Voyager Plummets (Merged)
Can I assume we should never fly a Mk1 of any type?
A number of UK airlines received the A330 in the late 1990s early 2000s without any exposure to the type before. Off we went to Florida with very few hours on type but we did have a background on Airbus aircraft , both conventional and FBW.
I mentioned in a previous post the situation whereby a pilot was disconnecting the autopilot by putting pressure on the side stick with his foot. This incident does not seem a lot different except that I am surprised that the FBW protections took longer then I thought to activate. The RAF seemed to have discovered very early on in their operation of an Airbus FBW the problem with having sidesticks that are not linked. It is a major failing in the basic Airbus design. Hopefully it may be addressed in the future.
I think that blaming it as a MK 1 version is incorrect. There are over 1000 330s in operation worldwide and Airbus through their CPIP are always tweaking the design.
I mentioned in a previous post the situation whereby a pilot was disconnecting the autopilot by putting pressure on the side stick with his foot. This incident does not seem a lot different except that I am surprised that the FBW protections took longer then I thought to activate. The RAF seemed to have discovered very early on in their operation of an Airbus FBW the problem with having sidesticks that are not linked. It is a major failing in the basic Airbus design. Hopefully it may be addressed in the future.
I think that blaming it as a MK 1 version is incorrect. There are over 1000 330s in operation worldwide and Airbus through their CPIP are always tweaking the design.
Of course not, but it'd probably have been a good idea to log a few hundred hours and bed down the SOP before introducing randomness like cameras into the mix.
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CASBO - it's in a privilege to be able to share this forum with gifted aviators such as yourself who have spent a whole career with out ever making a single mistake. I doff my cap sir.
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Nor can it be hidden behind when you've misled and deceived in an attempt to cover up a totally avoidable incident of your own creation.
If someone forgot to put their handbrake on and the car didnt move, is that an error?
If the same thing happened but the car rolled down a hill and hit a wall that's the same error, but different result.
If the same thing happened, the car rolled down the hill, and a child was hit by the car, its the same error, but now a tragic result.
So do we look at the error in the same way on all 3 occasions?
Looking at the pictures of the crews searching for the MH370, anyone notice any cameras placed on the side of the lookout window?
Such arrant nonsense concerning Just Culture. Try going to explain to the mother of the child that the twit who left the brake off and killed her child will get the same treatment as the twit who did the same and nothing happened. No we don't treat the twit who committed the error the same in all circumstances
It's not the placement of the camera that is the problem here. It's the ignorance of where it was when the seat was motored forward, the ignorance of AP disconnection when the sidestick was moved (before the major push to full forward limits) the ignorance of control law implementation, the ignorance of sidestick priority handling and the mishandling of the situation by both pilots. Compounded with what, on the face of it, appears to be less than complete frankness in the debrief.
The initial error was not grave, the resultant handling of the aircraft leads to some very serious questions about the level of competency displayed.
It's not the placement of the camera that is the problem here. It's the ignorance of where it was when the seat was motored forward, the ignorance of AP disconnection when the sidestick was moved (before the major push to full forward limits) the ignorance of control law implementation, the ignorance of sidestick priority handling and the mishandling of the situation by both pilots. Compounded with what, on the face of it, appears to be less than complete frankness in the debrief.
The initial error was not grave, the resultant handling of the aircraft leads to some very serious questions about the level of competency displayed.
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The initial error was not grave, the resultant handling of the aircraft leads to some very serious questions about the level of competency displayed.
Before jumping on the outrage bus at this one individual, perhaps if these drills are incorrect, (and I don't know) then learning can occur.
Still, sure all here would have dealt with it perfectly , would have had no loose articles on the flight deck etc etc. perhaps attitudes here are a generational thing.
If you understood Airbus systems, and there is no talk of them not working in this case, the first nudge of the stick would have disconnected the autopilot with accompanying aural warning and a change on the FMA. Apparently these were not noticed. The reason the CM1 could not disconnect the autopilot was because it was already disconnected.
The first action in a suspected sidestick problem is to hand control to the other pilot, who when he takes it presses the sidestick priority button to disable the other sidestick. The "dual control input" call out shows that this was not done.
The aircraft established controlled flight all on its own despite the best efforts of the pilots. They then recovered the flight path setting power and attitude, not wrong in itself, but indicative of them not recognising what the aircraft was doing, despite the aircraft telling them.
Of course this is pure speculation, but the behaviour of the aircraft, as described here, is what would happen in these circumstances if all the systems were functioning.
The first action in a suspected sidestick problem is to hand control to the other pilot, who when he takes it presses the sidestick priority button to disable the other sidestick. The "dual control input" call out shows that this was not done.
The aircraft established controlled flight all on its own despite the best efforts of the pilots. They then recovered the flight path setting power and attitude, not wrong in itself, but indicative of them not recognising what the aircraft was doing, despite the aircraft telling them.
Of course this is pure speculation, but the behaviour of the aircraft, as described here, is what would happen in these circumstances if all the systems were functioning.
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Clearly I do not understand Airbus, but what is the first action when the other pilot is not there?
Apart from removing the camera, there is nothing you can do when operating single pilot. At the moment Airbus do not make aircraft that are designed to be single pilot, the presumption is that 2 crew will be in the cockpit. Of course it is up to the operator what they consider as an acceptable time for one pilot to be alone in the cockpit.
However apart from an incident like this with an external control restriction I find it difficult to imagine anything like this happening. The sidestick has no input when the autopilot is engaged, it is isolated. Mechanically moving the sidestick will disengage the autopilot allowing sidestick inputs. Following disengagement if no movement to the sidestick is made the aircraft maintains it's last attitude (within control law limits.) Although we practice problems with sidestick input in the sim and there are procedures, I don't think they have ever been needed in live operations, although I could be wrong.
However apart from an incident like this with an external control restriction I find it difficult to imagine anything like this happening. The sidestick has no input when the autopilot is engaged, it is isolated. Mechanically moving the sidestick will disengage the autopilot allowing sidestick inputs. Following disengagement if no movement to the sidestick is made the aircraft maintains it's last attitude (within control law limits.) Although we practice problems with sidestick input in the sim and there are procedures, I don't think they have ever been needed in live operations, although I could be wrong.
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The initial error was not grave, the resultant handling of the aircraft leads to some very serious questions about the level of competency displayed.
Fortunately beardey, you are the sort of dinosaur that doesnt fit in a modern safety aware military or any high consequence organization for that matter. The same sorts of attitudes I saw many years ago, when the same dinosaurs thought that CRM stood for "Captains right mate", more willing to sling mud than accept they could, you know, make a genuine mistake.
Lots of assumptions being jumped to here, without all the facts (as per usual), including slurring of individuals who probably feel bad enough as it is. If they broke a reg or an FCOM warning or caution, so be it. A little bit of understanding and "walk a mile in their shoes" wouldn't go amiss.
Of course this is pure speculation, but the behaviour of the aircraft, as described here, is what would happen in these circumstances if all the systems were functioning.
Pure speculation of course, but which numpty laid his digital SLR camera, not a small compact digital camera, next to the Left sidestick?
Not the person in the RH seat is a far point.
Someone mentioned earlier about a camera on the side panel of a RAAF P-3 so others do it, does the P-3 have a sidestick and "fly-by-wire", no.
Bad old habits of "we used to do it on ..... types" do not wash with sidesticks.
Learn from mistakes but lucky this time, could have been much worse.
Not the person in the RH seat is a far point.
Someone mentioned earlier about a camera on the side panel of a RAAF P-3 so others do it, does the P-3 have a sidestick and "fly-by-wire", no.
Bad old habits of "we used to do it on ..... types" do not wash with sidesticks.
Learn from mistakes but lucky this time, could have been much worse.
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Beardy, I would have to agree with Vin Rouge that your outcome focussed approach to Just Culture is never going to improve safety in the slightest. It is exactly such an approach that clamours for the scapegoat when something bad happens and fails to deals with the real causes of an occurrence that will actually stop it happening again.
I'd advise a read of a book called "Whack a Mole" by David Marx.
I'd advise a read of a book called "Whack a Mole" by David Marx.
Well, fodfather, I agree with you, to an extent. Hanging the guilty does not prevent someone else taking the same actions (although it can dissuade), and in the case under discussion here may be inappropriate. I have no idea how the RAF deals with a Just Culture, but, if true that the crew in this case were less than forthcoming in their debrief, is the problem with the RAF interpretation or in the integrity of the crew? Not being privy to the machinations I don't know.
What I am fed up with is the constant repetition of the congenitally bigoted rantings of the Airbus detractors. In this case Airbus and it's philosophy took a battering on this thread until the facts were revealed. The aircraft performed as designed, the control laws prevented an increasing pitch rate and set the thrust to idle (if in doubt just read up the normal law protections.) In the man/machine interface the machine performed as designed and as described in the FCOM and in the simulator profiles. Now is the time to address the training (and assessment criteria) of this operator. Airbus have a vested interest in the safe operation of their aircraft, perhaps that may be a good place to start.
What I am fed up with is the constant repetition of the congenitally bigoted rantings of the Airbus detractors. In this case Airbus and it's philosophy took a battering on this thread until the facts were revealed. The aircraft performed as designed, the control laws prevented an increasing pitch rate and set the thrust to idle (if in doubt just read up the normal law protections.) In the man/machine interface the machine performed as designed and as described in the FCOM and in the simulator profiles. Now is the time to address the training (and assessment criteria) of this operator. Airbus have a vested interest in the safe operation of their aircraft, perhaps that may be a good place to start.
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I've flown with the RAF a number of times and only twice have experienced a mishap, once aboard a Herc landing -at West Freigh [but not where they should have] and once going forwards to visit the cockpit, as invited, only to find it full of sleeping green men [VC10K? returning from Suda Bay via Cairo 
].
Oh and having an unexpected layover in Asi, twice, as Timmy, the useless piece of s**t, left us stranded, AGAIN....
].Oh and having an unexpected layover in Asi, twice, as Timmy, the useless piece of s**t, left us stranded, AGAIN....
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It's against my nature to say anything in support of the RAF, but all the "learn best practise from the airlines" is being taken a bit far.
My experience of Airbus in the airline world is that there is a frankly astonishingly large amount of clutter loafing around the average cockpit, including behind the side sticks. Cups, glasses cases, newspapers, ipads, iphones, cutlery, stray hand baggage, plogs, food trays plus the enormous and ever growing pile of paper that spews incessantly from the acars box.
Sounds like some crappy luck.
My experience of Airbus in the airline world is that there is a frankly astonishingly large amount of clutter loafing around the average cockpit, including behind the side sticks. Cups, glasses cases, newspapers, ipads, iphones, cutlery, stray hand baggage, plogs, food trays plus the enormous and ever growing pile of paper that spews incessantly from the acars box.
Sounds like some crappy luck.
Can't comment on the RAF, but flew the jumpseat in a USAF C-17 out of Ramstein and into Bagram a couple of years ago. It appeared the two pilots were being assessed by a third more senior crewman on the flight deck.
Being plugged into the comms, I heard this more senior fellow instruct a left turn shortly after departure, only for the plane to start banking right. "LEFT turn!!" he shouted. It didn't exactly fill me with confidence, especially in light of where we were heading...
Being plugged into the comms, I heard this more senior fellow instruct a left turn shortly after departure, only for the plane to start banking right. "LEFT turn!!" he shouted. It didn't exactly fill me with confidence, especially in light of where we were heading...
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Albeit it is a rumour network..............
Nicely put Vin Rouge...
Yes Beardy of course you too are correct in that the "Airbus detractors" all jumped up and shouted about its failing while guess what......
Yes...making wise A$$ assumptions and coming to false conclusions using all their apparent expertise making wise A$$ guesses....
You could be making the same mistake, maybe not its true, but without all the facts your accusations, akin I must say to all the current ones in the MH 370 thread, are perhaps a tad too premature and slanderous to the individuals concerned.
Now for example, camera used, placed on the side coaming by the ash tray in the dark, without knowledge of its subsequent movement to an inappropriate position directly behind the side stick, the P1 motors seat forward and situation arises...
While crew deal with the developing situation, the camera, now free falls back and left and into an open Nav Bag on the floor. Once the immediate situation is resolved, on looking around the crew can find no reason for the aircrafts trajectory hence on initial interviews are unable to say they know the cause....
Latterly with CVR and DFDR info available to the board, the movement of the seat etc all tie in and the crew perhaps re questioned?
Now I am not claiming that is what happened, I wasn't there either, but it would mean it were not a wilful act of diss-information as perhaps your posts seem to suggest....
Maybe we let the Board deal with it, I am sure their findings will be just as open....and maybe the immediate flogging and dismissal of the alleged guilty is disproportionate and unwarranted in our "just culture"
Yes Beardy of course you too are correct in that the "Airbus detractors" all jumped up and shouted about its failing while guess what......
Yes...making wise A$$ assumptions and coming to false conclusions using all their apparent expertise making wise A$$ guesses....
You could be making the same mistake, maybe not its true, but without all the facts your accusations, akin I must say to all the current ones in the MH 370 thread, are perhaps a tad too premature and slanderous to the individuals concerned.
Now for example, camera used, placed on the side coaming by the ash tray in the dark, without knowledge of its subsequent movement to an inappropriate position directly behind the side stick, the P1 motors seat forward and situation arises...
While crew deal with the developing situation, the camera, now free falls back and left and into an open Nav Bag on the floor. Once the immediate situation is resolved, on looking around the crew can find no reason for the aircrafts trajectory hence on initial interviews are unable to say they know the cause....
Latterly with CVR and DFDR info available to the board, the movement of the seat etc all tie in and the crew perhaps re questioned?
Now I am not claiming that is what happened, I wasn't there either, but it would mean it were not a wilful act of diss-information as perhaps your posts seem to suggest....
Maybe we let the Board deal with it, I am sure their findings will be just as open....and maybe the immediate flogging and dismissal of the alleged guilty is disproportionate and unwarranted in our "just culture"
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Beardy, I think we are actually in agreement on many things although coming at the discussion from different positions. The constant Airbus bashing at the start of this thread was very annoying when there was not a lot of information available. There seems to be a lot that can be learnt from this incident, both in terms of the occurrence itself and what it might imply about the reporting culture. I hope that the management chain is thinking very carefully about the long term implications of their reaction to this occurrence.