FL - Just to pick up on this first
FL said: It cannot fairly be accused of under-regulating. Far from it. It could reasonably be criticised for over-regulating the GA sector.
My post was not a view on the degree of regulation and actually I'd agree with your point. Mine was a viewpoint upon the process.
If we talk CAP403 (update 13) as was in force at the time of the event that caused a review. I'd absolutely agree that it can not be dismissed as irrelevant - it has been the cornerstone of this type of activity for decades.
What data are the CAA using in order to support your comment:
Flying Lawyer said: The CAA immediately and reasonably took steps relating to the aircraft type and other privately operated former military jet aircraft, and identified enhanced risk assessment criteria for future displays. When steps are taken to reduce risks/enhance safety in light of accidents (generally, not just in aviation) it does not necessarily follow that there was anything lacking previously.
I respect the CAA for not going into 'kneejerk reaction' mode.
I think there has been a lot of kneejerk going on precisely because they have little real data and that has limited options. They grounded civil Hunters - why? was there a specific issue they were unhappy with beyond it simply happened to be the accident machine? If you extrapolate that to other accidents if a 737 crashes tomorrow will they ground all 737's? They didn't ground AW139's when one crashed in Norfolk, or AW109's because of the London crash.
So when I wrote the comment:
Pittsextra said: not a word from the CAA in terms of explanation
I was thinking of many different elements, including perhaps a walk through of how and what the thinking was behind the decision making.
Never the less in the absence of anything else I suppose grounding civil Hunters and the other actions, regardless of any real effectiveness, did create a "look of doing something" and didn't affect very many people in any event. OK fair enough you can see or work out the why part there.
Lets move on to the:
identified enhanced risk assessment criteria for future displays.
Really, based upon what? Is there some new science? Is there some new way of thinking - and if there is what was the flaw in the old way of thinking and what led us down that path... etc etc. You can see where this is going.
What I'm saying FL is that everybody including the CAA roll out the line "We must wait for the AAIB final report"....or similar. So on what basis have these "enhanced risk assessment criteria" been formulated? Are they even based upon Shoreham events - well they can't be can they? We don't have a final report and I believe you reacted to that by saying:
The CAA is absolutely right not to say any more at this stage.
Actually there may very well be elements that are apparent from Shoreham already - in fact we know that there are hence the Airworthiness focus.
So the reality is that it is partly influenced by Shoreham but what else? Are you saying that all the other historical data as ignored up until edition 14 of CAP403 and now we have this crash and suddenly things that were not relevant are suddenly front and centre? If that isn't knee jerk I'm not sure what it is.
But again what data is this? Again hence my comment:-
Pittsextra said: not a word from the CAA in terms of explanation
Do they have a lot of airshow/display data? because actually as Shoreham is the catalyst why some of the changes to medical and flying experience given the pilot involved here? I may or may not agree with that change but I'm very surprised that this Shoreham accident was the catalyst for these things and not (as example) the 2007 accident at the same venue.
Lets be honest here you can not seriously expect us to believe that all of these risk assessment elements are some sudden great revelation post Shoreham 2015?
Although that does rather lead us to your very well made point:-
the most sensible and appropriate course until it is possible to make carefully considered comments following the AAIB's final report and recommendations, and make any carefully considered changes that are then considered necessary.
It is entirely reasonable that the regulator should explore what further improvements to public safety need to be made by reviewing/evaluating current guidance and regulations. The objective is to assess whether it is possible to reduce even further the risks associated with air displays.
OK so they have suddenly woken up to a bunch of factors they had no idea existed - which almost certainly means there is little data pre-Shoreham and then at some point we get this AAIB FINAL report... What then?!
Imagine we are now end of 2016. We have the final report and it suggests something like "couldn't find anything conclusive mechanically wrong with the jet, pilot remembers nothing, video shows controls were working and all we know is he missed a gate, didn't roll wings level, pulled through and crashed."
Now without getting into a bun fight over that wording what then? What regulation can stop that type of event? Perhaps time on type, perhaps DA's not being issued across all classes (i.e I fly a pitts and have a DA, which means if I fly a Hunter I have a DA for that too.) Changing all of that would be very sensible maybe some guidance/rule/focus on abort points - but are we really saying we were oblivious to all of that before? Now of that can be a surprise can it?
Again what does the data suggest? Did/Do we capture anything?
Of course then we come to an over arching point which is that of finance. What activity was being funded before? It might be reasonable to expect that the money paid to the CAA was being spent in a way that ensured data was being captured, that risk assessments were being made and with some sort of methodology and to Evalu8ter's point that would include the "one man bands"...