Death of the Airshow?
On the CAA's website
CAA statement on air show charges consultation | UK Civil Aviation Authority
From the Manchester Airshow site
"We are also aware of a consultation of CAA charges in relation to Airshows currently underway. Whilst we shall be providing a response to the consultation with our views, we should emphasise that the charges are not a factor in our decision not to hold the Airshow in 2016, and regardless of the consultation outcome, we fully intend to review the feasibility of holding a future Airshow in the coming years."
Never let the truth get in the way......and all that
CAA statement on air show charges consultation | UK Civil Aviation Authority
From the Manchester Airshow site
"We are also aware of a consultation of CAA charges in relation to Airshows currently underway. Whilst we shall be providing a response to the consultation with our views, we should emphasise that the charges are not a factor in our decision not to hold the Airshow in 2016, and regardless of the consultation outcome, we fully intend to review the feasibility of holding a future Airshow in the coming years."
Never let the truth get in the way......and all that
To expand on TyroPicard's reply:
The chapter and verse may be read here at page 34.
YS
The CAA’s funding model
91. The CAA does not have monies voted to it by Parliament and must instead recover its operating costs, plus a rate of return on capital set by the Government, through charges on the aviation industry for its regulatory services and on users of UK airspace through the Eurocontrol en route charges system.
91. The CAA does not have monies voted to it by Parliament and must instead recover its operating costs, plus a rate of return on capital set by the Government, through charges on the aviation industry for its regulatory services and on users of UK airspace through the Eurocontrol en route charges system.
YS
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But if you read the other parts Widger, It does say the timing of the review and its possible outcome is a factor in their decision making.
The organisers of the Manchester Airshow are following this review process closely. Due to the timing of the completed review which is not expected to be fully published until early March 2016, and due to other planned unrelated developments at the Aerodrome venue, the organiser regretfully decided in December 2015 not to plan a full Airshow event in 2016.
There is little, if any point in targeting the CAA for criticism in this case
The last question of course could also be asked about the more general point of display regulation. It isn't good enough to simply say "well we hadn't had an accident that killed members of the public since Farnborough" because as we know from all other areas of aviation risk management that this attitude is not acceptable. Yet we are now expected to allow the very people that crashed the car to now write the new rules, it beggars belief and worse not a word from the CAA in terms of explanation.
Its the same with the fees. This concept of self funding isn't a new one - so why all of a sudden this huge lurch?? Did they ever have a look at the finances in Gatwick because why wake up after Shoreham and bang the table and demand a 100% increase?? Its insanity and again these same people are at the helm/wheel/stick.. I'm running out of vehicles!!!
Airshows are being binned because 1) the funding is a shock and comes very late in the day and 2) the CAA are providing such weak guidance around risk that FDD's are becoming terrified as they shoulder the liability should anything go wrong in future, which with clear guidance and strong support and leadership with your regulator I'm sure they would be confident and willing to do so - but its late Feb and these things are not in place.
The CAA might want to reflect that with the continued erosion of GA they will eventually erode their own mandate and another reason for even existing goes with it.
The No1 desirable quality of a regulator is confidence and I don't see how it is fulfilling that. Perhaps Pilot magazine could ask the CAA for an interview?
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I totally agree, the CAA have for a long time been shifting the liability off themselves and onto Engineers, that way they can steer clear of any blame or liability, and as for GA, don't get me started.
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?? You really believe that? Of course Shoreham has been the catalyst here but its been so dramatic on so many levels that one wonders who and where the accountability lies for the past. Its a thankless task to debate the accident but you can see that there is commentary over airworthiness of the accident aircraft - such that the CAA are now scrambling to employ an airworthiness engineer, but it rather begs the question what level of oversight was being provided before? What metrics were they using to decide if they were doing a good job?
The last question of course could also be asked about the more general point of display regulation. It isn't good enough to simply say "well we hadn't had an accident that killed members of the public since Farnborough" because as we know from all other areas of aviation risk management that this attitude is not acceptable. Yet we are now expected to allow the very people that crashed the car to now write the new rules, it beggars belief and worse not a word from the CAA in terms of explanation.
Its the same with the fees. This concept of self funding isn't a new one - so why all of a sudden this huge lurch?? Did they ever have a look at the finances in Gatwick because why wake up after Shoreham and bang the table and demand a 100% increase?? Its insanity and again these same people are at the helm/wheel/stick.. I'm running out of vehicles!!!
Airshows are being binned because 1) the funding is a shock and comes very late in the day and 2) the CAA are providing such weak guidance around risk that FDD's are becoming terrified as they shoulder the liability should anything go wrong in future, which with clear guidance and strong support and leadership with your regulator I'm sure they would be confident and willing to do so - but its late Feb and these things are not in place.
The CAA might want to reflect that with the continued erosion of GA they will eventually erode their own mandate and another reason for even existing goes with it.
The No1 desirable quality of a regulator is confidence and I don't see how it is fulfilling that. Perhaps Pilot magazine could ask the CAA for an interview?
The last question of course could also be asked about the more general point of display regulation. It isn't good enough to simply say "well we hadn't had an accident that killed members of the public since Farnborough" because as we know from all other areas of aviation risk management that this attitude is not acceptable. Yet we are now expected to allow the very people that crashed the car to now write the new rules, it beggars belief and worse not a word from the CAA in terms of explanation.
Its the same with the fees. This concept of self funding isn't a new one - so why all of a sudden this huge lurch?? Did they ever have a look at the finances in Gatwick because why wake up after Shoreham and bang the table and demand a 100% increase?? Its insanity and again these same people are at the helm/wheel/stick.. I'm running out of vehicles!!!
Airshows are being binned because 1) the funding is a shock and comes very late in the day and 2) the CAA are providing such weak guidance around risk that FDD's are becoming terrified as they shoulder the liability should anything go wrong in future, which with clear guidance and strong support and leadership with your regulator I'm sure they would be confident and willing to do so - but its late Feb and these things are not in place.
The CAA might want to reflect that with the continued erosion of GA they will eventually erode their own mandate and another reason for even existing goes with it.
The No1 desirable quality of a regulator is confidence and I don't see how it is fulfilling that. Perhaps Pilot magazine could ask the CAA for an interview?
We've had pages and pages of guff about why a perfectly serviceable aircraft struck the ground, whilst ignoring the less obvious but much more pertinent points that allowed the tragedy to happen in the first place
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Pittsextra
I am interested in the future.
ie What lessons should be learnt from the past? What changes need to be made to further reduce risks in future?
The CAA has neither said nor implied that is "good enough", nor anything even remotely similar.
It has correctly, and entirely reasonably, pointed out that UK air displays have an excellent safety record and in particular that, until Shoreham, no member of the public had been killed as a result of a UK air display for 63 years.
The efficacy of existing procedures/regulations, as they have gradually been developed, cannot sensibly be dismissed as irrelevant. They are the foundation for assessing and evaluating what changes are necessary now.
The CAA immediately and reasonably took steps relating to the aircraft type and other privately operated former military jet aircraft, and identified enhanced risk assessment criteria for future displays. When steps are taken to reduce risks/enhance safety in light of accidents (generally, not just in aviation) it does not necessarily follow that there was anything lacking previously.
I respect the CAA for not going into 'kneejerk reaction' mode.
What do you mean?
Who do you suggest should write any new rules?
The CAA is absolutely right not to say any more at this stage.
That is the most sensible and appropriate course until it is possible to make carefully considered comments following the AAIB's final report and recommendations, and make any carefully considered changes that are then considered necessary.
It is entirely reasonable that the regulator should explore what further improvements to public safety need to be made by reviewing/evaluating current guidance and regulations. The objective is to assess whether it is possible to reduce even further the risks associated with air displays.
Short of banning displays, which would absurd as well as a great pity, the risks can never be reduced to zero. They could be reduced significantly by restricting aircraft to s&l flypasts but that would also be absurd and probably lead indirectly to the demise of airshows.
I have confidence in the CAA as a regulator.
It cannot fairly be accused of under-regulating. Far from it. It could reasonably be criticised for over-regulating the GA sector.
Increased charges are, of course, a separate issue.
See comment by TyroPicard at post 40.
Of course Shoreham has been the catalyst here but its been so dramatic on so many levels that one wonders who and where the accountability lies for the past.
ie What lessons should be learnt from the past? What changes need to be made to further reduce risks in future?
The last question (What level of oversight was being provided before? What metrics were they using to decide if they were doing a good job?) of course could also be asked about the more general point of display regulation. It isn't good enough to simply say "well we hadn't had an accident that killed members of the public since Farnborough" because as we know from all other areas of aviation risk management that this attitude is not acceptable.
It has correctly, and entirely reasonably, pointed out that UK air displays have an excellent safety record and in particular that, until Shoreham, no member of the public had been killed as a result of a UK air display for 63 years.
The efficacy of existing procedures/regulations, as they have gradually been developed, cannot sensibly be dismissed as irrelevant. They are the foundation for assessing and evaluating what changes are necessary now.
The CAA immediately and reasonably took steps relating to the aircraft type and other privately operated former military jet aircraft, and identified enhanced risk assessment criteria for future displays. When steps are taken to reduce risks/enhance safety in light of accidents (generally, not just in aviation) it does not necessarily follow that there was anything lacking previously.
I respect the CAA for not going into 'kneejerk reaction' mode.
Yet we are now expected to allow the very people that crashed the car to now write the new rules, it beggars belief.
Who do you suggest should write any new rules?
and worse not a word from the CAA in terms of explanation.
That is the most sensible and appropriate course until it is possible to make carefully considered comments following the AAIB's final report and recommendations, and make any carefully considered changes that are then considered necessary.
It is entirely reasonable that the regulator should explore what further improvements to public safety need to be made by reviewing/evaluating current guidance and regulations. The objective is to assess whether it is possible to reduce even further the risks associated with air displays.
Short of banning displays, which would absurd as well as a great pity, the risks can never be reduced to zero. They could be reduced significantly by restricting aircraft to s&l flypasts but that would also be absurd and probably lead indirectly to the demise of airshows.
The No1 desirable quality of a regulator is confidence
It cannot fairly be accused of under-regulating. Far from it. It could reasonably be criticised for over-regulating the GA sector.
Increased charges are, of course, a separate issue.
See comment by TyroPicard at post 40.
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I'm not in a position to comment about engineers specifically but I wholeheartedly support the CAA moving further towards a safety management system which gives operators/organisations power to make responsible decisions in order to ensure an acceptable level of safety. That approach includes removing regulations where possible, regulating only where necessary, regulating proportionately and delegating where appropriate. Heavy-handed regulation often amounts to using a sledge-hammer to crack a nut.
Transport Canada was one of the earliest regulators, perhaps the first (1999), to start moving towards a Safety Management System approach, asking individuals, companies and organisations to put systems in place to identify, assess and mitigate risks, and to analyse whether they are meeting their safety goals and continuously improving safety performance. ie To be proactive.
As far as I'm aware, it has not been interpreted as shifting responsibility in a negative sense but widely welcomed and preferred to the previous 'traditional' approach to regulation.
It's possible that attitudes have changed since but my impression is based upon 10 days in Canada (Vancouver, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal) in 2013 discussing flight safety issues and associated regulation with a wide variety of very different types of operators and sizes ranging from small GA to a regional airline and also an airshow organiser, as well as meetings at Transport Canada (with the Director General of Civil Aviation), the Transportation Safety Board (two members of the Board and several senior investigators) and ending with a meeting with the then Secretary General and two heads of relevant departments at ICAO.
The SMS method appears to work. Canada has one of the most successful and safest civil aviation systems in the world.
the CAA have for a long time been shifting the liability off themselves and onto Engineers, that way they can steer clear of any blame or liability, and as for GA, don't get me started.
Transport Canada was one of the earliest regulators, perhaps the first (1999), to start moving towards a Safety Management System approach, asking individuals, companies and organisations to put systems in place to identify, assess and mitigate risks, and to analyse whether they are meeting their safety goals and continuously improving safety performance. ie To be proactive.
As far as I'm aware, it has not been interpreted as shifting responsibility in a negative sense but widely welcomed and preferred to the previous 'traditional' approach to regulation.
It's possible that attitudes have changed since but my impression is based upon 10 days in Canada (Vancouver, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal) in 2013 discussing flight safety issues and associated regulation with a wide variety of very different types of operators and sizes ranging from small GA to a regional airline and also an airshow organiser, as well as meetings at Transport Canada (with the Director General of Civil Aviation), the Transportation Safety Board (two members of the Board and several senior investigators) and ending with a meeting with the then Secretary General and two heads of relevant departments at ICAO.
The SMS method appears to work. Canada has one of the most successful and safest civil aviation systems in the world.
FL,
Having experienced working with a SMS as both mil and civ I agree with you. I'm not sighted as to whether the large display operators run an airline style SMS, but if they don't perhaps they might adopt one. Although very time consuming, a SMS based on SIRAs is a powerful tool for identifying risk, and putting appropriate barriers/mitigations in place. With an SMS endorsed by the CAA perhaps FDDs would have more confidence in hiring aircraft and staging displays?
My concern would be the 'one man bands' who own/operate a single/small operations. A proper SMS requires a number of honest inputs, and the outputs can drive expensive solutions. It might be the final straw for some.....
Having experienced working with a SMS as both mil and civ I agree with you. I'm not sighted as to whether the large display operators run an airline style SMS, but if they don't perhaps they might adopt one. Although very time consuming, a SMS based on SIRAs is a powerful tool for identifying risk, and putting appropriate barriers/mitigations in place. With an SMS endorsed by the CAA perhaps FDDs would have more confidence in hiring aircraft and staging displays?
My concern would be the 'one man bands' who own/operate a single/small operations. A proper SMS requires a number of honest inputs, and the outputs can drive expensive solutions. It might be the final straw for some.....
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FL. Excellent posts, thank you.
However:
Whilst this may be correct, I would also suggest that in many cases it does follow that something was lacking previously. As for this one, I think one could fill a book on with what was going wrong prior to the accident.
S-D
However:
When steps are taken to reduce risks/enhance safety in light of accidents (generally, not just in aviation) it does not necessarily follow that there was anything lacking previously.
S-D
FL - Just to pick up on this first
My post was not a view on the degree of regulation and actually I'd agree with your point. Mine was a viewpoint upon the process.
If we talk CAP403 (update 13) as was in force at the time of the event that caused a review. I'd absolutely agree that it can not be dismissed as irrelevant - it has been the cornerstone of this type of activity for decades.
What data are the CAA using in order to support your comment:
I think there has been a lot of kneejerk going on precisely because they have little real data and that has limited options. They grounded civil Hunters - why? was there a specific issue they were unhappy with beyond it simply happened to be the accident machine? If you extrapolate that to other accidents if a 737 crashes tomorrow will they ground all 737's? They didn't ground AW139's when one crashed in Norfolk, or AW109's because of the London crash.
So when I wrote the comment:
I was thinking of many different elements, including perhaps a walk through of how and what the thinking was behind the decision making.
Never the less in the absence of anything else I suppose grounding civil Hunters and the other actions, regardless of any real effectiveness, did create a "look of doing something" and didn't affect very many people in any event. OK fair enough you can see or work out the why part there.
Lets move on to the:
Really, based upon what? Is there some new science? Is there some new way of thinking - and if there is what was the flaw in the old way of thinking and what led us down that path... etc etc. You can see where this is going.
What I'm saying FL is that everybody including the CAA roll out the line "We must wait for the AAIB final report"....or similar. So on what basis have these "enhanced risk assessment criteria" been formulated? Are they even based upon Shoreham events - well they can't be can they? We don't have a final report and I believe you reacted to that by saying:
Actually there may very well be elements that are apparent from Shoreham already - in fact we know that there are hence the Airworthiness focus.
So the reality is that it is partly influenced by Shoreham but what else? Are you saying that all the other historical data as ignored up until edition 14 of CAP403 and now we have this crash and suddenly things that were not relevant are suddenly front and centre? If that isn't knee jerk I'm not sure what it is.
But again what data is this? Again hence my comment:-
Do they have a lot of airshow/display data? because actually as Shoreham is the catalyst why some of the changes to medical and flying experience given the pilot involved here? I may or may not agree with that change but I'm very surprised that this Shoreham accident was the catalyst for these things and not (as example) the 2007 accident at the same venue.
Lets be honest here you can not seriously expect us to believe that all of these risk assessment elements are some sudden great revelation post Shoreham 2015?
Although that does rather lead us to your very well made point:-
OK so they have suddenly woken up to a bunch of factors they had no idea existed - which almost certainly means there is little data pre-Shoreham and then at some point we get this AAIB FINAL report... What then?!
Imagine we are now end of 2016. We have the final report and it suggests something like "couldn't find anything conclusive mechanically wrong with the jet, pilot remembers nothing, video shows controls were working and all we know is he missed a gate, didn't roll wings level, pulled through and crashed."
Now without getting into a bun fight over that wording what then? What regulation can stop that type of event? Perhaps time on type, perhaps DA's not being issued across all classes (i.e I fly a pitts and have a DA, which means if I fly a Hunter I have a DA for that too.) Changing all of that would be very sensible maybe some guidance/rule/focus on abort points - but are we really saying we were oblivious to all of that before? Now of that can be a surprise can it?
Again what does the data suggest? Did/Do we capture anything?
Of course then we come to an over arching point which is that of finance. What activity was being funded before? It might be reasonable to expect that the money paid to the CAA was being spent in a way that ensured data was being captured, that risk assessments were being made and with some sort of methodology and to Evalu8ter's point that would include the "one man bands"...
FL said: It cannot fairly be accused of under-regulating. Far from it. It could reasonably be criticised for over-regulating the GA sector.
If we talk CAP403 (update 13) as was in force at the time of the event that caused a review. I'd absolutely agree that it can not be dismissed as irrelevant - it has been the cornerstone of this type of activity for decades.
What data are the CAA using in order to support your comment:
Flying Lawyer said: The CAA immediately and reasonably took steps relating to the aircraft type and other privately operated former military jet aircraft, and identified enhanced risk assessment criteria for future displays. When steps are taken to reduce risks/enhance safety in light of accidents (generally, not just in aviation) it does not necessarily follow that there was anything lacking previously.
I respect the CAA for not going into 'kneejerk reaction' mode.
I respect the CAA for not going into 'kneejerk reaction' mode.
So when I wrote the comment:
Pittsextra said: not a word from the CAA in terms of explanation
Never the less in the absence of anything else I suppose grounding civil Hunters and the other actions, regardless of any real effectiveness, did create a "look of doing something" and didn't affect very many people in any event. OK fair enough you can see or work out the why part there.
Lets move on to the:
identified enhanced risk assessment criteria for future displays.
What I'm saying FL is that everybody including the CAA roll out the line "We must wait for the AAIB final report"....or similar. So on what basis have these "enhanced risk assessment criteria" been formulated? Are they even based upon Shoreham events - well they can't be can they? We don't have a final report and I believe you reacted to that by saying:
The CAA is absolutely right not to say any more at this stage.
So the reality is that it is partly influenced by Shoreham but what else? Are you saying that all the other historical data as ignored up until edition 14 of CAP403 and now we have this crash and suddenly things that were not relevant are suddenly front and centre? If that isn't knee jerk I'm not sure what it is.
But again what data is this? Again hence my comment:-
Pittsextra said: not a word from the CAA in terms of explanation
Lets be honest here you can not seriously expect us to believe that all of these risk assessment elements are some sudden great revelation post Shoreham 2015?
Although that does rather lead us to your very well made point:-
the most sensible and appropriate course until it is possible to make carefully considered comments following the AAIB's final report and recommendations, and make any carefully considered changes that are then considered necessary.
It is entirely reasonable that the regulator should explore what further improvements to public safety need to be made by reviewing/evaluating current guidance and regulations. The objective is to assess whether it is possible to reduce even further the risks associated with air displays.
It is entirely reasonable that the regulator should explore what further improvements to public safety need to be made by reviewing/evaluating current guidance and regulations. The objective is to assess whether it is possible to reduce even further the risks associated with air displays.
Imagine we are now end of 2016. We have the final report and it suggests something like "couldn't find anything conclusive mechanically wrong with the jet, pilot remembers nothing, video shows controls were working and all we know is he missed a gate, didn't roll wings level, pulled through and crashed."
Now without getting into a bun fight over that wording what then? What regulation can stop that type of event? Perhaps time on type, perhaps DA's not being issued across all classes (i.e I fly a pitts and have a DA, which means if I fly a Hunter I have a DA for that too.) Changing all of that would be very sensible maybe some guidance/rule/focus on abort points - but are we really saying we were oblivious to all of that before? Now of that can be a surprise can it?
Again what does the data suggest? Did/Do we capture anything?
Of course then we come to an over arching point which is that of finance. What activity was being funded before? It might be reasonable to expect that the money paid to the CAA was being spent in a way that ensured data was being captured, that risk assessments were being made and with some sort of methodology and to Evalu8ter's point that would include the "one man bands"...
There is a fundamental point to make here and that is related to Safety Management. As part of any safety management system, periodic reviews or audits are undertaken to look at specific areas. This principle is embedded in ICAO Annex 19.
3.1 Safety Oversight
The State has established mechanisms to ensure effective monitoring of the eight critical elements of the safety oversight
function. The State has also established mechanisms to ensure that the identification of hazards and the management of safety
risks by service providers follow established regulatory controls (requirements, specific operating regulations and
implementation policies). These mechanisms include inspections, audits and surveys to ensure that regulatory safety risk
controls are appropriately integrated into the service provider’s SMS, that they are being practised as designed, and that the
regulatory controls have the intended effect on safety risks.
My emphasis.
This audit is exactly what ICAO requires, not some knee jerk reaction. The audit could have been undertaken any time in the last 30 years. If it had happened pre-Shoreham, would there be as much noise? The State i.e. the CAA is required to conduct such audits and yes this is probably well overdue but that is not a reason for saying they should not do it.
It is also worth saying that whilst Shoreham was the first fatality of uninvolved third parties, you could say the UK has been very lucky in the last 63 years. Shoreham was not the only accident in the last few years. i.e CarFest Gnat in the very same month as Shoreham.
I cannot understand your opposition to work which is intended to look to improve safety. I can only conclude that it is the increase in fees which is behind your vehement opposition rather than any particular issue with the report. In your comments Pitts, I cannot see any reference that you have read the report or any logical argument or debate about the specific recommendations within it.
I am in no way defending the CAA here but I can see the logic in what they are doing after a tragic 2015.
3.1 Safety Oversight
The State has established mechanisms to ensure effective monitoring of the eight critical elements of the safety oversight
function. The State has also established mechanisms to ensure that the identification of hazards and the management of safety
risks by service providers follow established regulatory controls (requirements, specific operating regulations and
implementation policies). These mechanisms include inspections, audits and surveys to ensure that regulatory safety risk
controls are appropriately integrated into the service provider’s SMS, that they are being practised as designed, and that the
regulatory controls have the intended effect on safety risks.
My emphasis.
This audit is exactly what ICAO requires, not some knee jerk reaction. The audit could have been undertaken any time in the last 30 years. If it had happened pre-Shoreham, would there be as much noise? The State i.e. the CAA is required to conduct such audits and yes this is probably well overdue but that is not a reason for saying they should not do it.
It is also worth saying that whilst Shoreham was the first fatality of uninvolved third parties, you could say the UK has been very lucky in the last 63 years. Shoreham was not the only accident in the last few years. i.e CarFest Gnat in the very same month as Shoreham.
I cannot understand your opposition to work which is intended to look to improve safety. I can only conclude that it is the increase in fees which is behind your vehement opposition rather than any particular issue with the report. In your comments Pitts, I cannot see any reference that you have read the report or any logical argument or debate about the specific recommendations within it.
I am in no way defending the CAA here but I can see the logic in what they are doing after a tragic 2015.
Widger - which report? The airshow review?
I'm not arguing against a review. I'm asking about the process that gets us to this point so that one might see how that fits within the framework and we then might have some greater confidence that its been done in the right way by the right people.
when you say:
Why lucky? It has had these reviews in the last 30 years, which is why CAP403 is onto revision 13 and more detailed CAP403 revision history is available on a page within CAP403.
So what - if anything - has changed in the thinking that will create version 14 to that which created v.12 or 13 etc? You pointed out the Gnat accident but nothing changed at that point. They weren't alive to change then? What about the other incident that is linked to Shoreham - did that have any outcomes? Or maybe there was? I don't know. Do you know? Could you know? What data is captured and by whom and who and when can you learn? Do we only use an AAIB report to learn? We only learn after we get a smoking hole? You don't think there have been 63 years worth of "wow that was fukking close... better not do that again...." And now we are right back to timescales and communication........ that old chestnut.
I'm not arguing against a review. I'm asking about the process that gets us to this point so that one might see how that fits within the framework and we then might have some greater confidence that its been done in the right way by the right people.
when you say:
It is also worth saying that whilst Shoreham was the first fatality of uninvolved third parties, you could say the UK has been very lucky in the last 63 years. Shoreham was not the only accident in the last few years. i.e CarFest Gnat in the very same month as Shoreham.
So what - if anything - has changed in the thinking that will create version 14 to that which created v.12 or 13 etc? You pointed out the Gnat accident but nothing changed at that point. They weren't alive to change then? What about the other incident that is linked to Shoreham - did that have any outcomes? Or maybe there was? I don't know. Do you know? Could you know? What data is captured and by whom and who and when can you learn? Do we only use an AAIB report to learn? We only learn after we get a smoking hole? You don't think there have been 63 years worth of "wow that was fukking close... better not do that again...." And now we are right back to timescales and communication........ that old chestnut.
No it doesn't. It explains the current review process. It neither addresses methodology of assessing risk or change nor (if any) how that relates to the process that got us to v.13 of CAP403. After all none of the items being considered in this review are new. Nothing. So how are these elements considered now? Will each and every change to CAP403 have explanatory notes to the change or outcome??
Then how is its success being monitored on an ongoing basis?
Then how is its success being monitored on an ongoing basis?
I am still struggling to understand what your point is. ICAO requires audits under Annex 19 and this is being conducted. Yes the catalyst was Shoreham but the investigation into that accident investigation is separate. The report is an interim update. It is a wide ranging audit in accordance with ICAO with an independent challenge panel.
I am failing to understand what your beef is. You could argue that the horse has bolted, which would be a valid criticism not not an argument for not carrying out a review or is it the money that is riling you?
I am failing to understand what your beef is. You could argue that the horse has bolted, which would be a valid criticism not not an argument for not carrying out a review or is it the money that is riling you?
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Pittsextra
I'm inclined to agree that grounding Hunters was unnecessary and that the decision may have been influenced by PR considerations. Further, given what has already emerged from the AAIB investigation, perhaps it could now be lifted?
However, I am not party to all the information available to the CAA, nor to CAA decision making.
You did not make that clear. Now that you have, I disagree.
You have not explained what other "many different elements" you had in mind. That is merely an observation, not a request for further information.
I sometimes have difficulty understanding points you are trying to make, not helped by the fact, as others have commented in various threads, that you have a propensity to shift your ground. Like Widger, I am struggling to understand what your beef is here.
No "new science" nor new way of thinking as far as I'm aware.
It is part of the ongoing process of reviewing all spheres of air safety. Given that 11 people died at Shoreham, it would have been surprising, to say the least, if the CAA had not announced a further review of air display safety notwithstanding that one had very recently been completed.
I hope that any further restrictions introduced at the conclusion of the review are not OTT and confined to those which are really necessary.
No, I am not.
If I thought any of those things I would have said so. I don't.
Let's be honest here: I did not say that, nor did I imply it.
I have no control over what you choose to infer from what I say, merely a passing curiosity about why you do and that fades quite quickly.
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I'm inclined to agree that grounding Hunters was unnecessary and that the decision may have been influenced by PR considerations. Further, given what has already emerged from the AAIB investigation, perhaps it could now be lifted?
However, I am not party to all the information available to the CAA, nor to CAA decision making.
So when I wrote "not a word from the CAA in terms of explanation" I was thinking of many different elements, including perhaps a walk through of how and what the thinking was behind the decision making.
You have not explained what other "many different elements" you had in mind. That is merely an observation, not a request for further information.
I sometimes have difficulty understanding points you are trying to make, not helped by the fact, as others have commented in various threads, that you have a propensity to shift your ground. Like Widger, I am struggling to understand what your beef is here.
Is there some new science? Is there some new way of thinking - and if there is what was the flaw in the old way of thinking and what led us down that path... etc etc.
It is part of the ongoing process of reviewing all spheres of air safety. Given that 11 people died at Shoreham, it would have been surprising, to say the least, if the CAA had not announced a further review of air display safety notwithstanding that one had very recently been completed.
I hope that any further restrictions introduced at the conclusion of the review are not OTT and confined to those which are really necessary.
Are you saying that all the other historical data as ignored up until edition 14 of CAP403 and now we have this crash and suddenly things that were not relevant are suddenly front and centre? If that isn't knee jerk I'm not sure what it is.
If I thought any of those things I would have said so. I don't.
Lets be honest here you can not seriously expect us to believe that all of these risk assessment elements are some sudden great revelation post Shoreham 2015?
I have no control over what you choose to infer from what I say, merely a passing curiosity about why you do and that fades quite quickly.
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Last edited by Flying Lawyer; 12th Feb 2016 at 13:46.
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Widger
You could, because luck plays some part however small in most things, but I wouldn't say it.
That impressive statistic has been achieved against a background of the UK having a very large number of airshows. I understand, but cannot confirm, that we have more air displays every year than the whole of the rest of Europe combined.
Accidents sometimes happen. That, in my view, is inevitable although every reasonable measure should be taken to minimise the risk. However, when I was involved in the air display world (warbirds), safety was taken seriously.
eg I was present at a meeting of the Historic Aircraft Association in or about 1984 when the then Chairman, John Allison, proposed adopting a voluntary system for approval and supervision of display pilots. I wasn't persuaded by his arguments at the time, partly because I was strongly opposed to and irritated by one aspect of the proposal, but it was carried by an overwhelming majority. I readily concede that he was right and believe that much of the original voluntary code was later adopted and developed by the CAA.
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you could say the UK has been very lucky in the last 63 years.
That impressive statistic has been achieved against a background of the UK having a very large number of airshows. I understand, but cannot confirm, that we have more air displays every year than the whole of the rest of Europe combined.
Accidents sometimes happen. That, in my view, is inevitable although every reasonable measure should be taken to minimise the risk. However, when I was involved in the air display world (warbirds), safety was taken seriously.
eg I was present at a meeting of the Historic Aircraft Association in or about 1984 when the then Chairman, John Allison, proposed adopting a voluntary system for approval and supervision of display pilots. I wasn't persuaded by his arguments at the time, partly because I was strongly opposed to and irritated by one aspect of the proposal, but it was carried by an overwhelming majority. I readily concede that he was right and believe that much of the original voluntary code was later adopted and developed by the CAA.
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Last edited by Flying Lawyer; 12th Feb 2016 at 13:47.
At the risk of sounding rather cynical, could I suggest that the actions of the CAA hitherto post Shoreham all come straight from the Ladybird book of how to cope with a high profile disaster, 2015/16 edition?
The death of so many members of the public, coupled with the graphic footage of the crash would have put the organisation at "Defcon 1".
It was inconceivable that it could do nothing, even if it genuinely thought that everything was perfect. Grounding the Hunter fleet and announcing a review of airshow safety was a no brainer, and bought them some time. Regardless of how recently a review of airshow safety had been completed, and regardless of its conclusions, another had to happen. Regardless of how thorough the previous review was, does anyone expect the latest review to conclude that everything is OK? Does anyone expect organising an airshow and display flying to be easier after the review?
As for the new fee regime, we should be clear that the one thing it isnt about is the CAA's finances. Airshow and display flying fees will represent a pimple on a pimple in the context of the CAA's overall budget, and the proverbial blind man running for his life can see that recovering a smaller number of larger fees will have little effect on the overall income. The revised fee structure is about sorting out the wheat from the chaff and ensuring that we have a smaller number of larger airshows, where the CAA will have a reasonable chance of discharging its responsibilities in accordance with the increased expectations of the organisation.
In similar cynical vein, why would they be in any rush to lift the ban on the Hunter fleet? When Daily Mail readers have yet to have the benefit of the AAIB report into the accident, why on earth would the CAA draw more attention to itself by effectively saying "we dont yet know what caused the accident, but we are saying it wasnt the aircraft".
All very cynical, but the realpolitik of public life in 2016?
The death of so many members of the public, coupled with the graphic footage of the crash would have put the organisation at "Defcon 1".
It was inconceivable that it could do nothing, even if it genuinely thought that everything was perfect. Grounding the Hunter fleet and announcing a review of airshow safety was a no brainer, and bought them some time. Regardless of how recently a review of airshow safety had been completed, and regardless of its conclusions, another had to happen. Regardless of how thorough the previous review was, does anyone expect the latest review to conclude that everything is OK? Does anyone expect organising an airshow and display flying to be easier after the review?
As for the new fee regime, we should be clear that the one thing it isnt about is the CAA's finances. Airshow and display flying fees will represent a pimple on a pimple in the context of the CAA's overall budget, and the proverbial blind man running for his life can see that recovering a smaller number of larger fees will have little effect on the overall income. The revised fee structure is about sorting out the wheat from the chaff and ensuring that we have a smaller number of larger airshows, where the CAA will have a reasonable chance of discharging its responsibilities in accordance with the increased expectations of the organisation.
In similar cynical vein, why would they be in any rush to lift the ban on the Hunter fleet? When Daily Mail readers have yet to have the benefit of the AAIB report into the accident, why on earth would the CAA draw more attention to itself by effectively saying "we dont yet know what caused the accident, but we are saying it wasnt the aircraft".
All very cynical, but the realpolitik of public life in 2016?