AA Crash Jamaica

[p51guy]

Why don't we wait for some facts to come out. Nothing so far is official. Speculation is fun but doesn't mean much. Jamaican officials are as crooked as they come so forget what they said. Have you ever been there? Don't ever venture away from your safe area. You can buy anything from a guys sister to any drugs you want for money. Even Jimmy Buffet got shot at trying to land his plane there. Going there is as dangerous as Haiti. Last time I was there I heard a gunshot outside the fence. We just chose a cruise and every one that went to Jamaica I Xed out.

[p51guy]

Maybe it is possible to have tunnel vision on landing but I don't think most pilots do. I have never seen it. In over 17000 hrs of flying the airlines I have never taken over the controls except once which probably would have damaged the plane. It is demoralizing to the other pilot to do so. I would rather take a hard landing than ruin his day. Going around is pretty simple, add thrust and pull the nose up. I don't think many pilots would have a problem with that.

[captjns]

ELAC asks:

There's an unresolved question here: How does an aircraft come to touch down 4,000' down a runway at Vref speed?

Flying technique, continuing the landing phase beyond the touchdown zone without initiating a go-around as required in the company's FCOM.

[Whippersnapper]

I have twice had First Officers on the 800 float badly and not react, even after shouting at them repeatedly to go around - they just froze. On both occasions I had to take control, fire-walling the thrust levers because we were going to touch down half way or further down the runway. On both occasions I made runway contact while the engines were half way through spooling up from idle, but both were safe go-rounds. Both would have been accidents if the landings had been continued.

I have never been trained on an aeroplane or simulator to deal with a baulked landing, and have never met another pilot who has been. The general philosophy on the line seems to be that once you have called "Land" at DH, that you are "in". This becomes almost a psychological committal. One airline I flew for saw the problem and changed the DH calls from "Land/Go around" to "Continue/Go around", which may help with the problem, but they gadn't instigated baulked landing training by the time I left.

There needs to be a training programme to deal with deep landings/float, with emphasis made that if you are not going to land within the touch down carpet, you MUST go around. Sim training is also required, and maybe that "Continue" call, as silly as it seemed at the time of introduction, is not such a bad idea.

[PJ2]

ELAC;

The choices seem to be either, the approach was not vertically stable in the late stages,

That is why I included the possibility that, similar to AA1420, the aircraft got high in the very last stages of the approach during the "inside to outside" perceptual transition, in darkness and heavy rain. "Floating" makes little sense as the energy is not there, as you say. If the aircraft is high, depth perception poor and time is compressing rapidly - (another similarity with AA1420, but not, obviously a causal factor in and of itself), that may explain the distance to touchdown. Nor do we know the power settings across the threshold, either but I wonder - will the N1s be low to idle indicating a higher than normal threshold crossing height, or will we see N1s reducing and then, if the autothrust was still engaged, increasing again in response to autothrust commands to maintain the approach target airspeed; - we do not have that information and cannot discount either notion.

galaxy flyer, whippersnapper;
I wouldn't look towards training as "being at fault". I think most would agree, as p51guy states that the need for a baulked landing at this stage of the approach is extremely rare and training time is expensive and has to respect the more common occurences as described in law and what is seen in the FOQA data.

That said, there is a FOQA event one can design which monitors a go-around from a low energy state, (thrust levers closed, N1s below nn%, reducing airspeed) and I have seen it trigger and the go-around has been successful. Clearly, such a decision is made very swiftly and not well into the landing regime! Bear in mind that the Transport Canada statements issue directly from an attempted go-around by an RJ at Fredericton and may not apply to all circumstances and/or all types.

Clearly too, this is not "advice" but speculative commentary. That said, whenever we do (or used to do), live training circuits and bumps for transition courses etc, we are/were doing go-arounds from this very state every time, (spoilers not armed, though) so we aren't exactly in "test pilot territory". But it is not trained as regular ops and isn't on any syllabus I am aware of. Clearly, the risk in such a decision grows steeply with every passing second, especially if one does not know exactly how much runway is remaining. Someone pointed out 'different colored lights' towards the end of the runway - well, that only applies to the alternating white-red then solid red CLLs and this runway had none of that.

Long landings is something airlines must see in their flight data analysis programs. They occur in all circumstances, for all kinds of reasons. Trying for a smooth landing is one possible cause; if the autothrust isn't disconnected and attempts to "maintain the target airspeed" before the pilot flying catches the thrust levers disconnects and closes them is another. Airspeeds much higher than Vref plus the usual additives is more common than one would expect, and tailwind landings are not that uncommon either. Also, one cannot discount the effects of TAS vice CAS - on a 30C day, even at sea level, the TAS can be 5kts higher, with a corresponding higher groundspeed.

p51guy;
Re your comment regarding Jamaican authorities, I was reluctant to automatically discount independant comments but you said it directly and it was the reason I asked about the sources of the information we have seen in the media. It seems credible however but so far there is very little to go on and far more questions than answers at this stage.

[ETOPS]

I have never been trained on an aeroplane or simulator to deal with a baulked landing, and have never met another pilot who has been.

That's suprising - we get this as part of initial conversion training onto a new type ( to give you the knowledge as to when it's too late to reject the landing) and then again in re-current sims every few years. The last scenario we had focussed on the idea of splitting the decision between a rejected approach - a "go around" and a baulked landing say from a bounce or float. The essential points were, when did TOGA disarm? and what was the effect of deploying reverse..........?

[Flight Safety]

Excellent discussion by all.

ELAC quoted the following:

According to the Flight Data Recorder (FDR), the aircraft was traveling at the Vref (landing) airspeed of 148 knots, with a groundspeed of 162 knots, i.e. with a tailwind component of 14 knots, when the wheels made initial contact at about 4,000 feet down the 8,900-foot runway.

If I read this correctly, the aircraft was at Vref speed with the 14kt tailwind, at the moment the wheels made contact with the runway. This suggests that the approach speed was quite a bit higher over the threshhold, and only dissipated to Vref by the time they were 4000 feet down the runway.

PJ2 wrote:

"Floating" makes little sense as the energy is not there, as you say.

If I'm reading correctly, the excess energy had to be there, as I presently don't see any other explanation for the long float (pending additional information of course).

[411A]

I have never been trained on an aeroplane or simulator to deal with a baulked landing, and have never met another pilot who has been.

Well, you've met one now.
In all heavy jet aircraft that I have flown, balked landings were a required demonstrated maneuver, for the initial type rating...and many times recurrent as well.
Just imagine (for example)...
You find yourself in the flare, and some bozo has entered the runway well downfield (contrary to ATC instructions), and an immediate GO is required, to avoid a collision.
There are many situations where a balked landing is very necessay and required, to keep from ruining your whole day.
Wonder if they teach 'em at AA?

[iceman50]

Add another to 411A

I have never been trained on an aeroplane or simulator to deal with a baulked landing

Been there, done that and we have company procedures and training for it.

[swordsman]

Ditto and never shouting at the other pilot

[waves-dubai]

Its funny that US based lawyers are now in Jamaica advertising their services to victims of the crash....
The local newspaper has released a flash representation of the crash...
Go-Jamaica :: Flash representation Updated: American Airlines, flight AA 331, with additional details Plane Crash in Jamaica:: News

[slf4life]

Bullets? - bah!

I suppose my 46 years living an ordinary schoolgoing, working stiff bill paying life in Kingston at all hours of night and day is just plain miraculous given the gunshots flying back and forth between drug dealers and gangs everywhere in the city. Yup, going home from a movie at 1:30 am with my wife two nights ago was just perilous

I'm just another pc 'pilot' with a lifelong interest who damn well knows his place, keeps quiet and listens to aviation experts.

Stick to what you know - please

[captjns]

Balked (involuntary) landings have been part of the training curriculum at every airline I've been with since the 1970's. However the go-around was called by either the instructor or examiner.

During ground school the subject is addressed as to why a pilot would inititiate a go-around for reasons other than "the old truck on the runway!" alert or "oops... what happened to the runway lights?"

Wonder if there will be a reacquaintance with the dreaded balked landing procedures during future RST's? Perhaps not a bad idea.

[justDave2010]

from justDave2010

I think the basic issues were, the aproach lights were out and hadn't been fixed because of the officials' incompetence, and the runway was dark and wet because of extremely heavy rain. If you were driving in that rain you couldn't see a foot in front of your car.

It was that heavy, i'm not a pilot, but I think that would affect visibility.
People in Jamaica almost never do what they are supposed to.
Official's here seem to be devoid of any common sense, so till the final verdict is in i'm leaning toward this crash being the fault of the Jamaican authorities because of incompetent maintenance and management procedures.

Hell even their first responders are a joke, many passengers had to be ferried by a kind person driving a JUTC bus- that's public transportation- to the hospital, because ambulances did not resond fast enough.

The officials have said that their first responders acted quickly which excepting, the fire fighters which did arrive in less than 3 minutes, is a complete lie. So I agree with most of what you said, just not the buying the guy's sister part. There is nothing unique or unusual about that.

[captjns]

As stated by justDave2010...

I think the basic issues were, the aproach lights were out and hadn't been fixed because of the officials' incompetence, and the runway was dark and wet because of extremely heavy rain. If you were driving in that rain you couldn't see a foot in front of your car.

It was that heavy, i'm not a pilot, but I think that would affect visibility.

Part of flight training is to conduct approaches to airports without visual cues. So with that being said, approach lights would not make a difference as their are runway lights running the entire length of the usable surface.

Irrespective of visual cues, an operating glide slope will provide a proper descent profile to the runway threshold so landing can be accomplished within the specified touchdown zone.

[slf4life]

justDave - you do know that the initial findings are from a joint statement compiled by the JCAA and the NTSB right? I would expect therefore that the purity of the NTSB lends sufficient credence to overcome the incompetence and corruption of the JCAA no?

[PJ2]

captjns;

Balked (involuntary) landings have been part of the training curriculum at every airline I've been with since the 1970's. However the go-around was called by either the instructor or examiner.

During ground school the subject is addressed as to why a pilot would inititiate a go-around for reasons other than "the old truck on the runway!" alert or "oops... what happened to the runway lights?"

Wonder if there will be a reacquaintance with the dreaded balked landing procedures during future RST's? Perhaps not a bad idea.

I know go-arounds are taught at "every" airline - it is a required manouevre just like the rejected t/o, engine fail at V1, etc. But just to make sure we're talking about the same manouevre, the assumption/suggestion I am making here is, this isn't a go-around from minimums, this is a go-around from just above the runway, at touchdown, or on the runway, all after the thrust levers have been closed for landing but reverse has not been selected. That to me is a "balked landing", just so we're on the same page.

I believe this is what 411A and one or two others are talking about and it is what I am focussing on.

That is the manouevre I don't think many airlines teach. As we are aware, the manoeuvre is high-risk and requires a high degree of skillful, coordinated actions.

Flight Safety;

PJ2 wrote:

Quote:
"Floating" makes little sense as the energy is not there, as you say.

If I'm reading correctly, the excess energy had to be there, as I presently don't see any other explanation for the long float (pending additional information of course).

My writing again...we are meaning the same thing. Where a long landing occurs, yes, the high energy has to be there or the float can't take place and that was what I was observing in response to ELAC's comment. Ergo, the energy had to come from height, not speed and that meant a higher threshold crossing height...was my thought. Hope that clarifies.

[suninmyeyes]

Justdave

You wrote

"I think the basic issues were, the aproach lights were out and hadn't been fixed because of the officials' incompetence, and the runway was dark and wet because of extremely heavy rain. If you were driving in that rain you couldn't see a foot in front of your car."

The accident report states that the pilots became visual between 1000 feet and 700 feet above ground level. That means that even without the approach lights they saw the runway between two and three miles out as opposed to a foot away!

It's fairly common in places like Africa to make an approach with no approach lights. It is not a cause of an accident. There is an ILS G/S and PAPIs at KIN. The pilots had sufficient visual reference and made a decision to land

Landing anywhere at night in heavy rain and the wipers going flat out is not nice though, the runway lights can blur and mushroom and depth perception becomes more difficult. I have not yet flown a simulator with a visual that accurately represents landing in rain although it gets the "eee aawe" noise of the wipers just right!

[barit1]

I'm beginning to think that the philosophy/mindset of post #243 (pattern_is_full) has some merit, particularly in conditions where braking may be problematical.

[IGh]

Hmm, Vref=148? FAA's "Gate" for wave-off

Stumbling over the Vref mentioned in the investigation update:

“… slightly below the maximum permitted landing weight when it landed in Kingston….”
“… at the Vref (landing) airspeed of 148 knots …”

Just doing the numbers now:
- - -assume GWt = 144,000 pounds (near Max Ldg Wt);

- -now grab a B738 perf manual, to find a Vref for that GWt:
Vref for Flaps 30 ~ 148 KIAS
Vref for Flaps 40 ~ 141 KIAS

April of 1976 had two cases of Rwy Excursion; both investigations focused on the approach quality; and those AARs include some early ideas on “stabilized” approach concept, and more information on “spool-up” of turbojet engine.

Flaps 30 vs F40 --
This stumbling over the FLAPS 30 approach (versus Flaps 40) was a consideration in the Rwy Excursion [off-end] of

AA625 / 27Apr76 B727-95, N1963; St Thomas, Virgin Islands. From NTSB AAR 77-1, pg 27 :

“… captain said that … he decided to use 30 degrees of flaps.
He stated that the aircraft at 30 flaps is more controllable, is easier to manage, and that, ‘you have a greater margin for what is ahead.’”

From AAR 77-1, pg 36+, “conclusions”

Finding #8: “… The use of 30 flaps instead of 40 flaps increased the landing roll, provided lower drag, lessened the decelerative capability of the aircraft, and made the aircraft more susceptible to atmospheric or aerodynamic factors which could produce a float.

Finding #11: The aircraft touched down about 2,500 to 3,000 ft beyond the runway threshold. Based on these distances, it could have been stopped within the confines of the remaining runway, but a safe go-around could not be made.”

From AAR 77-1, Appendix I and J include some 1970’s versions of what might now be termed the Stabilized Approach “gates” [as later defined in FAA’s AC120-71, Appdx 2]. Notice that in 1976 that only “gate” was much LOWER (closer to the threshold) at about 200’ agl.

Today’s FAA’s “stabilized approach” gates were reiterated in the FAA’s LETTER dated 2/19/02 (FAA’s response to NTSB Recommendation A-01-69):

“… Approach gates are points established by the operator as reference points for flightcrews to monitor the quality of their progress during an approach to a landing and to promote their situation awareness. Approach gates are points at which … limits are noted and stabilized approach criteria are checked. These criteria indicate whether an approach can continue or a missed approach should be executed….”

By FAA order, in IMC, pilots for any US operator now have that approach “gate” at 1000 feet above the threshold.

Especially when flying a TAILWIND approach, pilots fight the “energy management” element of the FAA’s “stabilized approach” concept; it must be mastered PRIOR to descending through that IMC 1000-ft “gate”:

“… maintain the proper approach speed with the engines spooled up …”
[FAA Order 8900.1, CHG 0; 9/13/2007; VOLUME 4,
CHAPTER 2, Section 3, paragraph 4-221, “STABILIZED APPROACH CONCEPT”]
Flight Standards Information System (FSIMS)

? Does FAA Southwest Region understand this “energy management” element of their own “stabilized approach” concept? ??

Could any 140K Lbs B737-800 fly such a stable glideslope, with 14kts tailwind – and still keep the “engines spooled-up”????

You ask, “What is ‘spooled-up’ for that CFM-engine"?

FAA’s only answer to pilots is in their AC120-71A, Appendix 2,

“... Power setting is … within the permissible power range for approach specified in the approved operating manual used by the pilot....”

FSF’s answer (same as Boeing’s) is in ALAR Briefing Note 4.2 –
“Energy Management”
http://www.flightsafety.org/alar_resources.html
click on: 4.2 — Energy Management [PDF 97K]
FSF, _Flight Safety Digest_, August-November 2000, pg 75-79 [five pages]
Table One: “Recommended Elements of a Stabilized Approach”, Item 6:

“Power setting is ... not below the minimum power for approach as defined by the aircraft operating manual …”

If FAA authorized 15kt tailwind for the B737-800, then FAA and Boeing must show that pilots can still meet FAA’s “spooled-up” requirement, while flying a stable glideslope, with that greater tailwind, at that Max Ldg Wt.
[See this photo for Boeing's DRAG solution to attain "spooled-up":
http://i14.photobucket.com/albums/a341/nw969/B47.jpg ]

Hopefully, AA & their pilots association will offer FAA & Boeing a day or two to deliver the data, and users will get better ideas about CFM’s minimum “spooled-up” RPM. Users need better Data; the "regulator" must ensure that the manufacturer defines "engines spooled-up" (rather than put that obligation on the poor "operator" ):

Boeing and FAA should agree to provide users with a graph similar to that shown below; but now for this mishap- CFM-engine, DISPLAY the scale of N1-RPM along the vertical axis, and define the "spooled-up" N1 for this mishap:
Turbojet Acceleration CURVES picture by IGhhGI - Photobucket