Mid - Air @ Caboolture
Clare Prop,
Once again, yours was a different scenario to what RUDE had.
Mach- You and Rude are examples was Australian aviation is a joke overseas.
I'm not aware of the intricacies of that runway. What was the problem with his decision? Was it illegal? Did it contravene SOPSs? Why was it unsafe? So you delayed him by 6 months. You are Rude are a fine match.
Once again, yours was a different scenario to what RUDE had.
Mach- You and Rude are examples was Australian aviation is a joke overseas.
I'm not aware of the intricacies of that runway. What was the problem with his decision? Was it illegal? Did it contravene SOPSs? Why was it unsafe? So you delayed him by 6 months. You are Rude are a fine match.
The ‘joke’ of our Aussie company policy required all failures to undergo remedial training before a second attempt. It was also a requirement that the second attempt at command be passed, or the candidate could expect a more permanent tenure in the RHS. The extent of remedial training varied according to the seriousness of the failure. For minor deficiencies in technique, a trip to the simulator sufficed. Sometimes, a few more sectors on the line.
For some pilots, situation awareness and airmanship are quickly acquired. For others it can be a slow learning process, but once acquired usually retained.
For a few, sadly, there is no way they ever get it. These are the ones that have to be weeded out.
When a pilot under check (and hence under some pressure) makes a serious error of judgement, the examiner, and by extension, the training department, have a responsibility to probe a bit deeper. This can not be done by having a nice chat over tea and bickies, or in a day, out for a jolly on a flight where nothing happens. Over an extended period, situations are bound to arise to thoroughly evaluate the candidate.
Last edited by Mach E Avelli; 31st Jul 2023 at 23:10.
Thanks Clare Prop #118
It comes down to “in proximity” WRT the correct frequency.
The hypotheticals regarding reciprocal headings etc. are fair but could happen anywhere where there are airfields close together. Is YBEV having a CTAF shared with White Gum and Northam the answer a la YMUL and YSEN, not convinced due to over transmission and frequency congestion.
After your description about the tow plane incident, certainly rude, but not necessarily a function of it being a tow plane.
The YBUN CTAF call was from about 6 years ago, perhaps the transmitting pilot had finger trouble.
Going back to YCAB, is the assumption that both planes were on the CTAF. Others have reported frequency congestion from adjacent fields.
It comes down to “in proximity” WRT the correct frequency.
The hypotheticals regarding reciprocal headings etc. are fair but could happen anywhere where there are airfields close together. Is YBEV having a CTAF shared with White Gum and Northam the answer a la YMUL and YSEN, not convinced due to over transmission and frequency congestion.
After your description about the tow plane incident, certainly rude, but not necessarily a function of it being a tow plane.
The YBUN CTAF call was from about 6 years ago, perhaps the transmitting pilot had finger trouble.
Going back to YCAB, is the assumption that both planes were on the CTAF. Others have reported frequency congestion from adjacent fields.
It's rare to have so many different frequencies overlapping. I've been flying around that area for over 30 years and frequency congestion really isn't a problem. Certainly nowhere near as busy as the Serpentine/ Murray Field area can get and that works. Better that than people in the same area on different frequencies.
As for the tug incident, the following weekend the same tug did the same thing to a student on a solo nav. Is it worth risking a collision by doing a non-standard approach than to take an extra two minutes and to use the radio?
When you call inbound to the other gliding airfields around there will be someone on frequency to give you a heads up about gliders in the air, runway in use, tugs about to launch etc and good communication. I don't know why they can't all do that.
As for the tug incident, the following weekend the same tug did the same thing to a student on a solo nav. Is it worth risking a collision by doing a non-standard approach than to take an extra two minutes and to use the radio?
When you call inbound to the other gliding airfields around there will be someone on frequency to give you a heads up about gliders in the air, runway in use, tugs about to launch etc and good communication. I don't know why they can't all do that.
CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY REGULATIONS 1998 - REG 91.370
Take-off or landing at non-controlled aerodrome--all aircraft (1) This regulation applies to an aircraft (the subject aircraft ) at a non-controlled aerodrome at which a take-off or landing of the aircraft can only occur from or to a runway.Rules for take-off
(2) The pilot in command of the subject aircraft (other than a glider being towed by a glider tug) for a flight contravenes this subregulation if:
(a) the subject aircraft commences to take-off from a runway; and
(b) before taking off, a requirement mentioned in subregulation (3) is not met.
(3) The requirements are the following:
(a) if another aircraft is taking off before the subject aircraft from the same runway:
(i) the other aircraft must have crossed the upwind end of the runway; or
(ii) the other aircraft must have commenced a turn; or
(iii) the runway must be longer than 1,800 m and the other aircraft must have become airborne and be at least 1,800 m beyond the proposed point of lift-off of the subject aircraft; or
(iv) the other aircraft and the subject aircraft must both have a maximum take-off weight below 2,000 kg, and the other aircraft must be airborne and at least 600 m beyond the proposed point of lift-off of the subject aircraft;
(b) if another aircraft is landing on the same runway before the subject aircraft--the other aircraft must have vacated the runway;(ii) the other aircraft must have commenced a turn; or
(iii) the runway must be longer than 1,800 m and the other aircraft must have become airborne and be at least 1,800 m beyond the proposed point of lift-off of the subject aircraft; or
(iv) the other aircraft and the subject aircraft must both have a maximum take-off weight below 2,000 kg, and the other aircraft must be airborne and at least 600 m beyond the proposed point of lift-off of the subject aircraft;
(c) if another aircraft is landing before the subject aircraft and is using a crossing runway--the other aircraft must have crossed, or must have stopped short of, the runway the subject aircraft is taking off from.
Part 91 General operating and flight rules s91.370
I understand this to mean that unless the pilot taking off has visually sighted the landing aircraft stopped short of the intersection, there is no guarantee of separation. From what I have seen on Google Earth and read here, it appears unlikely a pilot on the threshold of 11 (or holding) could see an aircraft on the runway to the west of the intersection of 06/24 and 11/29. Is that correct?
I can also picture a scenario where the landing aircraft goes around from a low height, transmits a call to that effect but it is not heard due to line of sight issues or worse, lost in the clutter of a busy frequency/over transmitted.
The question is then how often would this occur at uncontrolled aerodromes?
Last edited by Chronic Snoozer; 2nd Aug 2023 at 03:00. Reason: Updated with RWY 11 as departure runway
I'm not sure where you get that visual sighting is required. It states clearly that the aircraft must have passed through or stopped short, no additional requirements are stipulated on how you assess that. That could be confirmed by radio as well as visual, or phone or whatever else can signal to the PIC waiting to depart that the aircraft has indeed stopped short of the intersection. However there must be some confirmation other than a pilot saying they will stop short, otherwise you are assuming a lot. As saying you will, is not confirmation that you have stopped short, which the later is the legal requirement. This is to allow for obvious things like go-rounds and over-runs.
That being said, if you don't trust the other pilot to report having held short then by all means wait for visual confirmation.
Sometimes the landing aircraft might say they intend to land and hold short of the intersection for you departure, that might not mean they assume you will roll immediately, just that they are saying once you see us hold short, off you go. They might assume you know your rules and will hold for them until they stop or turn around.
The other point to consider is the rule has regard to 'who is first'. So if the landing aircraft is first to land the aircraft taking off has to wait, if the aircraft taking off commences roll before the arriving aircraft crosses the airfield boundary it all gets complicated and the landing aircraft then must apply the same rule set or waiting until the aircraft departing has crossed the intersection before proceeding beyond the boundary fence.... This is where it all gets too close to call anyway, so why didn't you organize it much earlier.
That being said, if you don't trust the other pilot to report having held short then by all means wait for visual confirmation.
Sometimes the landing aircraft might say they intend to land and hold short of the intersection for you departure, that might not mean they assume you will roll immediately, just that they are saying once you see us hold short, off you go. They might assume you know your rules and will hold for them until they stop or turn around.
The other point to consider is the rule has regard to 'who is first'. So if the landing aircraft is first to land the aircraft taking off has to wait, if the aircraft taking off commences roll before the arriving aircraft crosses the airfield boundary it all gets complicated and the landing aircraft then must apply the same rule set or waiting until the aircraft departing has crossed the intersection before proceeding beyond the boundary fence.... This is where it all gets too close to call anyway, so why didn't you organize it much earlier.
Last edited by 43Inches; 1st Aug 2023 at 02:44.
The question is then how often would this occur at uncontrolled aerodromes?
We should also beware the 'false dichotomy' risk: One pilot having to be entirely in the right and therefore others being entirely in the wrong. It may be that a pilot beginning a take-off roll should be waiting, in accordance with 91.370, for an aircraft landing on the crossing runway. But if the first aircraft is using the most into wind runway, it is also true that the pilot of the aircraft landing on the crossing runway shouldn't be doing so unless, among other things, satisfied, after taking into consideration the other traffic, that it is safe to land on the crossing runway.
Hence why right of way should not be sorted out below 500 feet with one on final and one taking off. Generally the simplest answer is if the aircraft on final sees an aircraft on the crossing taking off, go-round, avoid in the missed approach. There's much more space to maneuver in the air, then continue to land and you both end up in the intersection anyway. The situation at Caboolture sounds way more complicated than the rules can account for and a last minute third party confused the situation and led to the outcome. Granted what may have been agreed to occur may not have been legal, but once you are in that position....
I too have failed pilots on checks for lack of SA. One was on his final command check, with a F/O in the RHS and me in the jumpseat. He had got through every stage without any great distinction, but seemed ready, otherwise he would not have been there. Anyway, after landing on 24 at Perth, just ahead of another jet on fairly short final for 21, he wanted to turn into the intersection. Of course I over rode that in no uncertain terms! After another six months in the RHS, his SA was much improved.
I too have failed pilots on checks for lack of SA. One was on his final command check, with a F/O in the RHS and me in the jumpseat. He had got through every stage without any great distinction, but seemed ready, otherwise he would not have been there. Anyway, after landing on 24 at Perth, just ahead of another jet on fairly short final for 21, he wanted to turn into the intersection. Of course I over rode that in no uncertain terms! After another six months in the RHS, his SA was much improved.
If you call two people getting killed a very personal, possibly irrational, emotional investment, yep guilty. Like I said, I wasn't much more than an acquaintance. But when you see people cut down like this, in circumstances that are repeated day after day after day............read the comments above, there are multiple pilots recounting similar story's of tugs using opposite direction, crossing runways for no other reason but to cut corners and save a buck.
Clouding my judgement? Yeah, probably in some areas, mainly the language I use. Not runway ops though.
Clouding my judgement? Yeah, probably in some areas, mainly the language I use. Not runway ops though.
Hence why right of way should not be sorted out below 500 feet with one on final and one taking off. Generally the simplest answer is if the aircraft on final sees an aircraft on the crossing taking off, go-round, avoid in the missed approach. There's much more space to maneuver in the air, then continue to land and you both end up in the intersection anyway. The situation at Caboolture sounds way more complicated than the rules can account for and a last minute third party confused the situation and led to the outcome. Granted what may have been agreed to occur may not have been legal, but once you are in that position....
But the situation at Caboolture is, in my experience, not unusual and the existing rules deal with most if not all scenarios at non-controlled aerodromes. I just reiterate that it's important to understand that, in some scenarios, two pilots can be in the wrong rather than one of them being absolutely right and the other absolutely wrong.
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But if the first aircraft is using the most into wind runway, it is also true that the pilot of the aircraft landing on the crossing runway shouldn't be doing so unless, among other things, satisfied, after taking into consideration the other traffic, that it is safe to land on the crossing runway.
Last edited by Chronic Snoozer; 1st Aug 2023 at 04:13.
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I too have failed pilots on checks for lack of SA. One was on his final command check, with a F/O in the RHS and me in the jumpseat. He had got through every stage without any great distinction, but seemed ready, otherwise he would not have been there. Anyway, after landing on 24 at Perth, just ahead of another jet on fairly short final for 21, he wanted to turn into the intersection. Of course I over rode that in no uncertain terms! After another six months in the RHS, his SA was much improved.
Apologies for drift, and in no way implying that either pilot in this tragedy lacked SA, but I am with Rodney on this.
I too have failed pilots on checks for lack of SA. One was on his final command check, with a F/O in the RHS and me in the jumpseat. He had got through every stage without any great distinction, but seemed ready, otherwise he would not have been there. Anyway, after landing on 24 at Perth, just ahead of another jet on fairly short final for 21, he wanted to turn into the intersection. Of course I over rode that in no uncertain terms! After another six months in the RHS, his SA was much improved.
Apologies for drift, and in no way implying that either pilot in this tragedy lacked SA, but I am with Rodney on this.
Last edited by 43Inches; 1st Aug 2023 at 04:09.
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Specifically the use of a cross runway with an expectation that the landing aircraft will hold short of the intersecting runway.
However...
If the pilot is taking off on the into wind runway and the landing aircraft is not landing on that runway, other rules are relevant to the pilot landing (and make sense).
An "expectation" is not sufficient. The rule you pasted is pretty clear as to what must be true 'now', not merely expected in the future.
However...
If the pilot is taking off on the into wind runway and the landing aircraft is not landing on that runway, other rules are relevant to the pilot landing (and make sense).
However...
If the pilot is taking off on the into wind runway and the landing aircraft is not landing on that runway, other rules are relevant to the pilot landing (and make sense).
Last edited by Chronic Snoozer; 1st Aug 2023 at 11:04.
I don’t see the relevance of a pilot “nominating” the crossing runway to the operation of 91.370(3)(c). It seems to me that the operation of that provision depends on the timing of the landing on the crossing runway. I suppose that if a pilot chooses to use the crossing runway and nominates a time of landing that is before the planned take-off of the ‘subject aircraft’ and that timing is correct, the pilot of the latter must comply with the requirement in (c).
Back to basics: These non-controlled aerodrome rules were originally designed to work without the benefit of radio. You look out the window of your aircraft to see whether there’s anyone on base or final for or on the runway on which you’re about to line up and, after lining up, you look to see whether there’s anyone on base or final for a crossing runway. And if, for example, there’s someone just about to touch down on 27 and you’re sitting on the piano keys of 36, best to wait. (BTW: An ATC friend advised me to do the same thing at controlled aerodromes, just in case ATC has stuffed up…)
General point: These rules are originally based on the maritime collision regulations. Crusty old maritime regulators will tell you that if there’s a collision between two ships under way, it follows that both masters have breached the COLREGS.
Back to basics: These non-controlled aerodrome rules were originally designed to work without the benefit of radio. You look out the window of your aircraft to see whether there’s anyone on base or final for or on the runway on which you’re about to line up and, after lining up, you look to see whether there’s anyone on base or final for a crossing runway. And if, for example, there’s someone just about to touch down on 27 and you’re sitting on the piano keys of 36, best to wait. (BTW: An ATC friend advised me to do the same thing at controlled aerodromes, just in case ATC has stuffed up…)
General point: These rules are originally based on the maritime collision regulations. Crusty old maritime regulators will tell you that if there’s a collision between two ships under way, it follows that both masters have breached the COLREGS.
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Leady, your last reference to the maritime COLREGS nails it. In an aviation context VFR = see and be seen. No matter who technically has right of way, BOTH pilots - or if there are multiple aircraft - ALL pilots must do whatever it takes to avoid collisions. Sometimes that means stopping, which clearly (in an aviation context) can only be done on the ground. The airborne equivalent to stopping could be a tight orbit…possibly safer than a go around in some situations…whatever it takes.
Thare are too many rules for the average VFR pilot to absorb, so beyond the basic right of way/give way stuff in the PPL syllabus, over riding all is simply…don’t get too close to other aircraft, get out of their way if they are too close to you.
Thare are too many rules for the average VFR pilot to absorb, so beyond the basic right of way/give way stuff in the PPL syllabus, over riding all is simply…don’t get too close to other aircraft, get out of their way if they are too close to you.
Last edited by Mach E Avelli; 1st Aug 2023 at 12:45.
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I haven't seen any post yet indicating the summary of the accident as it now appears on the ATSB website, which differs to some of the earlier posts:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...rt/ao-2023-036
ABC News screenshots:
Caboolture runway designations from the Aeroclub website:
So approximate flightpaths / take-off run and final locations of aircraft would be something like:
Half a lifetime back, I had my one and only glider joyflight at Caboolture airport.
It is so sad to hear when such accidents happen. In this instance, seems like ATSB should be able to piece together the circumstances reasonably well. Hopefully there will be safety lessons, but what a price to pay.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...rt/ao-2023-036
"The ATSB is investigating a collision involving Jabiru J430, VH-EDJ, and Piper PA-25-235, VH-SPA, at Caboolture aircraft landing area, Queensland on 28 July 2023.
An initial analysis of video footage showed that VH-SPA was returning to land at the airfield on runway 06, before it commenced a go-around. The Jabiru J430 had just taken off from runway 11.
The 2 occupants of VH-EDJ were fatally injured. The sole pilot of VH-SPA was uninjured..."
Looking at aerial footage shown on ABC News, the wreckage of VH-EDJ lies on the western side of runway 24 threshold with VH-SPA parked on the eastern side of that threshold. Another post here (Dora-9, #60) suggests VH-SPA managed to complete a circuit after the collision before landing, so presumably that explains its parked location? There is also a taildragger parked beyond the threshold of 24 in the ABC footage. Unclear if it was involved or stopped there to try to render assistance?ABC News screenshots:
Caboolture runway designations from the Aeroclub website:
So approximate flightpaths / take-off run and final locations of aircraft would be something like:
Half a lifetime back, I had my one and only glider joyflight at Caboolture airport.
It is so sad to hear when such accidents happen. In this instance, seems like ATSB should be able to piece together the circumstances reasonably well. Hopefully there will be safety lessons, but what a price to pay.
Talking yesterday to a witness who didn't see the actual impact but the immediate aftermath - the Pawnee was observed flying another circuit, landed on 06 and then taxied to the far end (i.e. where it is in the photos).
Allegedly the Pawnee pilot asked the first responders "where's the Cessna?" in reference to the aircraft that allegedly taxied across 06/24 causing him to initiate his go-around. A good question - what DID happen to the recalcitrant Cessna?
Thanks for posting the photos/diagrams, helispotter. I don't think your final diagram is quite right - note how the wreckage trail of VH-EDJ parallels 11/29. I'm sure when we eventually see the ATSB report, all will be revealed.
A terrible business.
Allegedly the Pawnee pilot asked the first responders "where's the Cessna?" in reference to the aircraft that allegedly taxied across 06/24 causing him to initiate his go-around. A good question - what DID happen to the recalcitrant Cessna?
Thanks for posting the photos/diagrams, helispotter. I don't think your final diagram is quite right - note how the wreckage trail of VH-EDJ parallels 11/29. I'm sure when we eventually see the ATSB report, all will be revealed.
A terrible business.
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Sadly one could be mistaken for thinking that the registration VH-EDJ is cursed. The previous aircraft of that registration suffered a total write off after being hit by a Cessna 182 during a failed go-around, plus several other aircraft. Luckily it was parked and nobody was onboard. There were no injuries to the occupants of the 182.
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/185566
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/185566
Given the Jab was well and truly airborne before the 06/24 intersection, is it a reasonable to think the pilot considered any runway beyond the intersection as "unusable" for the purposes of "thou shall not takeoff until crossing traffic is stopped/passed"... Even if the Pawnee hadn't stopped and had rolled through the intersection, the Jab was already airborne and, therefore, had assured separation vertically.
I've done a similar thing at Caloundra - multiple aircraft in the circuit meant I couldn't get a safe gap to enter and backtrack R12, so after waiting at the intersection and realising this, I promptly did a 180, took off on R05 and stayed at 500AGL until well clear of the circuit then climbed to altitude. Positive separation was assured both laterally and vertically from circuit traffic, but on reading "the roolz", technically illegal I guess as I took off from what would be defined as intersecting runways, even though said intersection was behind me...
I've done a similar thing at Caloundra - multiple aircraft in the circuit meant I couldn't get a safe gap to enter and backtrack R12, so after waiting at the intersection and realising this, I promptly did a 180, took off on R05 and stayed at 500AGL until well clear of the circuit then climbed to altitude. Positive separation was assured both laterally and vertically from circuit traffic, but on reading "the roolz", technically illegal I guess as I took off from what would be defined as intersecting runways, even though said intersection was behind me...