accident in austria, flight UK to hungary (?)

[englishal]

Rotorblast,

Read again:

DOI: 12/15/1989
Certificate: PRIVATE PILOT (FOREIGN BASED)

Rating(s):
PRIVATE PILOT (Foreign Based)
AIRPLANE SINGLE ENGINE LAND
INSTRUMENT AIRPLANE
Limits

INSTRUMENT AIRPLANE US TEST PASSED.

In my opinion this chap was more than qualified to carry out this flight. There may have been a paperwork error somewhere which had NO bearing on this accident, but regards to Qualifications this chap WAS qualified. If he held a JAA medical instead of FAA, well that is simple a mistake and we all know that an FAA medical WOULD have been issued if applied for. Not relevant therefore.

I'll include this bit too:

DOI: 1/19/2006
Certificate: COMMERCIAL PILOT

Rating(s):
COMMERCIAL PILOT
AIRPLANE SINGLE ENGINE LAND
INSTRUMENT AIRPLANE

DOI: 9/27/2006
Certificate: FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR

Rating(s):
FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR
AIRPLANE SINGLE ENGINE
INSTRUMENT AIRPLANE

I'm just sorry that Henry has to listen to your drivel.

I didn't know the chap but did walk past him on the ramp at Shoreham I believe (when I had to borrow a chock from Peter to stop my plane blowing away ), and am sorry when anyone perishes like this.

[BackPacker]

His FAA CPL/IR is a standalone CPL, not one issued on the basis of a foreign (JAA) certificate. So that whole discussion is irrelevant.

And since he's got an FAA CPL/IR and even an FAA instrument instructor rating, I would guess that his medical exam would have been to keep his FAA CPL/IIR valid, not his JAA PPL. After all, if you own a very capable N-reg, which of the two would be more relevant?

If that was indeed the case, then the flight would have been completely legal. But as me and others have pointed out, the legality of the flight does not have a lot to do with what actually happened.

[julian_storey]

Rotorblast, for whatever reason you seem to be on some sort of personal crusade against this pilot. Let me just tell you - this is NOT the place for it. If you have something to contribute to the discussion about possible causes of the accident, then say so. If not - shut up, I at least find your attitude disgusting.

I should like to hope that most people on here would consider pursuing some kind of a vendetta against a dead man to be in very poor taste.

[172driver]

A bit more info (again from a newspaper website, the usual journo caveats apply):

- Pilot contacted LOAV and requested landing
- Switched from IFR to VFR despite dense fog (in the quoted words of the LOAV ops manager)
- Contact lost at 1305L
- Wreckage found around 1500L (apparently aided by ELT signal)

The article also quotes an 'ear witness', a forestry guard, who was in the forest at the time. He states that he heard an airplane with a 'very deep (as in bass, my explanation) engine sound, as if it was in trouble. Then silence.'

I wouldn't give too much on this 'unusual' engine sound, don't think the chap would have been used to hearing a single turbine as opposed to the usual SEP's the sounds of which he would most likely be familiar with, given the proximity to LOAV.

[IO540]

Is 1305L 1105Z or 1205Z?

[172driver]

It's 1205Z

[fluglehrer]

for those unfamiliar with the LOAV area, clip of departure on 31, towards the hills in the back - please turn down the volume of speakers first ;-)

YouTube - Take Off In Katana DV20 at LOAV

approach to 13 - looking back at hills
YouTube - landing at LOAV, RWY13

one to 31 with hills in back visible, upon touch down as well
YouTube - approach to LOAV (Bad Voeslau) RWY 31

regards
wolfgang, VIE

[vanHorck]

Wolfgang,

Thank you for these links.

I realise I am asking you to speculate here......
Am I correct in saying that the hills are so far away than one must be exceptionally below the normal approach over the hills to be anywhere near them? From a published chart on this forum the WSW sector has an IFR level of 7900 ft over the hills with a minimum safe VFR altitude of 3500 ft? (it is badly readable on the link). So much so that a QNH/QFE mistake would not lead to a CFIT accident?

What would be the effect of the MATZ coming from the west? Do people normally route around it? Or over it? or do they transit the MATZ when joining from the west for the procedure?

I understand the pilot knew the airfield quite well, so I guess he would have adhered to local procedures?

[172driver]

vanHorck,

although it's been a while, I am familiar with the area - these hills are quite a bit closer than they appear in the video.

Here's a possible scenario (actually the only one I can come up with):

This
METAR LOAV 141200Z 14012KT 5000 BR BKN006SC 04/03 Q1012 OVC
was the wx minutes before contact was lost (at 1205Z). The instrument approach at LOAV is for rwy 31. Given the wind, not a great option.

The pilot now faces a dilemma - accept a 12 Kt tailwind on landing, divert to LOWW - or try for rwy 13. Apparently he chose the latter, cancelled IFR and came around for the approach to 13. At which point the hills got in the way....

[BackPacker]

The instrument approach at LOAV is for rwy 31.

I admit I don't have an IR, but I have seen enough approach plates to know that the approach into LOAV is far from standard. The IFR portion of the approach brings you to a point almost due south of the airfield. At this point you have to decide whether to continue VFR, or to execute the missed approach under IFR.

If you've got the field in sight, you cancel IFR, cross the runway more or less in the middle and join a (visual) LH downwind (for 13) or a RH downwind (for 31). So from the MAPt, according to the procedure, you need to make RH turns totaling about 320 degrees in order to get lined up for 31. For 13, the LH turns add up to about 230 degrees.

But in both cases you're in the circuit roughly NNE of the field. The position vanHorck posted is something like 5 miles due west of the field.

Edited to say that the links I posted to the Eurocontrol website apparently only work if you are logged in as me. I found the following which lists the VFR portion of the IFR/VFR procedure, how the circuit should entered and be flown:

http://www.austrocontrol.co.at/en/Im...m586-67006.pdf

[vanHorck]

yes I agree, the peculiarity is the early IFR cancellation when he was still well west of the field. Normal procedure in my view would be to cancel IFR perhaps near or at the VOR, well south of the field (5 nm).

So cancelling IFR relatively early-on without announcing a diversion to another airfield (therefore apparantly intending to land at Bad Voslau) suggests in my view:

1 (assumed) visual contact with the field and intending a VFR approach to either 31 or 13.
2 no visual contact with the field but (assumed) awareness of VFR position sufficient to continue VFR to the field, perhaps between layers with BKN clouds below.

The pilot has been there before so must have been aware of the broad picture VFR and the procedures as intended

Perhaps someone flying a turbine Mirage can tell us what the effect is of landing her on a 950m hard runway with a 12 knot tailwind? Would this be grounds to change to 13 (no IFR approach)?

[BackPacker]

yes I agree, the peculiarity is the early IFR cancellation when he was still well west of the field.

Did he cancel IFR west of the field?

I know the crash site is west of the field, but up until now I assumed that he flew the IFR procedure as published, south of the field, at some point (most likely at the MAPt, south of the field) canceled IFR and then did something in the VFR portion of the approach that brought him far west of the field and into terrain.

But if you've got knowledge to indicate he cancelled IFR west of the field, presumably before overflying the SNU VOR (the FAF), that changes things.

[vanHorck]

ah sorry, perhaps a wrong assumption on my part.

From the fact that he had been in contact with the approach frequency i assumed it was his first contact, as directed by the plate, early on

Coming from the UK he would have arrived from the west, where he crashed.

So thank you for correcting me, I have no other knowledge than you guys/girls.

Point is however if he was close to the VOR when he made the (possibly first but certainly last) contact, his turn away from the procedure (possibly to RWY 13 as was earlier suggested, although not confirmed in the press), he went well outside a normal pattern to join right base for 13

[IO540]

Who would the pilot be talking to on the radio, normally, at each stage?

Presumably you will be talking to Vienna Approach to start with. Then, at LOAV, once you cancel IFR, you will be transferred to the LOAV tower, yes?

I can certainly think of a good reason to cancel IFR very early, in a situation like this.

[vanHorck]

IO540 can you elaborate on the why? It helps me learn. Thx

[BackPacker]

Who would the pilot be talking to on the radio, normally, at each stage?

What I understand from the AIP is that you are supposed to inform LOAV before starting the IFR approach procedure, probably on COM2, while still being under control of Vienna Approach. This way LOAV knows somebody's coming down the IFR approach path and will be "handed over" in a few minutes time.

"Handed over" between quotes because you cancel IFR with Vienna, so it's not a formal IFR handover but rather more a VFR freecall to Voslau Aerodrome Information.

I have tried to quote the actual text from the AIP but the document doesn't allow copy/paste. It's in LOAV AD 2.20 Special Local Procedures para 2.2 (k).

You're not missing much by the way, because the English in the AIP is pigeon-English anyway. Example: In German, the text is entirely clear: "Bei allen An- und Abflugen, sowie in der Platzrunde, ist auf IFR-Anfluge aus richting VOR Sollenau [...] zu achten." In English, this becomes "All approaches and departures, as well as flights within traffic circuit have to use caution on IFR approaches from direction VOR Sollenau." What?

[IO540]

vanHorck - the reason one would cancel IFR early is to do with a certain way of proceeding in this kind of situation, but after consultation I am not going to post what I think, in this thread.

I will say one thing though: looking at the weather data I posted early on, what do you think the vertical extent of the IMC was?

[vanHorck]

I just cannot imagine a premature cancellation of an IFR flight to avoid having to give illegal answers when going visual.

The context is a psychological one of get-home-itis, something i guess we've all at some stage noticed in ourselves, and in my view too little understood.

I pray i never fall victim to it in such a dramatic way, and we will have to wait for the findings, including all the radio communications before we hurt the family unnecessarily.

That said you are right that this could be a possible cause if this is what you were implying carefully

[IO540]

I don't believe in "get-home-itis" but if one were going to execute a DIY approach in this weather (prob99 solid IMC from ~ 5000ft AMSL to ~ 700ft AGL) one would be executing a certain plan, flying a certain track, and one doesn't want to be distracted by radio calls, until one is ready to report visual on something like a 2 mile final.

I think that while there are multiple scenarios, the weather data is impossible to ignore. I would not have even attempted the approach, having heard that weather data (tower or ATIS) from 20-30nm away, and would have headed straight to Vienna, or elsewhere where it is suitable.

UK to Austria is only about 2hrs in a Jetprop (~260kt TAS) so the TAFs, and also the METARs, would have been there for all to see well before departure, so an alternate would have been planned. This pilot was after all highly qualified.

OTOH, it is always 100% legitimate to have a go at an approach (the visibility was OK for an IR pilot) but, in this case, I think he was in solid IMC once he descended below about 5000ft altitude. Of course one cannot be 100% sure but that is what I think.

[LH2]

I don't believe in "get-home-itis"

Actually, I note this apparently was a business trip. Reading this thread immediately reminded me of an incident report in one of the BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses) publications.

Essentially it was some guy trying to get to a meeting by private (light) aircraft, crappy weather en route and at destination, pressed on, got in trouble but luckily lived to tell the story (to the BEA investigators ) -- I think in that case he eventually found a hole in the clouds with ATC assistance and managed to put it down on a field. I've tried searching for the report on line but no luck.