Some very good posts above. To quote from but a couple,
JTO:-
Do not use ASIMS, DASORs or even the aircraft F700 to postulate what you thought had happened. They can and will be used against you in a court of law.
You show us a glimpse of the possible unforeseen consequences of this vindictive sentence. That technical feedback should be withheld for fear of punishment is the very antithesis of Flight Safety and is unacceptable. That it could be an unforeseen result of the attack on UK Military Air Safety 30 years ago illustrates the ongoing effects of those illegal acts.
and:-
I am surprised that the CM attached such weight to the deletion of photographs
I'm not! That emphasis will be put out time and time again in explanation of the severity of the sentence, despite the Not Guilty verdicts of Perjury and Lying. Mud sticks! We are still told that the Mull pilots should have climbed to MSA once they entered IMC. What isn't mentioned is the +4C icing limit they were not allowed to breach and which was well below MSA, or the various SFIs about UFCMs or FADEC failures, or of the illegal RTS that did not even allow of engine starts let alone flights, or that the aircraft was Grossly Unairworthy anyway! One wonders what we haven't been told about in this case. The words Leopards and spots come to mind...
Engines, excellent posts as always! We all seek the same outcome, a fully functional system of UK Military Air Safety. How to get there? You remind us rightly and proudly of the RN AIU. I could just as proudly mention the RAF IFS that produced the ARTS series, which if acted upon could have saved lives, money, and rendered the RAF more effective than it now is. They were buried instead. Both the RNAIU and the IFS were centres of excellence, based upon dedication, expertise and personal integrity. Was it possibly the lack of that latter quality that so characterised parts of the RAF High Command three decades ago? If so, I would respectfully suggest that those who now fulfil that role should ponder upon the conflict of loyalty to those who produced this mess and those they owe a duty of care to, ie the present Royal Air Force.
Which brings us to safetypee. Your posts strike me as being somewhat cerebral if I may say so. The thread discussion is less concerned about the pros and cons of a retributive versus a restorative culture, but rather about the apparent RAF default to the former. In that regard we have the Mull Review Finding of Gross Negligence against the deceased pilots, the SO (ie 1* and below) scapegoats named in the Nimrod Report, and now this CM sentence. All of which serves to obscure the damage to Military Air Safety by certain VSOs.
If I seem extreme in my views to you it is because those JOs and SOs are punished while retired VSOs are protected by others whose duty should be rather to the present Royal Air Force instead.