Voyager Plummets (Merged)
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
To add, if all PAS carried the rank for the pay rate it would be chaos with wg cdr exec indistinguishable from wc cdr aircrew. Or even gp capt if you follow the airline style.
Some posters seem to be moving away from the OP to a more general consideration of Just Culture. Fair enough, until it is used as a stick to beat those questioning the severity of the sentence of this CM. No-one to my knowledge is suggesting that there be no punishment at all, least of all the defendant who, in pleading guilty to negligently carrying out his duty, implied that he expected to be punished.
In particular we have atg's responses to posts from both myself and from safetypee (whose #884 merely quoted from, and linked to, a piece published by Humanastic Systems) at:-
https://humanisticsystems.com/2017/0...in-la-la-land/
re retributive and restorative justice. Now I know that it includes a lot of big words, but can we be a little more grown up and argue the pros and cons of scapegoating versus safety systems? Scapegoating has always been the preferred option of the RAF High Command since its VSOs set out to Subvert, Suborn, and in turn Cover-Up, in their attack on UK Military Air Safety, as described above by tucumseh.
Of course, atg has told us how much he admires RAF VSOs. Perhaps it was while mingling among them that he picked up such classic retorts as:-
and
UK Military Air Safety has been rendered dysfunctional by the illegal orders, actions, and cover up by RAF VSOs. It must be removed from such malevolent influence by taking the Regulator (MAA) and Accident Investigator (MilAAIB, or whatever it's called this week) outwith the MOD and then be made independent of each other.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation it Kills!
In particular we have atg's responses to posts from both myself and from safetypee (whose #884 merely quoted from, and linked to, a piece published by Humanastic Systems) at:-
https://humanisticsystems.com/2017/0...in-la-la-land/
re retributive and restorative justice. Now I know that it includes a lot of big words, but can we be a little more grown up and argue the pros and cons of scapegoating versus safety systems? Scapegoating has always been the preferred option of the RAF High Command since its VSOs set out to Subvert, Suborn, and in turn Cover-Up, in their attack on UK Military Air Safety, as described above by tucumseh.
Of course, atg has told us how much he admires RAF VSOs. Perhaps it was while mingling among them that he picked up such classic retorts as:-
oh what bollocks, frankly.
What chutney, sounds like you want a no-blame system, not a Just Culture.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation it Kills!
Chug, agreed. Self regulation/self policing (clue in the term!) is intrinsically unsafe.Subversion from above or as dangerous, the appearance of subversion quickly destroys confidence.
Chugalug2, #904. The objective of my quotes and questions in #884 was to seek debate.
Very few issues in life are absolute; your views appear somewhat extreme, although I would agree with the sentiments and direction of the argument.
An alternative position is that Just Culture is an unobtainable academic concept; a top down view of human activity to achieve unvalidated objectives. The idea that self reporting will provide insight to human behaviour is flawed (IMHO), although other activities may have value - Creating a learning culture, Designing safe systems, Managing behavioural choice. (Ref *) Note "knowing that systems / human will never be perfect" slides 11/12.
Subsequent slides are equally important - 'JC is about' (20-22): Understanding risk and risk management, Changing managerial expectations.
The span of the JC issue ranges retributive to restorative, the key point is where an organisation's culture is positioned, remembering no absolutes.
Military views will by nature tend to retributive; a more focussed discipline in training, yet enabling (encouraging) variability and adjustment as required by the situation (e.g. war), thus there is greater focus on teaching / acquiring / reinforcing skills of judgement - but where 'punishment' might be used as reinforcement agent. Is this event one of learning or punishment?
The CM relating to this incident reflects a retributive culture. The thread discussion relates to the degree of punishment, which appears biased by hindsight, severity-outcome bias, and considering the resultant vice the behaviour. This judgment depends on who and when it is made - "who draws the line" (S. Dekker).
There is no objection to outlining problems - 'what's wrong', but not who as that might curtail restorative activity. The really important issue is how we might improve - safety, attitudes, behaviour.
I don't have a solution, but I am prepared to consider alternatives, new views of error, the human as an asset, work as actually done.
Is military management (RAF) sufficiently flexible or willing to consider alternatives, have they forgotten the caveats of military training re adjustment vs discipline (new views), is man management seen as the control of a hazard or managing valuable assets, are they close enough to the front line (work as done).
The learning value in this incident is that a small margin in judgement can have serious unforeseen consequences, either in the air or in managing policy relating to punishment.
Ref * https://www.unmc.edu/patient-safety/...st-culture.pdf
Very few issues in life are absolute; your views appear somewhat extreme, although I would agree with the sentiments and direction of the argument.
An alternative position is that Just Culture is an unobtainable academic concept; a top down view of human activity to achieve unvalidated objectives. The idea that self reporting will provide insight to human behaviour is flawed (IMHO), although other activities may have value - Creating a learning culture, Designing safe systems, Managing behavioural choice. (Ref *) Note "knowing that systems / human will never be perfect" slides 11/12.
Subsequent slides are equally important - 'JC is about' (20-22): Understanding risk and risk management, Changing managerial expectations.
The span of the JC issue ranges retributive to restorative, the key point is where an organisation's culture is positioned, remembering no absolutes.
Military views will by nature tend to retributive; a more focussed discipline in training, yet enabling (encouraging) variability and adjustment as required by the situation (e.g. war), thus there is greater focus on teaching / acquiring / reinforcing skills of judgement - but where 'punishment' might be used as reinforcement agent. Is this event one of learning or punishment?
The CM relating to this incident reflects a retributive culture. The thread discussion relates to the degree of punishment, which appears biased by hindsight, severity-outcome bias, and considering the resultant vice the behaviour. This judgment depends on who and when it is made - "who draws the line" (S. Dekker).
There is no objection to outlining problems - 'what's wrong', but not who as that might curtail restorative activity. The really important issue is how we might improve - safety, attitudes, behaviour.
I don't have a solution, but I am prepared to consider alternatives, new views of error, the human as an asset, work as actually done.
Is military management (RAF) sufficiently flexible or willing to consider alternatives, have they forgotten the caveats of military training re adjustment vs discipline (new views), is man management seen as the control of a hazard or managing valuable assets, are they close enough to the front line (work as done).
The learning value in this incident is that a small margin in judgement can have serious unforeseen consequences, either in the air or in managing policy relating to punishment.
Ref * https://www.unmc.edu/patient-safety/...st-culture.pdf
CGB:-
Indeed, and the CAA got criticised for it by the AAIB report! When was the last SI that openly criticised the Military Regulator? Any system can, and eventually will, fail. Of course! All the more reason to make it as robust as possible therefore. Making Operator, Regulator, and Investigator one and the same is a dead cert for failure. In the case of UK Military Aviation to the tune of 70 deaths catalogued in this forum, let alone the billions squandered, all in wholly avoidable airworthiness related accidents.
For national security purposes let alone the sheer needless waste, we must do better and make the reform of UK Military Air Safety our top priority.
Looking at the Shoreham report, it would appear that external regulation also has the ability to fail.
For national security purposes let alone the sheer needless waste, we must do better and make the reform of UK Military Air Safety our top priority.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 8th Mar 2017 at 12:13.
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Perhaps I can provide a little input to the ongoing discussion over SI reports and the MAAIB.
I absolutely agree that the aircraft accident investigators have to be independent of those carrying out Service Inquiries. In the past (in one service) they were, to a degree. The RN's arrangements for Boards of Inquiry into accidents ran something like this:
1. FONAC (FAA's two star) would direct that a Board be convened, normally within 24 hours of an accident. Board members would be drawn from units and stations not involved with the accident.
2. President of Board decided whether an investigation was required, and if so (almost always) the RN's Accident Investigation Unit (AIU) would be requested to carry out said investigation. Usually within hours of FONAC order.
3. Board of Inquiry suspended.
4. AIU carried out investigation, prepared report, submitted report to Board of Inquiry.
5. Board reconvened, carried out Inquiry using AIU report and calling witnesses as required. Report of the Board, submitted to FONAC, referenced the AIU report.
The thing to note was that the AIU reported to a two star post in MOD(RN), not to FONAC. Also note that their report was compiled independently, and always sat separately to the Board's eventual report.
Also note that Haddon-Cave explicitly praised the RN's system for accident investigation, and recommended it as a template for use across military aviation. Downstream staff work and plain skulduggery ended up creating the MAAIB as an integral part of the MAA, and resulted in the almost unreadable SI reports we see these days.
I'll say here that I don't for one moment claim that the RN system was perfect. But, the independence of the AIU within the setup was well understood and respected across the FAA, as was the expertise within the AIU. It's no surprise that the main horsepower of the MAAIB came from the AIU. (It's also no surprise that the new MAAIB required a full Colonel in charge, against the Lt Cdr who very effectively headed up the RNAIU).
The current 'fix' whereby the MAAIB answers to the three star head of the DSA is better than it being part of the MAA, but not much, as it still locates the MAAIB within the organisation that 'owns' the MAA. This inhibits it from presenting criticism of the MAA. Also, incorporating MAAIB activities within the SI process compromises their independence.
My suggestion - remove the MiAAIB from the DSA, establish it as a separate agency reporting direct to SoS for Defence. SIs call on it as required, and MAAIB reports are prepared and published as separate documents.
Best Regards as ever to all those accident investigators making the system work as best they can,
Engines
I absolutely agree that the aircraft accident investigators have to be independent of those carrying out Service Inquiries. In the past (in one service) they were, to a degree. The RN's arrangements for Boards of Inquiry into accidents ran something like this:
1. FONAC (FAA's two star) would direct that a Board be convened, normally within 24 hours of an accident. Board members would be drawn from units and stations not involved with the accident.
2. President of Board decided whether an investigation was required, and if so (almost always) the RN's Accident Investigation Unit (AIU) would be requested to carry out said investigation. Usually within hours of FONAC order.
3. Board of Inquiry suspended.
4. AIU carried out investigation, prepared report, submitted report to Board of Inquiry.
5. Board reconvened, carried out Inquiry using AIU report and calling witnesses as required. Report of the Board, submitted to FONAC, referenced the AIU report.
The thing to note was that the AIU reported to a two star post in MOD(RN), not to FONAC. Also note that their report was compiled independently, and always sat separately to the Board's eventual report.
Also note that Haddon-Cave explicitly praised the RN's system for accident investigation, and recommended it as a template for use across military aviation. Downstream staff work and plain skulduggery ended up creating the MAAIB as an integral part of the MAA, and resulted in the almost unreadable SI reports we see these days.
I'll say here that I don't for one moment claim that the RN system was perfect. But, the independence of the AIU within the setup was well understood and respected across the FAA, as was the expertise within the AIU. It's no surprise that the main horsepower of the MAAIB came from the AIU. (It's also no surprise that the new MAAIB required a full Colonel in charge, against the Lt Cdr who very effectively headed up the RNAIU).
The current 'fix' whereby the MAAIB answers to the three star head of the DSA is better than it being part of the MAA, but not much, as it still locates the MAAIB within the organisation that 'owns' the MAA. This inhibits it from presenting criticism of the MAA. Also, incorporating MAAIB activities within the SI process compromises their independence.
My suggestion - remove the MiAAIB from the DSA, establish it as a separate agency reporting direct to SoS for Defence. SIs call on it as required, and MAAIB reports are prepared and published as separate documents.
Best Regards as ever to all those accident investigators making the system work as best they can,
Engines
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Engines, admirable as it was, no matter how many or separate organisations are involved, they are all within the CoC. You can never guarantee that the members of an SI will be 100% impartial.
I can understand why an SI should be in-house for technical or professional reason.
I can understand why an SI should be in-house for technical or professional reason.
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Pontius, thanks for coming back.
Correct, I did say that I wasn't claiming that the RN system was perfect. The point I was trying to make (badly) was that a technical accident investigation report should, in my view, be carried out separately from the SI.
For one thing, it would make the accident investigation report far easier to read and digest. It would also stop the SI staff 'editing' the accident inquiry report. Most importantly, it would allow the accident investigators to raise any issues concerning the regulatory authority.
I know for a fact that immediately after the RNAIU was folded into the MAA, its staff were being tasked by DGMAA to carry out 'investigations' into alleged issues at various stations where no accidents had actually taken place. The Colonel placed in charge of the MAAIB did as he was told by the DGMAA, and it was left to the RN investigators to point out the effect being used as 'MAA police' would have on their ability to carry out future investigations in an open manner.
The important thing (in my view) is for accident investigators to be effectively and publicly separated out from any aspect of apportionment of blame. The RNAIU was well respected about the FAA for its expertise and fiercely preserved its independence. As a result, people always felt able to speak to it without let or hindrance. I sincerely hope that the MAAIB can hold that reputation.
Best regards as ever to all those seeking the truth out there
Engines
Correct, I did say that I wasn't claiming that the RN system was perfect. The point I was trying to make (badly) was that a technical accident investigation report should, in my view, be carried out separately from the SI.
For one thing, it would make the accident investigation report far easier to read and digest. It would also stop the SI staff 'editing' the accident inquiry report. Most importantly, it would allow the accident investigators to raise any issues concerning the regulatory authority.
I know for a fact that immediately after the RNAIU was folded into the MAA, its staff were being tasked by DGMAA to carry out 'investigations' into alleged issues at various stations where no accidents had actually taken place. The Colonel placed in charge of the MAAIB did as he was told by the DGMAA, and it was left to the RN investigators to point out the effect being used as 'MAA police' would have on their ability to carry out future investigations in an open manner.
The important thing (in my view) is for accident investigators to be effectively and publicly separated out from any aspect of apportionment of blame. The RNAIU was well respected about the FAA for its expertise and fiercely preserved its independence. As a result, people always felt able to speak to it without let or hindrance. I sincerely hope that the MAAIB can hold that reputation.
Best regards as ever to all those seeking the truth out there
Engines
From today's Witney Gazette:
Astonishing. How can someone in such an authoritative position be so apparently ignorant of the normal behaviour of any normal person who uses a digital camera?
MoD pays over £1M per day for their leased PFI nonsense, no matter whether the aircraft fly or not....
Military justice is clearly an oxymoron!
Judge Advocate Alan Large said the board ruled Townshend had deliberately deleted photographs from his camera because he feared they would make him look unprofessional, although he said there was no ban on using a camera in the cockpit.
He said "This was not a momentary lapse of concentration. Your eye was well off the ball."
He said "This was not a momentary lapse of concentration. Your eye was well off the ball."
Judge Large also said the MoD was subject to a £14M contract to AirTanker for the aircraft they could not use for this (13 day grounding) period.
Military justice is clearly an oxymoron!
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Judge Large also said the MoD was subject to a £14M contract to AirTanker for the aircraft they could not use for this (13 day grounding) period.
MoD pays over £1M per day for their leased PFI nonsense, no matter whether the aircraft fly or not....
Well, that's what I was briefed by a Gp Capt at RAF Brize Norton during an official GAPAN (as it was) visit to the station a few years ago....
Perhaps he was wrong? But that's what he told us.
Perhaps he was wrong? But that's what he told us.
I am surprised that the CM attached such weight to the deletion of photographs - a rather common and routine practice. Having seen the poor quality and blurry mess of the images taken they are not pictures you would normally keep.
If the pilot wanted to impede the investigation he could have thrown the memory card and camera away. As I understand it he handed everything over when asked to do so and readily admitted to use of the camera on many sorties.
Still, if he feels that the sentence is overly harsh he can appeal, so the next move his to make.
If the pilot wanted to impede the investigation he could have thrown the memory card and camera away. As I understand it he handed everything over when asked to do so and readily admitted to use of the camera on many sorties.
Still, if he feels that the sentence is overly harsh he can appeal, so the next move his to make.
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I'm not sure that's true.
The point about grounding cost should consider who and when the decision was taken, and what was the timing w.r.t. the progress of the investigation. When was it established that a camera could have contributed?
Even though the Voyager differs from the A330, are these differences significant regarding the control system.
Did MOD discuss the investigation and proposed grounding with the national authority or manufacture; noting that many more civil aircraft had been flying for a significant time and continued to do so.
I.e. What proportion of the responsibility for grounding should be borne by the organisation / their safety process.
Grounding / not to ground is a catch 22 for them, but having played safe you should not blame someone else to cover the cost.
Even though the Voyager differs from the A330, are these differences significant regarding the control system.
Did MOD discuss the investigation and proposed grounding with the national authority or manufacture; noting that many more civil aircraft had been flying for a significant time and continued to do so.
I.e. What proportion of the responsibility for grounding should be borne by the organisation / their safety process.
Grounding / not to ground is a catch 22 for them, but having played safe you should not blame someone else to cover the cost.
With the changes to the baseline aircraft and the issues some of these had caused the pause in flying was probably not unreasonable. Bringing in the costs incurred is new ground, especially with respect to a punitive contract arrangement agreed by MOD.
This cost precedent has got quite a few of us scratching our heads. It is not uncommon for this to be raised in civil proceedings but it is the first case I can recall where costs incurred to military aviation by a military pilot have been considered in court as part of a criminal sentence for negligence.
Legal precedence is a remarkable thing. Previous to this event we did not raise it when a Jaguar pilot ejected from his aircraft after driving it through trees, or the Jaguar pilot who shut down his only serviceable engine, or the Phantom crew who ejected over the Med from their departed but otherwise serviceable aircraft, or the Tornado pilot who didn't complete his after T/O checks and then departed his aircraft at low level on his first hard manoeuvre, or the Tucano display pilot who failed to meet his gate parameters, or the Tornado crew who accidentally drifted into their leader during a boring tanker trail, or the Hawk pilot who mismanaged his practice turn-back and crashed an otherwise service aircraft, or the Hercules crew that landed gear-up at Brize, or the Typhoon pilot at China lake, or the Hawk gear-up pilot at Cranwell, or the Harrier pilot grabbing the nozzle leaver and dropping his aircraft into the sea and the list goes on....
Aviation is an unforgiving environment when mistakes are made and sadly many pay the ultimate price even when aircraft have escape systems. But we recognise that people make mistakes with consequences that can cause death, injury and the loss of multi-£M aircraft.
Until now that is.
A new legal threshold has been set by a pilot-induced control restriction that caused an uncontrolled decent, numerous injuries and a financial cost to the MOD. It will be interesting to see what happens to the next serviceman who crashes an otherwise serviceable aircraft.
Everyone must respond to this and lawyer-up as soon as possible after any incident or accident. You must protect yourself to the fullest extent possible under the law. Do not use ASIMS, DASORs or even the aircraft F700 to postulate what you thought had happened. They can and will be used against you in a court of law.
This cost precedent has got quite a few of us scratching our heads. It is not uncommon for this to be raised in civil proceedings but it is the first case I can recall where costs incurred to military aviation by a military pilot have been considered in court as part of a criminal sentence for negligence.
Legal precedence is a remarkable thing. Previous to this event we did not raise it when a Jaguar pilot ejected from his aircraft after driving it through trees, or the Jaguar pilot who shut down his only serviceable engine, or the Phantom crew who ejected over the Med from their departed but otherwise serviceable aircraft, or the Tornado pilot who didn't complete his after T/O checks and then departed his aircraft at low level on his first hard manoeuvre, or the Tucano display pilot who failed to meet his gate parameters, or the Tornado crew who accidentally drifted into their leader during a boring tanker trail, or the Hawk pilot who mismanaged his practice turn-back and crashed an otherwise service aircraft, or the Hercules crew that landed gear-up at Brize, or the Typhoon pilot at China lake, or the Hawk gear-up pilot at Cranwell, or the Harrier pilot grabbing the nozzle leaver and dropping his aircraft into the sea and the list goes on....
Aviation is an unforgiving environment when mistakes are made and sadly many pay the ultimate price even when aircraft have escape systems. But we recognise that people make mistakes with consequences that can cause death, injury and the loss of multi-£M aircraft.
Until now that is.
A new legal threshold has been set by a pilot-induced control restriction that caused an uncontrolled decent, numerous injuries and a financial cost to the MOD. It will be interesting to see what happens to the next serviceman who crashes an otherwise serviceable aircraft.
Everyone must respond to this and lawyer-up as soon as possible after any incident or accident. You must protect yourself to the fullest extent possible under the law. Do not use ASIMS, DASORs or even the aircraft F700 to postulate what you thought had happened. They can and will be used against you in a court of law.
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Some of the costings and prosecutions statements have been questioned around the bazaars. The cost of the damage to the aircraft appears to have been taken by Airtanker and not the MOD. Also the status of the Co Pilot not resuming flying duties yet is a topic of conversation.... as he flew several of the guys in my office last month.... as captain.
Last edited by thegndeng; 9th Mar 2017 at 21:24.
Some very good posts above. To quote from but a couple,
JTO:-
You show us a glimpse of the possible unforeseen consequences of this vindictive sentence. That technical feedback should be withheld for fear of punishment is the very antithesis of Flight Safety and is unacceptable. That it could be an unforeseen result of the attack on UK Military Air Safety 30 years ago illustrates the ongoing effects of those illegal acts.
and:-
I'm not! That emphasis will be put out time and time again in explanation of the severity of the sentence, despite the Not Guilty verdicts of Perjury and Lying. Mud sticks! We are still told that the Mull pilots should have climbed to MSA once they entered IMC. What isn't mentioned is the +4C icing limit they were not allowed to breach and which was well below MSA, or the various SFIs about UFCMs or FADEC failures, or of the illegal RTS that did not even allow of engine starts let alone flights, or that the aircraft was Grossly Unairworthy anyway! One wonders what we haven't been told about in this case. The words Leopards and spots come to mind...
Engines, excellent posts as always! We all seek the same outcome, a fully functional system of UK Military Air Safety. How to get there? You remind us rightly and proudly of the RN AIU. I could just as proudly mention the RAF IFS that produced the ARTS series, which if acted upon could have saved lives, money, and rendered the RAF more effective than it now is. They were buried instead. Both the RNAIU and the IFS were centres of excellence, based upon dedication, expertise and personal integrity. Was it possibly the lack of that latter quality that so characterised parts of the RAF High Command three decades ago? If so, I would respectfully suggest that those who now fulfil that role should ponder upon the conflict of loyalty to those who produced this mess and those they owe a duty of care to, ie the present Royal Air Force.
Which brings us to safetypee. Your posts strike me as being somewhat cerebral if I may say so. The thread discussion is less concerned about the pros and cons of a retributive versus a restorative culture, but rather about the apparent RAF default to the former. In that regard we have the Mull Review Finding of Gross Negligence against the deceased pilots, the SO (ie 1* and below) scapegoats named in the Nimrod Report, and now this CM sentence. All of which serves to obscure the damage to Military Air Safety by certain VSOs.
If I seem extreme in my views to you it is because those JOs and SOs are punished while retired VSOs are protected by others whose duty should be rather to the present Royal Air Force instead.
JTO:-
Do not use ASIMS, DASORs or even the aircraft F700 to postulate what you thought had happened. They can and will be used against you in a court of law.
and:-
I am surprised that the CM attached such weight to the deletion of photographs
Engines, excellent posts as always! We all seek the same outcome, a fully functional system of UK Military Air Safety. How to get there? You remind us rightly and proudly of the RN AIU. I could just as proudly mention the RAF IFS that produced the ARTS series, which if acted upon could have saved lives, money, and rendered the RAF more effective than it now is. They were buried instead. Both the RNAIU and the IFS were centres of excellence, based upon dedication, expertise and personal integrity. Was it possibly the lack of that latter quality that so characterised parts of the RAF High Command three decades ago? If so, I would respectfully suggest that those who now fulfil that role should ponder upon the conflict of loyalty to those who produced this mess and those they owe a duty of care to, ie the present Royal Air Force.
Which brings us to safetypee. Your posts strike me as being somewhat cerebral if I may say so. The thread discussion is less concerned about the pros and cons of a retributive versus a restorative culture, but rather about the apparent RAF default to the former. In that regard we have the Mull Review Finding of Gross Negligence against the deceased pilots, the SO (ie 1* and below) scapegoats named in the Nimrod Report, and now this CM sentence. All of which serves to obscure the damage to Military Air Safety by certain VSOs.
If I seem extreme in my views to you it is because those JOs and SOs are punished while retired VSOs are protected by others whose duty should be rather to the present Royal Air Force instead.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 9th Mar 2017 at 20:42.
"and now this CM sentence" Don't know the guy, never a transport pilot Service or civilian, but unless I am missing something are you suggesting a sanction-free outcome for the captain. - leaves me floundering.
Wander00, certainly not. As I've said before he pleaded guilty to negligently carrying out his duty, so clearly expected to be punished. The sentence though seems excessive to me; a dishonourable discharge, and a criminal record (for the suspended prison sentence). Given that he was found not guilty of Perjury and Lying, it seems that he hadn't deceived but had simply made a mistake. A bad one admittedly but as JTO asks, since when was the financial consequence of such a mistake reflected in the severity of the sentence? Since 2017 it would seem.