Voyager Plummets (Merged)
Justanopinion, quite so! I can't imagine many people in such a sudden and unexpected situation in the dark of night thinking "You know, I wonder if something might actually be snagging the base of the sidestick" whilst the aircraft is bunting into an unexpected descent.
I imagine there'll be simple mitigations put in place now - such as checking that there's nothing in front of the arm rest when motoring the seat and a ban on anything being placed on the side console. Not necessarily a camera / iToy etc - anything could get caught, such as a flight document.
Time out for a war story - the Luftwaffe exchange officer on my F-4 squadron very nearly ran out of fuel way out over the North Sea once. All because he'd stuffed his flying jacket into the cockpit and nudged the fuel selector to the wrong position. Plenty of fuel, but the engines weren't getting it. Master Caution and FUEL caption, but he at least spotted the selector once he'd shifted his jacket off the panel and recovered the situation - although his frantic turn towards home and call of "Fuuuuuuuuuuelll priority" had us wondering!
I think it was Duncan Simpson who had a control restriction in the early days of testing the HS1182 (prototype Hawk). Whilst inverted. Being such a supremely experienced TP, he calmly remembered "I had this once when I was testing a Sea Fury", took the same recovery action and gingerly brought the aircraft home.
I imagine there'll be simple mitigations put in place now - such as checking that there's nothing in front of the arm rest when motoring the seat and a ban on anything being placed on the side console. Not necessarily a camera / iToy etc - anything could get caught, such as a flight document.
Time out for a war story - the Luftwaffe exchange officer on my F-4 squadron very nearly ran out of fuel way out over the North Sea once. All because he'd stuffed his flying jacket into the cockpit and nudged the fuel selector to the wrong position. Plenty of fuel, but the engines weren't getting it. Master Caution and FUEL caption, but he at least spotted the selector once he'd shifted his jacket off the panel and recovered the situation - although his frantic turn towards home and call of "Fuuuuuuuuuuelll priority" had us wondering!
I think it was Duncan Simpson who had a control restriction in the early days of testing the HS1182 (prototype Hawk). Whilst inverted. Being such a supremely experienced TP, he calmly remembered "I had this once when I was testing a Sea Fury", took the same recovery action and gingerly brought the aircraft home.
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Having reviewed the first few pages of this thread, a hat tip to Steve Tonks for providing the clue as to where our thinking should have gone, and a glass of champers to Silverstrata at post 118, for listing the actual problem (control restriction) together with some possible sources of said restriction.
For the rest of us, responsible for producing multiple pages of speculative tosh, I recommend Thinking Fast, Thinking Slow by Daniel Kahneman. It will tell you exactly why all humans (yes that means you!) are pre-programmed to make bad judgements all of the time.
It's what we do.
For the rest of us, responsible for producing multiple pages of speculative tosh, I recommend Thinking Fast, Thinking Slow by Daniel Kahneman. It will tell you exactly why all humans (yes that means you!) are pre-programmed to make bad judgements all of the time.
It's what we do.
Is there an intrinsic flaw in the side-stick design concept (given what happend to the Air France flight also)? I'm assuming this particular incident wouldn't have been possible with the traditional yoke.
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...Roadster 280...
This was not inadvertent... From what I understand, the operating crew disabled the warnings by virtue of pulling CBs.... Wilfully deviating from operating procedures.
This was not inadvertent... From what I understand, the operating crew disabled the warnings by virtue of pulling CBs.... Wilfully deviating from operating procedures.
Just Culture?
Erm, did the pilot say at any stage
"Oh, I put a camera down there and it turns out it's been damaged, so maybe the camera had something to do with it"
Or did the pilot keep schtum? Because if the pilot did, then that wouldn't be very 'Just.'
Erm, did the pilot say at any stage
"Oh, I put a camera down there and it turns out it's been damaged, so maybe the camera had something to do with it"
Or did the pilot keep schtum? Because if the pilot did, then that wouldn't be very 'Just.'
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Not bad Photoplanet, 24 words and I count 4 factual inaccuracies in your post, could almost be a record
Whilst it was beyond doubt a monumental cock-up, you need to check "your understanding" of the facts. I have tried to find the SI or BOI but to no avail.
Whilst it was beyond doubt a monumental cock-up, you need to check "your understanding" of the facts. I have tried to find the SI or BOI but to no avail.
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TBT
Not the findings but an interesting overview of error management here;
http://www.raes-hfg.com/engineering-...Brailsford.pdf
Not the findings but an interesting overview of error management here;
http://www.raes-hfg.com/engineering-...Brailsford.pdf
I think I can see now, a "unique event". No one would believe it could happen. How could it happen? How do all the other airliners fly without this happening? Answers to Wg Cdr Spry please.....
Hmmnn... The released report is disturbing from many aspects. Seems to me that they were seconds away from losing the aircraft. I estimate they must have reached approx 20 degrees of dive in about 10sec to achieve the 15,000'/min descent quoted within the 27sec event. Thank God the co-pilot was not in the loo, or further "down the back".
No mention of actual G or IAS/Mach ?
OAP
Hmmnn... The released report is disturbing from many aspects. Seems to me that they were seconds away from losing the aircraft. I estimate they must have reached approx 20 degrees of dive in about 10sec to achieve the 15,000'/min descent quoted within the 27sec event. Thank God the co-pilot was not in the loo, or further "down the back".
No mention of actual G or IAS/Mach ?
OAP
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However if this is the case then it is a worrying aspect and to have a grounded fleet for a considerable period when an honest admission early on could have saved a lot of time and money.
Other cases spring to mind...
If it turns out that the captain kept schtum about his camera then Wg Cdr Spry et al would be well-advised to seek an independent assessment of how well-embedded the just culture is. Fact is, it's very easy to write about and promote, but very difficult to apply, and is therefore a prime candidate for 'tick box' implementation (much like another great mantra 'people first').
Meanwhile, even allowing that the captain might not have realised that his camera was to blame, the fact that P2 reportedly returned to a 'disorderly' cockpit does not reflect particularly well on the captain's grasp of the warning system or the AP functionality... especially since he was pretty much the only person strapped in suitably for a negative g excursion and should have been best-placed to recognise indications!
On the light side, at least we can be thankful this didn't happen at the hands of a TP. If it had, they might have followed the Tri* precedent and banned some perfectly usable AP modes! ;-)
Meanwhile, even allowing that the captain might not have realised that his camera was to blame, the fact that P2 reportedly returned to a 'disorderly' cockpit does not reflect particularly well on the captain's grasp of the warning system or the AP functionality... especially since he was pretty much the only person strapped in suitably for a negative g excursion and should have been best-placed to recognise indications!
On the light side, at least we can be thankful this didn't happen at the hands of a TP. If it had, they might have followed the Tri* precedent and banned some perfectly usable AP modes! ;-)