King Air down at Essendon?
Join Date: Mar 2017
Location: Adeliade
Posts: 3
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
2000 rpm to 1586 rpm big difference. Please explain as you said it hit at 2000 rpm simple math you said. Difference is one being governed and one not. Nearly 25% not worried about a any ones elses reading as its not a point im trying to make. With out accurate measurements and not some pics its impossible to get it right. Its pure speculation as to prop speed. If it was simple maths we would not have 3 different answers aready.
Join Date: Mar 2017
Location: Adeliade
Posts: 3
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
P3 Air issue should result in hung start. But I guess you are referring to Px governing, ie the line running along the top of engine to the power turbine part of the CSU. Have experienced leakage here on a Caravan engine which resulted in topping out at about 1680 RPM.
This should show up on preflight run up.
This should show up on preflight run up.
Left and Mick, unable at the moment to find the source of where I found the roof cladding info.
I see the Kliplok here says 233mm between ridges. Do different manufactures have different profiles?
Roofing Profiles | Select Metal Roofing
Seems to be an avenue closed, unless some one can climb up there with a tape.
Unfortunately Eddie pending failures don't always show up on preflight. Have experienced three governor failures. The best was multi engine helo and during cruise the TQ's started surging. As one engine ran up the other ran down and visa versa. Playing semaphore over a wide TQ range. Identified the bad engine, reduced to idle, motored home, and gave it to maintenance.
Aircraft returned to line, and I made a big, big mistake in not checking what work had been carried out exactly. 35 minutes into the next flight in cruise the previously bad engine dropped to zero TQ, hand was half way to grabbing the throttle to reduce it to idle, when in the blink of an eye it went to max power. I couldn't believe the acceleration, far faster than a slam acceleration, and I was surprised it did so without any sign of compressor stalling. In any event, reduced power to idle and motored home. That's when I found the remedial action from the previous event was they made a one hour flight and unable to fault. Cause was deemed to be stricture in the flywheel assembly causing the original TQ fluctuations, which ultimately led to drive shaft failure on the final flight.
Flying a single engine type making approach to home base. Went to pull collective to terminate to the hover and there was nothing there, as in no engine response. Landed off an auto rotation, placed the governor into manual fuel and hovered to the pad, put the governor back into operation and unable to fault.
Dual engine PT6 helo, had just landed and both throttles still full open when one engine slowly started to accelerate with attendant increase in rotor RPM. Placed governor into manual fuel and completed flight. Maintenance put down to slug of ice in the P3 line.
The 700mm panels have four ridges per width or 175mm ridge to ridge
Roofing Profiles | Select Metal Roofing
Seems to be an avenue closed, unless some one can climb up there with a tape.
This should show up on preflight run up
Aircraft returned to line, and I made a big, big mistake in not checking what work had been carried out exactly. 35 minutes into the next flight in cruise the previously bad engine dropped to zero TQ, hand was half way to grabbing the throttle to reduce it to idle, when in the blink of an eye it went to max power. I couldn't believe the acceleration, far faster than a slam acceleration, and I was surprised it did so without any sign of compressor stalling. In any event, reduced power to idle and motored home. That's when I found the remedial action from the previous event was they made a one hour flight and unable to fault. Cause was deemed to be stricture in the flywheel assembly causing the original TQ fluctuations, which ultimately led to drive shaft failure on the final flight.
Flying a single engine type making approach to home base. Went to pull collective to terminate to the hover and there was nothing there, as in no engine response. Landed off an auto rotation, placed the governor into manual fuel and hovered to the pad, put the governor back into operation and unable to fault.
Dual engine PT6 helo, had just landed and both throttles still full open when one engine slowly started to accelerate with attendant increase in rotor RPM. Placed governor into manual fuel and completed flight. Maintenance put down to slug of ice in the P3 line.
Last edited by megan; 2nd Apr 2017 at 04:28.
I struggled with trying to determine exactly what roofing product we were looking at too but as I mentioned earlier I think that the alignment with the HVAC ducting and the walkways is instructive.
via megan: ...Seems to be an avenue closed, unless some one can climb up there with a tape...
The shipping container in one of the photos would be about 2435mm wide. The container is roughly aligned with the roofing ridges. Might give you a ball park figure to work with.
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: Itinerant
Posts: 27
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Came across this AAT decision published a few days ago regarding the situation
Australian Corporate Jet Centres Pty Ltd and Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2017] AATA 403 (31 March 2017)
Australian Corporate Jet Centres Pty Ltd and Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2017] AATA 403 (31 March 2017)
Good call Short Field! My guess is that ACJC is now toast. The Americans will sue them to bits. They are effectively out of business all ready - even if they win the case, the legal costs will bankrupt them.
The case of ACJC, if it goes to trial, is going to be analogous to the famous insurance case where a an item of ships Cargo was dropped in the water between the ship and the wharf while being unloaded and neither insurer would accept responsibility.
The case of ACJC, if it goes to trial, is going to be analogous to the famous insurance case where a an item of ships Cargo was dropped in the water between the ship and the wharf while being unloaded and neither insurer would accept responsibility.
Came across this AAT decision published a few days ago regarding the situation
Australian Corporate Jet Centres Pty Ltd and Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2017] AATA 403 (31 March 2017)
Australian Corporate Jet Centres Pty Ltd and Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2017] AATA 403 (31 March 2017)
I reckon around $65,000 will have been p*ssed up against the wall on bureaucratic busywork, lawyers and the AAT's time.
2000 rpm to 1586 rpm big difference. Please explain as you said it hit at 2000 rpm simple math you said. Difference is one being governed and one not. Nearly 25% not worried about a any ones elses reading as its not a point im trying to make. With out accurate measurements and not some pics its impossible to get it right. Its pure speculation as to prop speed. If it was simple maths we would not have 3 different answers aready.
And the maths is simple, it's year 7 level. We have two different answers (not three) because we have two different estimates of the distance between the prop strikes. I think megan now sees that her original estimate was on the low side because her reference measurement was on the high side; that means that you can discard the original estimate of 1586 rpm. So now you have one estimate that is within 6.7% of 2000 rpm; that's not bad given the method of estimation, moreso when we can see that the prop speed is retarding at about 4% per completed rotation as it chewed its way along the roof.
It is worth noting that 300mm between the roof cladding ridges is the largest distance likely and based on that we get an average left prop rotation of around 1866 rpm. That speed is in the green arc. If the ridges are closer than 300mm then the estimated rpm goes up, not down.
Connedrod "new here"? That right there is funny. 
On a serious note, I still don't understand why a yaw to the left would have been caused by a left engine/propellor that seem (on the extrapolations from the best guesses as to the dimensions of the prop damage to the roof) to have been running normally, irrespective of what came first out of the yaw and falling below VMCA.
If we assume there was some catastrophic failure and the pilot was deliberately turning left to keep some runway in sight while the left engine/propellor were operating normally, how does a left yaw result from that or falling below VMCA?
Maybe the extrapolations from the best guesses as to the dimensions of the left prop damage to the roof are incorrect.
On a serious note, I still don't understand why a yaw to the left would have been caused by a left engine/propellor that seem (on the extrapolations from the best guesses as to the dimensions of the prop damage to the roof) to have been running normally, irrespective of what came first out of the yaw and falling below VMCA.
If we assume there was some catastrophic failure and the pilot was deliberately turning left to keep some runway in sight while the left engine/propellor were operating normally, how does a left yaw result from that or falling below VMCA?
Maybe the extrapolations from the best guesses as to the dimensions of the left prop damage to the roof are incorrect.
Join Date: Oct 2014
Location: In my Swag
Posts: 490
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It was actually the opposite, the new AOC holder wanted the Registered owner/ operators details reverted to MyJet. For obvious reasons.
Ref your thoughts on the yaw, Ramrod's explanation of auto feather and others' thoughts of it being disarmed could lead to this occurrence.
Sunfish, unless maintenance has been carried out under the current AOC they may not bear any responsibility at all.
Ref your thoughts on the yaw, Ramrod's explanation of auto feather and others' thoughts of it being disarmed could lead to this occurrence.
Sunfish, unless maintenance has been carried out under the current AOC they may not bear any responsibility at all.
Lead, have a google for the report on the crash of VP-BBK.
Edit, I see Megan has posted it below.
Megan, I only mentioned the power lever slide originally only to highlight the phenomenon to any drivers that might not be familiar with it. I never meant for it, and I still don't mean it to, imply anything to the crash of ZCR. There's a handful of other ways any plane can kill you.
I'm happy to discuss generalities and B200 technicals, observations based on my own experiences etc, but I'm not posting my own thoughts/beliefs as to any causal factor of this crash. That's for the investigators to publish. The lack of CVR data is disheartening though and going to make the investigation that much more difficult.
Edit, I see Megan has posted it below.
Megan, I only mentioned the power lever slide originally only to highlight the phenomenon to any drivers that might not be familiar with it. I never meant for it, and I still don't mean it to, imply anything to the crash of ZCR. There's a handful of other ways any plane can kill you.
I'm happy to discuss generalities and B200 technicals, observations based on my own experiences etc, but I'm not posting my own thoughts/beliefs as to any causal factor of this crash. That's for the investigators to publish. The lack of CVR data is disheartening though and going to make the investigation that much more difficult.
Last edited by Car RAMROD; 3rd Apr 2017 at 05:47.
Time will tell, but there are uncanny similarities of this accident to the following, notably power reduction in the left engine and loss of RPM, but not an engine failure per se.
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/h...6E4D369AA7935E
https://assets.publishing.service.go...pdf_022814.pdf
Read, and draw your own conclusions.
As with these two reports, I don't see the ATSB coming up with any definitive answer, other than an assumption of possible Power lever migration, which Car RAMROD mentioned back at post #106. As I said, time will tell.
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/h...6E4D369AA7935E
https://assets.publishing.service.go...pdf_022814.pdf
Read, and draw your own conclusions.
As with these two reports, I don't see the ATSB coming up with any definitive answer, other than an assumption of possible Power lever migration, which Car RAMROD mentioned back at post #106. As I said, time will tell.
The reasons ACJC doesn't want to appear as the registered operator after the accident are, as you say, obvious.
If you read the AAT's decision you will see that before the accident ACJC was agitating CASA to find out why ACJC had not become the registered operator in accordance with an application submitted in December 2016. Indeed, ACJC's most recent inquiry to CASA was the day before the accident - 20 Feb.
On my reading of the AAT decision, the only reason the application had not been processed to completion in January in accordance the registration holder's wishes and ACJC's signed consent was that the registration holder's $65 credit card authorisation 'bounced'. The amount was then paid and the application actioned on 16 Feb. ACJC found out about this on .... 21 Feb.
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 669
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Time will tell, but there are uncanny similarities of this accident to the following, notably power reduction in the left engine and loss of RPM, but not an engine failure per se.
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/h...6E4D369AA7935E
https://assets.publishing.service.go...pdf_022814.pdf
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/h...6E4D369AA7935E
https://assets.publishing.service.go...pdf_022814.pdf
For the Wichita crash, the maintenance was followed by two short post-maintenance test flights, then came the accident flight.
For the Blackbushe crash, the maintenance and associated ground runs were immediately prior to the accident flight.
Any maintenance to ZCR immediately prior to the accident flight?
but I'm not posting my own thoughts/beliefs as to any causal factor of this crash
Megan, sometimes I don't conmunicate entirely effectively so I can see how you may have thought I was replying directly back to you as such. My response was more for others reading your post about what I had said. Some people may have believed what I had previously stated, which you had mentioned, could be me inferring a causal factor.
I think you and I are understanding each other though.
FGD, whilst maintenance was obvious in the Blackbushe and Wichita accidents, as I'm no doubt sure you'd know the frictions could be adjusted for other reasons (another pilot flew the aircraft previously for example).
I think you and I are understanding each other though.
FGD, whilst maintenance was obvious in the Blackbushe and Wichita accidents, as I'm no doubt sure you'd know the frictions could be adjusted for other reasons (another pilot flew the aircraft previously for example).