accident in austria, flight UK to hungary (?)

[vanHorck]

Get-to-work-itis may be one of the worst forms of get-home-itis.

I needed once to ask for an SRA when i had a bout of the G-H-itis and gave the published minima when the tower asked me for the height at which i became visual. I lied.

It was a lesson I'll never forget.

[IO540]

The reason I don't like the term "get-home-itis" is because it is used by the people who run GA as an excuse for the limited PPL training.

In reality, it is bad decisionmaking, under pressure. But every flight is done under pressure. Most other things are done too; this morning I decided to get an xmas tree but I also had to take the car in for a service, so not a lot of time to play before doing a little 1hr flight on a nice day like today. Imagine the huge pressure Ryanair pilots are under to do the 20-30 minute turnaround. Yet, they don't crash often because they fly new-ish planes (which rarely have bits falling off), follow strict rules, and fly automated procedures to "easy" airports with mostly "easy" approaches. One needs to get into a discipline to do the same. Easier said than done though!! I am sure everybody who can (or even cannot) fly on instruments has done something they regretted afterwards, myself included.

What happened here we will never know for 100% sure but like I said I have a pretty damn good idea.

Edited to avoid thread getting sidetracked.

[Newforest2]

Good report on Gerry in the local paper. Blue skies.

Pilot's fatal crash in fog (From The Argus)

[172driver]

IO, not so sure about the 'easy' at many of RYR's destinations!

[Butterfly_2]

I have been trying to follow this thread from the beginning. I am not a pilot (I have a medical background), just a colleague of this great pilot Gerry who had this tragic accident. I have been flying with him, like many of my colleagues and customers for (long) business trips and none of us have ever felt unsafe!
I have to say, I do agree with his brother Henny and still think that his crash has been caused by his health (e.g. brain damage, heart failure). He was a very experienced safe pilot and instructor, never willing to take any risk (also not in case of time pressure). He even always analyzed crashes from the past, explaining what the pilot in charge should have done (I know this is after all always easier).
What I do not understand from the discussion above (my lack of knowledge?) is that in case his health should not have been the cause, when he was flying VFR heading to runway 13 (after all the in this thread suggested steps he did before) and suddenly flying into the fog, how can be explained that Gerry would have continued his altitude or even descent (he has been there before), while the most logical reaction would have been to climb and start later on the approach all over again?
For family, colleagues and friends it is very difficult to believe OUR Gerry did NOT crash because of his health and this question is standing in the way for me when I try to follow the technical discussions.

Thanks

[vanHorck]

Butterfly

The vast majority of pilots who crashed were viewed as being professional and serious about their flying. There are luckily only a few rogues in the air.

It is far too early to decide on what caused the accident.

Pilots here speculate as a matter of course about the causes, often based on limited information, simply because the mere process of analysis seems to tune our brain so that we may be safer in the future.

Furthermore accident causes are often a sequence of events, not a single one.

In this case whilst nobody denies there could have been a medical cause, the most pointy information we have is the weather which was very poor, possibly nil visibility between 5000 and 600.

There is no landing system at the airport, only an IFR (instrument flying) aproach to runway 31 which has to be converted to VFR(visual flight rules, meaning requiring visibility) at no lower than 1500 feet but in fact expected much sooner thus higher, which was likely impossible given the cloud base.

We don't know if he choose to land at RWY 31 or 13 but in both cases it is unlikely that he would have been visual with the runway at the minimum decision height of 1500.

We also don't know if he made the IFR approach and then circled back west to turn for runway 13 or that he in fact crashed well before starting the IFR procedure

Many of us are wondering why he did not divert to Vienna where an automatic landing system was available (with lower Minimum Decision Altitude)

Get-home-itis is a term used to describe an urge to keep going to the landing site even in dangerous or illegal circumstances. It has killed many pilots and has to do with human psychology

Bert

PS I should ad that all pilots I know review plane accidents, and this is therefore not a good benchmark to decide if a pilot is professional. It is part of our training to do so.
Even if he made a fatal mistake, this does not make him a bad pilot, we are all human after all. He died doing something he must have loved a LOT even if this consolation is a painful one for those remaining behind.

[vanHorck]

Butterfly 2

Check your private messages

[Sir George Cayley]

What does the manager at Shoreham mean when he is quoted as saying

When something like this happens it really brings home to you fact that flying is only as safe as it is.

“There are risks involved and the weather invariably plays its part.

Sir George Cayley

[BackPacker]

It probably means that he was interviewed by a persistent journalist, while he had nothing to say about the accident, either on or off the record, and the journalist picked whatever quote sounded the best and looked the least like "no comment".

Why would the manager at Shoreham know anything about the circumstances of an accident that happened, what, a 1000 miles away?

[avanoort]

Dear all,

May I please request you to talk with respect about this pilot?
Please keep in mind that this man died doing the thing he love most in the hole world, flying an airplane.
And that he will be missed by many people, friends, family and collegues.
I understand the discussion, however please try to keep respect.

For his beloved ones it is very difficult to believe he had made a mistake. Who can tell? Nobody nows. I only hope that he didn't suffer any paine and that it was quick.

I'm sure that he is watching us now.

His daughter,
Antoinette van Oortmarssen

[vanHorck]

Hi Antoinette,

Condolences to all of you.

No one claims to know the reasons for this dreadful crash. This speculation on this forum is something that happens in most incidents.

I am glad to see the original critical and incomplete poster did not come back, possibly banned by the moderators.

If, in due course, the truth about why this happened comes out, it will help the flying community.

I doubt much more will be posted about this accident till more information comes available.

I wish you and the other loved ones much strength in the coming days, weeks and months

[vanHorck]

The crash seems to have indeed happened on a location on an extended downwind for 13 righthand about 3 NM (northwest) beyond Tango

http://www.austrocontrol.co.at/en/Im...m586-67006.pdf

the direction of the crash should indicate if he was indeed in the odd shaped circuit, and extended his downwind leg, or that this location is coincidental.

Alternatively he could have been on a long final for 13 or
still joining the procedure, although in that case his routing is peculiar (broadly heading 160), which seems less likely

Circuit height is 2500 ft MSL, the elevation of the "cone" is 2884 ft, Vienna III SRA extends down to 4500 ft

[henny39]

VanHorck and Antoinette

Please check your private messages

[vanHorck]

PM's

This thread is special to me because it is about a GA Dutchman who also lived in England, two similarities with my own situation.

Allow me to compliment both Henny and Antoinette, family memebers of the deceased, for having had the courage to come here and express their grief, as well as all the other posters (bar one) for their restraint in their wordings.

We all post here when accidents occur and can be pretty direct about the issue. However I feel this thread is in essence a good example on how to behave here.

[fluglehrer]

VanHorck states
"The crash seems to have indeed happened on a location on an extended downwind for 13 righthand about 3 NM (northwest) beyond Tango
http://www.austrocontrol.co.at/en/Im...m586-67006.pdf
....."


at TANGO there is triangular area on the approach chart linked above.
the upper left corner is at MERKENSTEIN: that's the area where the impact was.

the VOR approach chart:
IFR Approach Bad Vöslau LOAV

regards,
wolfgang, VIE

[vanHorck]

Thx Wolfgang

I stand corrected, that makes it 1.5 nm not 3 on the extended downwind, max 45 seconds at 120 knots beyond the turn for Whiskey.

Do you have information on the elevation of the impact point?

[BoeingMEL]

IO540..... I agree...sorta

I broadly agree with your opinions and views IO540 - except your reference to VMC. Of course, simply cancelling IFR will not magically change the wx conditions to VMC... maybe you meant VFR? Cheers bm

[IO540]

BoeingMEL - indeed. Not a lot one can say; once one cancels IFR one is legally VFR which means one must be in VMC (simply speaking, not flying in cloud). One cannot cancel IFR (legitimately) if one is actually in cloud.

The question is whether at the point of cancelling IFR the pilot was actually able to proceed to a normal visual approach and landing. I am assuming here that the information that he made the radio call to cancel IFR is in fact accurate; it if isn't then we are barking up the wrong tree entirely.

On an FAA license (or, indeed, almost any license issue by a country other than the UK) one can be legally VFR without seeing the ground, and it is possible that when cancelling IFR (which in this case had to be done not below 1505ft AMSL if on the VOR approach) he was in fact really VFR. I consider this very unlikely, looking at the weather, but nobody will ever know what the pilot saw.

It is also possible that he was visual with the airport when at 1500ft or even higher; this can happen because a ground observation of say OVC/BKN007 can be accurate for a scattered layer with that base but the pilot is actually flying under a higher layer (base say 2000ft) and can thus see the ground below, and if this higher layer is sufficiently thick and/or there is little sunlight above (true at this time of the year even at mid-day) the ground observer may write BKN007 only, whereas a more accurate observation would be BKN007 BKN020. I once got a bollocking from somebody on the ground (a well meaning friend) for flying such a DIY approach but actually I could see the ground all the time. However the baloon ascent data (sounding) from Vienna which is very close to the time of the crash and only 10-20nm away shows no layering whatsoever at that point, and the whole airmass appears (on the MSLP chart I saw at the time - unfortunately I cannot get it anymore) to be fairly uniform. Also, and to me most tellingly, the pilot would not have flown into the hill knowingly, and even if he was flying in slightly marginal visual conditions, a Jetprop can go up like a rocket when in a hurry: +3500fpm.

There are a few bits I don't get.

One is the LOAV tower man saying it was "fog" but the Metars for LOAV show ~ 5000m horizontal visibility which is a very long way from what I would call "fog". It is perfectly good VFR horizontal visibility. What isn't VFR of course is OVC006 if you are going to descend down through it...........

One is whether the pilot actually said on the radio that he was flying the VOR approach. I may have missed this.

[vanHorck]

We are not sure of what his message was to the tower, it could well be canceling IFR at 1505 ft (above ground!) and announcing entering the circuit for 13 right-hand.

There is at least one report of quite reasonable weather at LOAV but this was an observation on the ground, so I m assuming horizontal visibility.

The point of impact is 1.5NM ( 90 seconds at 120 knots) exactly on an extended downwind for 13 with no information about impact height, but the maps show that area to be between 1400 and 1600 ft.

This means not only was point Tango missed (turn to base leg 1) but also a descent to point of impact at around 1500 ft. At 700 ft per min (engine failure) this would take over a minute(engine failure). However as far as we know, no mayday call was made.

I see the following options:
1. medical occurrence on non-autopilot downwind resulting in slow descent and inability to send mayday, such as stroke or heart attack
2. mechanical failure but this does not explain lack of Mayday call
3. intended non-autopilot low circuit due to weather in apparent limited but possibly intermittent visibility but with grey indescript (no contrast) clouds ahead and sudden (re)entry in IMC resulting in disorientation and CFIT

I think it would be logical to not be on autopilot if in a bad weather circuit, especially in the mountains as one would assume having faster control of the plane in case of "issues"

I do not rate the quote of the mountain man about the sound. The sound would have been peculiar because the plane was closer to his mountain than other planes in the circuit. More important is that he did not hear a rev UP (spool up) of the engines as a plane intending to initiate a fast climb, so medical issue or not, it sounds like CFIT to me.....

Today both the family of the pilot and his company (ELEKTA) each put their condolences adverts in the Telegraaf, Holland's most widespread newspaper, the 2 adverts taking up 1/3 of the page. Impressive. We sometimes forget how many lives are touched in these matters. In his case there were many, and intensely so.

[IO540]

1. medical occurrence on non-autopilot downwind resulting in slow descent and inability to send mayday, such as stroke or heart attack
2. mechanical failure but this does not explain lack of Mayday call
3. intended non-autopilot low circuit due to weather in apparent limited but possibly intermittent visibility but with grey indescript (no contrast) clouds ahead and sudden (re)entry in IMC resulting in disorientation and CFIT

4. A DIY approach in solid IMC, with an error made on the altitude.

I think it would be logical to not be on autopilot if in a bad weather circuit

It would depend on the "bad weather". A visual circuit would be flown by hand, but in any high workload situation, and that includes any approach flown for real (in IMC), one would use the autopilot. Of course some pilots will fly by hand in IMC for the practice, too, but I think this highly qualified pilot (especially coming from the USA/FAA stable where they don't go for the European "life should be hard" way of doing everything by hand with the GPS turned off to make life extra hard) would have known that pilot workload minimisation is the key to safety and would have used every piece of kit he had.

My guess is #4, and a straight flight into terrain in which the pilot never suspected anything is wrong.

I don't believe it was a lateral navigation error because he would have had better nav kit than a 1980s 747.

So, the big Q is why was he too low?

QNH was reported as 1012 which rules out the easy mistake of forgetting to set the altimeter to the local QNH, after coming off the enroute section which would have been flown with a setting of 1013 - the difference is just 30ft.

Did he descend on QNH instead of QFE? LOAV is 765ft up and that is plenty in this case to account for the error. I have no idea if QFE is used out there. I killed myself once (on a simulator) at EGKB by going missed and forgetting to reset the altimeter from QFE back to QNH. So, today I never use QFE at all and if this is passed by the airport I ignore it. I think QFE is a British-only thing (the RAF uses it) and this pilot did some some British connections. It would suprise me if this was the reason though because no real instrument pilot I know ever uses QFE.

Did he set the autopilot to descend to 1500ft instead of 2500ft? It's easily done.

Did the autopilot fail to capture the assumed preset altitude? The KFC225 autopilot (which I have, and which was fitted to Mirages of a certain generation) is not only prone to servo failures (I consider this unlikely in this case because a pitch failure is annunciated within ~ 10 seconds because the pitch trim usually runs away) but it also has some subtle "finger trouble" issues whereby you can dial in a preset altitude and normally this should activate the ALT ARM mode but this doesn't always happen, so you descend at some defined rate but there is no stop... done that a few times and one has to watch it.

The relative lack of damage to the hull suggests that the impact was in level or nearly level flight, not in any kind of steep descent. Unless the pilot pulled up at the last moment.

Anyway, Vienna ATC radar will have the answers to most of these questions, immediately after the crash, but we won't see this data for a very long time. One N-reg crash in France was nearly 2 years ago and still no publication - very very irresponsible.