Voyager Plummets (Merged)
Vulcan autopilot 'modes' indeed! It had a single Smiths autopilot with very basic functionality! I never flew it in the AAR role, but when prodding against it with the F-4 it was a nice, stable platform and was much nicer than the Victor to prod against.
The VC10K autopilot system was a little more advanced, but as with the Vulcan, thrust had to be controlled manually (except during Auto ILS).
For AAR, both pilots were required to be properly strapped-in and the flying pilot had control of the control column and throttles. One of the primary responsibilites of the other pilot was to look out on his/her side of the aircraft.
I doubt very much whether Voyager is operated in the AAR role without both pilots being properly strapped in during any close formation work.
OAP, the TriStar couldn't have continued in service for very much longer, given the increasing cost of maintaining such an elderly aeroplane. Moreover, the Mk 17HDUs were very long in the tooth. However, I do think that the aircraft was retired prematurely - I saw one in the distance over Brize at 13:18 today, so I guess that was one of the last flights of the old beast? Even though the cause of the Voyager plummet has been proved to be an unique event and notwithstanding the excellence of the aircraft in the basic air transport role, it still hasn't met its AAR spec., by all accounts.
The VC10K autopilot system was a little more advanced, but as with the Vulcan, thrust had to be controlled manually (except during Auto ILS).
For AAR, both pilots were required to be properly strapped-in and the flying pilot had control of the control column and throttles. One of the primary responsibilites of the other pilot was to look out on his/her side of the aircraft.
I doubt very much whether Voyager is operated in the AAR role without both pilots being properly strapped in during any close formation work.
OAP, the TriStar couldn't have continued in service for very much longer, given the increasing cost of maintaining such an elderly aeroplane. Moreover, the Mk 17HDUs were very long in the tooth. However, I do think that the aircraft was retired prematurely - I saw one in the distance over Brize at 13:18 today, so I guess that was one of the last flights of the old beast? Even though the cause of the Voyager plummet has been proved to be an unique event and notwithstanding the excellence of the aircraft in the basic air transport role, it still hasn't met its AAR spec., by all accounts.
beardy, robust AP modes in suitability and function. Never mind the recent accident, according to some contributors, the Airbus sidestick/autopilot suffers from regular accidental disconnection and confusion about its functionality. Is this correct or not?
OAP
OAP
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Onceapilot
What do you imagine happens when the autopilot is accidentally knocked out by a knee or elbow?
Suddenly the aircraft is flying along in perfect trim....
...and the pilot presses the autopilot button again and all is well...
A motoring chair against an SLR into the stick is one thing but one would assume that during AAR nobody would be moving around.
What do you imagine happens when the autopilot is accidentally knocked out by a knee or elbow?
Suddenly the aircraft is flying along in perfect trim....
...and the pilot presses the autopilot button again and all is well...
A motoring chair against an SLR into the stick is one thing but one would assume that during AAR nobody would be moving around.
No. I have never had an accidental disconnect, so it cannot be a regular occurrence. When it disconnects the aircraft maintains trajectory as commanded by the side stick, if the stick is neutral 1g flight will be maintained.
If there is any confusion about AP mode, it is not the aircrafts fault!
If there is any confusion about AP mode, it is not the aircrafts fault!
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OAP, do you include the VC10 as one of the: 'First class pieces of kit' ?
One of the most common phrases recorded in the aircraft's defect log was: '# 1(2) autopilot random disconnect'.
One of the most common phrases recorded in the aircraft's defect log was: '# 1(2) autopilot random disconnect'.
Failure to engage, I can certainly recall. But 'random disconnects'? Very, very unusual.
The best autopilot snag I ever read was on one of the Crows' F-4s we were flying at the time: Use Autopilot with caution - prone to random uncommanded +4G pitch errors. But I don't think that I ever used the autopilot in my brief times on either the Buccaneer or F-4 though - there was simply no point.
During my brief acquaintance trip on an A330, the instructor disconnected the AP....and absolutely NOTHING changed - the aircraft maintained its trimmed state until I deflected the sidestick. It took about half a minute for me to understand how simple the manoeuvre demand character of the Airbus flight control system made flying the aircraft.
The best autopilot snag I ever read was on one of the Crows' F-4s we were flying at the time: Use Autopilot with caution - prone to random uncommanded +4G pitch errors. But I don't think that I ever used the autopilot in my brief times on either the Buccaneer or F-4 though - there was simply no point.
During my brief acquaintance trip on an A330, the instructor disconnected the AP....and absolutely NOTHING changed - the aircraft maintained its trimmed state until I deflected the sidestick. It took about half a minute for me to understand how simple the manoeuvre demand character of the Airbus flight control system made flying the aircraft.
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BEagle, It is great that you have an opinion on almost everything. A shame that you didn't last a little longer on the F4 and then you would have learnt how to operate some of the more temperamental systems. The F4 autopilot was basic, some may say crude, however, a Godsend on a 8 hour transit flight. Due to lack of any integration or proper testing it's limitations were learnt in Sqn use. It became well known that every time that the Nav selected PD on the radar there would be an AP disconnect. This may be accompanied with an un-commanded pitch-up or pitch-down. I'm sure that 228 OCU QFIs would have taught you all you needed to know!!
The use of the AP just required an understanding of the system and good Crew Coop.
On a previous post, the was no significant difference between AAR on the Victor or Vulcan on the CL. I must admit that I never tanked on the Vulcan wing pods, maybe you did, and have an opinion
The use of the AP just required an understanding of the system and good Crew Coop.
On a previous post, the was no significant difference between AAR on the Victor or Vulcan on the CL. I must admit that I never tanked on the Vulcan wing pods, maybe you did, and have an opinion
F4 Autopilot disconnects.
Dom2, in 15 years on the f4 I must have had no more than a handful of AP disconnects and I can't recall selecting PD causing one, anyway back to the thread...
Dominator2, notwithstanding the typically friendly 228 OCU staff manner of your post 
, my point was that, although I was well aware of the use of the F-4 autopilot, it was that one particular piece of junk which The Crows hadn't managed to fix which was lim'd for that ridiculous snag.
Roly, actually some Vulcans did have wing pods. Not for AAR though - they were the same 'special' ones we inherited for 3 of our K3s in the 2R role....
Which is doubtless yet another capability the RAF no longer has............
, my point was that, although I was well aware of the use of the F-4 autopilot, it was that one particular piece of junk which The Crows hadn't managed to fix which was lim'd for that ridiculous snag.Roly, actually some Vulcans did have wing pods. Not for AAR though - they were the same 'special' ones we inherited for 3 of our K3s in the 2R role....
Which is doubtless yet another capability the RAF no longer has............
I know, Haraka. But it's ADAM shame...
The role was supposed to have been passed on to FSTA, but seems to have been binned. It's a good job the world is so much more stable these days...
The role was supposed to have been passed on to FSTA, but seems to have been binned. It's a good job the world is so much more stable these days...
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Once the PFI was approved there was no way the role would pass to the acquired airframe due to the potential of an airframe write off.
Potential successors to the VC10 role have been studied for many a year. I wouldn't be at all surprised if there are no more 2R globals
, unless you count a live feed into a container.
Potential successors to the VC10 role have been studied for many a year. I wouldn't be at all surprised if there are no more 2R globals
, unless you count a live feed into a container.
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It surprises me that there isn't a requirement to hold the stick constantly in position for a period of time to disconnect the autopilot, not simply for a knock to do it.
It reminds me of a Cessna 182 fatal crash at Leicester, the pilot on take off opened the throttle and his hand accidentally turned the autopilot on which was situated above the throttle, the elevator trim then ran all one way unnoticed during the roll and on lift off it climbed and stalled killing them both.
The autopilot system was later modified to require a press on the power button for a couple of seconds to operate it, additionally they introduced a verbal trim warning that you couldn't miss.
It reminds me of a Cessna 182 fatal crash at Leicester, the pilot on take off opened the throttle and his hand accidentally turned the autopilot on which was situated above the throttle, the elevator trim then ran all one way unnoticed during the roll and on lift off it climbed and stalled killing them both.
The autopilot system was later modified to require a press on the power button for a couple of seconds to operate it, additionally they introduced a verbal trim warning that you couldn't miss.
It surprises me that there isn't a requirement to hold the stick constantly in position for a period of time to disconnect the autopilot, not simply for a knock to do it.
Last edited by beardy; 1st Apr 2014 at 01:34.
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While most autopilots will disconnect if bashed or tugged, it's not a recommended technique on any aircraft I've come across... and most certainly not on any fbw Airbus since it risks an immediate and unwanted control input. Even if the system had required sustained pressure, what difference would this have made other than delaying the accident by a few seconds?
Why is there so much discussion of the autopilot and it's disconnect system when neither was in the slightest respect at fault in this event? Is it perhaps more comfortable ground for some than discussing the human factors involved?
Why is there so much discussion of the autopilot and it's disconnect system when neither was in the slightest respect at fault in this event? Is it perhaps more comfortable ground for some than discussing the human factors involved?
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Beardy, I understand that, I am saying I am surprised it does not require a pressure of say a couple of seconds or less to disengage it, having a system that can disconnect the system at the slightest stick movement seems a bit flawed, that's all. One's not talking of holding it over one way for an inordinate amount of time.
