accident in austria, flight UK to hungary (?)
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OK, that's different
METAR LOWL 141050Z 09013KT 060V120 CAVOK 08/02 Q1005 NOSIG
METAR LOWL 141120Z 09013KT 050V120 CAVOK 09/02 Q1005 NOSIG
METAR LOWL 141150Z 09013KT CAVOK 09/02 Q1005 NOSIG
METAR LOWL 141220Z 10012KT 070V130 CAVOK 09/02 Q1005 NOSIG
However, LOAV is 84nm away (GC route) from LOWL. That's a long way in terms of weather. Did he really fly VFR all that way?
It would be unusual behaviour for an IFR pilot to cancel IFR unnecessarily early, because the moment you cancel IFR you lose the guaranteed support of ATC, and ATC could ask you to fly via some VFR reporting point, etc, so suddenly you need to dig out your VFR charts because you have lost your enroute IFR clearance and now have to get cleared separately into every piece of controlled airspace, or you have to remain outside CAS. All in a 260kt aircraft which uses a lot more fuel when flying at low level, plus a lot of unnecessary workload. It would be an extremely unusual strategy, especially as he must (?) have got the weather forecast, seen that LOAV is quite possible not going to work, so much have known that an ILS into Vienna LOWW is pretty likely, but you won't get that unless you convert the flight back to IFR, which could take a lot of hassle, especially since you won't realise you cannot go into LOAV until you are very near it.
One can also rule out the possibility of him cancelling IFR early on the basis of receiving a favourable VFR weather report for LOAV from ATC - because no such good report was possible (unless it was given by mistake).
METAR LOWL 141050Z 09013KT 060V120 CAVOK 08/02 Q1005 NOSIG
METAR LOWL 141120Z 09013KT 050V120 CAVOK 09/02 Q1005 NOSIG
METAR LOWL 141150Z 09013KT CAVOK 09/02 Q1005 NOSIG
METAR LOWL 141220Z 10012KT 070V130 CAVOK 09/02 Q1005 NOSIG
However, LOAV is 84nm away (GC route) from LOWL. That's a long way in terms of weather. Did he really fly VFR all that way?
It would be unusual behaviour for an IFR pilot to cancel IFR unnecessarily early, because the moment you cancel IFR you lose the guaranteed support of ATC, and ATC could ask you to fly via some VFR reporting point, etc, so suddenly you need to dig out your VFR charts because you have lost your enroute IFR clearance and now have to get cleared separately into every piece of controlled airspace, or you have to remain outside CAS. All in a 260kt aircraft which uses a lot more fuel when flying at low level, plus a lot of unnecessary workload. It would be an extremely unusual strategy, especially as he must (?) have got the weather forecast, seen that LOAV is quite possible not going to work, so much have known that an ILS into Vienna LOWW is pretty likely, but you won't get that unless you convert the flight back to IFR, which could take a lot of hassle, especially since you won't realise you cannot go into LOAV until you are very near it.
One can also rule out the possibility of him cancelling IFR early on the basis of receiving a favourable VFR weather report for LOAV from ATC - because no such good report was possible (unless it was given by mistake).
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The only explanation for the very early cancelling of IFR I can think of has nothing to do with anything rational: he could simply have wanted to enjoy flying and go along the Alps, doing some 'flightseeing'. LOWL-LOAV on a clear winters' day is pretty spectacular, at least the first part. From memory there is also no CAS on that route until you hit Vienna.
Why he would do so knowing (as he must have) that the entire Vienna basin (i.e. LOAV and LOWW) was socked in, I have no idea.....
Only way to know is to see the radar track.
Why he would do so knowing (as he must have) that the entire Vienna basin (i.e. LOAV and LOWW) was socked in, I have no idea.....
Only way to know is to see the radar track.
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Memorial
The funeral was very impressive. It was also very nice to experience such a heartwarming sympathy from all over the world. Fellow pilots of the Aeroclub Hilversum did a missing man formation fly over. An emotional event I will never forget.
Also on January 23 there will be a memorial on Shoreham Airport.
Henny
Also on January 23 there will be a memorial on Shoreham Airport.
Henny
Thread Starter
it seems there were 3 GPSs and 2 transponders onboard,
rumours at local airports are that possible misinterpretation of positional data presented, together with low visibility, and high workload in a complex aircraft, made taking the right decisions quite difficult.
but again, assumptions......
as soon as the official report is out i'll let you know.
rumours at local airports are that possible misinterpretation of positional data presented, together with low visibility, and high workload in a complex aircraft, made taking the right decisions quite difficult.
but again, assumptions......
as soon as the official report is out i'll let you know.
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With
how would one get a
??
even if one has
(more like zero visibility, IMHO)
Very true.
Unfortunately, without the radar track....
I would be amazed if none of the relatives have heard anything more detailed.
3 GPSs
misinterpretation of positional data presented
even if one has
low visibility
high workload in a complex aircraft
Unfortunately, without the radar track....
I would be amazed if none of the relatives have heard anything more detailed.
Thread Starter
@IO540
there's a difference between, first, having 3 GPS onboard, seeing 3 pictures, maybe two, which due to a different N being set up, not looking alike, and, then, getting the picture in your head, and all that maybe from turning inbound to where LOAV is supposed to be to the point of impact, all that in less than a minute, and he also had to fly the aircraft, look out for ground contact, and do radio work, maybe request additional information, reset transponder, ...? workload quite heavy.
that was my point - intellectual priorities, getting the picture.
the report will give the final version.
there's a difference between, first, having 3 GPS onboard, seeing 3 pictures, maybe two, which due to a different N being set up, not looking alike, and, then, getting the picture in your head, and all that maybe from turning inbound to where LOAV is supposed to be to the point of impact, all that in less than a minute, and he also had to fly the aircraft, look out for ground contact, and do radio work, maybe request additional information, reset transponder, ...? workload quite heavy.
that was my point - intellectual priorities, getting the picture.
the report will give the final version.
Last edited by fluglehrer; 23rd Jan 2009 at 19:06.
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Yes, it is possible to get confused if one has one GPS north-up and another track-up.
However, I would class that under bad cockpit organisation. This pilot was well qualified and should have known that kind of stuff.
The (very little) evidence we have suggests (to me) that he was flying a visual circuit, but why would he do that?
However, I would class that under bad cockpit organisation. This pilot was well qualified and should have known that kind of stuff.
The (very little) evidence we have suggests (to me) that he was flying a visual circuit, but why would he do that?
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This NTSB report has come out. Not sure what to make of it.
Do note that NTSB reports for aything outside of an IFR clearance seem to state
"Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident."
See N2195B for example.
Do note that NTSB reports for aything outside of an IFR clearance seem to state
"Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident."
See N2195B for example.
But now I think we can see a scenario in which an experienced pilot might get confused:
According to the Austrian Accident Investigation Branch, the pilot cancelled his IFR clearance and descended on to a downwind leg for runway 31. LOAV advised the pilot they were landing runway 13. The pilot made a left turn inbound toward LOAV in an area of high terrain west of the airport (elevation 2,880 feet msl).
Imagine approaching a left downwind for 31 and being told they're on 13. Very tempting to make a left turn on to base without thinking what you're getting yourself in to...
According to the Austrian Accident Investigation Branch, the pilot cancelled his IFR clearance and descended on to a downwind leg for runway 31. LOAV advised the pilot they were landing runway 13. The pilot made a left turn inbound toward LOAV in an area of high terrain west of the airport (elevation 2,880 feet msl).
Imagine approaching a left downwind for 31 and being told they're on 13. Very tempting to make a left turn on to base without thinking what you're getting yourself in to...
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Yes, but if you can see the ground you won't fly into it, and if you can't see the ground then you would surely not be doing this kind of stuff anyway?
One would never (??) be flying anything resembling a visual circuit, or flying any part of a visual circuit, if one cannot see anything.
One would never (??) be flying anything resembling a visual circuit, or flying any part of a visual circuit, if one cannot see anything.
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That sounds like he never even used the VOR for the approach to 31 which would take a few minutes longer and would lead him south of the airfield via the procedure towards 31
But knowing where he was broadly (some miles) east of the field and having cancelled IFR already before, joined (or was ready to join) downwind left hand for 31 to be told 13 was in use....
Ah ok then, we'll take a hard left right now so we can go straight to a base leg for 13, saves another minute....
But knowing where he was broadly (some miles) east of the field and having cancelled IFR already before, joined (or was ready to join) downwind left hand for 31 to be told 13 was in use....
Ah ok then, we'll take a hard left right now so we can go straight to a base leg for 13, saves another minute....