Double Bogey
Thank you. The point many very knowledgeable people here make is that the actual cause of the accident is in many ways irrelevant, and certainly I have never thought to speculate. My very simple position is that I knew the pilots were wrongly blamed, by the people who knowingly made them fly an unairworthy aircraft; but who did not tell them it was not airworthy.
This simple, demonstrable and now accepted fact (confirmed by Lord Philip) meant that, by definition, there existed doubt, when the MoD's regulations required no doubt whatsoever. They may have made an error of judgement, I do not know. But I have demonstrated beyond any doubt whatsoever that various VSOs committed serious offences. They were a directing influence on events. You may choose to conclude the blaming of the pilots conveniently detracted attention from their actions. I have always said, follow the lies. What MoD consistently lied about was airworthiness.
Despite MoD's claims, there were many known faults and defects (two entirely different things) in the aircraft. There was a significant and unexplained safety issue with UFCMs. There was a mandatory DASH modification outstanding, yet ACAS stated in the RTS it was not. (This need arose from a previous fatal Chinook crash, and its omission was one reason why Boscombe would/could not declare the aircraft airworthy). Parts of the transmission were being maintained using captured Argentine publications from 1982, as ours were no use. The FADEC software implementation was "positively dangerous". The complications arising from that prevented proper testing and trials, hence the statement by Controller Aircraft that the aircraft could not to be released to service. Lord Philip confirmed this was mandated upon ACAS.
THIS damning confirmation is what most commentators completely miss, and is the "new" evidence that called MoD's bluff. Lord Philip clearly stated Bagnall was not permitted to issue an RTS permitting operational flight. At best (according to respected pilots) the constraints meant one could do a rotors turning ground run, which requires the aircraft to be able to take off. But anything else? Don't ask me, ask a pilot. Would you fly operationally when you are not permitted to rely upon the entire aircraft in any way whatsoever? (The Switch On Only clearance applied to the whole aircraft, but was led by the FADEC, Nav and Comms SIL immaturity). Tapper and Cook weren't afforded the option, because this information was withheld from them and they were told the aircraft was airworthy.
In summary, this is entirely relevant, because if ACAS had met his legal obligations, the Mk2 would not have been flying on 2.6.94. That Wratten knew of this is beyond doubt, because AFTER the accident he wrote to Bagnall pressing him to have Boscombe declare it airworthy. How astonishingly stupid to place in writing that he, a Reviewing Officer, knew the aircraft was not airworthy! But entirely typical of their arrogance. Both he and Bagnall, and many others, were duty bound to come forward with this evidence. None did. I can't speak for anyone else, but in 2010 when the new Review was being mooted both MoD and plod approached me with polite warnings that I should cease and desist. I told them to **** ***. Those people are equally guilty.