly because of this experience that I recognise that a simple decision, made in a heartbeat, amidst a myriad of complex problems can determine the success, or otherwise of the outcome. Often luck joins in as well. For these reasons, more than anything else, trying to blame a flight crew for an accident is wrong, inappropriate, distracting and counterproductive. This has been my stance from the beginning.
I doubt I can make myself any clearer and unless there are any objections I will now bow out and leave this subject.
DB
So we are now a little clearer, the AC was almost certainly low level 468 feet when the yachtsman saw it. They climbed shortly thereafter and hit the hill around 800 feet. People in the vicinity of the lighthouse reported low visibility on the Mull.
Feel free to postulate and drawn reference to minor inaccuracies BUT the AVAILABLE evidence strongly suggests inadvertent IMC leading to CFIT.
Before you try to draw me again bear in mind I personally have a substantial amount of experience, in the air, in a helicopter, in similar conditions. I know what it looks, smells and feels like. Not the rarified atmosphere of the barrack room lawyer......or other kind. I know well the pressure, thought processes and strict priority of action required to survive in such situations especially when dealing with a malfunction.
It is pricesly because of this experience that I recognise that a simple decision, made in a heartbeat, amidst a myriad of complex problems can determine the success, or otherwise of the outcome. Often luck joins in as well. For these reasons, more than anything else, trying to blame a flight crew for an accident is wrong, inappropriate, distracting and counterproductive. This has been my stance from the beginning.
I doubt I can make myself any clearer and unless there are any objections I will now bow out and leave this subject.
DB
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Whilst I don't wish to intimate blame (and have always been appalled at the big-wigs / political decision to slate the crew without real evidence), I've always been puzzled at the crew decision to plan a track over high granite in marginal weather, in any aircraft, let alone one in which the crew had less than full confidence.
For those who've flown around the area (many) a small diversion around the MoK would have made little difference to their overall ETA & logic says a low-level visual route between MoK & Arran, or going up the West side & hopping over the Machrihanish saddle, would have reduced workload in the event of malfunction or systems doubt? It would also have had significantly less risk than a, potentially system-affected, climb to get over the biggest bit of cumulo-granite on the immediate planned track? I still fail to believe that, with the fair (witnessed/TANS) certainty that they were VCF over the water, that any systems/FADEC failure would have interrupted the ability to change heading at 400/500'?
I'm afraid I'm with Ag-B & D-B that the likelihood of CFIT is greatest, but there would appear to have been so many other pressure factors that personal, corporate or political ar*e-saving may not have been high enough up the priority list, very sadly.
D-B - I'd strongly advise not attacking FL or his views & certainly not his balanced, but legal, approach to his posts. He's FL because he's just that - there's nothing "barrack-room" about his views on law or aviation, and most of us (certainly those who know what he's done for aviation in the courts) welcome his sagacity on this forum.
For those who've flown around the area (many) a small diversion around the MoK would have made little difference to their overall ETA & logic says a low-level visual route between MoK & Arran, or going up the West side & hopping over the Machrihanish saddle, would have reduced workload in the event of malfunction or systems doubt? It would also have had significantly less risk than a, potentially system-affected, climb to get over the biggest bit of cumulo-granite on the immediate planned track? I still fail to believe that, with the fair (witnessed/TANS) certainty that they were VCF over the water, that any systems/FADEC failure would have interrupted the ability to change heading at 400/500'?
I'm afraid I'm with Ag-B & D-B that the likelihood of CFIT is greatest, but there would appear to have been so many other pressure factors that personal, corporate or political ar*e-saving may not have been high enough up the priority list, very sadly.
D-B - I'd strongly advise not attacking FL or his views & certainly not his balanced, but legal, approach to his posts. He's FL because he's just that - there's nothing "barrack-room" about his views on law or aviation, and most of us (certainly those who know what he's done for aviation in the courts) welcome his sagacity on this forum.
Last edited by zorab64; 8th Apr 2014 at 08:38. Reason: D-Bs latest post
With respect, I think people need to read the evidence about Uncommanded Flying Control Movements. A Special Flying Instruction was uncovered during the Philip Review notifying aircrew of serious and sudden changes in direction, especially after a long straight run. (Think the course alteration after Waypoint acceptance).
This was precisely what the Odiham test pilot, Sqn Ldr Burke, had experienced a number of times and reported; but MoD called him a liar. He gave evidence to Lord Philip that this SFI had not been promulgated to aircrew, and he knew nothing of it when he visited Aldergrove shortly AFTER the crash to investigate yet another occurrence. None of this was made available to the BoI. The SFI was dated AFTER the pilots underwent their "conversion" course; after which they primarily flew the Mk1.
This was precisely what the Odiham test pilot, Sqn Ldr Burke, had experienced a number of times and reported; but MoD called him a liar. He gave evidence to Lord Philip that this SFI had not been promulgated to aircrew, and he knew nothing of it when he visited Aldergrove shortly AFTER the crash to investigate yet another occurrence. None of this was made available to the BoI. The SFI was dated AFTER the pilots underwent their "conversion" course; after which they primarily flew the Mk1.
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Liverpool based Geordie, so calm down, calm down kidda!!
Age: 60
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The mark 1 was u/s, read the report. Read the report, read the report.
I don't need to dig, I enjoy watching other imbeciles doing that
I don't need to dig, I enjoy watching other imbeciles doing that