I do believe there is far more to the story than just the Parts.
As I recall Maintenance Manuals, Maintenance Procedures, and a desire to "Go it Alone" also played a role in the problems. RAF Engineering Quality Control and Management of the Spares, Engineering procedures, updates on Service Bulletins and related issues created an environment that set up a dangerous situation.
Putting it down to shoddy parts grossly understates the situation.
I have looked into the smoking hole made by a US Army Chinook at one end of Goldberg Heliport at Fort Rucker many times as it was at the point where One turned Cross Wind in the Circuit so I understand what it is like to lose friends in a crash.
Anytime an organization starts with a Zero Knowledge Base on a new Aircraft that has been in service for decades with other Military units, taking stock of their Lessons Learned beats re-inventing the wheel on ones on time.
The RAF certainly cannot brag upon its performance in bringing the various Marks of Chinook into Service if one takes an honest look at the history of those endeavors.
Just the information surfaced in the multiple investigations into the Mull Tragedy proves that.