AA Crash Jamaica
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vapilot writes:
Runway position - this is where I found the most fault. Obviously, had they known where they were, the crew would have gone around. What could have led to this lack of positional awareness? Severely restricted visibility is the number one suspect whose accomplice could most likely have been a gust of wind from the rear.
Runway position - this is where I found the most fault. Obviously, had they known where they were, the crew would have gone around. What could have led to this lack of positional awareness? Severely restricted visibility is the number one suspect whose accomplice could most likely have been a gust of wind from the rear.
It's been mentioned here and elsewhere that the 738 doesn't cool its heels as quickly as some other 73s
Not faulting PIC/PNC with this.
If I HAD to place a blame somewhere, I'd lay it right on the airport itself. NMIA is a tight situation in the best times, should be lit up and should have "real" reports for runway contamination.
Nice, though, that nobody was killed, and looking at the pix, one must appreciate the engineering that allowed the engine to depart without ripping the wing apart.
While we're trying to suppose exactly what went wrong with the hope of seeing the same not happen again, let's not overlook what went right - no lives were lost.
RR
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If I HAD to place a blame somewhere, I'd lay it right on the airport itself.
Naw...nothing to do with the pilots inability to actually land the airplane within the confines of the requested runway.
We can now see the true arrogance of AA guys...blame everyone/else...but them.
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"If I HAD to place a blame somewhere, I'd lay it right on the airport itself."
Captain rottenray . . . Please tell us how much longer than 8900 feet of non grooved, slick-when-wet pavement would be necessary for a B737-800 to land safely? 
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I recently exchanged PMs with a former Navy carrier pilot.
Those guys have both a fixation to get an aircraft down on the deck, and at the same time have an automatic go-around built into their procedure. Their landings on carriers have the tightest landing requirements of all for speed control and touch down point, and yet they still anticipate a need to go-around if things don't happen correctly. Doesn't it make sense that when tight landing and stopping conditions are encountered in the civilian world, that both fixation to land and the need to go-around can co-exist in the same mind?
Naval aviators do it all the time.
Those guys have both a fixation to get an aircraft down on the deck, and at the same time have an automatic go-around built into their procedure. Their landings on carriers have the tightest landing requirements of all for speed control and touch down point, and yet they still anticipate a need to go-around if things don't happen correctly. Doesn't it make sense that when tight landing and stopping conditions are encountered in the civilian world, that both fixation to land and the need to go-around can co-exist in the same mind?
Naval aviators do it all the time.
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Doesn't it make sense that when tight landing and stopping conditions are encountered in the civilian world, that both fixation to land and the need to go-around can co-exist in the same mind?
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Personal technique - I pull up the wind page, gives headwind and crosswind values, on all approaches. Compare tower reported winds vs. FMC winds vs. outside visual clues, to include windsock if visible.
misd-agin the touch-down point is an important factor (#232), but so too is the speed at the threshold as this contributes to higher energy and an extended flare.
I assume that you refer to the difference in distance shown in the performance manual, which relate to landing at the correct speed but at different weights (at the correct point); thus this difference may not be representative of an over-speed landing.
If the aircraft lands fast with respect to the correct speed for the weight, then there is a distance increase due to the energy and the long touchdown point from the extended flare.
AC 91-79 gives an example of such an event where typically a 10 kt speed excess increases the landing distance by 500 ft, but the extended flare contributes a further 2500 ft (3000 ft total). The touch-down point part appears dominant, but it originates from excess speed.
Given these figures as representative of the Jamaica 737 landing, then with the additional hazard of the tailwind, a touch-down point at 4000ft down the runway may be easier to understand.
I do not agree with the view expressed by p51guy I think pilots are fully aware of the runway they need. (#221).
The landing data supplied by many operators only shows the maximum landing weight (MLW) for a runway in specific conditions (wet/dry, wind, alt, etc). Many crews only check that the actual landing wt is within limits (were legal syndrome), whereas a more circumspect crew might asses the actual wt as a % of MLW and judge the required level of braking, but in either case, not checking the actual or required distance.
Greater professionalism might result in checking the actual distance charts and applying a factor, considering previous operations experience, or by adding a safety factor for items not considered by the data.
For those aircraft with auto brake / distance charts, the data is only as good as the assessment of the runway conditions, which is also a major weakness in the crews situation assessment and decision to land (see #217).
Regulated landing performance has a safety factor, but the often quoted 1.92 (wet/jet) value is most unlikely to be achieved. A significant proportion may used up in the difference between a certification minimum distance landing and that routinely practiced in every-day operations. Furthermore the data assumes a level of friction appropriate to wet conditions, but how wet is wet what are the exact conditions on the runway.
Manufactures rarely fly certification wet landings; the wet performance is based on dry landings and an assumption about the runway condition. Overall the safety margin during a wet landing is probably less than that for a dry landing.
After considering other distance reducing factors such as runway texture, wind error, contaminant (rubber, paint, dust), none of which are in the performance data, the overall safety margin could be very small.
Thus pilots must strive for accuracy during the approach and landing, taking responsibility for both the judgement to land and the execution of the manoeuvre. There is no hiding behind legal requirements.
It is the pilots professional duty and responsibility to form and adjust a plan for a safe result taking hindsight and turning it into foresight.
The Jamaica 737 landing might have been legal the plan apparently met the requirements, but due to any one or a combination of the many possible errors, misjudgements, or malfunctions, the execution of the plan and thus the result was incorrect.
Considering what can be done whilst we wait for the investigation report, the following questions may be worthy of debate:-
Why didnt operators know that the runway was contaminated with rubber (slippery when wet), or what precautions to take with that knowledge.
How do pilots report these conditions to the authority? Similarly for poor runway draining characteristics.
Do operators take account of the non-existent RESA? Are operators landing distance charts adjusted to allow for this?
Do operators specify additional approach / landing accuracy for difficult or limiting runways and mandate a go-around?
Do crews adjust landing distance for increased Vref (gust factors)? If so, how; - not knowing the required landing distance (as discussed above)?
Finally, and perhaps a major concern in the industry, is that there appears to be too many open questions about marginal landing conditions.
I assume that you refer to the difference in distance shown in the performance manual, which relate to landing at the correct speed but at different weights (at the correct point); thus this difference may not be representative of an over-speed landing.
If the aircraft lands fast with respect to the correct speed for the weight, then there is a distance increase due to the energy and the long touchdown point from the extended flare.
AC 91-79 gives an example of such an event where typically a 10 kt speed excess increases the landing distance by 500 ft, but the extended flare contributes a further 2500 ft (3000 ft total). The touch-down point part appears dominant, but it originates from excess speed.
Given these figures as representative of the Jamaica 737 landing, then with the additional hazard of the tailwind, a touch-down point at 4000ft down the runway may be easier to understand.
I do not agree with the view expressed by p51guy I think pilots are fully aware of the runway they need. (#221).
The landing data supplied by many operators only shows the maximum landing weight (MLW) for a runway in specific conditions (wet/dry, wind, alt, etc). Many crews only check that the actual landing wt is within limits (were legal syndrome), whereas a more circumspect crew might asses the actual wt as a % of MLW and judge the required level of braking, but in either case, not checking the actual or required distance.
Greater professionalism might result in checking the actual distance charts and applying a factor, considering previous operations experience, or by adding a safety factor for items not considered by the data.
For those aircraft with auto brake / distance charts, the data is only as good as the assessment of the runway conditions, which is also a major weakness in the crews situation assessment and decision to land (see #217).
Regulated landing performance has a safety factor, but the often quoted 1.92 (wet/jet) value is most unlikely to be achieved. A significant proportion may used up in the difference between a certification minimum distance landing and that routinely practiced in every-day operations. Furthermore the data assumes a level of friction appropriate to wet conditions, but how wet is wet what are the exact conditions on the runway.
Manufactures rarely fly certification wet landings; the wet performance is based on dry landings and an assumption about the runway condition. Overall the safety margin during a wet landing is probably less than that for a dry landing.
After considering other distance reducing factors such as runway texture, wind error, contaminant (rubber, paint, dust), none of which are in the performance data, the overall safety margin could be very small.
Thus pilots must strive for accuracy during the approach and landing, taking responsibility for both the judgement to land and the execution of the manoeuvre. There is no hiding behind legal requirements.
It is the pilots professional duty and responsibility to form and adjust a plan for a safe result taking hindsight and turning it into foresight.
The Jamaica 737 landing might have been legal the plan apparently met the requirements, but due to any one or a combination of the many possible errors, misjudgements, or malfunctions, the execution of the plan and thus the result was incorrect.
Considering what can be done whilst we wait for the investigation report, the following questions may be worthy of debate:-
Why didnt operators know that the runway was contaminated with rubber (slippery when wet), or what precautions to take with that knowledge.
How do pilots report these conditions to the authority? Similarly for poor runway draining characteristics.
Do operators take account of the non-existent RESA? Are operators landing distance charts adjusted to allow for this?
Do operators specify additional approach / landing accuracy for difficult or limiting runways and mandate a go-around?
Do crews adjust landing distance for increased Vref (gust factors)? If so, how; - not knowing the required landing distance (as discussed above)?
Finally, and perhaps a major concern in the industry, is that there appears to be too many open questions about marginal landing conditions.
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Runway conditions
It's pretty safe to say the runway was wet. And if they landed in heavy rain or after it had rained heavily, there would have been significant amounts of standing water on that non-grooved runway. And the chart even tells you that!
Throw in a potentially long-landing that was maybe a bit fast, and I don't think it's hard to image at all going off the end if there was any type of hydroplaning occurring.
Throw in a potentially long-landing that was maybe a bit fast, and I don't think it's hard to image at all going off the end if there was any type of hydroplaning occurring.
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The mishap crew relieved the JFK at MIA.
The CA pushing the wheelchair was not the mishap CA.
The CA pushing the wheelchair was not the mishap CA.
73
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As posted by VAPILOT2004
So VAPILOT2004, why did you find fault with my statement? Most of my fellow colleagues don't think it acceptable to chew up of 4,000 feet of runway? How about you?
Again, maybe its just me and the majority of the pilot world, but the touchdown zone is where you are supposed to land the jet, and not the departure end of the runway.
Also, during training with every airline, and documentation contained with FCOMs, if in the opinion of the crew the landing will not end in a satisfactory manner; ie... staying within the borders of the runway, then a go around shall be executed.
I find fault with statement
Again, maybe its just me and the majority of the pilot world, but the touchdown zone is where you are supposed to land the jet, and not the departure end of the runway.
Also, during training with every airline, and documentation contained with FCOMs, if in the opinion of the crew the landing will not end in a satisfactory manner; ie... staying within the borders of the runway, then a go around shall be executed.
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For the Navy guys posting. You cannot turn Kingston airport into the wind like maybe on an aircraft carrier!!! So, if you land with a tail wind and not within the gate, you are I am affraid to say, looking for trouble!! Maybe a Žbarrier net would have beenŽuseful in this case?
As with all accidents/incidents there will be many factors conspiring together (Swiss Cheese Model).
Interesting article in latest BALPA Log about training crews to land A318 at London City Airport. The touchdown zone has two sets of lights flush with the runway pointing to the touchdown threshold, and if the aircraft hasn't touched down by then, a mandatory go-around must be flown.
Maybe a simple addition/variation to the runway lighting would give pilots better situational awareness and help to avoid these types of overrun events.
Interesting article in latest BALPA Log about training crews to land A318 at London City Airport. The touchdown zone has two sets of lights flush with the runway pointing to the touchdown threshold, and if the aircraft hasn't touched down by then, a mandatory go-around must be flown.
Maybe a simple addition/variation to the runway lighting would give pilots better situational awareness and help to avoid these types of overrun events.
"No one should be surprised...APA initially supported the crews actions at Little Rock and with the A300-600 accident ex-JFK.
After all, APA considers their guys can do no wrong... Yesterday 06:59
After all, APA considers their guys can do no wrong...
Yesterday 06:59
Ok MODS,
Here we go again with 411A's bile spewing venom and crap that surfaces every time a US Major (especially AA) has an incident. He has a long disgusting history of posts like this.
Perhaps we can wait until we have more information on the accident before we crucify our fellow crew?
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SADLY, when a plane crashes...everyone blames the pilot...except the Unions representing them.
why?
The world is an adverserial (sp) place. If the unions came out and said: the pilots crashed and it was there fault, no one would bother finding the truth.
I really think the pilots screwed up on this one. I don't think the copilot is the fault of the Airbus crash near New York.
I've seen awful pilots hired at AA. I've seen great pilots get turned down there. I know at least one pilot who lied about his flying time get hired at AA. (he logged PIC time on a plane he as acting as copilot on...that didn't even require a copilot)
So, let's find the truth...let's also acknowledge that the way we do things isn't that great.
And let's examine the difficulty in selecting reverse thrust on the 737...could this be part of the problem?
why?
The world is an adverserial (sp) place. If the unions came out and said: the pilots crashed and it was there fault, no one would bother finding the truth.
I really think the pilots screwed up on this one. I don't think the copilot is the fault of the Airbus crash near New York.
I've seen awful pilots hired at AA. I've seen great pilots get turned down there. I know at least one pilot who lied about his flying time get hired at AA. (he logged PIC time on a plane he as acting as copilot on...that didn't even require a copilot)
So, let's find the truth...let's also acknowledge that the way we do things isn't that great.
And let's examine the difficulty in selecting reverse thrust on the 737...could this be part of the problem?
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I have a hard time understanding ANY talk of circle to land, even in cavok conditions, at night, when RNAV options are available.
I also believe it's endemic in the pilot population (me too) to favor the ILS with an acceptable tailwind over RNAV.
These options should have been discussed prior to TOD, and RNAV to 30 loaded into the secondary flt plan. Perhaps they were. In any case, landing distance, medium auto-brake, and strict adherence to G/S the mantra for this approach. A nice firm landing is a friend sometimes.
I also believe it's endemic in the pilot population (me too) to favor the ILS with an acceptable tailwind over RNAV.
These options should have been discussed prior to TOD, and RNAV to 30 loaded into the secondary flt plan. Perhaps they were. In any case, landing distance, medium auto-brake, and strict adherence to G/S the mantra for this approach. A nice firm landing is a friend sometimes.
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As posted by Protectthehornet
You gotta be kidding me... come on... that's a first. Please share... in all my year of flying the -800 I've never had any problem landing the jet in the touch down zone... auto braking stopping the jet... and never... and I repeat never had any problem selecting reverse thrust... even when using the Standby Hydraulic Pump as the primary source of hydraulic pressure.
And let's examine the difficulty in selecting reverse thrust on the 737...could this be part of the problem?
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Other than the passenger who said they landed long I have not seen one official report that can confirm this. Did I miss something or is this a rumor? The black boxes have probably been played and some people know how this happened. Hopefully they will publish the results soon. Speculating about pilot error is so easy since it ends up being that on a lot of accidents. If I ever had an incident I would hope I would not be hung until some facts came out.
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So VAPILOT2004, why did you find fault with my statement? Most of my fellow colleagues don't think it acceptable to chew up of 4,000 feet of runway? How about you?
As a slight aside but on the subject of missing the TDZ check out this video:
YouTube - All Nippon Airways Boeing 767-300ER Hard Landing @ Hong Kong
Allegedly someone googled the touchdown point and it was halfway down the runway. Granted they have a long runway at HKG but even so - surely bad form to miss the TDZ by 2000-3000ft!!
YouTube - All Nippon Airways Boeing 767-300ER Hard Landing @ Hong Kong
Allegedly someone googled the touchdown point and it was halfway down the runway. Granted they have a long runway at HKG but even so - surely bad form to miss the TDZ by 2000-3000ft!!
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captnjs
I refer to the 18 seconds delay in getting into reverse on the accident at midway with a southwest NG 737.
I've had a heck of a time getting into reverse on an older 737 once or twice...no incident...but wondering if everything was just right in both cases.
the more I read, the more I am sure that the winds changed into a more unfavorable situation...but still the pilot should know of possible wind changes in ANY aproach.
I've had a heck of a time getting into reverse on an older 737 once or twice...no incident...but wondering if everything was just right in both cases.
the more I read, the more I am sure that the winds changed into a more unfavorable situation...but still the pilot should know of possible wind changes in ANY aproach.